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A B S T R A C T
A naturalistic account of mental content is presented, aimed at solving
the problems with content indeterminacy that afflict other similar efforts
-notably, teleosemantics. Along the way, the sketch of a naturalistic
account of compositionality in thought is also provided.
This account of content developed in the first part is then used to
provide the foundations for a naturalistic modal epistemology.
R E S U M E N
Se presenta una teoría naturalista acerca del contenido mental que
pretende resolver los problemas de indeterminación del contenido a los
que se enfrentan otras teorías similares, la teleosemántica entre ellas.
Como parte de esta presentación, se ofrece el esbozo de una teoría
naturalista acerca de la composicionalidad del pensamiento.
La teoría acerca del contenido desarrollada en la primera parte se
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P R E FA C E
The initial goal of this dissertation was to make a contribution to
the naturalisation of modal epistemology. I had the idea of using a
broadly teleosemantic notion of concept to explain that our concevings
are reliably connected with the modal realm: concepts arise out of
our causal interaction with worldly entities, and it might well be that
those interactions allow them to encode some modal properties of
these entities. This encoding would underpin the reliability of our
conceivings.
In the actual course of my research, though, I have found issues that
have compelled me to linger in the discussion of the (at first, supposed
to be merely introductory) remarks on naturalistic accounts of content.
So much so, that the actual dissertation I am submitting is mostly, in its
longer first part, a presentation of such an account of mental content;
while the discussion of modal contents and modal epistemology has
ended up as an application and extension of this account, in the shorter
second part.
In particular, I was dissatisfied with several features of the best
worked-out naturalistic theories of content -and, among them, Mil-
likan’s biosemantics, which I take to be the best of all. First and fore-
most, these accounts are, to a higher or lesser degree, subject to an
indeterminacy problem: they are not able to make univocal predictions
as regards the content of mental states. This problem has been around
for at least twenty years, maybe longer and, while it was widely dis-
cussed some ten years ago, it has largely fallen out of fashion, with
next to no new contributions as of late. As is painfully often the case
in philosophy, this has not happened because researchers feel that the
issue has been solved but, rather, because they sense that everybody has
said what they had to say, and a stalemate has been reached. Chapters
1 and 2 are an attempt at unblocking this situation.
I have the feeling that a consensus is emerging, among those still
interested in the problem, according to which the right solution to the
conundrum of the naturalisation of content will have to draw from
ideas coming from both producer and consumer teleosemantics -that
the right theory will be a hybrid theory. Shea (2007)’s infotel semantics,
Ryder (2004)’s SINBAD neurosemantics and maybe Rupert (2008)’s causal-
developmental theory are part of this growing consensus; Millikan too
has seen it useful to spell out, in her (2004), how her theory explains
that contentful states carry information about their content. I also
believe that the right theory must be hybrid: the simplest contentful
states exploit a correlation between detectable properties (Being shiny
and black, say) and useful properties (e. g., Being nutritious, or Being
dangerous). If we start from the useful-properties end, and try to recover
the detectable-properties end, we encounter the Output Problem: our
content attributions to, e. g., animals that seek to mate will, implausibly,
involve things like Fertile mate that will not die before reproducing. If, on
the other hand, we start from the detectable-properties end, we face
the Input Problem: our content attributions will involve implausibly
proximal properties.
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We need to start from both ends at the same time. And maybe there
are not just two ends, maybe usefulness and detectability are not the
only interesting dimensions along which properties can vary for the
purposes of the content naturaliser. We need to start from all ends at the
same time: contents involve structures formed by the coinstantiation of
a mix of detectable and useful properties, and not only those, together
with the explanation that they are so coinstantiated. The account of
content defended in this dissertation is a development of these ideas.
A second issue in the theory of mental content, at least if you buy a
teleosemantic approach and an etiological theory of functions, is how to
account for the existence of contentful mental states that have not been
selected. This is of the utmost importance, if only because all of the
mental states we are interested in are of this kind. In this case, I take the
main proposal available to be largely correct: not selected mental states
have content because they have been produced by selected mechanisms.
On the other hand, I’m not as convinced of the actual implementation
details: the main idea available is that products of selected mechanisms
also have a function in virtue of the fact of being such products. But I
am not sure that products have this normative dimension. For instance,
it does not seem right to say that a token bee dance that leads other
bees down a path without honey should have done otherwise; this is
true for the bee-dance producer, of course, but where does the token
dance itself get its “should” from? I don’t think that a principled answer
to this question has been provided and, anyway, I think that content
attributions to ephemeral states can be sustained making appeal only
to the function of the selected producer. This involves extensive use of
the structures I was alluding to in the previous paragraph, and I think
this is as it should be: contents are tools for dealing with real world
entities that exploit connections among those entities. All of this must
be in place, out there, for contents to earn their keep in our cognitive
setup.
The third issue I tackle in the dissertation -and the second in impor-
tance, after indeterminacy- is that of productivity and compositionality.
This is not a case in which I think the standing theories are wrong, or
otherwise unsuccesful; in this case, the problem has been one of insuf-
ficient attention: apart from Millikan’s theory of mapping functions
-and even this is sketchier than other areas of her theory- there are no
substantial proposals on how to account for the compositionality of
thought, starting from a broadly teleosemantic perspective. I can think
of two reasons why this is so. First, there are sufficiently important
problems in the foundations of teleosemantics for researchers to feel
that it is premature to worry about compositionality -for example, one
does not need structure in thought to pose the indeterminacy problem.
The second reason is, maybe, the implicit assumption on the part of
some researchers that a teleosemantic recipe for the content of concepts
(such as horse) may be given, and that the account of compositionality
could then be simply co-opted from that offered by the computational
theory of mind (CTM), or some variation thereof. I also believe it would
be nice to think of compositionality along the lines offered by CTM, but
I am aware of the need to start from propositional contents as the most
basic ones -that is to say, I believe that at some stage in the phylogene-
sis of contents there are only propositional contents, with concepts a
later innovation. As the chapters leading to (and including) chapter 4
will show, there is no other way to make teleosemantics (and related
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approaches, such as mine) work. Chapter 4 may be, then, seen as a
proposal on how to make compatible the kind of naturalistic account of
content I favour with the CTM take on compositionality. The discussion
of compositionality in thought closes the first part of the dissertation,
dedicated to the extensive spring cleaning of teleosemantics I have just
summarised.
Apart from the need to solve these three problems with naturalistic
accounts of content, there was another constraint informing the discus-
sion: I wanted my theory to be suitable for extension to the modal case.
While there has been a recent surge of interest in the naturalisation of
modal epistemology, there has been virtually no overlap of the work
of naturalistic modal epistemologists and that of content naturalisers.
This is an awkward situation: surely the people that have devoted their
writings to uncovering the nature of conceptual content should have
something to say about, for instance, how we are able to entertain
thoughts regarding merely possible states of affairs? In fact, the very
few references to this family of problems that I have been able to find
in the writings of content naturalisers show, more than indifference,
distrust. I have formed the impression that people such as Millikan
regard modality as one of these areas in which substantial progress is
not likely to be forthcoming. Phenomenal consciousness being, maybe,
another of these areas.
The second part of my dissertation may, then, be regarded as commu-
nity service: it will have have fulfilled an important goal if it convinces
other philosophers of the possibility of achieving progress in the nat-
uralisation of modal content, and of the convenience of starting out
from naturalistic accounts of content in general in so doing. Indeed,
most of what I say in the second part falls out from, or are otherwise
straightforward extensions of, what I say in the first part: contents
involving the merely possible are entertainable because the open future
is thinkable -this I show using the very same tools that show that There
is a fly around is thinkable-, and many (maybe all) thoughts involving
possibilities are simply thoughts about what is or has been an open
future possibility. The last chapter of this second part discusses how
an account of content along the lines developed here can be fruitfully
used to inform a naturalistic account of epistemology so as to solve the
well-known Generality Problem. In particular, I sketch how an account
of modal content can inform modal epistemology.
I would like to raise a caveat regarding my interpretation of Millikan.
Although I have made every effort to portray her ideas faithfully, it is
entirely possible that I have occasionally misrepresented them. In partic-
ular, it is possible that I sometimes represent myself as in disagreement
with her when, in fact, I am simply adhering to her opinions. If there
are such cases, I hope that the unwitting reexposition of Millikan’s
theses sheds some light on them, and provides elaboration to points
she has left in a sketchier level of detail.
I spend a substantial portion of this dissertation disagreeing with
Millikan, and I feel obliged to say what will surely be obvious to every
reader of the pages to follow: the disagreement takes place against a
background of general agreement.
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In this dissertation, definitions are introduced and quoted using
spaced low caps. An index of frequently used definitions may be
found in page 227.
Mental mechanisms’s names are written in low caps. Many times,
’n’ stands for a mechanism that produces other mechanisms such as m.
The content of thoughts -such as There is a fly around is written in
italics; also the name of properties such as Being red. Sections within this
work are quoted thus: 1.3.1. In the pdf version that was a hyperlink.
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Part I
C O N T E N T

1A S O L U T I O N T O T H E I N D E T E R M I N A C Y P R O B L E M
One of the most vexing problems for naturalistic accounts of content is
that of indeterminacy. In a higher or lesser degree, all of the proposals
on offer in the marketplace for the naturalisation of the content of
mental states are such that they can be shown to yield indeterminate
results about what exactly these contents are. Solving this problem
is, therefore, a main stepping stone in the road to a fully working
naturalistic semantics.
In this first chapter I defend a solution, which may be seen as a
refinement of teleosemantics, to this Indeterminacy Problem for simple
contentful states. The idea, in a nutshell, is the following: in the vast
majority of cases, selection of an indicator m is made possible by the
presence of certain natural structures that may be identified with Home-
ostatic Property Clusters (HPC). Regardless of the different possible
descriptions of the facts that play an explanatory role in the existence
of m, and regardless of the different possible function-attributions that
such explanations ground, content attributions to m’s being on must
involve said HPCs.
After a quick review of some of the literature on causal accounts
of content, in section 1.2 I introduce a broadly Dretskean naturalistic
account of content, for a simple mechanism m such that the content of
its positives is of the form There is an F around. In the formulation of such
an account, two notions are used (indication and function) that may raise
suspicions as regards their naturalistic credentials. I quickly review
a widely accepted way of analysing them in clearly non-intentional
terms.
In section 1.3 I introduce the Indeterminacy Problem: m’s fitness
contribution -which is the one property of m’s that natural selection
ultimately favours- may be seen from multiple perspectives. From
each perspective, the explanatorily relevant fact is that m indicates
the instantiation of property Fi, for an indefinitely high number i of
properties. Each of these indication relations, indeed, grounds a content-
attribution and there is no principled reason to choose among all of
them.
Fortunately, there are more facts among those that explain the exis-
tence of m than the ones used for fixing m’s etiological function. Thus,
in section 1.4 I will argue that such explanation may invoke the causal
groundings of the following fact: a mechanism with m’s causal powers
remains a positive contributor to the fitness of its possessor across gener-
ations. These causal groundings may, and in the vast majority of cases
will, include a homeostatic mechanism in the world that explains the
recurrence of the properties used in the explanation of m’s fitness con-
tribution in each particular generation. Such a homeostatic mechanism,
together with the properties the recurrence of which it explains, fix a
Homeostatic Property Cluster. My proposal is that it is these HPCs that
must be used in the content attribution for the positives of m. In section
1.5 I show how this proposal deals with the Indeterminacy Problem,
and in section 1.6 I take up the objection that my proposal (which
I call Etiosemantics to emphasise the role that causal explanations of
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the existence of representations play in fixing their content) is not a
proposal about content.
The preliminary conclusion of the chapter is that etiosemantics pro-
vides a recipe for the attribution of content to simple, selected-for
mental states that is both intuitive and immune to the problems that
vex most other naturalistic accounts.
1.1 naturalising contents
Some entities are about others, or refer to or involve others. For example,
many sentences in my copy of Dummett’s Frege are about Frege. My
belief that the Earth is a planet refers to the state of affairs that consists
of the Earth’s being a planet. My current perceptual state involves the
screen of my laptop. All of these entities that are about, refer to and
involve others are said to have content. It is in virtue of having the
content they have that they so refer, involve and display aboutness.
Contents are non-negotiable tools in a wide range of theoretical
pursuits. Everyone everyday relies on some of them. Take belief and
desire attributions: the behaviour predicting strategy that postulates
the existence of these paradigmatically contentful mental states does
not seem the kind of thing we may be ready to abandon anytime soon.
Some other of these pursuits are of interest only to philosophers. Such
is, for example, the project of characterising mentality; the idea (popular
at least since Brentano) being that intentionality (i. e., aboutness, the
having of content) is the mark of the mental. Another use philosophers
put contents to -and about which I will have something to say in later
chapters- is in the theory of how we get to know that some state of
affairs is necessary, or that some thought could have referred to an
actual state of affairs -although, as it happens, it does not. A popular
idea is that our knowledge of the necessary and the possible is mediated
by a particular kind of attitude to contents we may call finding conceivable.
What we find or fail to find conceivable are, again, contents.
On the other hand, contents, such most useful entities, have a per-
plexing feature. We do not seem to have a clear answer to the ques-
tion: in virtue of what do contentful entities have them? One not very
satisfactory answer is that having a content is a brute characteristic
of the mental (and mind-related entities, such as linguistic outputs),
not reducible to or otherwise explicable in terms of other, more basic
entities. This is not very satisfactory because, given the sweeping suc-
cess of scientific explanation, it seems more and more plausible that
the only brute, non reducible properties are physical properties. That
content/physical-stuff dualism is true seems, thus, extremely unlikely.
In any event, if a fully naturalistic account of content can be worked
out, it is to be preferred if only on grounds of simplicity.
Fortunately, there are several promising approaches to the natural-
isation of content. The theory I will be defending in this Part I is an
example of what have been called causal-informational accounts of con-
tent, so in this introduction I will be paying attention to other examples
of this approach1. In other sections of this and the next chapter I will
discuss in some more depth other examples of this approach, more
germane to my own proposal, such as Dretske’s theory of content
1 There are many reviews of the literature on content naturalisation. In preparing this
summary I have found useful Fodor (1990), Loewer (1999), Papineau (2006) and Rupert
(2008).
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circa Dretske 1988, Millikan’s biosemantics, Shea’s infotel-semantics and
Papineau’s version of teleosemantics.
Besides causal-informational accounts there is another important
tradition in the naturalisation of contents, which offers what we may
call network-based accounts. Causal and Inferential Role Semantics, in
their various flavours, are important network-based accounts of content.
Although I will largely ignore this other approach, I will have something
to say about it in section 4.8.
1.1.1 Very Simple Causal Accounts
As a starting point in the project of naturalising content we may ask:
which physical relation between representation and represented pro-
vides the best raw material for the construction of intentionality? One
possibility is geometric/structural similarity2. For example, one could
defend the following simple theory about the content of a perception
of my mother’s face:
structural similarity: A mental state mmf is an Idea of my
mother’s face if and only if it bears the relevant kind of structural
similarity with her face.
This kind of structure-based account is seldom defended these days.
Even granting that one can spell out which is the relevant kind of struc-
tural similarity involved, one main difficulty with this account comes
from appreciating that resemblance is symmetrical, while intentional
relations are not: my Idea of my mother’s face is about her face, but her
face is not about my Idea -cf. Wittgenstein (1953/1973). Another source
of objections is the work in externalist semantics, from the seminal
Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975) on. This work has convinced many
philosophers that no amount of, say, geometrical or structural informa-
tion encoded in our mental state can make it be about my mother’s face
-as opposed to, e. g., a perfect 3D plastic model of it. That is, no amount
of congruence between representation and represented can ensure the
kind of aboutness we demand of the contents of our mental states.
structural similarity is afflicted by one of the main problems
that the right naturalistic account of content will have to solve: according
to this theory, mmf represents my mother’s face. After all. it does bear
the right kind of structural similarity with it. But, unfortunately, mmf
also represents every good enough 3D model, photograph, etc. of her
face. After all, it bears the right kind of structural similarity with those
things as well. So, contrary to what we wanted, the content of mmf is
highly disjunctive: my mother’s face, or a 3D model thereof, or... Instead, we
need an account that allows mmf’s content to be, solely, my mother’s
face. This Disjunction Problem must be solved.
disjunction problem: A theory of content suffers from the Dis-
junction Problem if the content attributions it warrants are highly
disjunctive, even in cases where the common-sense content attri-
bution is not.
A physical relation that seems more promising as a building block
for content is Being caused by. Indeed, it looks as if part of what makes
2 It may be defended that the British Empiricists would have chosen this kind of properties.
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a mental representation be about my mother is that it is her that causes
it3. We might, then, try out the following simple causal account:
simple causal account - mmf: A mental state mmf is an Idea of
my mother’s face only if it is caused to token only by her face.
In simple causal account - mmf we are talking of the mental
state type mmf; something that could, in principle, be tokened in differ-
ent circumstances. As presented, simple causal account - mmf
is afflicted by the Disjunction Problem, although it will be more infor-
mative to see the same issue under a different aspect: according to this
simple causal account, states such as mmf cannot misrepresent. Suppose
that a token of mmf is caused by a 3D model of my mother’s face. We
may want to say that the mental state in question has been fooled by the
model’s similarity to my mother’s face, and that it has been erroneously
tokened. But we cannot say that, because, in those circumstances, the
token mental state in question ceases to be an Idea of my mother’s face
-as it has not been caused by it. This Error Problem is equally urgent.
error problem: A theory of content suffers from the Error Problem
if it never warrants a content attributions such that the contentful
state in question is a misrepresentation.
The strategy deployed in simple causal account - mmf is let-
ting the desired content fix the nature of the mental state -if a mental
state is caused by something different, it is not ruled to be a content-
ful Idea. Another possibility -the one that, for expository purposes,
is usually considered as the simplest version of causal-informational
accounts of content- is taking the fact that a mental state is contentful
to be independently fixed, and then letting the causes of its tokens fix
its content. In general, an account of the content of mental states along
these lines, such as
simple causal account - general : A mental state m is an Idea
of whatever causes it to token.
cannot account for the possibility of error. Every mental state is about
whatever causes it. If a mental state that, we might want to say, is an
Idea of cat is caused to token by vaguely feline lumps, we are forced to
say that it is also an Idea of vaguely feline lumps.
In the following subsection I will quickly survey some contemporary
efforts to refine simple causal accounts, such that the resulting theory
provides for the possibility of misrepresentation and does not attribute
highly disjunctive contents in cases in which such attributions are
counterintuitive.
1.1.2 Somewhat More Complicated Causal Accounts
3 We will need to qualify these remarks in due time. For example, my considered opinion is,
rather, that what makes a mental perception be about my mother is that it is produced by
a system that has to produce individual-involving representations, and that has produced
my perception in the presence of a cue related to my mother in the right way.
For the time being, though, the simpler causal story is more informative, and better
suited to my current introductory purposes.
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stampe Stampe (1977) is customarily regarded as the first of contem-
porary efforts of analising intentionality in causal terms4. Stampe re-
covers from structural similarity the idea that an isomorphism
between a set of properties of the representation and a corresponding
set of properties of the represented is essential to one thing having the
other as content. The twist in Stampe’s account is that, for a genuine
representation relation to exist, the latter must bear the right causal
relation with the former:
The causal relation we have in mind is one that holds
between a set of properties F (f1...fn) of the thing (O) repre-
sented, and a set of properties Φ (φ1...φn) of the represen-
tation (R). Stampe (1977, p. 85)
Assume that R represents O in virtue of such a causal relation holding
between them. This already takes care of much of the disjunctivity that
afflicted content attributions according to structural similarity:
suppose we wish to attribute a content to a photograph of my mother’s
face. There is, indeed, an isomorphism between certain properties of
the photograph and certain properties of her face. If it is my mother’s
face’s facial features that have caused the properties of the photograph
that bear the relevant isomorphism with them, then the photograph
represents my mother’s face. As we have noted above, being isomorphic
with my mother’s face in the relevant way is, eo ipso, being isomorphic
with a great many other things: 3D models, maybe, or my mother’s twin
sister’s face. All of these things (which are part of what the photograph
represents according to structural similarity) are ruled out by
the causal condition: none of them have caused the photograph to have
the properties it has.
This is already a partial solution to the Disjunction Problem, but
there are many other sources of candidates for the role of represented
object. As Stampe points out, if there is an isomorphism between the
object represented and the photograph, there is surely going to be
another isomorphism (a better one, actually) between the photograph
and the impressed plate. But the photograph is only a photograph of
my mother, not of the plate.
Now, as regards the Error Problem, this account so far is in the
same situation as simple causal account - mmf. Consider, as a
candidate for the role of representation, the stump a certain tree left
after a lumberjack cut it; and the age of the tree at the moment of its
death as a candidate for the content of that representation. There is,
indeed, an isomorphism of the right kind between a certain property
of the stump and the age at the time of its death: if the stump has n
rings, the tree had n years, and, furthermore, it is the tree’s having
n years that has caused the stump’s having n rings. Thus, the stump
represents the tree’s age at its death5. Now, suppose that the tree has
sixty rings, but lived sixty-one years -one of them under a terrible
draught. Stampe’s theory -if left at this state- would not count the
4 This is, of course, little more than a stipulation useful for expository purposes. It is safe to
say that Stampe’s account would not have existed without e. g., Grice’s notion of natural
meaning (Grice (1957)) or the aforementioned groundbreaking lectures and papers by
Kripke and Putnam.
5 Stampe in fact writes “that the stump shows sixty rings indicates that the tree was sixty
years old” (op. cit., p. 88). Here, apparently, it is states of affairs and not objects that
represent. In the main text I’m sticking to objects (such as tree stumps) and not states
of affairs as the right candidates for the role of representations. This seems closer to
Stampe’s official position.
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stump as a representation in this case, given that it’s not the age of
the tree that has caused the number of rings. The system number-of-
rings/age-of-the-tree is uncapable of showing misrepresentation. The
Error Problem again.
Stampe makes an appeal to the function of the representing device
in solving these two problems: that it is mother and not plate that
the photograph is a photograph of depends on the function of the
mechanism producing it (op. cit., p. 83). Moreover, the possibility of
misrepresentation is solved by adding a clause of fidelity conditions
to the causal account, such that, e. g., if fidelity conditions hold, years of
tree life cause number of rings in the stump. This fidelity conditions
are supposed to be the conditions under which “a functional system”
functions well (op. cit., p. 90)
We can, then, summarise Stampe’s final proposal thus:
stampe : A representation r is about a thing represented O if and
only if the right causal relation holds between a set of properties
F (f1...fn) of the latter and a set of properties Φ (φ1...φn) of the
former, if fidelity conditions hold.
This very insightful proposal suffers from some of the shortcomings
typical of pioneering theories. First and foremost, it is little more than
programmatic in several crucial respects. For example, it remains to
be seen how the conditions of well-functioning of functional systems
can provide for the possibility of misrepresentations; in particular, it
is unlikely that the tree-age/stump system has any function that may
help fix fidelity conditions for the reading of ages out of numbers of
rings. Unlike photographs, trees are not supposed to keep track of their
age in their rings.
It is also unclear how the teleological properties of photographs may
-in a naturalistically acceptable manner- help track down one among
the many isomorphic candidates for the object represented. It is not
that this cannot be done; it’s rather that Stampe’s theory does not
comment on it. It doesn’t comment either on how should we ascertain,
in stampe, what counts as “the right causal relation”.
In a second level of importance, Stampe’s theory is too heavily based
on the model of photographs -hence the appeal to isomorphisms. It
remains to be seen how stampe deals with, among other things,
contentful entities such as the concept water -in which way is this
concept to be isomorphic to water6, and in what way such a isomorphic
structure is to mediate our water-involving thinkings?
dretske circa 1981 In his (1981) Dretske offers a theory that
makes content depend on information:
Structure S has the fact that t is F as its semantic content =
S carries the information that t is F in digital form. Dretske
(1981, p. 177)
Where S carries the information that t is F in digital form iff it is the
most specific piece of information that it carries about t (ibid.), and S
carries the information that t is F iff P (Ft|S) = 1 (ibid., p. 65).
The theory, as it stands, falls prey to the Disjunction Problem. Con-
sider a mental state m the content of which we want to say that it is
6 In section 4.1 I discuss another, deep problem for theories that think of objects, as opposed
to states of affairs, as the primary targets of representations.
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There is a fly around. According to the passage just quoted, we may only
attribute such a content if the probability of there being a fly around
conditional on m being tokened is 1. So, if there is the slightest prob-
ability that m is tokened in the absence of a fly around -maybe in the
presence of a black speck-, the desired content attribution will be un-
warranted by the theory. Rather, the right semantic content attribution
will have to be There is a fly or a black speck around.
The answer Drestke (ibid., p. 193f) suggests is postulating the exis-
tence of a learning period for each representation. It is during that
learning period that the content gets fixed and, so, post-learning token-
ings of the representation may well misrepresent. The final proposal
may be rendered thus:
early dretske: Structure S has the fact that t is F as its semantic
content = S carried the information that t is F in digital form
during its learning period.
As Dretske came to see later on, this is not a very good way to account
for misrepresentation. On the one hand, there is no principled way to
distinguish learning and learned phases in the use of a representation.
On the other hand, it is extremely implausible that there is any period
at all in which any one representation perfectly covaries with its content.
Rather, it seems that throughout its whole existence any representation
will be erroneously tokened some times. It has to be possible to have a
workable notion of misrepresentation even if this is the case7.
We are going to spend some time (in section 1.2) discussing a theory
in the spirit of Dretske’s later theoretical efforts, and then other theories
with a similar so-called teleosemantic outlook; but, before that, I wish
to review quickly a more contemporary approach: Rupert’s causal-
developmental theory.
rupert In his (2008, p. 362f), Rupert defends the following theory of
simple, atomic representations:
If a subject S bears no content-fixing intentions toward
R, and R is an atomic mental representation (i.e., not a
compound of two or more other mental representations),
then R has as its extension the members of natural kind Q if
and only if members of Q are more efficient in their causing
of R in S than are the members of any other natural kind.
Where the efficiency in question is to be calculated thus:
For each natural kind or property Qi, calculate its PRF
[past relative frequency] relative to R: divide the number
of times an instantiation of Qi has caused S to token R by
the number of times an instantiation of Qi has caused S to
token any mental representation whatever. Then make an
ordinal comparison of all Qj relative to that particular R; R’s
content is the Qj with the highest PRF relative to R. (Ibid.)
This is supposed to apply primarily to primitive representations (hence
the antecedent of the conditional), the idea being that sophisticated
content-crunching engines such as human minds can and do override
facts about efficient causation with their intentional behaviour. So,
7 For a more sympathetic view of the learning-period strategy see Sterelny (1990).
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for such primitive representations -e. g., the mental states of frogs, or
newborns- the property or natural kind that, in the long run and after
the PRFs have reached their stable values, causes them to token is their
content. This account is obviously able to accomodate misrepresentation
-the content is the property with the highest PRF, which means that there
are other properties with lower PRF that also cause the representation
to token- and does not attribute highly disjunctive contents -these are
plausibly ruled out by the constraint that contents be natural properties
or kinds.
Rupert’s causal-developmental theory is similar to what has been
called producer semantics (see 1.3.2). One problem with these theories
(the Input Problem, to be discussed in 1.3.2 as well) is that they warrant
content attributions that are as close as possible to the firing patterns
of the representation in question. In Rupert’s version, whatever is
most efficient in getting the representation to fire is its content. This,
sometimes, provides counterintuitive content attributions. Take, for
example, the case of supernormal stimuli:
[A supernormal stimulus is an] artificial stimulus that pro-
duces in an animal a response that is stronger than would
be evoked by the natural stimulus it resembles. For example,
in some birds incubation behaviour is stimulated by the
presence of an egg, and the larger the egg the stronger the
stimulus; in such birds a very large artificial egg may be
incubated in preference to a much smaller real egg. Allaby
(2009)
Supernormal stimuli are more effective than, say, eggs in causing a
certain subject to token a representation that, pretheoretically, we would
like to identify as the perceptual concept egg. In cases in which super-
normal stimuli are possible, Rupert’s theory will, counterintuitively,
count the supernormal stimulus as the content of the representation
in question. So, the brain state in the bird that causes it to initiate an
incubation routine in the presence of a normal egg will not have the
content, say, There is an egg there but, rather, There is a very large artificial
egg there. Surely, this is implausible.
There is a way out of this unacceptable conclusion which does not
look very promising: the causal-developmental theorist may retort
that large artificial eggs do not form a natural kind, and thus are not
candidates for being the content of a representation. While this may
well be so8, nothing prevents that some natural eggs (of, say, larger
birds) have the features of supernormal stimuli. In such a case, the
rejoinder is unsuccessful.
An apparently better answer is that these representations are there to
help birds incubate eggs and reproduce; this is their biological function
and that is why their content involves (healthy, fecundated) eggs and
not supernormal stimuli, even if the latter are much better in triggering
the representation than the former. Answers along these lines come
from a familiy of theories commonly called teleosemantic, which make
content depend on historical properties of representations -particularly
those having to do with them, or their producers, having been selected
through natural selection. I believe this is the most promising approach,
8 Although see Millikan (2000) and below in 1.4.5 for notions of natural-kindhood that
would plausibly count some types of artificial eggs in.
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and for the rest of the chapter I will concentrate on teleosemantic
accounts of content9.
Millikan’s biosemantics is, of course, the best known and most so-
phisticated of the teleosemantic accounts available but, for starters, it
will make sense to consider a simpler theory that recovers many of
the Millikanian insights10: a somewhat updated version of Dretske’s
second take on the problem, circa 1986. We will see that a particularly
insidious version of the Disjunction Problem can be used to cast doubt
on teleosemantics in general; my own positive proposal is designed to
solve this insidious Indeterminacy Problem.
1.2 a (better) dretskean theory of content
In this section, I introduce a concrete proposal about the content of
some simple states that follows closely the one advanced in Dretske
(1988). It is not Dretske’s theory, mind you: I have tweaked several
minor points to bring it closer to other contemporary accounts, and
maximise its usefulness as a springboard for discussion. I will signal
such tweakings as we go along.
A Representational System, according to Dretske is
any system whose function it is to indicate how things
stand with respect to some other object, condition or magni-
tude. Dretske (1988, p. 52, my emphasis)
As with the other accounts reviewed above, Dretske’s definition should
be understood as a step towards the naturalisation of the paradig-
matically intentional notion of representation. The idea is to offer an
analysis of this and cognate notions such as content into others which,
it is hoped, may be tractably analysed in thoroughly non-intentional
terms. It has been doubted, in this connection, that indicate and function
can be given naturalistically unobjectionable analyses: maybe indicating
is too close to meaning to be of any use, and scruples about the use
of teleological idioms in science have, of course, a venerable history.
In order to advance from Dretske’s definition to a fully-naturalistic
account of content, therefore, we need a non-intentional treatment of
those two notions. I will discuss them now in turns.
One final introductory remark before that: I will be only concern-
ing myself with extremely simple examples of contentful states. So,
throughout this chapter I will assume that we are dealing with an
innate mental mechanism, m, part of the cognitive setup of a subject S,
which is always in one out of two possible states: on or off. My ambition
is, simply, to offer a set of conditions for attributing the state-type [m’s
being on] with contents of the kind There is an F around in a way immune
to the Indeterminacy Problem (to be shortly presented). How do the
lessons we may learn from this kind of examples carry over to more
sophisticated contentful states is matter for the rest of the chapters of
this part I, specially chapter 4.
9 A brief discussion of the way in which the account I will favour accomodates the
possibility of supernormal stimuli may be found in chapter 4, footnote 25.
10 Not by chance: Dretske’s account is posterior and based on Millikan’s first exposition of
her theory in her (1984), as he fully recognises in his (1988).
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1.2.1 Indication
We have seen in subsection 1.1.2 how Dretske suggests to analyse the
notion of content in terms of the notion of information. The appeal to
indication in the passage just quoted is doing a similar job. A bathroom
scale indicates weight in virtue of the following fact: the position of
the pointer of the scale causally covaries with the weight of the mass
placed on the scale. The number of rings in a tree stump indicate
how many years the tree has lived in virtue of the following fact: the
number of rings in tree stumps causally covary with the number of
revolutions of the Earth around the Sun during the lifetime of the
tree. Indicators have a number of possible outputs (in our examples:
pointer positions and numbers of rings) which causally covary with
a number of possible states of the indicated system (e. g. different
weights, different lifespans).
For mechanisms as simple as m, a straightforward way of under-
standing the indication relation is the following:
indication : A mechanism m’s going on indicates instantiations of a
property F around S iff
i1 : P (F|m is on) > P (F)11 and
i2 : The difference in probabilities in i1 is causally grounded.
This is one of the points in which the Dretskean account I am intro-
ducing is not Dretske’s account. For Dretske, there is indication only
if P (F|on) = 1 (see above). Most theorists nowadays agree that this
proposal, motivated by Dretske’s views on epistemology, is unduly
restrictive: in most cases positive correlation (understood as in i1) is
enough12.
Clause i1 means that the probability of F being instantiated around
S, conditional on m being in its on position, is greater than the un-
conditional probability of F being instantiated around S1314. These
11 Or, equivalently, P (m is on|F) > P (m is on), if P (m is on) > 0. Remember Bayes’
theorem: P (F)P (m is on|F) = P (m is on)P (F|m is on). The formulation I’ve used in
indication is most congenial with Dretske’s original idea (that an indicator causally
covaries with the indicated). On the other hand, it lends itself less straight-forwardly to
calculation of mean fitness values for a state (see below). In the sequel I’ll be often using
the condition P (m is on|F) > P (m is on).
12 For discussion of this point cf. Shea (2007).
13 Around S is loose talk, of course, and could be made more precise in a number of different
ways. Further refinement will be introduced in 4.2.
14 Millikan, in Millikan (2007), has raised doubts about the possibility of characterising
the domain upon which to calculate probabilities such as those in i1 in a non-circular,
yet useful way -the famous reference-class problem. I cannot go into a full discussion of
this criticism, but I wish to suggest that some of her complaints can be assuaged by
concentrating on the indication relations in which the particular token of the mechanism m
that S has enters, instead of trying to characterise what ms in general indicate.
We may help ourselves to a methodological fiction according to which, once the token
of m in question has lived its whole life, and the actual frequency of coincidence of
its being on with F being instantiated around S has been established, we rewind up
to the point in time in which m started existing and press play again. We record the
second actual frequency of coinstantiation and rewind again. After doing this a number
of times, the mean frequency of coincidence will start converging to a value, which is
P (F|m is on). We cannot actually do this, of course, which means that there may be an
epistemic problem of how to know which is the right assignment of probabilities (cf.
Gillies (2000, p. 813f); but, as far as I can see, these problems do not carry over to the
metaphysical question of what it is that probabilities are. I am after an account of the
metaphysics of content, not of the (very interesting, but different) problem of how to
know that the account applies.
So if, in Dretske’s famous example of the anaerobic, magneto-sensitive bacterium, we have
two populations of bacteria, living in the northern and the southern hemisphere, do their
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probabilities are to be understood as being objective, and not as track-
ing the opinions of some epistemic agent.
i2 is there to honour Dretske’s request that the correlation between
m’s being on and instantiations of F be causally grounded. Some situations,
among many others, in which an indicator-indicated relation complies
with i2 are:
• The instantiation of F around S causes m to go on.
• The instantiation of a certain property E causes both an instantia-
tion of F around S and m to go on15.
A situation that does not so comply, on the other hand, is:
• Instantiations of F around S have happened to coincide, by a most
extravagant coincidence, with m’s being on.
The first building block on the way to the Indeterminacy Problem
comes at this point. According to indication, a state may, and most
of the times will, indicate indefinitely many properties. For instance, a
machine than bleeps if the person in front of it is more than 2 m high
indicates the property of Being more than 2 m high, but also indicates
Having rather tall parents. This is because the probability of the parents
of the person in front of the machine being rather tall, conditional on it
bleeping, is higher than the unconditional probability of the parents of
the person in front of the machine being rather tall. For similar reasons,
it indicates a great many other properties: Making a decent basketball
player, Using shoes above size 9, etc.
1.2.2 Function
A difference between bathroom scales and tree stumps is that the former,
but not the latter, may misrepresent something or other. My scale may
give my weight wrongly, but it makes no sense to see to say that a tree
stump gives the age of the tree wrongly16. We may be misled by the
number of tree rings into thinking that the tree had a different age than
it had when cut, but this is not to say that the stump is wrong or right.
A crucial insight exploited by Dretske -following similar ideas by
Millikan- is that something may be a (mis)representation only if it has,
magnetosomes indicate the magnetic North and South respectively? According to indi-
cation , this question must be posed independently for each individual magnetosome,
throughout its life. The relative size of the northern and southern populations play no
role whatsoever in ascertaining it.
In chapter 5 I will give reasons to think that this method of rolling back to a point in
the past can help us know fully objective states of affairs regarding the counterfactual
probabilities of m’s behaviour being one way or another. All in all, this is congenial to
long-run propensity theories of probability which, at least, are not obviously false -a useful
review may be found in Gillies (2000, p. 126f). For a sophisticated view of objective
single-case probabilities see Weiner and Belnap (2006) and references therein.
15 It is not clear whether the following third option would be accepted by Dretske as meeting
i2: F is instantiated around S in some predictable sequence -maybe its being instantiated
now causes the absence of instantiations in the following five minutes, which in turn
causes another instantiation of F, etc. m also goes on and off in a similarly predictable
pattern. These two patterns are such that F and m comply with i1.
As Millikan (2004) has pointed out, the indication relation going on in magnetobacteria
is not causally-grounded in the strict sense: the Magnetic North indicates lower oxygen
concentration in the Northern hemisphere not because there is any causal relation
between these two gradients, but because both gradients stay put, so that one can usefully
be used as a sign of the other. I intend indication to be understood in a way such that
this non-causal third kind of cases comply with i2.
16 Contra Stampe (1977), see above.
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or has been produced by something that has, the function of indicating
something or other. Now, bathroom scales have such a function because
they have been designed by intentional agents such as us. But there
are many central cases of representational states (our own perceptual
states, for instance) which in all likelihood have not been designed at
all. And, on the other hand, if in every unequivocal case of functional
mechanism we had to appeal to the intentional states of a designer,
functions would be unable to help us in the project of naturalising
content. All in all, if our Dretskean proposal is to get off the ground,
then, we need some account of how functions arise in Nature17.
Before turning to the most popular naturalising account of functions,
a proviso is in order. There is an important objection to the idea that a
mechanism may have a function to indicate: the functions of a device are
a subset of the effects of that device in a system, and indicating, instead,
is passively standing in some conditional probability with regards to
the instantiations of a property. If so, indicating cannot be the function
of a state, something a state may be supposed to do -cf. Millikan (1993,
p. 129), Neander (1991, p. 168), Kingsbury (2006). I think this objection
is correct, as far as a theory of function goes. I also think that this issue
is largely irrelevant for the project of naturalising semantics: qua content
naturalisers, we are not, or need not be, interested in the correct account
of biological functions; besides, the phenomenon described below, and
codified in etiological function (namely, that a mechanism m’s
indicating instantiations of a property F may be part of an explanation
of the selection for m) is clearly coherent, possible, and we have every
reason to believe that it has also been actual a great many times. If the
reader feels qualms about granting a function attribution to m upon
such a history, she may substitute my uses of function in this context
for pseudo- or quasi-function. Nothing hinges on this18.
1.2.3 Etiological Functions
Hearts have, among others, the function of pumping blood and do not
have the function of making thumping noises -even if the latter can
be very useful for us, e.g., as evidence in diagnosis. A very plausible
proposal (mainly associated with Larry Wright, e.g., Wright (1973/1994),
but also hinted at independently by a number of authors in the 70s,
such as Ayala (1970)) is the so-called etiological approach19: the functions
of such natural devices should be identified with certain explanations
of the existence of those devices. So, Wright:
[S]aying that the function of X is Z is saying at least that
X is there because it does Z. Wright (1973/1994, p. 39)
17 Dretske does not commit himself to the account of functions I am about to introduce, or
to any other.
18 Section 2.2 provides a fuller discussion of this point.
19 Other prominent approaches to the naturalisation of functions, about which I will have
nothing to say, are the dispositional view -mainly associated with Cummins (1975)- and
the systemic or organizational view -see Mossio et al. (forthcoming).
Schroeder (2004) has proposed to combine teleosemantics with a systemic approach
to the naturalisation of functions, instead of the usual etiological approach. I cannot
discuss his proposal here, but I do not find it very promising. According to Schroeder, the
normativity of a representation depends on the fact that it belongs in a system with a goal
state and a way to feedback information back into the system. I believe, for reasons that
will be clear by the end of chapter 4, that it is highly unlikely that the goal-directedness
of our cognitive system, disregarding its historical properties, can provide the right
normativity for beliefs such as, say, “Bill Gates is tech savvy”.
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How does the fact that Xs do Z help explain the actual existence of
an X in the relevant way -a way that bears on X’s function20? There
are a number of concrete proposals in the literature for unpacking
this etiological insight, including some extremely sophisticated ones;
among them Millikan (1984, , chapter 2f)21, Millikan (2002), Neander
(1995), Price (1998). To appreciate the force of the Indeterminacy Prob-
lem for semantics, nevertheless, it is best to keep the discussion at a
conveniently uncommitted level. Here is a tenet that is common ground
among most22 etiological-function theorists:
selection from fitness contribution: The existence of a bio-
logical trait or mechanism is explained in a way that bears on its
function only if it has been selected23 for.
This tenet helps ground a set of necessary and sufficient conditions
for the attribution of etiological functions that makes the Indetermi-
nacy Problem most conspicuous. A convenient way to provide such
a set of conditions, for m to have the (pseudo-)function to indicate
the instantiation of a property F, is using a simplified version of the
apparatus of signal detection theory, as presented by Godfrey-Smith in
Godfrey-Smith (1996):
So, how does m’s being an indicator explains that it contributes to the
fitness of its possessor, and gets thus selected? Assume that m indicates
(remember: among many other properties) the instantiation of property
F around S. The fact that m indicates F may help explain m’s existence
in the following way: in the simplest cases, m’s going on causes, in its
turn, S to initiate behaviour that is adequate for managing the presence
of an F. Likewise, m’s going off causes behaviour that is adequate
for managing the absence of Fs24. This puts S in a better position to
survive and reproduce than the one that m-lacking conspecifics enjoy.
Eventually, this leads to the fixation of m in the population whence S
comes.
We can summarise the effect that this adequate F-management has
on the reproduction possibilities of S by assigning a fitness value to the
four different states that result of the combination of m being on or off,
and F being, or not, instantiated around it. Thus,
• m’s being on whenever F is instantiated around the agent is a
hit. We will assign this combination a fitness value w11 that, it
20 In Wright’s quote X is a token. I’m using X now to talk about a type.
21 Millikan has repeatedly rejected that her theory of proper functions is influenced by, or
in any way related to, Wright’s. Although her theory is, in my view, a great improvement
over his, I must say that I share the general opinion according to wish both are intimately
related. This may be, of course, just another case of convergence of theories.
22 An important exception is Buller (1998).
23 In this dissertation I will assume that a classical approach to natural selection is correct;
one according to which
evolution by natural selection results whenever there is a population in which
there is variation between individuals, which leads to those individuals
having different numbers of offspring, and which is heritable to some extent.
Godfrey-Smith (2009a, p. 4)
Furthermore, I will understand fitness simply as rate of reproduction. This is a substantive
simplification, and I am sidestepping here many interesting philosophical discussions
regarding the true nature of natural selection -see Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini (2010)
and Godfrey-Smith (2009a)- and of fitness. I believe my account to be more permissive of
error in the classical view of selection than other similar accounts of content, but I will
not discuss such issues here.
24 For simplicity, I’m helping myself to the assumption that doing nothing is a kind of
behaviour.
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is to be supposed, will be positive: the correct detection of an F
will be coupled with some benefits (e. g., the successful hunting
of prey, or escaping from predators) with an eventual impact in
reproduction.
• m’s being off whenever F is instantiated is a miss -fitness value
w12. In normal cases it will be detrimental: without recognising
the presence of an F, the F-appropriate behaviour cannot kick in.
We will lose a hunting opportunity, or may die devoured by an
undetected predator.
• m’s being on whenever F is not instantiated around the agent is a
false alarm -fitness value w21. It will also be negative in general.
The relation between w12 and w21 will depend on the context in
which F-detection takes place. If F is coupled with the presence of
predators, normally w21 > w12. That is, usually it will be more
harmful for the fitness of the agent not to detect the presence of
a predator than believing it is there when it is not. In the latter
case only the resources spent in idle fleeing will be wasted; in the
former, death is a likely outcome. Vice versa when F is coupled
with, e. g., the presence of prey, if prey is abundant. And,
• m’s being off whenever F is not instantiated around the agent is
a correct rejection -fitness value w22. In normal cases w22 will be
lower than w11 but higher than both w12 and w21.
Thus we obtain the following Fitness Matrix, seen from the standpoint










On the other hand, we need to supplement the information that
indication provides about the relation between F and m, defining a
complete Indication Profile of F by m (IPF)25:
IPF =
[
P (on|F) P (off|F)
P (on|¬F) P (off|¬F)
]
The Fitness Matrix, together with the Indication Profile, yields the
following Fitness Contribution of m to its possessor, from the standpoint
of the detection of F -that is, the weighted average of fitness values26:
FCF = P (F) ·
[





+ P (¬F) ·
[




where P (F) = 1− P (¬F) is the objective unconditional probability of
F being instantiated around the agent. We can use Fitness Contributions
to offer the following set of conditions for the attribution to m of the
etiological function of indicating F.
25 In the sequel I use P (on|F) as an abbreviation of P (m is on|F).
26 I use the subindex F in FCF to signify that we are dealing with m’s fitness contribution
as seen from the perspective of the indication of F.
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etiological function: A token of the mechanism m in a subject S
has the function of indicating the instantiation of F around S iff
ef1 : According to indication, mechanisms of the type m have
indicated the instantiation of F around its possessor in (a
sufficient number of) S’s recent ancestors.
ef2 : The Fitness Contribution, as seen from the perspective of in-
dicating Fs, of the token of m in S’s recent ancestors has been
positive (that is, FCF > 0), and this is part of an explanation
of the fact that S has a token of m.
ef3 : (A sufficient number of) the conditional probabilities in IPF
are grounded.
ef4 : (A sufficient number of) the fitness values in FMF are grounded.
I am making at least two assumptions here. First, that the history of
the lineage of m is long enough, and pressures from the environment
fine-grained enough, for m to end up having as fitness-contribution
FCF. In real cases m’s fitness-contribution will approach FCF, up to
a certain level, and then move randomly in its proximity. Second, I
are assuming that Fitness Matrix and Indication Profile are constant
throughout the history of selection for m. Rather, it is likely that in more
realistic scenarios such values change slightly as a result of changes
in the environment, either random or directional. None of these two
assumptions is crucial for my argument, although they do simplify the
discussion.
Let me say something about the need for conditions ef1, ef2, ef3 and
ef4 in turn.
ef1: This is necessary to comply with selection from fitness
contribution: if m’s indicating F has contributed to the fitness of
a sufficient number of S’s ancestors, then it must have been the case
that m has indicated F in those very ancestors. How many ancestors are
a sufficient number of them is not susceptible of precise specification:
clearly one ancestor is not enough and clearly all ancestors are enough;
in between there is a large grey area. The reference to recent ancestors
here and in the next condition is there to avoid once functional and
now idle traits to count as functional -cf. Godfrey-Smith (1994), Griffiths
(1993). Again, there probably are borderline cases of “recent enough”.
ef2: This provides with the second necessary condition to comply
with selection from fitness contribution: indication must
result in a positive Fitness Contribution, which must be part of the
explanation of the actual existence of m in S.
ef3: It is important to see that how higher is P (on|F) than P (on)
need not be the critical factor in selection for m. It is perfectly possible,
e. g., that a high rate of false alarms in m is compensated with a very
low rate of misses, so that another mechanism m’ such that P (on ′|F) >
P (on|F) > P (on) ends up having a lower FCF and is, therefore, not
selected against m. This is why, in keeping with Dretske’s requisites,
if a low rate of false negatives has been instrumental for selection
for m, then the probability of m’s being off conditional on F’s being
instantiated or not must be causally grounded as well. How many of the
four values in IPF must be causally grounded depends on the actual
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selection history of m: maybe all four are instrumental in selection,
maybe less.
ef4 : Again, in keeping with Dretske’s requisites, the last bit of string
for a tight causal package: the fact that, e. g., m’s hits have a fitness
value w11 must not be a bizarre coincidence. Imagine, for example, that
the state m of an ant is very good at indicating pieces of metal and that,
by most bizarre coincidence, on top of many pieces of metal there is
a small lump of sugar. This case is such that hits have a high fitness
value, but we wish to rule it out as a case in which the state m in the
ant has the function of indicating metal27. This is the role of ef4. Again,
how many of the four values in the Fitness Matrix must be grounded
depends on the actual selection history of m.
Finally, it must be remembered that, with etiological func-
tion, we will only be able to warrant content attributions to states of
mechanisms that have been selected for. Contentful states that come
to exist during the life of a subject (e. g., beliefs we form) need a more
complicated treatment, and I deal with them in subsequent chapters.
1.2.4 The Content of m
Finally, the announced Dretskean proposal about the content of m’s
positives:
better dretske: m’s being on has the content There is an F around if,
according to etiological function, m has the function of
indicating the instantiation of F around S.
better dretske, together with indication and etiological
function of course, completes the broadly Dretskean analysis of the
content of m’s being on promised at the beginning of this section.
1.3 the indeterminacy problem
We are now in a position to introduce the Indeterminacy Problem.
To use the standard (and, admittedly, rather tired) example in the
philosophical literature, let me concentrate in a simplified frog, which
I will call Democritus. We may tell the following idealised story about
Democritus’s mental mechanism m:
democritus and the content of m’s being on : Many gener-
ations ago, through random mutation, a mechanism m came into
existence deep inside the brain of some ancient frog. Mechanisms
of type m happen to indicate instantiations of the property of
Being a fly around its possessor28 .
They do this in the following way: an m fires whenever a black
shadow of a determinate shape and size moves across the frog’s
retina. m also happens to provoke a response in the frog that
27 Its being a case in which m has the function of indicating sugar is already ruled out by ef1:
the fact that P (on|sugar) > P (on)is not grounded, and this is one of the conditions
for the indication relation to obtain, as I have defined it.
In section 2.1 I discuss whether we really wish to deem cases such as these as lacking
function.
28 That is, ex-hypothesi each token of m has stood in the right kind of conditional probability
vis-a-vis de property of Being a fly. See footnote 14.
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makes it protract its tongue. Finally, m is hereditary. Thanks to
these lucky causal powers, m tokens have helped frogs survive,
by helping them hunt flies. This has meant that frogs with m have
been fitter than frogs without, which in turn explains that m got
fixated in that population. Nowadays, all frogs, and in particular
Democritus, have m.
We may suppose that a more detailed account of the history of
m allows us to calculate that FCfly > 0, for many of Democritus’s
ancestors, in a way such that Democritus’s token of m complies with
etiological function. In that case, better dretske warrants a
content attribution to m’s29 positives of There is a fly around.30
But, as Fodor (1990) points out (together with Neander (1995), Agar
(1993), Rowlands (1997), and a great many others since) this is not
the only option we have: there is an alternative, equally satisfactory
explanation of the existence of m that leads in turn to a different
attribution of etiological function and, finally, to a different content
attribution:
democritus and the other content of m’s being on : Many
generations ago, a mechanism m came to be deep inside the brain
of some ancient frog through random mutation. m happened to
indicate instantiations of the property of Being a black speck around
its possessor...
The rest of the explanation is the same as above. Indicating black
specks contributes to the fitness of the possessor of m because, in the
environment shared by Democritus and his ancestors, it has always
been the case that a sufficient number of black specks were flies. And
m does indicate black specks: the probability of m going on conditional
on there being a black speck around S -which is causally grounded- is
much higher than the unconditional probability of m going on.
Thus, etiological function also warrants the conclusion that
m has the function of indicating black specks; finally, through better
dretske , we are led to an attribution of content to m’s positives of
There is a black speck around. There is no fact of the matter as to which one
of these two alternative explanations of the survival of m is the right one
and, consequently, there is no principled reason to choose among the
two alternative content attributions: hence the Indeterminacy Problem.
indeterminacy problem: A theory of content suffers from the In-
determinacy Problem if it warrants multiple content attributions
to one mental state, even in cases where the common-sense con-
tent attribution is univocal.
1.3.1 Different Descriptions, Same Fitness Contribution.
I will now reconstruct the Indeterminacy Problem in a more formal
fashion. It is maybe regrettable that nobody, as far as I am aware, has
taken the time to do it before; all the more so as it provides crucial
insights for solving the problem itself.
29 This is Democritus’s token of m now.
30 Sometimes, informally, instead of using “the content of m’s positives” or “the content
of m’s being on” or “the content of m’s positives” I’ll just talk of the content of m.
Nevertheless, it should be reminded at all times that, rigourously, contents are attributed
to types of states of mental mechanisms -m’s being on, in our example.
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Friends and foes of teleosemantics alike grant that m’s indicating flies
has been fitness conducive for Democritus and ancestors. Thus, if F is












P (on|F) P (off|F)
P (on|¬F) P (off|¬F)
]
FCfly = P (F) ·
[





+ P (¬F) ·
[




But, as I have shown above, there are many properties that m indicates.
One of them is Being a black speck. In fact, m indicates black specks better
than it indicates flies. That is, if G is Being a black speck,
IPblackspeck =
[
P (on|G) P (off|G)
P (on|¬G) P (off|¬G)
]
where values in the diagonal of IPblackspeck are closer to 1 than
those of IPfly, and values outside the diagonal are closer to 0. On the
other hand, this better indication profile is coupled with a different
fitness matrix31:
• A correct positive of black specks, wG11, contributes less to fitness
than a correct positive of flies, wF11 : some of these positives
will be the correct indication of a non-fly black speck. They will,
therefore, have the fitness value of a false positive of flies, wF21.
The percentage of such deleterious correct positives will depend









So, for example, wG11 increases when the probability of m’s firing
in the presence of Gs decreases while the probability of m’s firing
in the presence of Fs is constant. That is, when the probability of
idle firings in the presence of Gs goes down.









then wF11 > w
G
11. A detailed calculation of w
G
11 may be found in
the appendix A.
• A false positive of black specks, wG21, is as deleterious as a false
positive of flies, wF21: what is not a black speck, is definitely not a
fly. wG21 = w
F
21.
31 In the derivations below, I am assuming that P (G|F) = 1. That is, all flies are black
specks. In fact, this assumption could be relaxed and we would still get the same result,
if all the fitness-conduciveness of black specks comes from their being flies.
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• A false negative of black specks, wG12, is less deleterious than a
false negative of flies, wF12: some of these false negatives will be
correct negatives of flies -if the black speck out there is not a fly.
Again, the value of such beneficial false negatives depends on the
















• Finally, a correct negative of black specks, wG22 is as deleterious
as a correct negative of flies, wF22.
The fitness contribution of m seen from the point of view of the indica-
tion of black specks is:
FCblackspeck = P (G) ·
[





+ P (¬G) ·
[




And finally, taking into account that
P (G∧¬F)P (on|G∧¬F) + P (¬G)P (on|¬G) = P (¬F)P (on|¬F)
and that
P (G)P (F|G) = P (F)
it can be shown32, substituting the equivalences between fitness values
calculated above, that
FCfly = FCblackspeck
This is, I submit, the root of the Indeterminacy Problem: regardless
of how we choose to describe Democritus’s situation -i. e., from the
perspective of m’s indicating black specks or the perspective of m’s
indicating flies- we may obtain different pairs of Indication Profile and
Fitness Matrix, but such that they converge in the same Fitness Contri-
bution. And natural selection only cares about Fitness Contributions,
not about from which point of view we look at it.
Assuming, as we must, that the rate of flies over black specks has
remained approximately constant in Democritus’s environment during
selection for m, etiological function warrants an attribution of
function to m of indicating black specks and better dretske war-
rants a content attribution of There is black speck around. It also warrants
32 The detailed derivation is in Appendix A.
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the attribution There is a fly around and a great many others33. In Fodor’s
ingenious slogan,
Darwin cares about how many flies you eat, but not what
description you eat them under. Fodor (1990, p. 73)
1.3.2 Problems In and Out, High and Low.
In order to show the convergence of FCs that grounds the indeter-
minacy problem, I have put wblackspeckij in terms of w
fly
ij . But this
should not mislead the reader into thinking that there is something
intrinsically basic or fundamental about m’s Fitness Matrix as seen from
the perspective of indicating flies. Indeed, we very well may regard the
fitness value associated with hits when indicating the property of Being
a fly as a linear combination of the positive fitness contribution of hits
when indicating Being a fly with no frog-predator nearby and the negative
contribution of false alarms thereof (assuming that m also indicates this
complicated property.) In any event, m’s total fitness contribution will
be the same, either as seen from the perspective of indicating black
specks, flies or flies-far-from-predators.
Philosophers interested in the Indeterminacy Problem (e. g., the above-
cited Neander (1995), Price (1998) and Rowlands (1997)) have described
two kinds of closely-related problems:
the input problem . First, what Price (op. cit) calls The Input Prob-
lem: we can formulate a lowest content attribution, finding the property L






-I will sometimes call L the lowest property. Between the lowest attribu-
tion There is an L around and some (let us call it) “natural” attribution
such as There is a fly around there lie indefinitely many attributions.
A teleosemanticist may defend that the right attribution for a state
is the lowest, with, maybe, some additional constraints. This approach
gives rise to what Rowlands (op. cit.) calls stimulus-based teleosemantic
accounts, Papineau (op. cit.) calls producer teleosemantics, and Neander
(op. cit., where she actually endorses it) calls low church teleosemantics.
The Input Problem is the problem of stopping your theory from endors-
ing ever lower, to the point of totally implausible, content attributions.
For example, Neander’s idea in her (1995, p. 129f) may be described
thus:
neander: A mechanism m’s positives have the content There is an F
around if, at the lowest level of functional analysis at which m is
an unanalysed whole, it is supposed to detect Fs.
I will not get into the details of Neander’s account, but the idea is
that a mechanism such as Democritus’s m occupies a certain role in the
overall functioning of its possessor -it takes certain inputs, and serves
certain outputs to other parts of Democritus. Moreover, m is part of
33 Incidentally, the fact that teleosemantic content attributions are multiply indetermined
in the way we have shown invalidates Rowland’s solution (cf. Rowlands (1997)) of
distinguishing organismic and algorithmic proper functions attributions; the former is an
attribution to Democritus, the latter to its mechanism m. For Rowland’s proposal to get
off the ground we should be able to identify indefinitely many loci to which attribute an
etiological function, one for each competing attribution. This is not a promising project.
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other, larger functional structures within Democritus and, in its turn,
is composed of smaller parts. The level of description at which m is
a standalone, unanalysed component of Democritus, is the level that
fixes its content. In this case, the content is, then, whatever makes m go
on; that is, black specks.
There are several problems with the account -and all other low
church accounts. An important one is that it does not easily allow
for the possibility of misrepresentation without malfunctioning -the
possibility, that is, of tokening a wrong representation through no fault
of one’s own, only because the environment has not been collaborative.
But the problem that interests me most is that such low attributions
are very counterintuitive. In the seminal (1959) paper that gave rise
to the frog example, Lettvin reported feeling ’tempted’ to call the
convexity detectors in the Rana Pipiens eye ’bug perceivers’; not in vain
such detectors work best
when a dark object, smaller than a receptive field, enters
that field, stops, and moves about intermittently thereafter.
Lettvin (1959, p. 1951)
That is, Lettvin was distinguishing, as one should, between what causes
a representation to token -small, dark objects in this case- and its content
-bugs. We should strive at upholding this distinction.
the output problem. Second, the complementary Output Prob-
lem. We can formulate a highest content attribution, by looking for the
property H such that FMH has highest diagonal values and lowest
anti-diagonal values -the highest property. Exactly what function should
be maximised (|w11 +w22|− |w12 +w21|, or what) is unclear, but the
intuition is that the highest content attribution involves the property
that in fact accounts for the success of the possessor of m. It is not
enough that m helps Democritus catch flies; they must also be nutri-
tious flies, far-from-frog-predators flies, not-covered-with-frog-poison
flies, etc. for the possessor of m to improve its fitness thanks to them.
All of these increasingly complicated conditions for success amount to
different proposals for content attribution34.
The version of teleosemantics that defends the highest attribution
as the right content-attribution (again, with some possible additional
constraints.) gives rise to what Rowlands (op. cit.) calls benefit-based
teleosemantic accounts, Papineau (op. cit.) calls consumer teleoseman-
tics, and Neander calls high church teleosemantics. The most popular
brands of teleosemantics are at least extensionally equivalent with some
version of consumer teleosemantics as just characterised. In particular,
in 2.2, once we are in a position to see why, I will show that Millikan’s
biosemantics is, indeed, subject to the Output Problem, at least in cases
such as Democritus’s.
What emerges from this discussion is a continuum of content attribu-
tions (see figure 1), from lowest to highest, depending on the choices we
34 It may be that P (H|on) 6 P (H). That is, things be such that m does not indicate
instantiations of the highest property; e. g., in cases in which a very fallible covariation
is coupled with a very high fitness value of hits. In such a situation better dretske
would not warrant the highest content attributions; reference to the highest property should
be substituted with reference to the highest property such that m indicates it.
This is unlikely to be a problem: the fact that better dretske and related accounts
warrant the highest content attribution is commonly perceived as a weakness, not a
strong point, of the theory.
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Figure 1: A Continuum of Content Attributions
make for Indication Profile or Fitness Matrix35. This was to be expected:
the critical parameter behind selection is the Fitness Contribution of a
state, which underdetermines the Indication Profile-Fitness Matrix pair
that is needed to fix a content attribution. This extra degree of freedom
gives rise to the multiple indeterminacy in content pointed out by foes
of teleosemantics. Input and output versions of the Indeterminacy Prob-
lem are simply different perspectives on the same underlying issue36.
More interestingly, we will see that the solution is equally homogeneous
for both problems37.
35 More rigorously: although, mathematically, there is a real continuum of Indication Profile
- Fitness Matrix pairs, nothing ensures that, for each 〈IPi,FMi〉 pair, there will be a real-
world property i such that m indicates i and m’s Indication Profile from the perspective of
indicating i is IPi. The indetermination need not be as huge as the formalism suggests,
although it will definitely be big enough for the Dretskean teleosemantic project to be in
serious problems.
36 Other philosophers have described the same or closely related issues in different ways:
• The Distality Problem (e. g., Price (1998), Ryder (2004), Stampe (1977)): How are
we to decide whether the content of a mental state m involves a certain entity E,
rather than entities causally downstream from E and upstream from m?
• The qua Problem (e. g., Dretske (1988), Price (1998)): A content account suffers
from the qua Problem in virtue of suffering from the Input Problem or the Output
Problem.
• The Landslide Problem (Enç (2002)): Again, any of the Input or Output Problems.
Enç’s idea being that teleosemantic theories are on a landslide which takes them
to ever lower -or ever higher- content attributions.
The sheer taxonomic variety present in the literature on the Indeterminacy Problem attests
to the importance that philosophers accord to this problem. The Fitness Contribution,
Indication Profile, Fitness Matrix framework can be used to describe all of these varieties
easily. Admittedly, there is a kind of indeterminacy which slips through the framework:
if there are two properties F and G such that both Fitness Matrix and Indication Profile
seen from the perspective of indicating one are the same as seen from the perspective
of indicating the other, the indeterminacy between the F-involving and the G-involving
content cannot be capturedn in this framework. Fortunately, this seems like an unlikely
case. Moreover, the account of content that I will be defending in this chapter takes care
of this kind of indeterminacy just as it takes care of the rest.
37 Another point I’d like to stress, even if it’s obvious, is that, given that the different
indeterminacy problems can be given straightforward expression in the formalism, the
formalism itself (in particular, the assumption that there is a Fitness Matrix coupled with
each different Indication Profile) does not beg any questions against them.
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1.4 the causal back-office
The conclusion of the last section is, therefore, that there is an Indeter-
minacy Problem: traditional teleosemantics, indeed, warrant a multiply
indetermined content attribution. Input and Output Problems are, both,
consequences of the same background difficulty: if the fact that m co-
varies with some property F is evolutionarily useful, in most cases there
will be an indefinitely high number of properties in the vicinity of F
such that m covaries with them too, and this is evolutionarily useful for
the same reasons.
The solution to the Indeterminacy Problem will emerge from spelling
out what we mean by “the same reasons”. We need, I submit, to pay
attention to the causal grounds of the multiple indication relations that
explain, each of them in an independently satisfactory manner, the
evolutive success of m through its history. The general diagnosis will
be that, although the causal underpinnings of attributions of functions
to indicate are not enough to zero in on an univocal content attribution,
among the facts that help explain the existence of a mental state m there
are some, over and above those used in fixing function-attributions, that
do pick out a unique content attribution. So far, this is trivial: there’s
a plethora of causal facts to choose from between the Big Bang and m.
The difficult bit will be singling out of this plethora causal material that
is, first, enough to zero in on a concrete F that is to figure in the content
attribution There is an F around and, second, such that this singling out
is plausibly regarded as grounding content attributions, not as merely
providing an ad hoc solution to the Indeterminacy Problem.
I will presently elaborate on these sketchy remarks, first, by dis-
cussing in more detail which are the kinds of causal facts that must
be in place for attributions of functions to indicate to be warranted.
According to etiological function, we need two different kinds:
• (As per ef3) A causal explanation for (a sufficient number of) the
conditional probabilities in IPF.
• (As per ef4) A causal explanation for (a sufficient number of) the
fitness values in FMF.
I will discuss them in turn38.
1.4.1 Meeting ef3: The Causal Grounds of the Indication Profile
Let us see which kinds of causal facts make ef3 true for a couple
of functions-to-indicate attributions to Democritus’s m. First, it will
simplify the discussion to define m’s input.
input: m’s input is the property F such that
1. m’s indication profile of F is, as a matter of nomological





. That is, m is
always on when F is instantiated around its possessor, and
never otherwise.
2. FCF is such that wF11 > w
F
22.
38 ef1 and ef2 do not require the presence of causal grounds, just the very existence of the
right Indication Profile and Fitness Matrix.
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Clause 2 is necessary because, if there is one property F that complies
with 1, there are two of them: we can redescribe m’s performance
relabelling on and off states the other way round. Under that description,
¬F is m’s input. Postulating that correct positives must be more fitness-
contributing than correct negatives allow us to pick, out of m’s two
possible inputs, the most natural one: e. g., Being a black speck and
not Not being a black speck. m’s input individuates the lowest content
attribution to m.
Now, let us see which kinds of causal facts meet ef3 for Democritus’s
m. I will do the exercise both for the function of indicating flies and the
function of indicating black specks.
from the perspective of indicating flies. Let us suppose,
for the sake of the example, that Being a black speck is m’s input. Then,
what causally grounds the elements in IPfly is, on the one hand, the
mechanism, partly constitutive of being m39, that makes m fire as a
matter of nomological necessity in the presence of a black speck. And,
on the other hand, the fact that many flies are black specks.
Concretely, if P (on|black speck) = 1; P (on|¬black speck) = 0, as
we have just assumed, then
IPfly =
[
P (black speck|fly) P (¬black speck|fly)
P (black speck|¬fly) P (¬black speck|¬fly)
]
So, whatever grounds the conditional probabilities around the agent
of something being a fly given that it is a black speck helps ground
also P (on|fly). The facts that should be cited in this connection are the
abundance of flies around Democritus, an estimation of the uncondi-
tional abundance of black specks, etc. In summary: in order to meet
ef3 we need the external world to collaborate in providing a causal
explanation of the fact that a sufficient number of black specks are flies,
and a sufficient40 number of flies are black specks. Maybe instantiations
of Being a fly cause in some circumstances instantiations of Being a
black speck, or vice versa, or the instantiation of both properties share a
common cause, etc.
from the perspective of indicating black specks . Given that
Being a black speck is m’s input, we need no collaboration of the external
world to make sure that IPblackspeck is the 2x2 identity matrix. The
internal constitution of m is entirely to blame41.
1.4.2 Meeting ef4: The Causal Grounds of the Fitness Matrix
from the perspective of indicating flies . m’s output -those
events caused by m’s going on- involves Democritus’s protracting his
tongue and, subsequently, most of the times swallowing whatever it is
39 For a refinement and explanation of this claim of partial constitutiveness, see 2.5.1.
40 The ’sufficient’ here can be given rigorous expression, with the help of the Fitness
Contribution. The number of black specks that are flies will only be sufficient if it leads
to a FC that explains the existence of m, as per ef2.
41 The caveat I raised in footnote 35 is in order here too: m’s Indication Profile as seen
from the perspective of property F will depend only of the mental state m itself only in
case there exists a property such that it is m’s input. This is a substantial metaphysical
assumption that may not be always met -indeed, I am not sure that it is ever met. The
point, though, is not very important for our current purposes, and we can help ourselves
to the useful fiction that there is such as property.
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that made m fire. Correct positives of flies are fitness-increasing because
and when they lead to nutrient-intake, and such nutrient-intake has in
turn caused differential reproduction in favour of each of Democritus’s
ancestors. Whatever it is that causally grounds, in each generation, the
correlation between instantiations of the properties of Being a fly and
Being frog-food (i.e., causally grounds P (nutrient|fly)) helps ground
wF11. Remember: one causing the other, vice versa, both having common
causes, etc. This explains that instances of Being a fly go together with
fitness-increase; but we already had an explanation for the correlation
between instances of Being a fly and m’s going on (see above).
In case we need to provide causal grounds for the rest of values of
FMfly we will have to appeal to, e. g., how heavily has the idle hunting
of black specks been detrimental for the reproduction of Democritus’s
ancestors (wF21), and how severely the shortage of flies makes letting a
fly pass detrimental for that reproduction (wF12).
from the perspective of indicating black specks . The same
facts cited in grounding FMfly, together with the causal grounding of
the relation between Being a fly and Being a black speck, must be cited here.
The causal story will be complicated by the fact that FMblackspeck
values are linear combinations of FMflyvalues, as calculated in 1.3.1.
1.4.3 Etiological Function is Met. Now, What?
Following the causal entangling of FM and IP for these two cases,
we have been able to “decompose” the causal underpinnings of an
attribution to m of the function to indicate Fs, warranted by etiolog-
ical function. In summary, the world must provide with causal
explanations for a number of conditional probabilities:
• P (black speck|fly) and P (¬black speck|¬fly),
• P (nutrient|fly) and P (¬nutrient|¬fly), etc.
Explaining why these properties tend to go together is enough to
meet etiological function for each attribution of the function
to indicate instantiations of the property Fi -that is, enough to explain
the fact that m has the pair of Indication Profile and Fitness Matrix
〈IPi, FMi〉 for each property Fi. This is all it is sensible42 to ask by way
of causal underpinnings of function attributions.
Unfortunately, the Indeterminacy Problem has taught us that these
causal grounds, the ones that underpin attributions of functions to
indicate, are not enough to fix a unique content attribution for m. . .
1.4.4 The Causal Grounds of the Stability of IP and FM Throughout Selection
for m
. . . Fortunately, on the other hand, barring bizarre thought-experiment
scenarios, if there is selection for m a further causal ingredient will be
in place, and this will be enough to zero in on a concrete natural kind
to figure in the content-attribution. There will normally be an answer
to the question: what makes m have such pairs of Indication Profile
plus Fitness Matrix across the generations needed for selection for m? That
is to say, there will normally be a causal explanation of the fact that the
42 Or, maybe, it goes beyond what is sensible. See below, section 2.1.
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Figure 2: Arete and the Peach Tree
environment remains the same in the respects that ground m’s Fitness
Contribution.
To make vivid the relevance of this requirement for content attribu-
tions, let me introduce a situation in which it is not met.
arete and the peach tree The mental state m is passed from
mother on to daughter in Arete’s family. m works like this: its
input is a cluster of more-or-less peachy properties (peach shape,
the particular shade of red-orange that peaches normally show,
etc.), and it causes its possessor to grab and eat whatever she
finds there where the input properties were instantiated. m has
proven very useful for Arete’s ancestors (Great Great Grandma,
Great Grandma and Grandma), whose diet was chiefly based on
peaches from a nearby peach tree.
But, most unexpectedly, one day the whole population where
Grandma’s daughter, Ma, belonged, was abducted in her sleep
and deposited in Cheap Earth. Cheap Earth is just like Earth,
except that no peaches are to be found there, but a very similar
fruit, the cheap, genetically and causally unrelated to our peaches,
although equally nutritious for creatures such as Arete. During
her stay in Cheap Earth, Ma and the rest of m-endowed mutants
(just a part of the population) survive better than many others
just by doing what they have always done: grabbing and eating
the peach-like object around. Some time later, the remnants of
Ma’s population, including her, is deposited back on Earth. Soon
after that, she gives birth to Arete (cf. figure 2.)
The events depicted in arete and the peach tree (we may
suppose that these four generations stand in for many more) allow
etiological function to warrant an attribution to m of a function
to indicate: in every generation of Arete’s family m’s Fitness Contri-
bution has been positive, and this explains that Arete has m. We may
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discuss the composition of the causal grounds of 〈IPi, FMi〉 pairs in this
example, just as we did in the previous subsection, and we would end
up with the causal grounds of a number of conditional probabilities:
• P (nutrient|peach) and P (¬nutrient|¬peach),
• P (nutrient|cheap) and P (¬nutrient|¬cheap),
• P (peachy thing|peach) and P (¬peachy thing|¬peach),
• P (peachy thing|cheap) and P (¬peachy thing|¬cheap), etc.
The protest that some of these probabilities may not be adequately
causally-grounded is misplaced: they all are. Cheaps and peaches,
alternatively, ground these correlations for each generation. That is, we
can attribute m with the function of indicating the property Being a
peachy thing, according to etiological function: both ef3 and ef4
are met, for all generations.
Nevertheless, it is clear that there is something strange about Arete’s
story, more concretely around Ma’s akmé. What is lacking there, and will
be present in every actual case, is causal grounds for the transgenerational
stability of the 〈IPi, FMi〉 pairs. A number of such pairs converge in a
positive FC for each generation, and all of them are adequately causally-
grounded. But we lack an explanation why such a thing is true, e. g.,
both for Grandma and Ma.
1.4.5 Homeostatic Property Clusters.
So, a better explanation of the survival of m (and, I submit, the type
of explanation that warrants content attribution) has to cite, apart
from the collection of causal facts of the kind we have appealed to
in subsections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2, whatever mechanisms account for the
environment remaining such that m’s Fitness Contribution is the same
across generations.
Of course, bizarre cases such as Arete’s mother never ever happen,
and such mechanisms are in place whenever an m gets to be selected
for its behaviour as an indicator. E. g., genetic heritability among flies
ground the constancy of 〈IPi, FMi〉 pairs in Democritus’s lineage: the
explanation that Being a fly, Being a black speck and Being frog food keep co-
recurring throughout the time needed for selection for m to take place
is that there is an homeostatic mechanism that keeps producing entities
that present more or less those properties: the genetic reproduction of
flies.
My proposal, finally, is that that we identify the natural kind F we
talk about in content attributions to m such as There is an F around with
the kind individuated by:
1. The relatively open cluster of properties the frequent co-instantiation
of which grounds m’s 〈IPi, FMi〉 pairs in each generation, together
with
2. The homeostatic mechanism that explains that such cluster recurs in
time, across the generations needed for selection for m.
Identifying certain natural kinds with a property cluster and its home-
ostatic mechanism, what is customarily called a Homeostatic Property
Cluster, is not new, of course. The idea is originally suggested in Boyd
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(1988), Boyd (1991), as a proposal for the kind of entities that normative
properties such as Being good may be. Boyd’s idea has had some success
in contemporary philosophy of biology, as the right kind of entities for
species (such as fly) to be; defences of this use of Homeostatic Property
Clusters may be found in, e. g., Brigandt (2009) and Wilson et al. (forth-
coming). See also Richards (2008, p. 181) for a quick criticism of this
project.
Neither is it new to use reasons why a cluster of properties recur
as building blocks in naturalistic accounts of content. One prominent
example is Millikan’s development of the concept of real kind in her
Millikan (2000) -with earlier versions of the same idea present since
Millikan (1984). It is unclear, though, that a Millikanian real kind is
individuated by something over and above the causal grounds that
make some properties recur; it is unclear that the properties themselves
play a role. Remarks such as
[Real kinds] are things that have properties, rather than
merely being properties. Millikan (2000, p. 15)
may or may not point to the idleness, in fixing real kinds, of the
properties they normally have. Supposing that Millikan’s account of
real kinds is, more or less, the following:
real kind: The causal grounds C that keep a set of properties recur-
ring together accross time individuates a real kind.
There is at least the following worry with real kind. We sometimes
want to say that a species S1 has evolved into another species S2; most
of the times environmental pressures will have driven the change but
sometimes mere genetic drift is behind the speciation process. It is
difficult to say, in this case, just what in the causal grounds that keep
properties together is there to tell apart one species from the other.
It looks, rather, as if the same causal processes are now responsible
for keeping together a wholly disjunct set of properties, and that it
is partly these new properties that take the two species apart. But,
if so, proponents43 of real kind, which cannot help themselves to
the disjoint sets of properties for kind-individuation purposes, have to
count the two species as the same. This is an implausible result. Leaving
speciation aside, in general, there may well be cases in which typical
or frequent properties have some role in fixing the relevant real kind,
even if not a criterial one.
Another similar idea put to use in a content naturalisation strategy is
Ryder (2004)’s sources of correlation. Also Ryder seems to doubt whether
taking the properties whose recurrence is causally grounded as part
of what a real kind is. When he introduces the notion of ’unified
property cluster’ (2004, p. 213), sources of correlation individuate,
together with ’a set of correlated properties’, these clusters. In the
subsequent discussion, though, he talks of correlation grounds alone as
that which representations are about. It seems, thus, that his account is
subject to the worry about speciation just presented.
In any event, what is new, I venture to say, is the result I have been
arguing for: that something similar to Millikanian real kinds, which I
will call Homeostatic Property Clusters (also HPCs from now on), solve
the Indeterminacy Problem for naturalistic accounts of content. So that
43 Which, let me say again, may or may not include Millikan.
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we do not need to rely on our intuitions about these entities, let me try
to lay down as explicitly as possible what I will be meaning by HPC
throughout this work44.
hpc: Given a class of properties P, and a class of their instantiations,
SEED (I will sometimes call this class a seed of the HPC), if there
is a specialised homeostatic mechanism SHM that explains, in a
certain domain d, a sufficient number of the instantiations in SEED
of properties in P, then there is also the smallest class of properties
P’ such that SHM explains the fact that, in d, the properties in P’
are frequently coinstantiated.
We define an HPC as the entity individuated by
• The set PI’ of those among the instantiations of properties in
P’ that are explained by SHM (I will sometimes call this set
the property cluster of the HPC), and
• SHM.
For simplicity we may understand domain as spatiotemporal domain;
but we should keep in mind that domains are also constrained in other
dimensions: ranges of temperatures, pressures, ion concentrations, etc.
The domain d doesn’t have to be particularly smooth; it may well be
discontinuous and take any shape whatever, but we shouldn’t think of
it as including only the place and time (temperature, etc.) at which the
instantiations in the Cluster occur. It is difficult to be more precise in
this respect, but there seems to be a clear sense in which the domain of,
e. g., flyhood is not exhausted by the places in which actual flies have
been; flies could have occupied a number of nearby places, and flown
following other trajectories. Those are also part of the HPC’s domain.
Let me explain the appeal to ’specialised homeostatic mechanisms’.
A homeostatic mechanism is a type of causal processes that explains
that the environment remains the same across some dimension in some
respect. For example, in the case at hand, it explains that the density of
instantiations of properties in P across space and time remains more
or less constant, at least within the bounds of d. We need specialised
homeostatic mechanisms because there are non-specific homeostatic
mechanisms which explain the frequent coinstantiation of properties in
P, but also of properties such as Being an oxygen-rich portion of atmosphere
in d. For example, one such mechanism is the sum of every homeostatic
mechanism that there will ever be. Such too general mechanisms will
distort the HPC beyond recognition45. Another example; suppose the
Gaia theory is correct, and the Earth is a giant ecosystem. There is a
homeostatic mechanism that keeps it stable across time, and maybe
the mechanism that keeps the density of flies constant across time
is a submechanism of that one46 So we need a way to distinguish
relevant from irrelevant here. One way to do so is to choose the set of
homeostatic mechanisms that explains the frequent coinstantiation of
fewest properties -provided that it explains the coinstantiation of those
in P. This is SHM.
44 What follows is, although obviously indebted to Millikan and Boyd, very much my own
development of the notion of HPC. It is definitely not to be taken as a statement of Boyd’s
position, or of any other philosopher’s.
45 This problem, by the way, although seldom if ever discussed, afflicts every theorist, from
Stampe to Ryder, that makes covert or overt use of real kinds.
46 There are many interesting questions here about mechanism individuation which must
remain outside the scope of this work. I hope to tackle them elsewhere.
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Notice that there is no guarantee that the specialised homeostatic
mechanism in question only explains the coinstantiation of properties
in P; P may be a proper subset of that smallest set of properties. We
want the smallest set P’, and not P, to individuate HPCs at least for
the following reason. Imagine a situation in which a certain animal
-a cat, say- is a prey to some -dogs- and a predator to others -mice.
Suppose we construct the class of properties that enabled selection for a
cat indicator in dogs (mdog) and mice (mmouse). It is likely that mdog
relies on a class that includes properties such as Being nutritious for dogs,
while mmouse relies on a class that includes properties such as Being
dangerous for mice. We do not want to say that the HPC that mice detect
is different from the HPC that dogs detect. This is effectively avoided
by allowing instantiations of P’, and not of P, to individuate HPCs47.
Boyd’s theory of HPCs is customarily taken to be a somewhat de-
flationary account of real kindhood compared to the traditional essence
account of real kinds. This other account has it that real kinds have a
hidden essence -say, Being H2O for water, or Being the element with atomic
number 79 for gold- such that all and only that which has that essence
is part of the real kind in question. I wish the notion of homeostatic
mechanisms to be understood in a way compatible with the essentiality
of essences, when they exist. So, for example, a certain specialised
homeostatic mechanism may have, as a proper part, the fact that certain
molecular structures give rise in certain conditions to certain macro-
scopic properties. If these macroscopic properties are part of the cluster
of an HPC, the fact that it is the molecular structure in question, say, M,
which helps explain that properties recur is an essential property of the
HPC. The twin HPC that is kept in place by molecule M’ is a different
one48.
a hierarchy of hpcs When, in the next chapers, we set about to
explain the possibility of not selected, yet contentful, mental states, we
will need higher order HPCs. Their definition is recursive.
higher order hpc : 1. An HPC is of order 1 iff none of the instan-
tiations in the Cluster is of a property Being an F, where F is
an HPC.
2. An HPC is of order n+ 1 iff any of the properties instantia-
tions in the Cluster is of Being an F, where F is an nth order
HPC.
A higher order HPC provides a causal explanation of the fact that two
or more (lower order) HPCs are frequently coinstantiated. For example,
car is a high order HPC which explains the frequent coinstantiation of
wheels and tyres -which, I am assuming here, are also HPCs. In 2.5 I
discuss the difference between the kind of properties one may find in
the cluster of 1st order HPCs, and properties such as Being an F, where
F is an HPC.
47 Thanks to Sònia Roca for discussion here.
48 There is further discussion of the relation between tradicional-essence real kinds and
HPC in 2.5.2.
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1.4.6 The Content-Attribution Recipe
In sum, I submit, in order to obtain the correct content attribution
for simple mental states such as m’s positives, we should follow the
following recipe:
• First, we need the properties the correlation among which ground
Indication Profile and Fitness Matrix pairs for m. These properties
will be part of the cluster of the HPC.
• Second, we need the causal mechanism that explains the recur-
rence of said properties across generations of the possessors of m
and, therefore, explains that m keeps being fitness-contributing
across generations. This is the specialised homeostatic mechanism
appealed to in hpc (e. g. fly-reproduction, plus whatever en-
abling environmental conditions are needed, such as the presence
of oxygen, a fertile soil, etc.)
Once we have identified these different ingredients of the explanation
of the existence of m, we may now give a content-attribution recipe:
there is an f around: m’s being on has the content There is an F
around if49
tfa1: etiological function warrants, for a number i > 1 of
properties Gi50, the attribution to m of the etiological func-
tion of indicating the instantiation of Gi around its possessor
S.




, of Indication Profile
and Fitness Matrix for each property Gi are grounded on
the frequent co-instantiation of several properties in S’s envi-
ronment. (cf. subsections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2)




pairs remain the same across
S’s lineage is causally grounded on a specialised homeo-
static mechanism SHM that explains51 the recurrence of the
properties appealed to in tfa2 in a certain domain d around
m.
tfa4: F is the natural kind individuated by SHM and the smallest
set of properties P’ such that SHM explains the fact that, in
d, the properties in P’ are frequently coinstantiated.
The notion of causally-grounded in tfa3 is also technical:
causally grounded: A specialised homeostatic mechanism SHM





indicator m across time only if:
49 Not “... and only if”. We are just providing sufficient conditions for a state to have the
content There is an F around, not necessary ones. None of our conscious mental states
meets there is an f around. In subsequent chapters I will enlarge the class of
mental states covered by the theory -including states that have not been selected for. But,
in general, I will only defend the existence of interesting -relevant, frequently instantiated,
etc.- sets of sufficient conditions for contents to exist. I don’t think much of the project
of providing a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. In this, I share the qualified
scepticism about the project of naturalising content vented by Godfrey-Smith (2004b),
Godfrey-Smith (2004a).
50 These properties need not be properties of Fs.
51 That a particular SHM explains or not the recurrence of a cluster of properties may be
a vague matter, with paradigmatic and borderline cases. There may be cases, that is, in
which it is unclear whether a certain HPC is part of the content of a mental state, or
whether the mental state is contentful at all. See, in 2.5.1, the discussion of disjunctive
contents.
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cg1 : The domain in which SHM applies overlaps significantly
with the domain in which m exists; also, a sizeable number
of the property instantiations that have caused m to go on
historically must be part of SEED.
cg2 : SHM does not explain instantiations of the property of
Being m, unless this means that SHM does not explain the
instantiation of any property.
cg1 is there for reasons such as the following: if a number of physical
replicas of flies, but causally unrelated to flies, appear near Democritus
and start reproducing among themselves, although not with normal
flies, and Democritus never feeds on them, we wish to avoid the content
of m’s being on to be There’s a fly-or-swampfly around, where swampflies
are these physical replicas. In general, the appeal to concrete property
instantiations in the definition of HPC is there to avoid that HPC
extensions include causally-unrelated swampreplicas. In cg1 we are
fixing which HPC should be invoked in the content attributed.
cg2 is there to avoid m itself to be part of the Cluster. On the other
hand, we need to admit cases in which a thought is directed to own’s
own thoughts -e. g., a cogito thought, but not only those. So, if ruling
out that the Cluster includes m empties the Cluster, we repeal the rule.
there is an f around is, I submit, an account of the content of
simple mental states that recovers all the advantages of proposals such
as better dretske, without, crucially, falling prey to the Indetermi-
nacy Problem.
To put the main idea under a different light, the proposal is that the
content of these simple, innate mental states should not involve (as
Dretskean teleosemantics wanted) useful properties such that there is
an explanation why they can be detected but, rather, it should involve
the very structure individuated by those properties and this explanation.
This structure (the HPC) is not any random mereological sum of causal
facts and property instantiations, but may be plausibly regarded as a
real kind.
Before finishing this first chapter I will show that this is in fact
a solution to the Indeterminacy Problem, and then I will take up the
question why should we think of there is an f around as offering
content attributions.
1.5 the indeterminacy problem solved
A quick recap: one may provide indefinitely many properties such that,
on the one hand, m indicates them and, on the other, this explains m’s
Fitness Contribution. For example, for Democritus: flyish things; flies;
black specks, etc. Some of them m indicates very accurately (i. e., they
have an Indication Profile that is nearly the identity matrix). Some of
them less so, but, according to better dretske, content attributions
involving each of them are, all, warranted. Another bunch of candidates
for warranted content-attributions surface if we focus on the properties
that ground the fitness gains -that is, properties that maximise values in
the diagonal of the Fitness Matrix: nutritious stuff, frog food, unpoisoned
frog food, etc. Again, each of these properties ground a different 〈IP, FM〉
pair, but all of them amount to the same FC.
Now, the way to solve the Indeterminacy Problem: we have to look
for the properties that explain that conditions ef3 and ef4 of etiolog-
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ical function are met for these alternative content attributions. This
class of properties will be the seed of the HPC -let us call it P.
If Democritus’s m is to be contentful, there has to be a specialised
homeostatic mechanism that has made properties in S recur around
Democritus and its ancestors. In the normal case, this mechanism is fly
reproduction, together with enabling environmental conditions -call it
FR. FR is able to explain the recurrence of the properties in S in a certain
spatial region a (that is, the region where flies are naturally present),
and during a certain time t (from the time in which flies appeared to
the future time in which they evolve to something else).
Now, according to there is an f around, the HPC that must
figure in the content attribution is the one individuated by FR, together
with the set P’ of all properties such that FR explains their recurrence
in a and t (P will normally be a proper subset of P’):
P’ = {flyish things, flies, black specks, frog food, unpoisoned
frog food...}
We happen to have a name in English for such an HPC: fly52. So the
content of [m’s being on] is There is a fly around.
As we have seen, the fact that m has indefinitely many functions
to indicate -the root of the Indeterminacy Problem- is not a difficulty
for there is an f around: the HPC that must figure in the content
attribution remains the same regardless of which such function-to-
indicate we choose.
1.6 how is this content?
Our inquiry on the naturalistic basis of content attributions began with
accounts that propose a causal analysans which appears to have an
intuitive claim to being a candidate for the content of representations.
Thus, simple causal account - general: the things that cause
representations do have a prima facie appeal as possible candidates for
the role of contents, even if, on secunda facie reflection, the Error and
Disjunction Problems have convinced us otherwise. Similarly, better
dretske has intuitive appeal too: contents do seem the kinds of things
that representations may have the function to indicate. Unfortunately,
learning to live with the Indeterminacy Problem is simply not an option.
On the other hand, there is an f around has none of these
imposing problems. I have, I hope, provided sufficient reasons to think
that it is not subject to the Indeterminacy Problem. The Error Problem
is clearly not a difficulty for the account either: e. g., any old black
speck can cause Democritus’s m to go on in the absence of a fly around.
Neither is the Disjunction Problem: the content attributions warranted
by the account are of the well-behaved, non-disjunctive form There is
an F around, where F is an HPC53. The worry I wish to consider now is
whether this resilience to problems against causal accounts of content is
achieved at the cost of not being an account of content, at all. Indeed, the
52 Although this is not important for our present concerns, we may notice that fly is a higher
(at least 2nd) order HPC: one of the properties in the cluster is Being an individual fly,
which is another HPC. In this respect, fly is similar to chair and different from, say, gold
or water. This additional structure in the former but not the latter HPCs is signalled in
language by the use of count (as opposed to mass) common nouns. We will witness the
additional structure doing some work in 4.2.
53 In section 2.5.1 I will provide conditions for the attribution of some disjunctive contents.
Nevertheless, the emergence of systematic abilities to form and entertain disjunctive
contents will have to wait until compositionality makes its appearance, in chapter 4.
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involved condition for being the content of a representation according
to there is an f around does not seem to strike an intuitive chord
the way, e. g., the appeal to functions to indicate does. I wish to argue
that, after secunda facie reflection, it does.
The first thing to note is that there is an f around, just like
better dretske and simple causal account - general abide
by the following general principle:
compressed explanation To provide a content attribution for a
representation type r is to provide a compressed explanation of
the existence of r in a sufficient number of cases.
compressed explanation may be thought of as a partial elucida-
tion of the essence of content: perhaps, after sufficient reflection it is a
priori true that content attributions are, in fact, in the business of explain-
ing the existence of representations. At any rate, all of the theories we
have considered in this chapter comply with it. Take simple causal
account - general. Indeed, that which causes a representation to
token (this is the content candidate according to the theory) figures
in an explanation -the most proximal- of the existence of the caused
representation. Or better dretske: at least under the etiological
understanding of what functions are, to say that something is whatever
a representation has the function to indicate (i. e., its content) is to say
that it figures in an important way in an explanation of the existence of
the representation: had not the ancestors of the representation indicated
it, the actual representation would not exist54.
there is an f around also abides by the principle. In fact, ac-
cording to my theory, one may recover a substantial part of the story
that explains the existence of a (simple, innate) representation just from
its content attribution: the HPC that figures in a content attribution,
indeed, explains how the emergence of Dretskean functions-to-indicate,
that in turn explain the actual existence of the representation, was
possible in the case at hand.
A second thing to note is that what explains the appeal of simple
causal account - general is also present here: there is a real
kind (an HPC) lying about in the environment, and it is this real kind
that brings the representation into existence. At this level of description
both theories are on a par. It is only that, we have found out, not any old
way of causing the representation is sufficient to fix a content; rather,
our investigation has led us to conclude that only a very concrete kind
of intervention of the HPC in the events leading to the existence of
the representation will secure the former a place in the content of the
latter55. The theory I am proposing is the wised-up version of a simple
causal account. To stress the crucial role that, if I am right, causal
54 As I have explained above, Dretske himself is not committed to the etiological theory of
functions, or any other, being the right one. On the other hand, it is maybe telling that most
contemporary accounts that rely on broadly teleosemantic insights also uphold etiological
functions. A prominent counterexample to this is Cummins (1991). But Cummins himself
points out that his account is not after the content of thoughts but rather after “the
content of the representations of a computational system” (id., p. 88).
So, even if Cummins’s theory were correct, compressed explanation may still be
true for the content of thoughts.
55 This is so for selected-for, simple representations. In subsequent chapters we will see
that, in more sophisticated content-crunching creatures, the content of a representation is
sometimes fixed simply by what first caused it to token -or something close to it. This is
possible because the ’concrete kind of intervention of an HPC’ is done at a different level,
e. g., in the selection for the mechanism that creates mechanisms such as Democritus’s m.
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explanations of the existence of representations have in fixing their
content, I will call the theory to be developed in this work, of which
there is an f around is the first building block, Etiosemantics. I will
establish in the next chapter -although it’s probably apparent already-
that etiosemantics is not teleosemantics: indeed, the causal explanation
needed to fix content has as a proper part the causal explanation needed
to fix the biological function of representations.
A final consideration in favour of etiosemantics comes from the
kinds of attributions the theory makes. The account uses as content
attributions the entities that keep together a large number of properties
that are of use to the possessor of the representation -immediately
useful ones such as Being food, and useful for the detection of the
former, others such as Being a black speck. It is likely that the entity
distinguished with this role will not lie at any of the two extremes that
give rise to the Input and Output Problems. In Democritus’s case, for
instance, the entity is fly; one of the “natural” attributions we would
have pretheoretically favoured.
All in all, I hope I have made a case for drawing the following tenta-
tive conclusion: there is an f around, upon reflection, provides
a candidate for the role of content that is as good from the intuitive
perspective as other prominent causal theories of content. This first
impression, I hope, will be confirmed once the rest of the Etiosemantics
theory, to be developed in the following chapters of this part I, is in
place.
On the other hand, there is an f around does not suffer from
the problems of Error, Disjunction or Indeterminacy. It is, thus (and
tentatively) to be preferred to the other accounts discussed in this chap-
ter. In the next chapter I chart more carefully the differences between
etiosemantics and teleosemantics, paying close attention to Millikan’s
version. I will also be more explicit about some of the assumptions of
the theory. Finally, I provide the etiosemantic answer to some well-know
objections to teleosemantics.

2E T I O S E M A N T I C S A N D T E L E O S E M A N T I C S
According to etiosemantics, it is the existence of HPCs enabling the
emergence of functions-to-indicate that guarantees univocity of content.
That there is an HPC around to play the role the theory demands,
however, is not guaranteed by the fact that a mental mechanism m
has an etiological function of the kind teleosemantics builds content-
attributions on. In this respect, etiosemantics parts company with strict
teleosemantics. Section 2.1 explores the kinds of situations in which
teleosemantics and etiosemantics yield different predictions. I defend
etiosemantic predictions by showing how two contemporary broadly
teleosemantic theories fall prey to the Output Problem -Millikan’s
biosemantics- and the Indeterminacy Problem -Shea’s infotel seman-
tics as developed in Shea (2007). I also discuss Papineau’s version of
teleosemantics (2.4), and defend that it only solves the Indeterminacy
Problem under a highly idiosyncratic understanding of what desires
are.
After that I show how even the small fragment of etiosemantics I have
introduced so far can accomodate several semantic phenomena (ref-
erence change, disjunctive contents, etc.), I review some metaphysical
assumptions of the theory, and provide an answer to some well-known
objections to teleosemantics.
2.1 contentless indicators
I have claimed that my proposal of content attribution for simple
mental states parts company with teleosemantics, at least of the bet-
ter dretske variety. One way to see this is with a situation in which
etiological function warrants an attribution to m of the function
to indicate instantiations of a property F around m’s possessor, but
there is an f around does not warrant any content attribution to
m’s being on. It will have to be a thought experiment, though. Cases in
which the states of a mechanism with the function to indicate are not
contentful most probably have never existed and will never exist.
An easy way to provide an example of a contentless indicator is by
modifying the arete and the peach tree example, making Ma’s
case the norm rather than the exception. That is, ensuring that no HPC
plays a role in the explanation of the existence of m:
many earths, many peaches : Not just Ma’s generation but, at
time intervals that correspond roughly with every generation, the
whole population in which she belongs has been, by chance,
abducted and transported to a different planet. Great Great
Grandma and her conspecifics to Earth3, Great Grandma and
hers to Earth2, etc. Such planets are very similar to the Earth, ex-
cept for their not having peaches but, rather, peachesn -different
kinds of fruit, similar in all respects to peaches, but such that for
every i and j, peachesi and peachesj are genetically, and otherwise
causally, unrelated.
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Figure 3: Many Earths, Many Peaches
In general, the nth member of the family line has been abducted,
by the most bizarre of coincidences, to a different planet Earthn.
They have all fed on the peachy nutritious things around (peach,
peach2, ..., peachn) and this has helped them be better off than
conspecifics not endowed with m. This has accounted for m’s
selection, to the extent that, nowadays, m has become fixated in
Arete’s population (cf. figure 3.)
etiological function warrants the attribution to m of the func-
tion to indicate some properties. Take, for instance, the property F:
Having peachy-looks and being nutritious for the likes of Arete1.
• ef1: m has indeed indicated the instantiation of F around its pos-
sessor in a sufficient number of Arete’s ancestors. It has indicated
it in all of them, actually: for all of her ancestors, P (on|F) > P (on)
and, moreover, this conditional probability is causally grounded,
for each ancestor n, on peachesn.
• ef2: Ex-hypothesi, m’s fitness contribution as seen from the per-
spective of indicating Fs has been positive (that is, FCF > 0) for
Arete’s ancestors, and this is part of an explanation of the fact
that Arete has m.
• EF3: There is a causal explanation for (a sufficient number of) the
conditional probabilities in IPF. The main element of the indica-
tion profile, P (on|F), as we have said, is grounded on peachesn: it
is these fruits that ground the correlation between Having peachy-
looks (which is m’s input, remember) and Having peachy-looks and
being nutritious for the likes of Arete. We may further assume that the
overall frequency of peachy things which are not nutritious, and
that of nutritious, non-peachy things that m’s possessor manages
to eat, is comparatively low. This grounds the rest of IPF.
1 If there are such conjunctive properties. This is the kind of hybrid, input-output properties
that Agar (1993) defends as content attributions for the likes of Democritus and Arete.
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• ef4: The positive fitness value of hits derives, precisely, from
the fact that they result in the ingestion of nutrients; now, ev-
ery peachy thing that is nutritious is, unsurprisingly, nutritious.
Whatever grounds P (on|F), then, grounds w11.
In conclusion, m has the function of indicating instantiations of the
property Having peachy-looks and being nutritious for the likes of Arete
around its possessor. As a consequence, better dretske warrants
the attribution of the content There is something with peachy-looks and
nutritious for the likes of Arete around S.
On the other hand, there is no specialised homeostatic mechanism
that helps explain the frequent coinstantiation of the properties that
ground IPF and FMF across generations. Nothing, but chance, explains
that. That ingredient, normally present wherever there is selection for
a mechanism such as m, is absent here. Arete’s m has, therefore, not
managed to zero in on any particular real kind. It is, according to
there is an f around, contentless.
So if, as I have been urging, solving the Indeterminacy Problem for
simple states depends on relying on an HPC that ties together the
causal explanation across generations of the existence of an indicator,
then we have to live with the fact that some states that have the function
to indicate are contentless. I have argued in 1.6 that this should not
be motive of much trepidation: attributing content is a compressed
way of claiming that there is a certain natural structure such that the
existence of a mental state enjoys a certain, quite concrete kind of
explanation based on the former. It may be that function attributions
rely on less specific explanations than content attributions; a greater
number of causal paths may lead to selection for an indicator than lead
to contentful states. In those (most likely never instantiated) cases it is
not implausible to claim that we have enough with the pre-semantic
notion of indication, and content attributions are overattributions.
The reader may, on the other hand, cherish the insight that the
contentful states are all and only the states that have the function
to indicate, and she may wish to strengthen the notion of etiological
function so that these two classes are again coextensional. I’m going to
discuss now whether this is a sensible project.
2.1.1 Strengthening Etiological Function.
Could the strict teleosemanticist, in light of the foregoing discussion,
strengthen her definition of function, adding a condition ef5?
ef5: The fact that ef3 and ef4 remain true for (a sufficient number of)
S’s ancestors is causally grounded.
First of all, it is unclear that she should. It is natural to think that m
in many earths, many peaches has kept on existing because of
the indication relations it has established with its environment. And
this history, it appears, is the kind of thing that warrants etiological
function attributions.
In fact, I suspect that even conditions ef3 and ef4 are spurious
as requisites for a function attribution to be warranted: rather, they
are there because etiological function is a building block for
the construction of a content-attribution recipe. And, as selection
from fitness contribution states, a naturalistic account of the
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biological function of a mechanism should only rely on whether that
mechanism does something that makes its possessor reproduce more
than competing conspecifics. For instance, the much more parsimonious
indication* and etiological function* below also abide by
said tenet.
indication*: A mechanism m’s going on indicates instantiations of a
property F around S iff
i1 : P (F|on) > P (F)
etiological function*: A mechanism m in a subject S has the
function of indicating the instantiation of F around S iff
ef1 : According to indication*, m has indicated the instantia-
tion of F around its possessor in (a sufficient number of) S’s
ancestors.
ef2 : m’s fitness contribution as seen from the perspective of
indicating Fs is positive (that is, FCF > 0) for S’s ancestors,
and this is part of an explanation of the fact that S has m.
But better dretske would yield wildly implausible results using
these two definitions: for example, any random, and randomly benefi-
tial, correlation between the indicator* being on and the instantiation
of a property anywhere would count as providing a content for the
indicator*. So, if the ancestors of Democritus’s token of m’s being on
has correlated, by a bizarre coincidence, with gamma outbursts near
Alfa Centauri, and this has also coincided, randomly, with these ances-
tors being better off after m fired, indication* and etiological
function* would conspire to warrant a content attribution to m’s
being on of There has been a gamma outburst near Alfa Centauri. On the
other hand, there is an f around could use indication* and
etiological function* without any changes in what is deemed or
not contentful
In summary: maybe the notion of function used, or presupposed,
when formulating teleosemantics is unduly strengthened in a way that
suits a theory of content but goes beyond what should be countenanced
by a theory of functions2. All the more so if we throw ef5 in.
Moreover, adding a condition ef5 does not solve the Indeterminacy
Problem. Admittedly, such a definition etiological function**
(i.e., etiological function + ef5), as we wish, does not warrant a
function attribution to m in Many Earths, Many Peaches: ef5 is not met.
So far so good, but, whenever there is an HPC there to comply with
ef5, we still have the whole indeterminacy there for us. Even on Earth,
where peaches play the role that ef5 demands, it is still the case that
etiological function** warrants a function attribution to m of
indicating Having peachy-looks, Being nutritious for Arete, et a great many
caetera. Indeed, this was the conclusion of section 1.3.
The only way to fix etiological function to avoid indetermi-
nacy, in the direction I have been advocating, is to rule that only HPCs
are such that an m has the function of indicating them, thus:
etiological function***: A mechanism m in a subject S has the
function of indicating the instantiation of F around S iff
2 I think Price (1998) is a particularly vivid case of unduly strengthening the notion of
function on the way to solving a problem in semantics. See footnote 3.
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ef1 : According to indication, m has indicated the instantia-
tion of F around its possessor in (a sufficient number of) S’s
ancestors.
ef2 : m’s fitness contribution as seen from the perspective of
indicating Fs is positive (that is, FCF > 0) for S’s ancestors,
and this is part of an explanation of the fact that S has m.
ef3 : There is a causal explanation for (a sufficient number of) the
conditional probabilities in IPF.
ef4 : There is a causal explanation for (a sufficient number of) the
conditional probabilities in FMF.
ef5 : The fact that ef3 and ef4 remain true for (a sufficient number
of) S’s ancestors is causally grounded.
ef6 : F is the natural kind individuated by the properties together
with the homeostatic mechanism that explain that ef2 to ef5
are met.
ef6 should be spelt out in detail, as we have done for the con-
struction of there is an f around. If this is done wisely, better
dretske*** (i. e., better dretske after substituting etiological
function with etiological function***) should end up exten-
sionally equivalent to there is an f around.
There remain two questions about such a view: one is whether this is
at all a sensible analysis of the notion of having the function to indicate;
whether this is salvaging the letter of the teleosemantic proposal at
the cost of its spirit. Intuitively, it seems that many more things in the
world have a function to indicate that are countenanced by etiolog-
ical function***. In particular, the most sophisticated etiological
developments of the notion of etiological function (Millikan’s among
them) are less restrictive. On the other hand, at least one prominent
account is as restrictive as etiological function***: Price (1998).
Price explicitly states that her theory is intended as a solution of the
Indeterminacy Problem in teleosemantics. Now, I think it is dangerous,
as a general methodology, to try to solve problems in one theory (the
theory of content) by tampering with the reducing theory (the theory
of functions). In this case, as I have explained, the tampering has
the unwelcome consequence that less things are deemed to have the
function to indicate than what is plausible. It is a more satisfactory
solution overall to identify contents with the structures that enable the
appearance of functions to indicate, as I have explained3.
3 There are other problems with Price’s account of functions. I cannot provide a close
examination of her theory, but there are at least the following two issues:
• The Abstractness Condition (op. cit. p. 67f) states that the explanation of the
existence of the functional item must not depend on specific features of the design
of said items. This notion of explanation is, as far as I can see, intentional. Price
provides no principled, non-intentional way to ascertain whether the condition is
met. But in the context of the program of naturalising semantics, this is not an
acceptable situation.
• It is extensionally inadequate. Price’s final analysis of function-talk is:
Where d is a device and G is an activity, d has the function to do G iff there
is some type of item E; there is some item e which belongs to E; there is
some type of device D, to which d belongs, and which consists of devices
produced by E-type devices in some manner M; and there is some activity
F, such that:
1. This d was produced in manner M by e;
2. D-type devices have done G;
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2.2 the selected-effects restriction and consumer seman-
tics
It is features about the causal explanation of the existence of contentful
states, over and above those that fix the function of the mechanism that
produces them, that have helped us solve the Indeterminacy Problem
for the content of simple states: the recurrence of a property cluster,
which some homeostatic mechanism keeps in place, helps explain such
existence while at the same time individuating a natural kind. The
causal requisites of function-attribution are less strict.
In many senses etiosemantics is very congenial with traditional
teleosemantics: the explanations of the existence of m I have appealed
to are of the kind standardly used to ground function attributions,
although they go beyond those needed to ground such functions. I will
now discuss in more detail other respects in which the proposal at issue
fares, I think, better than its competitors. In particular, better than the
very influential family of views frequently discussed under the name
of consumer semantics and, specially, Millikan’s account.
I will start with an important objection to Dretskean teleosemantics as
codified in better dretske: the Selected Effects restriction. Functions
are what devices are supposed to do -as opposed to what devices are
supposed to be done to. As Neander puts it,
biological proper functions are effects for which traits
were selected by natural selection. Neander (1991, p. 168,
my emphasis)
This restriction makes it difficult -though not impossible- to account for
the very plausible idea that the content of some mental states has partly
to do with whatever has caused it in its ancestors. Given that, as Neander
points out, functions are selected effects, strict teleosemanticists cannot
directly help themselves to the input pattern of a mental state in order to
fix its content; even if the input pattern has played a crucial explanatory
role. Thus, Millikan:
A problem with Dretske’s view is that it is hard to see
how it could be the function of any biological device literally
3. The fact that e produced this d by M is explained partly by the fact
that by doing G, D-type devices have helped to bring it about that
e or other E-type items which are ancestors of e did some further
thing F;
4. There is nothing which D-type devices did in the past which would
provide a more immediate explanation of e producing this d;
5. G is characterised in terms of some effect which D-type devices were
able to bring about by themselves;
6. The truth of the explanation referred to in 3 does not depend on
specific features of the design of those D-type devices, or of any other
devices which worked in conjuction with those devices to bring it
about that e or e’s ancestors did F.Price (1998, p. 68)
Consider the following case: someone starts sweating, the sweat wets his shirt and this
makes him uncomfortable, which, in turn, causes further sweat. And take:
• d: a drop of sweat.
• D-type: drops of sweat.
• G: wetting shirts
• e: a sensation of social uncomfortability
• M: nervous sweating
• F: Increase, or perpetuate.
In this case, certain drops of sweat have the function of wetting shirts.
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to effect the production of one of his “indicators.” To do so,
the device would have to effect that certain statistics should
hold. Millikan (1993, p. 129)
As I have said above, I think it is correct to insist in the fact that
functions cannot be causally upstream from the functional device. This
is an important requisite for the philosopical theory of functions. I have
also said that we should not feel constrained by this requisite when
building our theory of content. If the best theory of content involves, as I
think it does, mechanisms whose selection has been, in part, explained
by their Indication Profile, so be it. We should stop talking of functions
in the reduction base, and rather talk of pseudo-functions, and move
on.
Anyway, if we stick to functions as opposed to pseudo-functions,
we’ll need to say that the function of a mental representation will have
to do solely with whatever it is supposed to cause downstream in
the cognitive system of which it is part. That’s how we get to another
important insight of traditional teleosemantics; the one in virtue of
which it is also called consumer semantics: it is facts about the way
the output of the representation (i. e., whatever it causes) is utilised
(consumed) by mechanisms causally downstream which fix (in a way
that varies according to each theory) the content of the representation.
Some summaries and expositions of consumer semantics make (what
I take to be) an error at this point4. Take, for example,
On the teleosemantic approach, content depends on how
consumer mechanisms interpret representations. It depends
on the behavioural output, not the informational input.
The content is that condition under which the resulting
behaviour would be appropriate, whether or not the actual
circumstances that caused the representation are of that
type. Macdonald and Papineau (2006, p. 6)
It is simply not true that consumer semantics are committed to identi-
fying content with the “condition under which the resulting behaviour
would be appropriate”; at least because this would be a terrible theory.
Take, for instance, MacDonald and Papineau’s example of a content
attribution according to this paradigm:
[A mental representation] is a snake representation be-
cause it makes you behave in a way appropriate to snakes,
given your biological ends. And this will remain the case
even if you are pretty bad at recognising snakes. The produc-
tion mechanism for this representation may be triggered by
toy snakes, by other slithery animals, indeed by the slightest
hint of a slither, yet the representation will still stand for
snake, if it is specifically snake-appropriate behaviour that
it prompts. (ibid.)
It may well be that a snake-representation remains so “even if you are
pretty bad at recognising snakes”, but, under this view of consumer se-
mantics, it does not remain a snake-representation if you are pretty bad
at displaying snake-appropriate behaviour. Now, surely, less-than-perfect
snake-appropriate behaviour (behaviour that does not distinguish be-
tween, say, snakes and lizards) can be fitness improving in many cases.
4 This may be simply necessary to fulfil their roles as summaries and expositions, which
calls for a sacrifice in rigour to improve clarity.
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Moreover: there are many situations in which the most appropriate
behaviour is not snake-selective in the least. When a mouse flees it does
not do it in any particularly anti-slithery way. But, under McDonalds
and Papineau’s version of consumer semantics, one needs such selectiv-
ity to snakes in the consumer end of the representation to credit it with
snake-involving content. This would be, as I say, a very uncomfortable
result.
But consumer semantics can choose other, more reasonable ways in
which the way the representation is consumed helps fix its content. For
example, in Millikan’s biosemantics, contents are to be identified with
the conditions that held in the occasions in which past responses to
the output of the representations helped explain the selection of the
representation’s producer. Let see the process at work in Democritus’s
example:
1. A certain mechanism (m, in our example) produces a couple of
representations (m’s being on and m’s being off ).
2. M’s being on is consumed in the following way: it causes its
possessor to protract its tongue. This has been useful in a number
of occasions because, at the right end of the tongue, there was
nutritious stuff. As a result, m has been selected for. Part of what
makes m useful, also, is that it is off most of the time when
there is no food around. This avoids idle resource expenditure in
protracting the tongue when there is nothing good to catch.
3. m’s being on and its being off, in the relevant situations -i. e.,
when there has been selection for m- correspond to (or, in Millika-
nian terminology, map onto) the conditions of There being frog food
around m’s possessor and There not being food around m’s possessor,
respectively. These are to be considered the contents of the two
states.
[T]he systems that use, that respond to, the frog’s fly
detector signals, don’t care at all whether these correspond
to anything black or ambient or specklike, but only whether
they correspond to frog food. (...) So the firing means frog
food. Millikan (1991, p. 163)
I have stated in 1.3.2 that Millikan’s biosemantics is subject to the
Output Problem. We can now see why: in 2. above, after “This has
been useful in a number of occasions because, at the right end of the
tongue, there was” we can write many things apart from “nutritious
stuff”. In fact, what is important is that at the right end of the tongue
there is non-poisonous nutritious stuff -nutritious, but otherwise toxic
stuff not being what makes tongue protracting useful- so this is what a
consumer-semanticist should settle in for as content. Or should it be
non-poisonous frog food such that there is no frog-predator near it? Etc.
Millikan’s account, in cases such as Democritus’s, seems to have to
settle in for the highest content attribution; maybe something along
the lines of There is something good for frog digestive systems around. This
attribution seems artificial or, at any rate, more artificial than the content
etiosemantics attributes in this case: There is a fly around.
Millikan has mounted a sophisticated defense against this charge,
involving what she has recently been calling local natural information
(cf., e. g., Millikan (2004, 2009)). Before discussing this defense, I will
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point out one important difference in the predictions that etiosemantics
and biosemantics make.
2.2.1 Millikan’s Normal Conditions.
We have seen the way in which Millikan abides by the selected-effects
restriction while still honouring the importance of external conditions,
the ones that cause mental states to fire, in fixing the content of repre-
sentations:
The content of the descriptive sign is not determined
by the tasks its consumer performs. It is determined by
what the sign needs to correspond to if the consumer is to
perform its tasks in its normal way. The producer’s job is
merely to make a sign that corresponds in the right way to
a world affair. If it does this in its normal way, by its normal
mechanisms, the intentional sign it makes will also be a
natural sign. Millikan (2002, p. 79f)
A mechanism such as Arete’s m in arete and the peach tree has
a function, i. e., a collection of selected effects -roughly, making Arete
grab and eat the things that make it fire. That is, the consumer of m, c,
is some relevant part of Arete’s motor control engine, whatever it is. We
may assume that c contributes to Arete’s fitness whenever the things it
makes Arete grab and eat are nutritious for her. This is enough for c’s
“performing its tasks”. As with Democritus, the descriptive sign in this
example is m’s going on, and m is the producer of these signs.
So, according to Millikan, it is enough for m to fulfil its function that
it goes on whenever the grabbing and eating will secure nutritious stuff
for m’s possessor. Under this perspective, in arete and the peach
tree, Ma (the one that lives and thrives in Twin-Earth, out of twin-
peaches) has an m that performs its function impeccably: it contributes
to Ma’s fitness by providing correct advice about what to grab and eat,
and what not to.
But m’s function is not the only source of normativity for m’s perfor-
mance. The way in which it fulfils its function is also subject to appraisal:
there is a privileged, normal way for m to work. This normal way5 must
be cashed out as involving the conditions in which, historically, m was
when it performed its function (cf. Millikan (1984, p. 33f)) If so, m does
not contribute to Ma’s fitness in a normal way: if it has signalled nutri-
tious stuff for m’s possessor, it has historically done so by relying on the
causally-grounded correlation between peachy-looks and nutritious-
ness facilitated by peaches. That very causal grounds are not present in
Ma’s case; so m is not a natural sign of nutritiousness in the abnormal
conditions present in Cheap Earth. But in normal conditions it is such a
natural sign. This effects the reconciliation between the selected-effects
restriction and the fact that representations are, normally, natural signs.
One must try to avoid being lulled by vocabulary such as “normal”
or “selection”. Millikan’s proposal is made in the context of a naturalis-
ing effort. In that context, such vocabulary is admissible only if it can
be cashed out in clearly naturalistic terms. “Selection” is, at bottom,
differential reproduction in some natural context or other. “Normal”
is whatever feature was present during selection. Now, we can easily
envisage cases in which normal conditions as defined are not, what
5 In older writings by Millikan it used to be “Normal”, capitalised.
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we would intuitively call, normal. In those conditions, Millikan’s con-
tention that the intentional sign will be a natural sign is wrong. many
earths, many peaches is, precisely, one such case: the conditions
prevailing during selection of m (that is, the normal conditions) do not
allow m to zero in on any particular natural sign of nutritiousness.
What natural signs provide in everyday selection cases, an overwhelm-
ing good luck provides in this particular case. Millikan’s biosemantics
yields the prediction that m’s being on has a content along the lines
of There is nutritious stuff for the likes of Arete around here; but, if this is
so, m’s being on has a nutritiousness-involving content without m’s
being on being a natural sign of nutritiousness. This is not a problem in
general for contentful states; we have a great many contentful mental
states which are no natural sign of their content -beliefs about impossi-
bilities are an extreme case. But, I think, it is a problem for these very
simple states which, intuitively, have content in virtue of their tracking
substances around them.
I have stated in 2.1 that content is doing no real job in these cases, and
that it is explanatory enough to say that m has the function to indicate
that property -or, we might add now, the selected-effects cognate that
Millikan prefers. We have in the present discussion further reasons to
think that this is so: Millikan rescues natural signhood as a consequence
of the mechanism of selection in everyday cases. But this puts things
upside down: what happens in fact is that environments are, normally,
stable enough to allow for selection for some mechanisms which rely on
this stability. Content should be identified with this selection-enabling
stable features. If not, in the abnormal -but nomologically possible- sit-
uations in with selection takes place without environmental constancy,
we are forced to provide content attributions which are uncalled for.
the use of thought experiments. Millikan has repeatedly (e.
g., in Millikan (1989a) and Millikan (1989b)) voiced her disapproval of
thought-experiment-driven philosophy. She does not intend her eluci-
dations of function, sense, content and the like to be analyses of the
common-sense concepts behind those terms. Rather, they are to be
appraised solely on the basis of their theoretical fruitfulness. If a theo-
retically fruitful concept conflicts with some of our intuitions about the
applicability of its common-sense counterpart, so much the worse for
the latter. So, a thought experiment cannot prove wrong Millikan’s defi-
nitions, which are postulations, not analyses. If this is correct, many
earths , many peaches has no force against Millikan’s attributions
of function and content.
I am sympathetic with this qualified scepticism about thought experi-
ments and, like most everyone else, agree that the right attitude to take
is one that strives for a reflective equilibrium between intuition and
theory. There are a couple of things that may be rejoined in this con-
nection, though. First, the role of the thought experiments presented in
this chapter is only to make vivid a theoretical proposal: that content is
to be thought as fixed by natural structures (such as HPCs) that enable
selection for indicators. Thought experiments can be used to show that,
although it may be assumed that Millikan’s biosemantics adheres to
that proposal, it actually does not. Second, a theory’s conforming with
our intuitions in the evaluation of one thought experiment or other, we
may agree with Millikan, is not a terribly important datum in favour of
said theory. But it surely is not against the theory that it explains some
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of our intuitions. All in all, if we have to choose among two theories
whose predictions coincide among them and with common sense in all
everyday scenarios6 and differ in their prediction about some recherché
scenario, I submit, it is rational to accept the theory that tracks common
sense in that very one scenario.
2.2.2 Biosemantics and the Output Problem
In a recent summary of Millikan’s views, Millikan (2009), there is a brief
(but, as far as I am aware, the most explicit) discussion of the Output
Problem:
Taking for her example the female-hoverfly detector in
a male hoverfly’s visual system, Karen Neander (1995) has
objected that among the external conditions needed for the
detector’s consumers to perform all their functions are that
the female is fertile and that she won’t be eaten before she
reproduces, hence that on the biosemantic theory these facts
about the female must be part of what is represented by the
detector in the male’s visual system. What this overlooks,
however, is that an intentional icon [for our purposes, this
is interchangeable with what I have been calling a simple
contentful state - MM] must also have a producer and that
it must be a function of the producer to make an icon that
corresponds to the condition it represents. If the producer
has a function there must be a normal mechanism by which
it performs that function. This, however, would require the
male hoverfly’s visual systems to be sensitive to natural
signs of fertility in female hoverflies and of liability not to
be eaten. But on no theory of information, certainly not
on the theory of local natural information, does the male
hoverfly use or even encounter any such natural information.
Millikan (2009)
This discussion presupposes the following setting: male hoverflies have
a detector (we will call it m) that fires when a shadow of a certain shape
and at a certain speed crosses the hoverfly’s retina. m’s going on causes
the hoverfly to dart in a certain direction, calculated from the speed
and angle of the shadow, which in a sufficient number of times helps
the hoverfly reach a fertile female to mate with. The case is described
in Millikan (1990), Millikan (1993).
Millikan’s argument seems to be the following.
1. If There is a fertile female hoverfly around is to be warranted by
biosemantics as a content-attribution to the state m’s being on of a
male hoverfly, the state’s producer m should have as a function
to produce a state that corresponds to the condition of being a
fertile female hoverfly.
2. If m has such a function, there must be a normal mechanism for
its fulfilment.
3. Such normal mechanism must involve m’s sensitivity to natural
signs of fertility in female hoverflies.
6 I don’t think this is the case with consumer- and etiosemantics, but let that pass.
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4. But the male hoverfly does not encounter information upon which
to build such a sensitivity.
5. Hence, the content-attribution in 1 is not warranted.
I have just argued against 3 above: it is not true that normal mechanisms
must involve sensitivity to natural signs. If there are no such natural
signs, normal mechanisms cannot involve sensitivity to them, and I
have shown how etiological functions of the relevant kind may emerge
-to be sure, only in bizarre, unlikely cases- in the absence of natural
signs. Anyway, this is a moot point here: even if 3 need not be the case,
it is surely the case as a matter of fact in actual hoverflies.
The real difficulty, it seems to me, comes with 4. It is, to begin with,
not true that “on no theory of information” does the male overfly
encounter information about fertility in female hoverflies. Take indi-
cation: in many cases we may perfectly well have that
i1: P (Fertile|on) > P (Fertile) and
i2: The difference in probabilities in i1 is causally grounded.
That is, m indicates instantiations of the property of Being a fertile female
hoverfly7, and this indication relation is causally grounded, even if m is
unable to distinguish at all between fertile and infertile hoverflies. I. e.,
even if P (on|Fertile) = P (on|Infertile). This is because the percentage
of female hoverflies that are fertile stays approximately constant, for
reasons having to do (I hypothesise) with the rate of genetic mutation
and environmental conditions leading to infertility, and which provide
the causal grounding for the relevant probabilities. In such a case, m
indicates instantiations of the property of Being a fertile female hoverfly
without needing to exploit a natural sign that is specific to fertile (as
opposed to infertile) females8.
What about Millikan’s own theory of local natural information? Al-
though, in the passage quoted, she explicitly denies that m carries local
natural information about fertile female hoverflies, it is unclear that
this follows from the characterisation she has made (in Millikan (2004,
chapter 3) and Millikan (2007)) of this notion:
[A sign carrying natural local information] is one that
corresponds to its represented in the same way, and for
the same reason, that other signs of the same recurrent
type correspond to theirs, and where there is a reason why
examples of this kind of correspondence (with the same
kind of cause) tend to spread from one location into nearby
space-time locations. Millikan (2007, p. 453)
If this is a strict definition, the matter is easy to settle: m does carry
natural local information about fertile female hoverflies. There are
causal reasons -mutation rates, environmental conditions; see above-
why a sign that loosely corresponds to female hoverflies also loosely
corresponds to fertile female hoverflies, and a reason why this kind
of correspondence tends to spread -the rate of fertile hoverflies gets
7 Or, in Shea (2007)’s terms, m carries correlational information about it. See next section.
8 By, the way, it is possible that it also indicates the property of Being an infertile hoverfly.
This is not a problem for Millikan: such property is, surely, not the one the consumer
needs and therefore is out of the question as a candidate for content. It is not a problem
for me either: it is one of the properties the specialised homeostatic mechanism that fixes
the content brings along for the ride. See below for my take on the hoverfly case.
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copied with hoverfly reproduction, relevant environmental conditions
stay put, etc.
In an earlier discussion Millikan claims that the reason why m carries
local natural information about female-hoverflyhood but not fertile-
female-hoverflyhood is that,
The domain in which the hoverfly operates is one in which
the chance that the shadow crossing its retina, assuming that
it is of a female hoverfly, is also of a fertile female not about
to be eaten is no higher than the chance of any arbitrary
female hoverfly being fertile and not about to be eaten. By
contrast, assuming that it is the shadow of a hoverfly, the
chance of the shadow being that of a female is considerably
higher than the chance of an arbitrary hoverfly being female.
Millikan (2004, p. 85f)
That is, on the one hand,
P (fertile femalehoverfly|Mison∧ femalehoverfly) 6
P (fertile femalehoverfly|femalehoverfly)
while, on the other hand,
P (femalehoverfly|Mison∧ hoverfly) >
P (femalehoverfly|hoverfly)
The theoretical reason behind the change of conditions in the proba-
bilities above and below is not perfectly clear. For example, it is also
true that
P (fertile femalehoverfly|Mison∧ hoverfly) >
P (fertile femalehoverfly|hoverfly)
which, paraphrasing Millikan, means that
... By contrast, assuming that it is the shadow of a hoverfly,
the chance of the shadow being that of a fertile female is
considerably higher than the chance of an arbitrary hoverfly
being a fertile female.
Again, this is so because of the fact that the rate of fertile females
hoverflies in the female hoverfly population is sufficiently large, and
a number of causal processes ensure that this remains so. But this is,
if we are to judge by the passage just quoted and for reasons that
are quite unclear, irrelevant to m’s carrying local information about
fertile-female-hoverflyhood.
Moreover, in the same passage, Millikan defends that m carries local
natural information about hoverflyhood because
the chance of the shadow crossing [the hoverfly’s] retina
being that of a hoverfly rather than that of some other small
particle of matter is also very much raised. (ibid.)
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Which, I take it, can be rendered as
P (hoverfly|Mison∧ someparticle) >
P (hoverfly|someparticle)
But, again, it is also true that
P (fertile femalehoverfly|Mison∧ someparticle) >
P (fertile femalehoverfly|someparticle)
That is, paraphrasing Millikan again,
the chance of the shadow crossing [the hoverfly’s] retina
being that of a female fertile hoverfly rather than that of
some other small particle of matter is also very much raised.
All in all, there is no principled reason to deny that m carries local
natural information about fertile-female-flyhood. And, without such a
reason, Millikan’s biosemantics is still subject to the Output Problem.
Millikan (in personal communication) has suggested that this dis-
cussion shows, indeed, that she should accept There is a fertile female
hoverfly around as the right content attribution to m’s being on. But that
is as far as we need to get: further attempts to push the biosemantic
content attributions towards the highest attribution will involve prop-
erties which m does not carry natural information about; say, Being a
fertile female hoverfly such that it won’t be eaten before it reproduces. Surely
that’s not the kind of thing m can carry information about?
In fact, I think it is a virtue both of Millikan’s theory of local natural
information and of indication that, according to them, mental states
do carry information about (indicate) these properties. Again, the flying
stuff that causes the right kind of shadows on the hoverfly’s retina is,
more often than not, a female hoverfly, which are, more often than
not, fertile, which in turn are, more often than not, lucky enough not
to be eaten before reproducing -and this not by chance, either: the
density of predators is what it is, and the homeostatic properties of
the ecosystem will ensure that this remains so. Of course, if you nest
enough [more often than not, for a reason] operators, you will reach a
property that m does not indicate (carry information about). But the
highest property such that m indicates it will already be too high to be
a natural content-candidate.
It is maybe useful to see how etiosemantics deals with the hoverfly
case. Part of the interest of the case has to do with the rule the male
hoverfly follows to calculate its response to the retinal shadow. In this
connection, Millikan has defended that biosemantics offers a response
to Kripkenstenian sceptical considerations. I will have something to
say about Millikan’s discussion of this feature of the case in 4.5 but,
for the purposes at hand it is enough if we concentrate on a content
attribution to m’s being on of the kind There is an F around. We have
seen that biosemantics is forced to put very high properties in place of
the F. What about etiosemantics?
We know that m indicates, better or worse, a number of properties:
Being a flying thing, Being a female hoverfly, Being a fertile female hoverfly
that will not be eaten before reproducing, etc. m has an Indication Profile
and a Fitness Matrix for each of these properties; and each such pair of
Indication Profile and a Fitness Matrix allows to calculate a (the same)
Fitness Contribution according to which etiological function
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warrants attributions to m of the function of indicating instantiations
of all of those properties. We may, in the way shown in 1.4.1 and 1.4.2,
find out which properties must be frequently coinstantiated around m’s
possessor. We will end up with a list of properties including:
• Being a body of more or less such and such a shape darting at
more or less such and such a speed
• Being a suitable mating partner for a male hoverfly
And many others. There is a specialised homeostatic mechanism that
keeps most of these properties together in an spatiotemporal region
(a, t) that overlaps sufficiently with the region in which m gets selected
for: hoverfly reproduction plus the sex-determination process that
results in a female, plus enabling conditions such as an atmosphere, etc.
The smallest number of properties that such a specialised homeostatic
mechanism keeps together in (a, t), together with the mechanism itself,
individuate an HPC that may be plausibly taken to be identical to the
real kind female hoverfly. The content of m is, thus, There is a female
hoverfly around.
There is a standard rejoinder to objections such as the Output Prob-
lem from friends of teleosemantics: it is, after all, a good thing that
such simple creatures as frogs and hoverflies are predicted to have
mental states with slightly unfocused contents. Perfectly determined
contents are best reserved for sophisticated cognisers such as human
beings. In particular, according to Millikan, it is open to the theorist
to suppose, plausibly, that the consumer systems in human brains are
extremely picky, and that satisfying their needs will require representa-
tions to map onto much more precise states of affairs. I would like to
say something about this rejoinder.
First of all, a minor point. This rejoinder looks like an afterthought:
teleosemantists have stumbled upon this family of problems, and given
the difficulty of providing what, after Schiffer (1996), we may call a
happy face solution to the problem, some of them have settled in for
the “unfocused is fine” reply. Etiosemantics offers a true happy face
solution to the problem: the content of frogs’ and hoverflies’ mental
states involve, as we originally wished, flies and hoverflies. This is
maybe a reason to rethink the afterthought.
A second, maybe more important worry is that the content biose-
mantics predicts for the male hoverfly’s mental state m is not really
unfocused or indeterminate. The content, very determinately, involves
the highest property such that m’s being on carries natural local infor-
mation about it, be it Being a fertile female hoverfly, Being a fertile female
hoverfly that will not die before reproducing or whatever. The problem is
not the indeterminacy, but the implausibility of the content attribution.
Etiosemantic attributions are, prima facie, more appealing.
This is obviously not a knockdown argument against biosemantics:
our intuitions regarding the contents that frogs and hoverflies entertain
are shaky at best, and we may well sacrifice a measure of plausibility
in these, the shady corners of the theory if it means better fit with
the paradigmatic data: human contents. A third problem with the
Millikanian rejoinder comes at this point: that the human consumer-
systems are picky enough to solve the Output Problem is an interesting
hypothesis, but one that has not been developed in anything like the
necessary amount of detail even in Millikan’s writings. As matters
stand, It may not be unwise, if possible, to design a theory that provides
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determinate contents in these very basic stages, which may then work as
building blocks for more sophisticated contents. I submit etiosemantics
may be such a theory.
2.3 shea’s infotel semantics
Recently, Shea (2007) has advocated a Dretskean theory of content as a
solution to an objection by Godfrey-Smith (1996) to traditional teleose-
mantics. In this section I will, first, briefly present the objection, along
with Shea’s solution; after that, I will show that Shea’s Infotel semantics
falls prey to the Indeterminacy Problem for exactly the same reasons
that other broadly Dretskean proposals -such as the one presented in
1.2- fail. I will finally show that etiosemantics solves the Shea/Godfrey-
Smith objection at least as well as infotel semantics and is, therefore, a
better package deal.
2.3.1 The Behaviour-Explanation Objection
One of the chief uses to which we put content attributions is the
explanation of successful behaviour. Thus, e. g., our successful goings-
to-the-fridge are explained by our there’s-a-beer-in-the-fridge doxastic
states -Shea (2007, p. 410f); see also the introductory remarks to chap. 3
in Dretske (1988).
But, the objection goes, an explanation of a piece of behaviour ac-
cording to which such behaviour is caused by a representation with
thus-and-so a content is substantive only if the content of representa-
tions is not, in its turn, fixed by appealing to the success conditions of
the behaviours it tends to cause. That would be a very thin explanation,
if not outright circular.
And it is precisely, according to Shea, the teleosemantic content-fixing
strategy:
teleo: In the past r caused a consumer subsystem to behave in a way
that contributed systematically to survival and reproduction only
if r truly represented that C. Shea (2007, p. 416)
According to Shea, the traditional teleosemanticist wishes to defend
that the left-hand side is constitutive of r’s truly representing that
C. Take now the following schema of a content-based explanation of
successful behaviour.
behaviour explanation: The piece of behaviour B has contributed
to survival and reproduction because it was caused by a represen-
tation with the content C.
Plugging teleo into behaviour explanation, we get
behaviour explanation - teleo: The piece of behaviour B has
contributed to survival and reproduction because it was caused by
a representation r such that, in the past, things of the same type
caused a consumer subsystem to behave in a way that contributed
systematically to survival and reproduction.
There are a couple of minor wrinkles in the derivation of the very
thin behaviour explanation - teleo from behaviour expla-
nation and teleo: first, it is unclear whose survival and reproduction
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is relevant in behaviour explanation. The “chief use” of content
attributions appealed to above is in order to explain the behaviour of
cognitive subjects such as persons or animals. It is much less common
to use content attributions to explain the behaviour of their cognitive
subsystems. If so, it is persons’ and animals’ survival and reproduction
that is relevant in behaviour explanation, and teleo (which
talks about survival, reproduction and behaviour of cognitive subsys-
tems) should be modified before plugging, maybe by working out the
not entirely straightforward relation existing between animal-survival
and subsystem-survival.
Second, teleosemantics is not such a thin explainer as Shea appears
to suggest. According to traditional teleosemantics, there are other
facts constitutive of r’s having the content C that are explanatorily
relevant, apart from the fact appealed to in teleo (i. e., that, in the
past, a number of behaviours have contributed to survival as a result
of being caused by r). In particular, the cognitive subsystem whose
behaviour we are in the business of explaining has a concrete function
in the mental economy of its possessor. It is this concrete function that
fixes the behaviour of r, not just some general usefulness of its doings.
Teleosemantics, that is, can at least provide the following9:
behaviour explanation - teleo*: The piece of behaviour B has
contributed to survival and reproduction because it was caused
by a representation r such that, in the past, things of the same
type caused a consumer subsystem to display behaviour B, and
this contributed systematically to survival and reproduction.
This other version does not sound quite as (although, admittedly, it
still sounds rather) thin. In any event, in the discussion to follow, I plan
to grant Shea that teleosemantics can only provide behaviour ex-
planation - teleo by way of explanation of a piece of behaviour10.
Shea’s solution is to add an extra necessary condition for a repre-
sentation r to have content C: r must indicate that C11, and its having
done so in the past must figure in an explanation of the actual existence
of r. In Shea’s own terminology:
infotel semantics: A representation of type r has content C if
is1 : rs are intermediate in a system consisting of a producer and
a consumer cooperating by means of a range of mediating
representations (all specified non-intentionally), in which
every representation in the range also satisfies is1 to is4;
9 We do not need to modify teleo to provide for this reading: we just need to read the
quantifier governing “a way” as taking wide scope.
10 Given that my main target is not Shea’s argument against traditional teleosemantics, I
will not discuss Millikan’s rejoinder, in Millikan (2007), to the effect that, even if such
explanations are thin, they are explanations nonetheless and, in fact, they are the kinds
of explanations we are giving when attributing a content, or a function, to a device.
I do agree with Millikan that explanations come in degrees, and there is no reason why
behaviour explanation - teleo should not count in some contexts as a perfectly
adequate answer to a request for information about a piece of behaviour. But, as I have
urged throughout this and the previous chapter, and shall be presently stressing again,
content attributions rely on an explanation of the existence of a mental state that is far
more substantial than behaviour explanation - teleo -or Shea’s alternative, for
that matter. So, in my view, the point about the explanatory adequacy of traditional
teleosemantics is moot.
11 Indication above only covers the case in which C is of the form There is an F around S.
Here I am helping myself to the following notational variant from Indication: r indicates
that there is an F around S iff r indicates instantiations of F around S.
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is2 : rs carry the correlational information that condition C ob-
tains;
is3 : an evolutionary explanation of the current existence of the
representing system adverts to rs having carried information
about C;
is4 : C is the evolutionary success condition, specific to rs, of the
behaviour of the consumer prompted by rs. Shea (2007, p.
419 - I have renamed the four conditions)
The picture Shea has in mind, and its translation to the terminology
I have been using, is the following:
• r is produced by some mechanism and consumed by some other
(in a cognitive system, maybe, although not necessarily); r is
one of several alternative representations that the mechanism
produces. This is condition is1. In the Democritus example we
have been studying, r’s producer is m, and r is, e. g., m’s being
on, which is one of two alternative representations: m’s being on
and its being off.
• Condition is2 (as Shea glosses it in his paper) amounts to P (R|C) >
P (R) in some local domain D, and this conditional probability be-
ing causally grounded. That is, if C is there is an F, and D is around
m’s possessor, condition is2 amounts to m’s being on indicating
that there is an F around m’s possessor.
• Conditions is3 and is4 amount to saying that the producer’s
Indication Profile (in is3) and Fitness Matrix (in is4), as seen
from the perspective of the indication that C, are part of the
evolutionary explanation of the existence of r.
That is, Shea’s Infotel semantics may be regarded as, give or take, a
notational variant of the better dretske theory of content I intro-
duced in 1.212. It is to be expected, then, that Infotel semantics displays
the same kind of indeterminacy we found in better dretske + eti-
ological function + indication.
It does: take the following two attributions of content to m’s going on
in Democritus the frog: There is frog food around and There is a black speck
around. Does infotel semantics warrants them?
• is1: This condition is content-independent, and m’s going on
complies with it. As I said above, the alternative representation is
m’s going off. The producer is m itself, and the consumer is (say)
Democritus’s tongue-protracting device.
• is2: Ex-hypothesi, P (on|C) > P (on) for both contents.
• is3: There is an evolutionary explanation of the current existence
of m’s on state -for instance, one along the lines of Etiological
Theory- that adverts to its having carried the information that
there was a black speck around m’s possessor. On the other hand,
12 Shea (2007, p. 419, fn. 23) also remarks the congeniality of Infotel semantics with Dretske’s
theory of content. According to him, Dretske’s theory of content relies on learning and
not evolution, and is, therefore, not a version of teleosemantics. This is true for contentful
states such as our beliefs and desires, but not so true for simpler contentful states
such as those of some marine bacteria, frogs and the like (what Dretske calls Type III
Representational Systems) in which content is indeed constrained by evolution, and not by
learning, in approximately the way I described in 1.2.
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there is another, equally adequate explanation that adverts to
there having been frog food around m’s possessor. Remember
the gambit: both explanations converge in the same Fitness Con-
tribution for m, and Fitness Contributions is all evolution cares
about.
• is4: Shea glosses this condition thus:
[A]n (historical) evolutionary explanation of the sur-
vival and reproduction of the representing system ad-
verts to C’s obtaining when rs were tokened. Shea (2007,
p. 419, fn. 22)
Again, there are at least two evolutionary explanations available,
etc.
2.3.2 Etiosemantics and Behaviour Explanation
In sum, Infotel semantics falls prey to the Indeterminacy Problem. This
was probably to be expected: the proposal is engineered to comply with
the explanatory-substantiality constraints that Shea wishes to enforce;
but, as we have seen in earlier sections, whenever there is a substantial
explanation of the existence of a representation of the kind Shea favours,
many other, equally substantial explanations are also available.
This problem, it may seem, has no bearing on his project: after all,
Shea is concerned only with the Behaviour-Explanation Objection, and
his proposal does solve this problem: according to Infotel semantics,
a state is not contentful unless it indicates that C, and this indication
relation substantiates content-based explanations.
indeterminacy undermines explanatory relevance . But one
could raise the issue that the Indeterminacy Problem seems to have con-
sequences also in Shea’s area of interest. Remember, he is in the business
of defending that explanations such as behaviour explanation
are substantial:
behaviour explanation The piece of behaviour B has contributed
to survival and reproduction because it was caused by a represen-
tation with the content C.
If I am right and infotel content-attributions are multiply indeter-
mined, the following worry appears to be in order: if two content-
attributions C and C* to a representation r are warranted, in what
sense does its having content C in particular helps explain behaviour B?
It appears that content-based explanations abhor indeterminacy in the
following sense: an explanation of behaviour B based on its having
been caused by a representation with the content C must be, at the
same time and for all alternative contents C*, an explanation based
on its having been caused by a representation with the content C as
opposed to C*. Alternative content-attributions appear to undermine
one another’s claim to explanatory relevance in causing a piece of
behaviour, in a way in which, e. g., alternative function attributions do
not: the answers “The alarm is ringing because you are smoking your
pipe under a smoke detector” Millikan (2007, p. 440) and “The alarm is
ringing because you are smoking your pipe under a fire detector” are
not clearly incompatible.
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the explanatory relevance of hpcs. Even if one wishes to
defend that such undermining is, in the case of simple contentful
states, benign at worst13, etiosemantics remains a better package deal
than infotel semantics: not only does the former not suffer from the
Indeterminacy Problem while the latter does; moreover, it solves the
Behaviour-Explanation Objection better than the latter: Shea added to
teleosemantics the constraint that a representation only has the content
that there is a fly around if it indicates that there is a fly around.
The requirements for a representation according to Etiosemantics are
stronger: it must carry correlational information, better or worse, about
a bunch of property instantiations -those in the Cluster- and such that
there is a mechanism that explains the recurrence of such properties
in the environment of the representation’s possessor. So, explanations
that Infotel counts as substantial enough -e. g., those present in many
earths, many peaches- do not succeed in grounding a content-
attribution according to etiosemantics. The latter needs more substantial
explanatory facts to be available.
I suggest the conclusion of this discussion of Shea’s theory, then,
is that etiosemantics remains a better package deal. Not only does it
solve an important problem (indeterminacy) infotel semantics does not
solve, it has more stringent informational constraints so that, if infotel
semantics solves the problem of the explanation of behaviour Shea was
concerned with, etiosemantics, a fortiori, solves it as well14.
2.4 papineau’s teleosemantics
David Papineau (1987, 1993, 1998) has proposed a different approach to
the indeterminacy problem. In this section, I first quickly reintroduce
the Indeterminacy Problem using his terminology and -after providing
a quick reminder of why, I think, my own account is not subject to
the problem- I go on to present Papineau’s solution, and raise two
objections against it: the first is that, for his account to work, desires
need to be individuated in a very non-standard way -e. g., efferent
nerves and maybe even hands need to be literally part of the desire for
food-; the second is that the account only provides a content attribution
for structures that have antecedently been identified as beliefs or desires.
And it is unclear what exactly is to effect this identification: for example,
in other accounts it may be suggested that beliefs are structures that
share a particular kind of content, but this is not an option for Papineau
-a certain state has some content or other partly in virtue of the fact that
it is a belief. Without such an account of what beliefs and desires are,
Papineau’s proposal is incomplete.
2.4.1 The Concertina Problem
Papineau agrees with almost everyone in believing that there are mul-
tiple satisfactory explanations of the existence of certain biological
traits:
[I]magine that a species of highland antelope has some
distinctive trait T which has been selected because it (a)
13 Shea does not feel that his project is constrained by common sense intuitions about
content; this gives me reasons to think that his answer to the worry raised in the
foregoing paragraph would be one of polite dismissal along these lines.
14 More on behaviour explanation in 3.10.
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alters the antelope’s haemoglobin structure (b) increases
oxygen uptake (c) enables the antelope to live on higher
ground (d) gives it access to a plentiful food supply (e)
increases reproductive success. Papineau (1998, p. 2)
This plurality of explanations, according to Papineau, gives rise to
the Concertina Problem of function attribution: there is no fact of the
matter as to which of these effects is T’s function. Alternatively, we
may understand this plurality as leading to an analogous function
plurality: T is supposed to alter the antelope’s haemoglobin structure,
and increase oxygen uptake, and... In any event, this function plurality
(indeterminacy), Papineau argues, leads to problems in consumer-
teleosemantic accounts such as the following:
The teleological theory [identifies] the content of an infor-
mational state with the circumstances in which it . . . leads
to advantageous effects. Papineau (1998, p. 3)
This proposal, according to Papineau, falls prey to the Concertina Prob-
lem: consumer semanticists, Millikan among them, propose that Dem-
ocritus’s m’s being on represents frog food, “because it is only when food
is present that the frog action has advantageous effects” -Papineau (1998,
p. 3). But, Papineau continues, any other member of the Concertina of
effects for m would do just as well: health-preserver, reproduction-enhancer,
etc. The Indeterminacy Problem again.
Let me quickly remind why etiosemantics, if I am right, does not face
a Concertina Problem: Certain instantiations of the properties Being a
health-preserver for frogs, Being a reproduction-enhancer for frogs and the
like are part of the property cluster that partly constitutes the HPC
fly, just as instantiations of the property Being a black speck are. They,
together with the homeostatic mechanism of fly-reproduction, will zero
in on the very same natural kind. The concertina of effects is closely
related to a concertina of properties that, in turn, can double as the
seed of an HPC -see 1.4.5. This is the real kind to be used in the content
attribution; thus, There is a fly around.
2.4.2 Papineau’s Solution
Papineau proposes a different solution to the Indeterminacy (Con-
certina) Problem. Suppose we have a belief b, and we wish to provide a
content attribution for it. Papineau believes we need to focus on one
among the many “advantageous effects” appealed to in the quote above.
One way to do so is to concentrate in the satisfaction conditions of the
desires that the behaviour prompted by b helps to satisfy. We could
render Papineau’s proposal approximately as follows:
papineau: The content of a belief b is There is a fly around if its biologi-
cal function is to be present in those circumstances in which the
behaviour it prompts will satisfy the desire for catching a fly.
That is, Papineau proposes to modify the consumer-semantics insight
according to which the content of a mental state are the Normal condi-
tions for the state to help fulfil the function of its consumer, concentrat-
ing on one such particular consumer: the desire that the belief serves.
Desires have a certain concrete content -involving, say, flies or food or
black specks-, and we can profit from this determinacy in fixing the
content of the beliefs that help satisfy them.
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In earlier work Papineau considers some objections to this proposal,
having to do, e. g., with actions based on more than one belief, or
false beliefs that nevertheless help satisfy desires -cf. (Papineau 1993, p.
74f). I propose to discuss here a more fundamental worry: this account
will only work if there is a way of providing for determinate desire-
contents, and this seems as difficult a task as providing for determinate
belief-contents. Are we back to square one, then?
Of course, Papineau is alive to this worry. His strategy to provide
desires with determinate contents is an adaptation of Neander’s low
church teleosemantics (see 1.3.2). We could render his proposal regard-
ing the content of desires as follows:
low church desires: A mechanism m’s positives are a desire for
Fs if, at the lowest level of functional analysis at which m is an
unanalysed whole, it is supposed to bring about the acquisition
of Fs.
The idea is to think of a cognitive system as a set of nested boxes. A
particular desire is a box which contains other boxes, and which sits
inside others15. The content of a desire has to do with the function of
the desire’s box, independently of the other boxes it has inside (thus
the unanalysed whole restriction), or the box/es inside which it sits (thus
the lowest level of functional analysis restriction).
So, consider a desire of which we want to say that it’s a desire for food.
Such a desire (which we may assume is a certain physical state) has a
concertina of selected effects (Papineau 1998, p. 11): that you move your
arm, that the spoon enters your mouth, that you acquire food, that the
food be digested etc. low church desires should single out that
you acquire food from the rest of effects. According to Papineau, it does:
The initial stages in the concertina of results [e .g., that
you move your arm, that the spoon enters your mouth]
depend as much on the beliefs behind your behaviour as on
the desire itself. (If you didn’t believe that there is food in
your spoon, your desire for food wouldn’t make you put
the spoon in your mouth. . . ) Papineau (1998, p. 12)
Papineau suggests that we deal with this part of the concertina by
asking that the content of the desire be one among the effects that the
desire is always supposed to produce -not just in combination with this
or that belief. Now, to deal with the rest of effects in the concertina (e.
g., that food be digested, that you survive and reproduce):
If we apply Neander’s analysis, then we see that the
function of acquiring food is nevertheless specific to this
desire. For the non-fulfilment of the further functions, like
digestion and reproduction, doesn’t show that this desire
is malfunctioning, since these further functions depend not
just on the desire doing its job, but also on other traits, like
the digestive and reproductive systems, doing their jobs too.
Papineau (1998, p. 12)
That is, the effects to be screened off are, in fact, effects of a larger
system that includes the desire together with, e. g., the digestive and
15 The analogy gets awkward when one is forced to think about a box sitting inside two
different boxes such that one is not contained in the other, but I hope the idea is clear.
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reproductive systems. After ruling these out, acquiring food is the only
effect that remains a candidate to be used as content for the desire, as
we wanted.
Mendola (2006) has claimed that this account of the content of beliefs
and desires is circular: the strategy for screening off part of the unde-
sired effects makes an appeal to “the beliefs behind behaviour” (see
above) and, particularly, to the content of these beliefs: “if you didn’t
believe that there is food in your spoon, your desire for food wouldn’t
make you put the spoon in your mouth” (my emphasis). But the con-
tent of beliefs was supposed to depend on the content of desires; if the
content of desires depends on that of beliefs, we launch a vicious circle.
Or, at least, as Mendola (2006, p. 314) points out, a “spiral into the past”
where the content of beliefs depends on that of desires, which depends
on that of previous beliefs which depends...
It is difficult to see what Papineau’s rejoinder could be. Some of his
writings -I’m thinking of (Papineau 1993, p. 73)- suggest that he may
want to propose that his analysis of the content of beliefs and desires
should be applied simultaneously to every belief and desire in the spiral,
in a diachronic ramsification of sorts. Much more would need to be said
about how to make this work, though. In any event, I have a different
worry to press: if Papineau’s proposal is to stand, we need to individuate
desires in a highly non-standard way.
2.4.3 Individuating Beliefs and Desires
Consider again the reason Papineau provides for leaving out of a
desire’s content effects such as food being digested: food may fail to be
digested and the desire still be functioning correctly, because the failure
may be happening elsewhere; in the digestive system, say. If this is the
right way to keep food being digested out from the content of desires,
it must be that the analogous maneuver is not available for the effect
acquiring food: if the desire is tokened and food fails to be acquired it
must be because the desire has malfunctioned.
For this to be the case, the desire itself must stretch out all the way to
the motor control areas, the efferent nerves and beyond, up to the hand.
Otherwise, one could deny that acquiring food is to be counted as the
content of desires in the same way that digesting food was filtered out.
Paraphrasing Papineau, one could say that
the non-fulfilment of the function of acquiring food doesn’t
show that this desire is malfunctioning, since this function
depends not just on the desire doing its job, but also on
other traits, like the efferent nerves and the hand muscles,
doing their jobs too.
That’s why I was suggesting that desires appear to be strange beasts
in Papineau’s philosophy of mind: they quite literally stretch down
my arm to the tip of my fingers; and if I suffer demyelinisation in the
efferent nerves connecting my brain to my right arm, my desire for
food is physically changed16.
16 In fact, I think, Neander would not agree with Papineau that the specific function of a
desire may be something like acquiring food. If we are to judge from what she says about
the frog’s m mechanism, it is likely that she would take the function of a certain desire to
be some of its effects in neighbouring brain mechanisms; acquiring food seems, indeed,
to need of the concerted effort of a great part of the human body, well beyond a certain
mental state or other.
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This is an implausible consequence, and an important drawback to
his theory as it stands; but it also points to a more general shortcoming
of his account of content, which has to do as well with the individuation
of beliefs and desires. Papineau’s account aims at providing a content
attribution to a certain structure that has been independently characterised
as a belief. The account does not comment on what makes a certain brain
structure a belief, or a desire. Rather, it takes as a given that it is one
or the other or neither. But, if a theory of content of the kind Papineau
is interested in developing does not establish this kind of facts, it is
difficult to see what will. For example, in a theory such as Millikan’s,
one can characterise beliefs as the mental states that have a content of
a certain kind -maybe with some other structural constraints- and do
the same with desires. This is not an open option for Papineau because,
according to his theory, something does not have a determinate content
or other unless it is already a belief, or a desire.
Papineau cannot easily help himself to the traditional functionalist
idea according to which something is a belief if it has a causal role of a
certain kind. The combination of this view with a teleosemantic account
of content is unstable: for example, it would turn the swampman -a
physical replica of Donald Davidson that has emerged in a swamp
as a result of the purely random recombination of molecules- into a
creature with as many beliefs and desires as we have, but such that all
of its beliefs and desires are empty -not just gappy, mind you, but blank
through and through. That would be a monster generated by theory if
anything is17.
Papineau has not provided a theory of the content of beliefs until
he has provided a theory of what makes a certain structure a belief
-and it is unclear how he could go about providing that. As it stands,
his theory does not seem to deal satisfactorily with the Indeterminacy
Problem.
2.5 more on hpcs
Once a number of basic tenets of the theory have been presented, and
some of its differences to some contemporary teleosemantic approaches
charted, I wish to go back to the characterisation of HPCs. In the
present section I introduce what we may call disjunctive HPCs, and
the possibility of reference change. I also discuss some of the relations
between traditional-essence real kinds and HPCs as I have defined
them. Finally, I draw a clearer distinction between the property Being
an F, where F is an HPC, and traditional properties such as Being a red
square.
2.5.1 An Explanation for Several Semantic Phenomena
disjunctive contents In arete and the peach tree I stip-
ulated that Ma’s abduction is a one-off situation in the story of Arete’s
17 . . . Although I cannot help but note the Beckettian beauty of such a swampman. For
Papineau’s take on the swampman see Papineau (2001). In this paper he defends that we
need not worry about swampmen as far as they remain safely confined in counterfactual
situations. Míguel Ángel Sebastián has suggested to me an elaborate way in which
something sufficiently similar to a swampman may actually exist -involving a DNA
sequencer hooked up to a random-number generator, and advanced in vitro technology.
It would be interesting to explore the import of such examples for Papineau’s views on
the swampman. This will need to be matter for future work, though.
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Figure 4: Disjunctive Contents
family. Consider, instead, a scenario in which roughly half of Arete’s
ancestors had fed on cheaps (cf. fig. 4). What is the content of m’s being
on, then?
In this situation we have a cluster of properties that is held together
by two different specialised homeostatic mechanism. One of them,
together with the property cluster, individuates the real kind peach;
the other, the real kind cheap. In such a case we probably wish to say
that the content of m’s being on is, as the content of jade is, disjunctive:
There is a peach-or-cheap around. A simple way to accomplish this is by
introducing the following notation
disjunctive hpc: Given a set of properties P, if there are i sets of
specialised homeostatic mechanisms SHMi that explain the fact
that, in a domain d, the properties in P are frequently coinstanti-
ated, then there also is a disjunctive HPC individuated by the set
of every HPC Fi which, in their turn, are individuated by:
• The smallest set of properties Pi’ such that SHMi explains
the fact that, during a certain time period t and in a certain
spatial area a, the properties in Pi’ are frequently coinstanti-
ated, and
• SHMi.
To ensure that disjunctive HPCs do what we want them to do, we
have to tweak tfa3 in there is an f around, to rule that a state
has a content involving disjunctive HPCs only if
1. Every SHMi explains to a certain, sufficiently1 high degree, the
fact that the properties in P are frequently coinstantiated through-
out the generations needed for selection for m.
2. Only the whole set of SHMs explains to a sufficiently2 high degree,
the fact that the properties in P are frequently coinstantiated
throughout the generations needed for selection for m.
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Where sufficiently1 marks the point at which we want to say that
a certain HPC has a non-negligible participation in the explanation
of the existence of m, and sufficiently2 marks the point where we
want to say that the existence of m is satisfactorily explained. There
are paradigmatic cases of reliance in a disjunctive HPC, the situation
depicted in fig. 4 being one of them. In that case we may say that
m’s being on has a content involving the disjunctive HPC peach-or-
cheap. There are also paradigmatic cases in which there is no reliance
in an HPC. Take, again, many earths, many peaches. Here the
notation just introduced allows us to talk of the disjunctive HPC peach1-
or-peach2-or-...-peachn. But such disjunctive HPC is not to be considered
as part of the content of m’s being on in the story: no SHMi explains
to a certain, sufficiently1 high degree, the fact that the properties in P
are frequently coinstantiated throughout the generations needed for
selection for m.
Of course, it may be that the properties of Being sufficientlyi explanatory
are vague properties and that, for some mental states, it is unclear
whether a certain disjunctive HPC is or is not part of its content; or
whether the mental state has content at all.
reference change . If, after a sufficient number of generations of
feeding on peaches, Arete’s family starts feeding on cheaps and keeps
doing that for ever more, after some time we may wish to conclude that
m’s being on has stopped meaning There is a peach around and started
meaning There is a cheap around: given that peaches are nowhere to
be found in Arete’s environment, genetic drift would have ended up
mutating away from m; but m sticks with Arete’s family because it is
still useful. Only the explanation of its usefulness has changed. Now it
must make reference to a different real kind.
This would not be a well-described possibility if a mental state was
individuated by its content. Luckily, they are not, or shouldn’t be.
Plausibly, the right way to individuate mental states is what Millikan
(1984, p. 23f) calls reproductively established families. Without entering in
the painstakingly detailed treatment of the notion in the op. cit., the
idea is that what makes a certain mental mechanism a token of the
type m is that it derives from other m tokens through a process similar
to reproduction18 that preserves a certain reproductive character, that
is, a relevant set of properties, which may include m’s causal profile
-what causes it to go on, and what its going on causes. Belonging to
a certain reproductively established family is what makes a certain
mental mechanism a token of m.
The independence of m-hood from content, together with the fact
that etiological function is a modern-history theory of function
(cf. the discussion of condition ef1 in 1.2.3) is enough to accomodate
the possibility of reference change.
2.5.2 Traditional-Essence Kinds vs. HPCs
It is useful to distinguish two types of real kinds. On the one hand, those
such as water or gold that have what may be called traditional essence. In
such real kinds a hidden essence accounts for all or most of the visible
18 It is not the commonsense notion of reproduction because, e. g., it has to make room
for the fact that a legged daughter may be born from a mother without legs. For further
details see Millikan (1984).
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properties which are normally associated with them. Thus, the property
Being made of H2O molecules helps account for the transparency, liquidity
at ambient temperature, disposition to dissolve ionic compounds, etc.
of water.
On the other hand, there are kinds such as tiger or mammal, used in
biology, and maybe even others such as Renault Megane -cf. Millikan
(2000)- or good -cf. Boyd (1988). The problem of the essence of such
natural kinds is perceived as much more pressing; to the point that it’s
natural to conclude that they have no hidden essence at all. The insight
I’m adhering to by using the notion of HPC is that a causal mechanism
that keeps properties together may be enough to bring a real kind into
existence, even in the absence of a traditional essence -although, as I
said in 1.4.5, traditional essences may be an essential ingredient of some
HPCs.
It is unclear that creatures as simple as Democritus or Arete, accord-
ing to my account, can secure reference to traditional-essence real kinds
such as water. This is so because something’s being water -that is, being
H2O- cannot fulfill the whole explanatory bill etiosemantic demands
for content attributions to be justified. Being water, in the traditional
sense, fails to explain the sufficient density of instantiations of proper-
ties in the cluster (transparence, liquidity, etc.) in the domain in which
a certain mental state may be selected for. But, without an explanation
of such density -i. e., of the frequent co-ocurrence of properties in the
cluster- we do not have enough grounds to attribute content in the
simple cases we have been seeing19.
The closest analogue to water that a creature such as Democritus
can entertain is an HPC in which the traditional essence Being H2O is
supplemented with a mechanism that explains that molecules of H2O
keep appearing around Democritus in the spatiotemporal region in
which an H2O indicator is selected for. In the case of water it may be
something similar to the water cycle: water recurs in the environment of
the agent -a nearby river does not run dry, for instance- because water
downstream is heated and travels upstream as vapour. A story should
be told -rather, some story should be the true cause- why water keeps
happening around the agent. So, the real kind closest to water that
one of these simple creatures will be able to entertain contents about
is an HPC whose specialised homeostatic mechanism is constituted by
being H2O together with the water cycle. Maybe a not totally unfitting
English name for such an HPC is Earth water.
A similar thing would happen with gold. Imagine a population of
microorganisms that use gold for some purpose -there is none, that I
know. If an indicator with Being shiny and yellow as input mutates into
existence in one of these creatures it may get selected for, and we may
want to say that the indicator’s being on means There is gold around.
For very simple creatures, this will not be the right content, but, rather,
There is gold* around, where gold* is individuated by a homeostatic
mechanism constituted by Having atomic number 79 and whatever it is
that explains that more gold is sufficiently near most amounts of gold
in the environment of these microorganisms. Maybe a name for such
an HPC would be This chunk of gold.
19 Beyond a certain threshold of sophistication, content-crunching systems, such as the
ones introduced in chapter 4, will not have this particular limitation because some of
their contents will depend on homeostatic mechanisms, such as physical laws, which are
universal.
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Fly and hoverfly are special in that they are HPCs which enjoy an
English name; and it may not be a coincidence that the most common
examples of very simple contentful states discussed in the literature
on content are about these kinds of entities. The lesson to draw from
this discussion is that reference to traditional-essence kinds is a more
sophisticated cognitive feat than reference to HPCs. I think, in fact,
that the phylogenesis of contents is perfectly upside down from what
Russell-style empiricists would have hipothesised: the first contents to
appear involve HPCs; then come contents involving traditional-essence
real kinds; and only then contents involving properties such as Being
red or Being square. I will be saying nothing about the emergence of
contents involving the latter properties in this dissertation. That will
remain matter for future work.
2.5.3 Kinds and Properties.
The thing to which the most basic contentful states refer, I have been
arguing, are HPC real kinds. States with similar intrinsic complexity
as the ones I am crediting with content -e. g., states that have the
same causal powers under some suitable description of their intrinsic
behaviour, such as input in 1.4.1- are contentless precisely because
they do not owe their sustained existence to a suitable relation with
a real kind. This is, for example, the case with m in many earths,
many peaches.
Let me call Shoemakerian properties those individuated by their intrinsic
causal contributions, along the lines of Shoemaker (1998):
Any property has two sorts of causal features: “forward-
looking” ones, having to do with what its instantiation can
contribute to causing, and “backward-looking” ones, having
to do with how its instantiation can be caused. Such features
of a property are essential to it, and properties sharing all of
their causal features are identical. Shoemaker (1998, p. 59)
I am unsure that Being an F, where F is an HPC, is a Shoemakerian
property: instantiations of Being an F can only be caused by the spe-
cialised homeostatic mechanism in play, from other instances of the
very same property -or suitable ancestors thereof, up the phylogenetic
stream. So, the backward-looking features of an instantiation of Being F
are episodes of further instantiations of the same property causing it,
via the homeostatic principle. We can formulate in a compact fashion
said backward-looking features, together with its forward-looking prop-
erties. Suppose that the HPC F is individuated by a set of Shoemakerian
properties P’ and a specialised homeostatic mechanism SHM:
shoemakerian version of being an hpc: λx[an instantiation of
x caused its instantiation, via the specialised homeostatic mecha-
nism SHM; and it causes other instantiations of x and events of
type t]
Where events of type t are whatever events the instantiation of Being
an F normally causes -prey of F to abandon the scene, for example, or
predators to appear.
This Shoemakerian version does not fix what it is to be an F. This
is because the HPC F is a concrete, spatio-temporally situated entity,
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not completely defined by its causal profile: it is the sum of the par-
ticular instantiations of a cluster of properties -these could very well
be Shoemakerian- together with the homeostatic mechanism that links
them. Other things, replicated in the same way from the same homeo-
static mechanism, will not be that very HPC.
This may lead to conjecture that the most basic mark of a contentful
state may be that the explanation of the existence of the state involves,
in the ways I have been detailing through the chapter, a concrete HPC,
and not just a collection of Shoemakerian properties. And we may,
subsequently, reformulate our solution to the Indeterminacy Problem.
There is a clear sense in which all that frogs care about are the forward-
looking causal features of Being a fly: these are the features that account
for frogs detecting flies, and for frogs being fed by flies. And Fodor is
also right that a number of real (and not so real) kinds are such that
the property of Being a fly has the same forward-looking properties as
the property of being those other kinds has, in the environment of the
agent (e.g., Being a black speck and what have you.) What Fodor and
other fans of the Indeterminacy Problem failed to see is that the fact
that such forward-looking properties recur in the environment of the
agent is an indispensable part of the explanation of the persistence of
the contenful state, and this recurrence is explained by an homeostatic
mechanism that, together with the property instances Fodor recognizes,
fixes an HPC once and for all. No indeterminacy remains, because if
Being an F -where F is an HPC- is the property that fits this explanatory
bill, there is no alternative property Being an F* -where F* is an HPC-
that does, too.
2.6 related objections
Before finishing this chapter, and with it this first, long exposition of
the very basics of etiosemantics, I wish to show how the theory deals
with a couple of prominent objections to teleosemantics.
2.6.1 Objections to the Real-Kinds solution
Etiosemantics provides grounds for one attractive idea explored in the
literature on teleosemantics: the suggestion that the explanation that
is to ground content attributions must appeal to the detection of real
kinds -cf. Sterelny (1990). We don’t need to appeal to a, seemingly,
ad-hoc preferability of real kinds as intentional objects for simple mental
states. Rather, it is only real kinds, and not other, less natural entities,
that enable the selection for indicators. This is why it is real kinds that
must figure in content attributions to basic mental states.
Nevertheless, doubts have been raised about the suggestion that the
most basic contents involve real kinds: according to Neander (1995),
naturalistic accounts of content ought to account for the existence of
basic contents that involve non-real kinds:
Birds have an innate preference for ripe fuit, and some-
times for mates with vivid red tails, so presumably they
have representations of colors, and so color kinds had better
count as natural kinds, or we will have shaved too much.
But in virtue of what would they count as natural kinds? (op.
cit., p. 127)
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First of all, we should point out that there is nothing wrong with the
idea that colours are real kinds. There may actually be homeostatic
mechanisms that explain that colours recur in our environment. Of
course, these homeostatic mechanisms will not be genetic as with flies,
but, as in the homeostatic mechanisms that individuate clouds, have
to do with the recurrence of colour-forming conditions: physical laws
explain that surfaces recur in our environment, and that these surfaces
have reflectance properties. Colours would then be identified with such
reflectance properties. This kind of theories20 are surely controversial,
but they are not obviously wrong.
More importantly for our current purposes, it is not obvious that the
birds in Neander’s example have colour-involving contents. Neander’s
argument could be reconstructed with the help of a concrete example:
Protagoras, a bird, has a mental mechanism m. m does the following:
whenever there is thus-and-so kinds of light, Protagoras goes towards it.
Since the mutation took place first in Protagoras’s family, it has helped
Protagoras’s ancestors to thrive by either dragging them towards ripe
fruit or to suitable mates. What is the content of m’s being on, then?
There is nothing in common between suitable mating partners and ripe
fruit but their displaying vivid colours, so it must be this that m detects.
Now, being a vivid colour is not a natural kind, etc.
But, despite Neander, the content of m’s being on is not whatever
ripe fruit and mating partners have in common but whatever it is that
explains the evolutionary value of m for Pierre and his family. The
properties that causally ground m’s Fitness Contribution are Being a
vivid colour; Having such-and-such nutritional properties, Being suitable for
mating, etc.. There is no homeostatic mechanism that links all of these
properties together, so this is one of the cases in which it makes sense
to make m’s being on a state with content that involves a disjunctive
HPC (see 2.5.1): There is a ripe-fuit-or-suitable-mate around. That is, if there
really is a single mental structure m that channels responses to ripe
fruits and suitable mates and nothing else.
Contents involving such gerrymandered disjunctive HPC such as
ripe-fruit-or-suitable-mate are, probably, comparatively infrequent: we
need a case in which two or more homeostatic mechanisms are present
and active in the evolution of some creature. Then again, if they are
not infrequent, then they aren’t. The world, and not philosophers, is to
decide.
2.6.2 Pietroski’s Kimu
In Pietroski (1992)’s famous example, the kimu are colour-blind creatures
until Jack, a mutated baby kimu, develops a certain mental structure, b.
b works such as this: whenever there is red nearby, Jack feels compelled
to go towards it. Because of this, he is dragged to the top of a nearby
hill every morning, to spot the lovely reds of the rising sun. The snorf
are predators of the kimu, and normally go hunting at the time that Jack
is uphill. This has saved him from being caught, and, thus, has allowed
him to reproduce. This is the only explanation why Jack’s sensitivity to
red gets to be selected by Nature.
The intuitively correct content to be attributed to b is red. Or, at any
rate, according to Pietroski, it is obvious that “b-tokens are not about
snorfs” (Pietroski, op. cit.) Nevertheless, consumer semantics, looking at
20 Tye has developed one such account in his Tye (2000).
2.6 related objections 69
whatever it is that explains the correct performance of the consumers of
representation b, would probably want b to have the content snorf-free
area, or something to that avail. Indeed, Millikan (2009) suggests that
the content of b is fewer snorfs this way.
One of the reasons why we may feel uneasy in ascribing content
to b is that the homeostatic mechanism at play is extremely fragile:
there is causally-grounded correlation between red and fewer snorfs
only in one place at one time of the day. Besides, this brittle correlation
must remain operative for a sufficient sizeable number of generations
in Jack’s family line, if there is to be selection for b. This suggests that
kimus have a not very flexible behavioural repertoire, are fairly basic
creatures and, contra Pietroski, we shouldn’t feel too inclined to grace
them with contents involving the property Being red.
In any event, etiosemantics provides a reasonable content attribution,
somewhat more intuitive than Millikan’s -although our intuitions about
this case are feeble, and Millikan’s candidate seems OK if intuition
grounds are alone to be considered- but more realistic than Pietroski’s:
The properties co-ocurrence of which help ground the Indication
Profile and Fitness Matrix of b’s producer include, among others, Being
closer to red and Being snorf-free (or, better, Having less snorfs that areas in
which other competing kimus are). Is there any homeostatic mechanism
that links properties in this cluster together? There is; it’s something
like this: there is a place close to the habitat of kimus that is higher
than the rest of the nearby territory. Its being elevated grounds the
correlation between Being closer to red and Being comparatively snorf-free
(at dawn). It remains a causal ground for the correlation during the
time needed for selection for b because orography tends to stay put.
The HPC that, according to etiosemantics, should figure in the right
content attribution to b is individuated by:
• All the instantiations of properties that Being on top of the hill
have caused: Being snorf-free, Being closer to red than in the valley;
but also, Being colder than in the valley, Being rocky, etc.
• The homeostatic mechanism constituted by: the fact that the hill
is higher than the valley and the fact that orography tends to stay
put.
It is not clear that this HPC has a satisfactory name in English. The best
we can do is, probably, The top of this hill. When Jack and his family
are affected by red light, they go towards it, because that is, by their
hopelessly dim lights, like going to this hilltop. Most of the times, they
are wrong but, crucially, they are right at a time in which snorfs abound
in the valley. Hence b’s fitness contribution.
Pietroski is right in refusing to equate too directly the content of a
mental state with whatever it is that makes it evolutionarily useful. I’m
advocating that the right content attribution involves the HPC that ex-
plains the recurrence of the conditions that make it evolutionarily useful.
The ascription of content we get in this way is maybe more plausible
than Millikan’s “fewer snorfs this way”. Agreedly, it is still superficially
less plausible that a simple ascription of red, but the plausibility of this
latter attribution seems to depend on the anthropomorfic fallacy of
ascribing too quickly a counterpart of our red-involving contents to
kimus.

3E P H E M E R A L C O N T E N T F U L S TAT E S
In the first two chapters I have introduced the basics of a naturalistic
theory of content I have called (with a respectful nod to teleosemantics
and biosemantics) etiosemantics. Up until now I have been dealing with
extremely simple mental mechanisms. One of such mechanisms, m, can
be in one of only two possible states: on and off. The class of properties
such that m responds to their instantiations as a matter of nomological
necessity we have been calling its input. m is also hooked up with some
other systems, so that its going on causes a number of changes in them.
This is m’s output.
m has been selected because its input and output have conspired to
make it fitness-contributing for its possessor throughout generations
-cf. 1.2.3. There is an explanation of this fact, which has to do with the
sufficiently frequent coinstantiation of a number of properties around
m’s possessor, and the causal processes that have ensured this frequent
coinstantiation during the time needed for selection for m -cf. 1.4. The
etiosemantic proposal is to attribute m’s being on with a content that
involves the natural structure individuated by those property instan-
tiations and these causal processes -an HPC (cf. 1.4.5). In this chapter
I will start developing an account of the content of mental states that
have not been selected for -or ephemeral states, as I will also call them.
For example: Democritus’s [m’s being on] mental state has happened
a sufficient number of times for its own selective history to play a
content-fixing role. The states I will start discussing in this chapter -and
further discuss in the next- do not have this feature.
To begin with, in section 3.1 I give a content-attibution recipe for
what we could call (not ephemeral, but) selected proto-beliefs, in the
same sense that m’s being on could be called a proto-judgement (the
suitability of these labels is briefly discussed in 3.1.2). These proto-
beliefs (whose implementation involves what, after Dretske, I will call
property recruitment) will be about the fact that certain two HPCs are
causally related in a certain way.
In 3.2 I start developing the account that allows the attributions of
contents to mental states that are a result of a property recruitment that
has not been selected for. That is, the content attribution I provided in
3.1 for selected-for states, I provide here for ephemeral ones. In this
connection, I discuss Millikan’s theory of derived proper functions, also
designed to account for ephemeral states. I express some misgivings
about the theory, and canvass the way in which I propose to fix them,
for the purposes of a theory of content. After that, in 3.4, I provide a
concrete example: a simplified version of the mechanism of long term
potentiation in our brains.
After that, I discuss contents involving individuals. I follow the same
sequence as in the first part of the chapter: first (3.7) I offer a recipe for
the attribution of individual-involving contents to selected-for states;
after that (3.8) I extend the idea to ephemeral states; finally (3.9) I
discuss a concrete example. After the first part of the chapter (about
contents involving causal relations) and the second (about individuals)
I discuss several normative notions -Procedures (3.6) and Norms (3.10)-
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which should help alleviate anxieties about the role of contentless states
in the explanation of behaviour and, in general, should help account
for our internalist intuitions.
One of the main results of this chapter is that it is possible to attribute
content to ephemeral states without attributing function to them. This
is interesting, and maybe desirable, given the increasing suspicion with
which pan-adaptationist accounts of mentality (according to which all
mental states are adaptations) are regarded. While it is unclear whether
Millikan’s account of derived functions implies that such functions are
adaptations, it is informative to see how one can go about providing
content attributions for functionless items, while still following the
main teleosemantic insights.
3.1 property recruitment
Discussions of the Homeostatic Property Cluster theory in the philoso-
phy of biology have normally stressed those members of the Property
Cluster that scientists have traditionally relied upon in order to identify
a real kind. Say, the properties of zebrahood or tigerhood that first
come to our mind -stereotypical properties such as Having black and
yellow stripes, which, in less enlightened times in the philosophy of
biology, were taken as criterial for the presence of some real kind or
other. Our entry point to HPCs, instead, has been the (proto-)epistemic
relations of very basic cognisers such as Democritus or Arete with
their environment. From this perspective, instantiations of properties
in the Cluster are naturally understood as closely related to what more
sophisticated creatures will take as evidence of the presence of the kind.
Now, the presence of a certain real kind may be a very good sign
of the presence of another. Consider the case of a real kind F that,
in a certain domain, is instantiated whenever another real kind G is
instantiated. This may be so because the presence of F be sufficient tout
court (i. e., metaphysically sufficient) for the presence of G. Alternatively
F may be just in situ sufficient for G: the causal underpinnings of the
relation between F and G may be available only in a very restricted
context, place or time, e. g., only around the agent’s neighbourhood, or
only during weekend evenings. We may say that
sufficient: F is sufficient for G iff
1. P (G|F) ≈ 1 and
2. The probability in 1. is causally grounded.
Suppose m is a mechanism such that there is an f around war-
rants an attribution to m’s being on of the content There is a G around
-I will also call such mechanisms G-mechanisms. Suppose also that m
has some property E as its input. We will say that m has disjunctively
recruited the real kind F if it changes its input to (E∨ F) (cf. figure 5)
If the instantiation of F is (in situ) sufficient for the instantiation of
G, then disjunctively recruiting F will improve m’s indication profile
as seen from the perspective of the indication of Gs -on condition that
E is not necessary for G, and F is not always uninstantiated1. That is,
disjunctively recruiting a sufficient real kind is, normally, rewarding.
1 In fact, we don’t need P (There is an F around|There is a G around) to be exactly equal
to 1 for the recruitment of F in the input of a G-mechanism to be rewarding. In the
Appendix C I give rigorous conditions for the recruitment of a property to be rewarding.
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Figure 5: Disjunctive Property Recruitment
3.1.1 Recruiting a Nonnomic Property
Property recruitment, as just defined, is a process at the end of which
some real kind enters in a nomological relation with a mental mecha-
nism: the instantiation of F, among other things, causes the mechanism
to fire, as a matter of nomological necessity. If this is so, recruiting a
property for the input of a state is only possible in the cases in which
such properties are, as Fodor (1986) has called them, nomic: properties
that can enter directly in nomic relations2. According to Fodor there
are many other, nonnomic properties, which can only enter in nomic
relations indirectly, through nomic properties. For instance, Being a
crumpled shirt (Fodor’s example). The property of being a crumpled
shirt that my shirt has can cause me to go iron it, but not directly; only
through, say, geometrical and colour properties of the shirt.
However plausible this is for the case in which I am caused to iron
something3, it is quite plausible that simple mental mechanisms only
enter in causal relations with properties such as Being a crumpled shirt
through other, more proximal properties. If this is true, it means that
mental mechanisms cannot simply recruit nonnomic properties in the
crude way we have discussed; they have to do it through the recruitment
of mediating nomic properties.
More interestingly for our purposes, it may be argued that the prop-
erty of Being homeostatic property cluster Q is nonnomic in Fodor’s sense:
2 It may be that there are no nomic relations at all between mental mechanisms’ going
on and other properties: on this view, the firing of a mental state would need a very
complicated set of conditions that cannot be described without heavy use of ceteris
paribus clauses. We may go around this issue by saying that, of all the properties that
a mental state indicates, there is one property, Q, such that ∀iP (on|Q) > P (on|Pi),
the posterior probabilities being grounded, in Dretske’s sense. That property has a
psychophysical relation with m that is close enough to being nomological, for our
purposes.
3 Not very plausible, I think, but the metaphysics of causing people to do something are, to
be sure, extremely complicated.
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whatever an HPC causes at t, it is because some of the Shoemakerian
properties in its cluster causes it at t, the historical properties that tie
the cluster together not being causally efficacious at t. This amounts
to saying that HPCs only enter in indirect nomic relations: they are
nonnomic4.
In the process of recruiting, a mental mechanism can go around the
nonnomicality of a property in different ways. The simplest way is
to recruit a nomic property that indicates the nonnomic one that is
ultimately interesting. This is just the case with Being a fly and Being
a moving black speck: Being a fly, we hypothesise, cannot directly cause
Democritus’s m to go on; and Nature goes around this issue by placing
a nomic property that is a good indicator of flyhood (blackspeckness)
as m’s input. This way of going around nonnomicality lies at the centre
of the etiosemantic account of mental content, and of other broadly
teleosemantic proposals. I wish to suggest now that one special case
of this way of recruiting nonnomic properties is a plausible building
block of contents involving causal relations among HPCs:
In the cases in which F is a reliable sign of G-hood, the positives of a
mental mechanism which have content There is an F around (I will call
such a mechanism an F-mechanism), if they are available, will normally
also be a good indicator of G-hood: not in vain, what explains the
existence of an F-mechanism is, in part, that it is a good indicator of
the presence of F5.
A causal link between the F-mechanism and the G-mechanism such
that whenever the former fires the latter does too (i. e., disjunctively
recruiting F-mechanism’s firings for the G-mechanism’s input) may,
therefore, be useful: it means that the G-mechanism has recruited a new,
quite reliable indicator of G-hood. Alternatively, it may be understood as
meaning that the survival value of the F-mechanism has been enhanced
-now, as part of its output, it also helps to bring about whatever benefits
accrue from the successful detection of G. See figure 6.
If there is a way to replicate this causal link accross generations -e. g.,
if the recruitment is the result of a heritable genetic mutation- then the
extra fitness contribution may end up fixating the link in the population
of its possessors. This explanation of the existence of the mental state
jointly formed by the F-mechanism, the G-mechanism and the causal
link among them may ground a content attribution for it. Let us call
this state fg.
It is a natural extension to the etiosemantic main insight to defend
that fg will be contentful if there is a (higher order) HPC, say, Q, that
has in its Cluster the instantiations of F-hood and G-hood that have
made fg useful for its possessor and its ancestors, and explains that
P (G|F) has remained sufficiently*6 high across the generations needed
for selection for fg. In this case, fg’s content will be something like The
causal mechanism SHM ensures that when there’s an F around there tends to
be a G around. This is so because Q (the higher order HPC) is constituted,
4 Cf. section 2.5 for a fuller elaboration of these remarks.
5 Of course, as I already pointed out in 2.2.2, Being a good enough indicator of is not a
transitive relation, and it may well be that the F-mechanism is a good indicator of F-hood,
F-hood a good indicator of G-hood, and the F-mechanism not a good indicator of G-hood.
The discussion to follow is relevant only for those (many) cases in which the relation of
good-enough indication does carry over. In Appendix B I give the formal condition for
such a recruitment to be rewarding.
6 I use sufficient* instead of sufficient to remind us that there is a rigorous understanding of
sufficiency available, in terms of Fitness Contributions, and their components -Indication
Profiles and Fitness Matrices.
3.1 property recruitment 75
Figure 6: Disjunctive Recruitment of an F-mechanism
inter alia, by the instantiations of F-hood and G-hood around S that
were kept together by a certain specialised homeostatic mechanism
SHM that keeps the conditional probabilities as needed. More formally:
shm between fs and gs: A subject S has a mental state fg with
the content The causal mechanism SHM ensures that when there’s an
F around there tends to be a G around if
1. fg is hereditary, and consists of a G-mechanism, and an
F-mechanism disjunctively recruited for the input of the
G-mechanism.
2. There is a specialised homeostatic mechanism SHM that
explains that Fs are sufficiently*7 good indicator of Gs accross
generations, and
3. [The causal mechanism SHM ensuring that when there’s an F
around there tends to be a G around] is the HPC that stems
from using the instantiations of the properties of Being an F
and Being a G that fg has relied upon as seed8 and SHM as
specialised homeostatic mechanism.
Here we have a mental state whose content involves the presence of
a higher order HPC that connects two (lower order) HPCs such that the
same cognitive system has, also, mental states whose content involves
them9. We have used two names for this very HPC: Q and [The causal
mechanism SHM ensuring that when there’s an F around there tends to be a
G around]. The content attributions warranted by etiosemantics are de
re through and through, so it is quite the same to attribute the content
7 It is sufficiently* good only if
P (G) ·P (F∧¬E|G) (w11−w12)−P (¬G) ·P (F∧¬E|¬G) (w22−w21) > 0
where E is the property that makes the G-mechanism fire in the absence of Fs. See
appendix B.
8 See the definition of HPC in 1.4.5.
9 For higher and lower order HPCs cf. 1.4.5.
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Q exists to fg and to attribute the content The causal mechanism SHM
ensures that when there’s an F around there tends to be a G around. Obviously,
though, the latter content attribution is, we may say, “human-readable”
while the former is not.
Using the human-readable description of the content is not uncalled
for: the state fg with that content is quite literally constituted by a
mechanism whose positives have the content There is an F around, and
another whose positives have the content There is a G around. The only
material that the disjunctive recruitment is bringing in is that there is a
causal mechanism SHM that ensures that when Fs are there Gs tend
to be there. This looks, I think, like the kind of fact that a disjunctive
recruitment may carry content about.
3.1.2 Proto-judgements and Proto-beliefs
fg has a property that we have not encountered before. In the simplest
types of mental state we have investigated in previous chapters, those
covered by the content-attribution recipe there is an f around,
what was endowed with content was the comparatively short-lived
state consisting of some mental mechanism’s being on. The tokening
of that kind of mental state has some affinities with our full-blown
judgements: it may be suggested, for example, that the going on of an F-
mechanism bears interesting resemblances with an act of acceptance, on
the part of the subject, of the state of affairs the F-mechanism represents.
There is no true act and true acceptance, to be sure: the firing of an
F-mechanism is hardly an act on the part of the possessor of the state,
although it is, like acts and unlike standing beliefs, an event. Likewise,
the very simple agents we are dealing with can hardly be credited with
the ability to accept a proposition; but, like those more sophisticated
creatures who do accept, they let their behaviour be guided by the
content of the mental state it “accepts”, if all goes well. The ordinary
notion of judgement seems to require a certain amount of rationality
(which in turn requires an ability to draw some simple inferences, etc.)
absent in the cognitive systems we are studying here.
But at least, in summary, the firing of an F-mechanism is like a
judgement in that it is an event of tokening a contenful mental state
such that it is supposed to guide the behaviour of the agent. On the
other hand, the state with the content The causal mechanism SHM ensures
that when there’s an F around there tends to be a G around has affinities
with our standing beliefs: it is not a short-lived but a permanent state
of the agent’s cognitive system that is to be credited with content.
This state is supposed to guide the agent’s behaviour in that, when
all goes well, makes the agent act in a way that is appropriate to the
state of affairs it represents. Henceforth I will help myself to the labels
proto-judgement and proto-belief in cases such as these. Also, when I use
terms such as belief (or, in chapter 6, knowledge), I wish to be taken as
talking about these proto- counterparts. Which, I think, are just like the
real article except for the fact that they are embedded in a cognitive
system that does not meet the minimal requirements of rationality,
accountability, etc. I will not engage in further discussion of these
minimal requirements here, either.
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3.2 second-order functions
In the last section we have dealt with states that record relations among
real kinds. These states were produced by natural selection: first F- and
G-mechanisms emerged. Then, through more natural selection, agents
were endowed with disjunctive recruitment among those mechanisms.
The states consisting of two mechanisms connected by disjunctive
recruitment are the ones that shm between fs and gs talks about .
But such states as these, hardwired by natural selection, are of limited
interest: in fact most of our contentful states are ephemeral. That is, they
come to exist, and cease existing, during our lifetime and never get to
be selected for. In most cases, when we come to associate two real kinds
G and F in a way that records a causal link among these properties, it’s
through a process of learning, and not of brute mutation-cum-selection.
While a detailed investigation of the process of conceptual learning is
outside the scope of this work, fortunately, teleosemantics -and related
approaches, such as mine- provide a way to tackle this problem, so
to say, from an abstract implementation-perspective: the main idea
(suggested by Millikan (1984)) is that the content of ephemeral states
is fixed by facts having to do with selection up the implementation
ladder10. The strategy consists in postulating the existence of a system
that has been selected because it gives rise to further states, which
are the ones to which content will be attributed. These states have
not been selected; their existence is way too short for that. They are,
nevertheless, contentful: their existence enjoys a content-conferring
biological explanation, through the workings of their producer -which
has been selected in the usual way.
Let us return for a moment to the ascription of biological function
for devices. A general, simplified template for first-order explanations
that ground function-attributions may be11:
1st order function: An agent A has a token mechanism, m, with
the function FUNCT if the following explains that m exists:
1. The fact that mechanisms of type m have done FUNCT in
A’s ancestors has been fitness-contributing for them, and
2. This figures in an explanation of the fact that A has m.
1st order function is a schema for the attribution of first-order
functions because one and the same mechanism is both the bearer of
10 There is at least another possible proposal: that ephemeral beliefs undergo a small-scale
process of ontogenetic natural selection that recapitulates the phylogenetic one:
Suppose our individual psychological developments throw up new pos-
sible belief types, new ways of responding mentally to circumstances,
at random, analogously to the way that out genetic history throws up
mutations at random. Then we would expect such new dispositions to
become ’fixed’ just in case the belief tokens they give rise to lead to advan-
tageous (that is, psychologically rewarding) actions, analogously to the way
that genetic mutations become fixed kust in case they have advantageous
(offspring-producting) results. Papineau (1987, p. 66)
There is one case in which this kind of selection-based learning -Papineau (2006, p. 186)-
can be recovered in the Millikanian terms I favour in the main text: a mechanism mec
creates an environment which fosters this kind of random generation of alternatives,
and such process culminates in the emergence of useful mental states; this may explain
selection for mec, and help provide content for the emerged states.
The alternative case -that there is no mec, and the random generation of alternatives
happens also randomly in every generation- is too empirically implausible.
11 Here again, I am ignoring a great many issues that call for complications in the function-
attributing recipe. Those issues, though, are irrelevant for my current purposes.
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function, and the one that was selected for. When second order functions
are attributed, these two features come apart: the bearer of function is
a product of the selected state. A general template for such functions
could be:
2nd order function: An agent A has a token mechanism, m, with
the function FUNCT if the following explains that m exists:
1. There is a mechanism, n, such that, according to 1st order
function, n has the function of producing mechanisms of
kind K, and
2. n has produced m in A.
It will not have escaped the attention of the reader that m’s function
FUNCT does not appear in the clauses of the definition. Instead there
is an appeal to a kind K of mechanisms. The problem of providing
conditions for the attribution of second order functions is, precisely,
the problem of characterising K, such that n may have the first order
function of creating mechanisms of type K, and such that m counts
intuitively as having the function to do FUNCT, in virtue of its being a
mechanism of type K.
It is notoriously difficult to do such a thing. For instance, an easy
way out will not do. If we postulate that the type K is identical with
the type Mechanisms with the function to do FUNCT, it is clearly true that
mechanisms of such type have the function to do FUNCT in virtue of
their being K; but it is also true that we have not explained how n may
have the first order function of creating mechanisms of this type.
Another idea is that K should be, simply, Mechanisms that do FUNCT.
Millikan’s proposal of introducing derived proper functions could be
understood as a sophisticated elaboration of this idea. Unfortunately,
even if her proposal is, I think, the best available, I am unsure that it
succeeds. I will now review Millikan’s theory, and formulate a couple
of worries. After that, I will sketch what I take to be a more plausible
way out of this difficulty, for the purposes of a theory of content.
3.2.1 Millikan on Relational, Adapted and Derived Functions
As I have said, a certain mechanism has a 2nd order function because
it has been produced by a mechanism which has the 1st order function
of producing mechanisms of its type -see fig. 7. This kind of 1st order
functions are, in Millikan’s terminology (cf. Millikan (1984, chapter 2)),
relational proper functions. A couple of examples (Millikan’s examples)
will make clear what is meant by that:
Some chameleons have the ability to make their skin change colour,
and this has been evolutionary useful, because it has helped the
chameleon hide from danger12. Let us assume that a certain mech-
anism ch in the brain of the chameleon is in charge of issuing the order
to the skin chromatofore-cells to rearrange themselves, so as to match
the colour of the chameleon’s surroundings. The evolutionary history
of ch allows 1st order function to warrant an attribution of the
12 Or so goes the folk account of chameleon colour-change. In fact, it has been recently
suggested that the evolutionary advantage of colour change has had more to do with
“increasingly conspicuous signals used in contests and courtship” -cf. Stuart-Fox and
Moussalli (2008)- than with camouflage. The folk account is more useful for our present
purposes; I hope the lack of biological accuracy will be excused.
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Figure 7: Producer and Products
1st order function of rearranging chromatofores so as to match the colour of
the chameleon’s surroundings.
Bees communicate the position of a source of nectar to the rest of
bees in a hive by performing a waggle dance. This has been historically
benefitial, as it has lead to better exploitation of those sources. Let us
assume that a certain mechanism wd in the brain of the bee is in charge
of issuing the motor orders that cause the movements that constitute the
dance. The evolutionary story of wd allows 1st order function to
warrant an attribution of the 1st order function of producing dances the
pattern of which corresponds in a certain way with the location of nectar.
The 1st order functions of ch and wd are different to, say, the kidney’s
function of cleaning blood in that the former do, and the latter does
not, have a free slot that must be contributed by the enviroment (for
chameleons: by the chameleon’s surrounding; for bees: by the location
of nectar). The 1st order functions of ch and wd are functions to create
a relatum (for chameleons: the chromatofore arrangement; for bees:
the waggle dance) so that it stands in a predetermined relation (for
chameleons: sameness of colour; for bees: one being transformable into
the other by the set of rules we may call B-mese) to the relatum provided
by the environment. Thus the name of relational proper functions.
More terminology: Millikan proposes to give a name to the relational
proper function of a device once in the presence of a particular relatum,
that is, once saturated the free slot. This will be its adapted proper function
Millikan (1984, p. 40). For example, if the chameleon’s surroundings
happen to be brown, ch acquires the adapted proper function of re-
arranging chromatofores so as to look brown. The product of ch in these
circumstances (i.e., the concrete brown arrangement of chromatofores)
Millikan calls an adapted device (ibid.).
Relational and adapted proper functions are 1st order functions:
functions attributed to the selected-for mechanism. This is not enough
to solve the problem of ephemeral contentful states. For example, we
want to provide content attributions for individual bee dances, but
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individual bee dances do not have 1st order functions of any kind
-they have not been selected for. Now, we have said that contents,
according to Millikan’s biosemantics, are fixed by the evolutionarily
normal conditions for the performance of the function of the consumers
of the contentful state. If the contentful state is ephemeral, there are no
evolutionarily normal conditions of the right kind. So we need some
other kind of normal conditions for the ephemeral contentful state to
collaborate in the biological function of its consumer. A way to do so
may be to provide a proper function for the ephemeral contentful state
itself.
Before going on to present Millikan’s derived proper functions, I
think a caveat is in order. The point made in this paragraph, namely,
that providing a function for ephemeral states is necessary in order
to provide a content for them, is a common assumption among com-
menters of Millikan. Thus, e. g.,
Relational and derived functions are essential to account
for the capacity to represent something never before encoun-
tered in the history of the individual or of the species. Shea
(2004, p. 49)
or
The introduction of derived proper functions goes some
way towards solving the problem of content for novel beliefs.
Kingsbury (2006, p. 38)
“Representation” is, for Millikan, a technical term that refers only to
contentful states of sophisticated cognisers: beliefs and desires are,
and waggle dances and chromatofore patterns are not, representations.
For the less sophisticated counterpart Millikan reserves the name of
“intentional icon”. I think the theory of derived proper functions is only
designed to deal with representations, and not with contentful states
that are just intentional icons. There is some textual evidence for this
claim:
The theory of representations (as distinct from that of in-
tentional icons) rests very heavily on the theory of “derived
proper functions”. Millikan (1997, p. 94; my emphasis)
The most natural reading of this quote is as saying that the theory
of representation only insofar as it goes beyond the theory of inten-
tional icons does rely on derived proper functions. Her Millikan (2002)
provides more evidence, to be discussed below.
So, Shea and Kingsbury, in the quotes above, are strictly right. That
is, right if taken to be raising points only about representations such
as beliefs, but not about intentional icons. It is likely, though, that they
take their points to apply also to intentional icons in general. I will
now provide some reasons to think that derived proper functions are,
at least, suspect. If I am right, then, a theory which provides contents
for ephemeral states without resorting to them will be preferable. As
I say, Millikan may be providing just such a theory about simple con-
tentul states (her intentional icons). If so, the problems to be raised
against derived proper functions are only a problem to the theory of
simple contents that some people take Millikan to be defending; not to
Millikan’s13.
13 Of course, my objections are, if successful, a problem for Millikan’s theory of derived
proper functions themselves. I discuss some of Millikan’s views on representations in 4.5.
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So, can we provide a function for the adapted device itself? That is,
for the brown arrangement of chromatofores, or the particular waggle
dance. According to Millikan,
The proper functions of adapted devices are derived from
proper functions of the devices that produce them that lie
beyond the production of these adapted devices themselves.
I will call the proper functions of adapted devices derived
proper functions. Millikan (1984, p. 41)
The idea is that a producer mechanism, such as ch or wd, has many
functions apart from that of producing individual dances or pigment
arrangements. Some examples: making the chameleon invisible, feed-
ing the denizens of the beehive, etc. All of those extra functions of
the producer mechanism, Millikan contends, should be considered de-
rived functions of its product. Now, among these extra proper functions,
producer mechanisms -once we fix the relevant features of the environ-
ment, as we have seen- can be credited with adapted proper functions
that lie beyond the production of the adapted devices themselves: e.g.,
the adapted proper function of getting bees to go in thus-and-so a par-
ticular direction looking for nectar; or the adapted proper function of
making the chameleon indistinguishable from its brown surroundings.
These should also be considered as (adapted) derived proper functions of
the products. I see several problems with the notions of adapted and
derived proper functions. Let me present them in turn.
First of all, there appears to be some abuse of language in the talk of
adapted proper functions. It is not clear what has made these effects
of a device earn the label of (even if adapted) proper functions. That
is, it is unclear whence comes the normativity in this case. We have
accepted that the evolutionary history of a device may endow it with
proper functions; but selection, in the case of ch, can only account for
its relational functions. Precisely, the idea is that the production of a
certain concrete chromatofore arrangement may be completely new
in the history of the species, and not selected-for. In the absence of
additional arguments, thus, one may be reluctant to honour this set of
effects with the name of adapted proper functions. Millikan is aware of
this issue:
[An adapted proper function] is not of course a simple, but
only a conditional proper function of the mechanism, an
"iffy" proper function, but the "if" part has been asserted.
Millikan (2002, section 7)
I read Millikan as endorsing the following argument.
1. n has the relational proper function [for all x, if x do f (x)] [e .g.,
to arrange brown pigment in case the ground is brown].
2. (from 1, and by definition) If a, then n has the adapted proper
function to do f (a)
3. a
4. (from 2 and 3) n has the adapted proper function to do f (a).
Let me introduce the notation FNp to mean n has the proper function to
do p. If Millikan had talked, without qualification, of proper functions
both in 1 and in 2 she could be accused of ignoring an important scope
distinction: that between
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• FN [∀x (x→ f (x))] -the relational proper function in 1- which,
after elimination of the quantifier, gives FN [a→ f (a)]
and
• a→ FNf (a).
This transition is not in general correct: [producing a key with shape
S if presented with a key with shape S] can be the proper function
of a key-copier, even if [producing a key with shape S] is not one of
its proper functions because, say, the key-copier was not designed to
produce keys with that, or any other, shape in particular.
Of course, Millikan is more careful than that, and she qualifies with
relational and adapted the functions in 1 and 2. That is, the transition is
from
• Frel.N [a→ f (a)]
to
• a→ Fadap.N f (a)
Thus, the protest over scope is misplaced: all we have in the transition
from 1 to 2 is introduction of terminology. That is, in the argument,
stating 2 is nothing over and above stating 1.
If so, it is somewhat misleading to detach the consequent of the
conditional, in 4 (“an “iffy proper function, but the “if” part has been
asserted”.) It makes it look as if n had the -admittedly adapted, but also
proper- function to do f (a). But n does not have the proper function to
do f (a), not even if a. Asserting 4 cannot be anything over and above
asserting that
adapted proper function: Fadap.N f (a) ≡df
[
a∧ Frel.N [a→ f (a)]
]
.
That is: to attribute an adapted proper function is just a way of saying
in one breath that the mechanism has a relational proper function, and
than one of the relata is thus-and-so, or, alternatively, that such-and-
such conditions hold. Adapted-proper-function attributions are hybrid
statements: on the one hand, they ascribe a relational proper function
to a device; on the other, they assert that the environment has such-
and-such a property. Talk about adapted proper functions is slightly
misleading in that adapted-proper-function statements are not solely
about functions. Anyway, once we are clear about this, we can use
adapted-proper-function talk as a convenient way to abbreviate talk of
relational functions when one of the relata is fixed14.
On the other hand, there is the introduction of derived-function talk:






And, by application of derived proper function in the case of
adapted proper functions,
14 And we can take Millikan’s word that this is how she intends adapted proper functions
to be taken:
Every reference to an adapted (...) proper function is really an implicit
reference to one or more deeper relational functions Millikan (2002, section
7)
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F
adap.
N f (a)→ Fadap.der.n f (a)
This result, if understood as dealing simply with transformation of
terminology, is pretty harmless and may well be useful in some contexts:
saying that a certain ephemeral device has the function of doing f (a)
would simply amount to saying that its producer has the relational
function of [if a, doing f (a)], and a. But, while the introduction of
adapted-function talk is a simple, innocent terminological move, the
introduction of derived function is apparently not. Millikan appears
to assume that there is a genuine transfer of normativity from producer
to product. Thus the contention, in the quote above, that “[t]he proper
functions of adapted devices are derived from proper functions of the
devices that produce them...”. This assertion, unhedged by the likes of
“we may say that...” or “it’s theoretically fruitful to talk as if...”, seems
to show that Millikan takes products to have proper functions of their
own, with their own charge of normativity15.
In summary, if the functions of adapted devices are not intended
to come for free, as a result of terminological manipulation, but are
independent sources of normativity, this I think must be contested.
Counterexamples appear to be provided by flawed adapted devices.
Consider the following story:
wrong dance! wd is a bee-dance-producing mechanism. It has, as
one of its relational proper functions, the production of dances that
correspond, under a certain set of transformation rules which we may
call B-mese, to locations of nectar around the beehive. Now, let us fix
the relevant relatum in this relational proper function: a bee has found
nectar in the same direction of the Sun, at a somewhat longish distance.
It, thus, proceeds to signal these facts to its peers and, to that avail, the
wd token in it produces dance m. But, alas, something has gone wrong:
m, in B-mese, means “nectar in the opposite direction of the Sun, at a
somewhat longish distance”.
If Millikan is right, the wg in wrong dance! has the adapted
proper function of signalling nectar in the same direction of the Sun.
This function goes beyond the production of dances, so the adapted
device m also has that as an adapted derived function. In this example,
m misfunctions in indicating the location of the source of nectar. Or does
it? Does the performance of m really have this normative dimension?
There is an innocent sense in which it does: the one that makes
talk of the function of m a mere notational variant of the talk of the
function of wd (see above). But, if we aim for a less innocent sense,
in which talk of the function of a product is not simply talk of the
function of its producer, we need to produce reasons why this talk is
appropriate. Remember -from 1.2.3- that, in the context of a naturalistic
program such as Millikan’s or mine, we are allowed to indulge in talk
of misfunction of a device only because we are able to cash it out as
talk of not doing whatever it is that explains the existence of the device. And
it is simply not true that m exists because it has successfully signalled
15 Admittedly, in more recent work (such as the (2002) piece quoted above) Millikan states
that derived proper functions are nothing over and above relational proper functions.
Even so, the question remains: whose relational function? If Millikan means the product’s
(as opposed to the producer’s) relation function, the points I raise below go against this
later version of Millikan as well.
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the location of a source of nectar. m has just started to exist, and it has
never signalled anything before -maybe never before has nectar been
in the direction of the Sun at a somewhat longish distance. Can we,
alternatively, trace m’s malfunctioning to wd’s malfunctioning? Well,
clearly, wd has not fulfilled its adapted function to signal nectar in the
same direction of the Sun. If it had fulfilled it, it would have produced,
not m, but a different dance m* that does represent that location in
B-mese. The only way to turn this fact into a malfunction for m is to
say that m has malfunctioned by failing to be m*. And it seems quite
obviously wrong to put things this way. Things do not malfunction in
virtue of the fact that they are not other things. The general problem is
that etiological accounts of function don’t seem to allow for ephemeral
devices, that are not part of reproductively established families and are
produced in the absence of intentional agents16, to have function.
Should we conclude that m does not have the possibility of malfunc-
tioning and, therefore, in familiar Wittgenstenian fashion, that it has no
function? Millikan has recently suggested a way out:
[It may seem that a particular bee dance has no proper
function], for it seems theoretically possible, at least, that
the particular bee dance has no ancestors. (...) Then this
particular bee dance, having never occurred in the past,
certainly could not have been selected for any effects that
it had, hence could not possibly have any proper functions
at all. But (...) [w]e must describe functions and how they
are performed in the most general way possible. Because
bee dances that map different directions are different from
one another in specific respects does not mean they are
not also the same in more general respects. (...) And when
they function in the way that has accounted for the natural
selection of their producers (...) they always do exactly the
same general thing. They produce a direction of flight that
is a given function (mathematical sense) of certain aspects
of their form. (...) In this respect, all bee dances of the same
bee species have exactly the same proper function. Millikan
(2002, p. 130)
The idea is the following: the particular dance, m, qua token of the type
dance with such-and-such a meaning in B-mese may have no function, but
m belongs to other types too; in particular it is a token of the type bee
dance. And bee dances qua bee dances have the function of signalling
the location of a source of nectar. So, m has no function qua dance
with such-and-such a meaning, but it has function (and also adapted
function, once fixed the relevant relatum) qua bee dance simpliciter.
As far as I can see, this represents a change of doctrine from Millikan
(1984): now, we don’t need to see the function of a bee dance as derived
in any sense from the function of its producer. Rather, bee dances
themselves, qua bee dances, are selected for. They form a reproductively
established family in Millikan’s sense with a certain character that
16 It seems that intentional agents may produce, say, a prototype model of corkscrew that
fails to open bottles. I think an appeal to the intentions of the agent in question -which in
turn is susceptible of naturalisation- should be able to account for this fact. It remains
to be seen whether this would count as an etiological account of the function of this
corkscrew, though.
This is not to be taken as a point about the function of artifacts in general. The function
of most artifacts -say, normal corkscrews or chairs- is perfectly naturalisable through the
Millikanian theory of proper functions.
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correlates with a certain effect etc. Everything behaves according to the
definition of proper functions in Millikan (1984, pp. 27-8). They also
have a 1st order function according to 1st order function. The
apparatus of derived functions, and of 2nd order functions, is doing no
real work.
The second problem is more important: as I said at the beginning of
the section, an important theoretical advantage teleosemanticists hope
to achieve from the postulation of derived functions is the possibility
to explain that mental states, concepts and the like, that come to exist
in the life of an individual, have content. If content is fixed by the
Normal conditions for the consumer of the contentful state to perform
its function, as biosemantics has it, ephemeral consumer systems must
have function. For the same reason, if two different concepts, both prod-
ucts of the same concept-producing mechanism, are to have different
meanings, there must be different Normal conditions for the successful
performance of their consumers.
The strategy for adscribing proper functions to ephemeral states that
we have just reviewed, on the other hand, would have to be translated
to the concept case thus: individual beliefs (or, rather, the consumer
systems of those beliefs), qua individual beliefs, do not have function;
but qua beliefs they do. Of course, qua beliefs all beliefs will have
the same (relational) proper function. Whence comes the difference in
meaning then? It has to come from the adaptor in each case; the relatum
that the world fixes. There must be a mapping function from beliefs to
states of affairs that take transformations of ones into transformations
of the other. The existence of this mapping function is the Normal
condition for the emergence of the functional category of beliefs qua
beliefs. A full discussion of this contention will have to wait until section
4.5; but it should already be evident that asking for the existence of
such a transformation function between beliefs and states of affairs as
a prerequisite for the contentfulness of said beliefs is asking for quite a
lot17.
3.3 the etiosemantic take on ephemeral contentful states
The conclusion of the last section is that the (derived, 2nd order) func-
tion of ephemeral contentful states does not play any substantial role
in fixing their content. In fact, a stronger claim might be made: it is un-
clear that there are derived, 2nd order functions at all. If so, a powerful
reason to recommend etiosemantics against classical teleosemantics is
that it can attribute contents to ephemeral states without the need of
positing derived functions. This section shows how it goes about doing
that.
In the first two chapters (see, particularly, 1.3.2 and 2.2.2) I have given
my reasons to think that relying on 1st order functions to fix content,
in the way teleosemantics in general and biosemantics in particular
do, makes content attributions vulnerable to the Input, Output or
Indeterminacy Problems. I have also defended that letting content
be fixed by the natural structures I have called HPCs patches this
vulnerability. The way to make the same idea work for what I’ve
been calling ephemeral states is by relying on higher order HPCs.
Suppose that we wish to provide content attributions such as the ones
17 For additional criticism of the notion of derived function, see Preston (1998).
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warranted by shm between fs and gs, but for states that have not
been selected for; only produced by a certain selected-for mechanism
n. What we need is an HPC that connects cues of a certain type C -the
ones that n will use to effect disjunctive recruitments- with lower level
HPCs of the kind shm between fs and gs relied upon; of course,
this time the homeostatic mechanism that individuate these HPCs may
be much more short-lived that the ones relied upon in shm between
fs and gs -those needed to stay around for as long as selection for the
mental state took; these need simply make a disjunctive recruitment
fitness-conducive during the lifetime of an individual mental state.
We want to tell the following story about the appearance of an
ephemeral mental state with a content analogous to The causal mechanism
SHM ensures that when there’s an F around there tends to be a G around:
m exists in A because, many generations ago, a mechanism n
appeared in one of A’s ancestors -through random mutation,
we may suppose. n has properties of type C as input and,
when it goes on, it effects a disjunctive recruiting among
two pre-existing brain mechanisms that produce contentful
states; which ones exactly is a function (in the mathematical
sense) of C; say, if f1 (C) = F and f2 (C) = G, the recruitment
is produced between F- and G-mechanism.
In many occasions, the recruiting effected by n has increased
the overall fitness contribution of the two mental states. As a
consequence of this, n has become fixated in A’s population.
Besides, there is a higher order HPC that connects properties
of type C with the HPCs that have made disjunctive recruit-
ment between f1 (C)-mechanism and f2 (C)-mechanism fit-
ness contributing in the process leading to fixation of n.
Today, a cue C’ has caused A’s token of n to produce a dis-
junctive recruiting of A’s F-mechanism by A’s G-mechanism,
giving rise to m (cf. figure 8.)
The content of m in this case is fixed by the lower level HPC that goes
together with C’ in virtue of the homeostatic mechanism of the higher
level HPC. Although it may sound convoluted, the content-attributing
recipe is, in fact, straightforward. Let me give another pass to this HPC
hierarchy:
• There is a higher level HPC (let us call it Qn; the superindex
stands for the order of the HPC) that connects (for as long as
needed for n to become fixated) each of a number of cues Ciwith
a lower level HPC Qn-1i .
• In their turn, repeatedly in the process of selection for n, HPCs
such as Qn-1i have kept together the properties needed to make a
disjunctive recruitment between f1 (Ci)-mechanism and f2 (Ci)-
mechanism fitness conducive.
• If a cue Ck causes n to produce a new disjunctive recruitment
among a f1 (Ck)-mechanism and a f2 (Ck)-mechanism, we say
that the content of the new (ephemeral) disjunctive recruitment is
Qn-1k exists -or, in the human-readable version, The causal mechanism
SHMn−1k ensures that when there’s an f2 (Ck) around there tends to
be a f1 (Ck) around.
Figure 8: The Explanation of Ontogenic Appearance of Recruitments
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We may even provide a general process to devise recipes for attribut-
ing content involving an HPC to ephemeral states18.
ephemeral contentful state : To devise a recipe for attributing
ephemeral states with the content F (k) where k is an HPC:
a1 : Find a recipe to attribute contents of the type F (k) to a
selected-for state S.
a2 : Find out in which way does S’s causal profile’s being fitness-
conducive depends on the Property Cluster of kind k.
Once done so, we may provide the following recipe. Consider a
mechanism n that is caused, by cues of type C, to create states
whose causal profile’s being fitness-conducive depends (on the
way found out in a2) on the Property Cluster of an HPC Qn-1i that
is function of the cue: Qn−1i = f (Ci). Now, if
b1 : n’s having created states from cues Ci have made it fitness
conducive in many of the possessors of n, contributing to its
fixation in their population of its possessor,
b2 : There is a higher order HPC Qn that explains that instantia-
tions of properties Ci go together with the instantiations of
the properties in the HPC Qn−1i = f (Ci), and these lower
level HPCs in turn explain the fitness conduciveness alluded
to in b1.






It will be very much easier to see how this process works after
discussing a concrete example. In the following subsection I consider
long term potentiation, which could well be a real life producer of
ephemeral contentful states.
3.4 long term potentiation
Long term potentiation (LTP), is a brain process which
results from coincident activity of pre- and post-synaptic
elements, bringing about a facilitation of chemical transmis-
sion that lasts for hours in vitro, and that can persist for
periods of weeks or months in vivo. Cooke and Bliss (2006,
p. 1659)
The mechanism of LTP, widely perceived as a possible implementation
basis for memory and learning (cf. Koch (1999, p. 317)) is probably a
process “up the implementation ladder” of the kind we are interested
in. It is, under the plausible assumption that LTP exists because fre-
quent coincident activity of neurons is not, well, coincidental. If such
activity responds, instead, to a causal relation among the environmental
properties to which the pre- and post-synaptic neurons are sensible, it
makes sense to increase the degree to which the pre-synaptic neuron
18 It cannot be a watertight, automatic process, though: the circumstances for different kinds
of contents will be different, and some thinking on the part of the theorist will be needed.
This is fine from a naturalistic point of view, though: the thinking in question will have
to be done only a finite number of times; only, that is, for the mechanisms that create the
ephemeral contentful mental states that are human thoughts.
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makes the post-synaptic neuron fire -in the simple model we have been
working with, it makes sense to disjunctively-recruit pre-synaptic firing
for the input of the post-synaptic neuron.
To keep the discussion in focus, let us suppose that an agent A has a
mechanism we could call ltp* (intended to be a simplified, manageable
version of the LTP mechanism) that could be described as follows:
ltp*: Whenever two mental mechanisms, an F-mechanism and a G-
mechanism, are on together repeatedly, ltp* builds a probabilistic
causal connection that makes the G-mechanism fire with a higher
probability if the F-mechanism has fired, and vice versa. This
probabilistic causal connection decays slowly when there is no
correlated activity between F- and G-mechanism.
ltp* is our candidate for a mechanism n that produces ephemeral
contentful states. Here, the cues Ck are of the type An Fi- and an Fj-
mechanism being on together repeatedly. Connecting probabilistically both
mechanisms in the presence of this cue has been fitness contributing
in the past because, many times, whenever both mechanisms are on
together repeatedly, there was a causal relation between there being an
Fi around and there being an Fj around that made both states of affairs be
positively correlated. Building up the causal connection among states
ensured that the system as a whole would miss less instantiations of
the states of affairs in question.
Now, for ltp* to be able to confer content on its productions, it must
be the case that there is a higher order HPC connecting instantiations
of the cues Ck with the causal grounds connecting the states of affairs
there being an Fi around and there being an Fj around. That is, there must
be a causal explanation of the following state of affairs:
association: Many times19, when there is frequent cofiring of an
F-mechanism and a G-mechanism in S’s brain, there is a causally
grounded relation between there being an F around S and there
being a G around S.
And so, previous coinstantiation making it probable that there is
a grounded relation between F and G, future coinstantiation is to be
expected20. See Appendix C for further discussion.
While it is clear than in many spatiotemporal domains around us as-
sociation is causally grounded, it is not trivial to explain exactly what
are these causal grounds. There are so many properties instantiated at
so many different times and places that, in general, correlation among
property instantiations is no guarantee of causal relationship. asso-
ciation is only plausible for creatures that have states attuned to the
instantiation of some properties, under some circumstances. That is, I
dare to say, it is unlikely that a mere associative mechanism such as long
term potentiation, on its own, would have given rise to contentful states.
Anyway, suppose that we have identified the domain under which
19 This “many times”, again, is susceptible of rigorous analysis in terms of Fitness Contri-
butions.
20 Could we have proposed the following alternative explanation to HM?
(hm*) Whenever there is frequent coinstantiation of two mental states, F-mechanism
and G-mechanism, it is sufficiently probable that there is a grounded relation
between F-mechanism and G-mechanism.
This “explanation” makes LTP* redundant. If what explains the coinstantiation of mental
states is that they are groundedly related, this does not explain (but actually preempts)
the usefulness of a mechanism that builds a grounded relation between them.
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association is causally grounded, and which has helped selection
for ltp*. We may then provide a content for the products of ltp*:
ltp* products : If there is a higher order HPC Qn that explains as-
sociation, then the state created by the token of ltp* in S, as a
result of the cue Ck: [An Fi- and an Fj-mechanism being on together
repeatedly] has as content The causal relation R ensures that whenever
an an Fj is around, an Fi tends to be around. Where [the causal
relation R ensuring that whenever an an Fj is around, an Fi tends
to be around] is the HPC Qn-1k that Q
n keeps together with the
cue Ck.
What explains that ltp* has linked F- and G-mechanisms together?
The answer to this is that, a sufficient number of times, the G-mechanism
has been on whenever the F-mechanism was on, and ltp* builds a state
whenever this condition holds. And why is that? Because most of the
time that two states behave like that, there is a causal relation linking
the properties they refer to in the right way. The state created by ltp*
means that such a causal relation is in place.
Once we have a mechanism such as ltp* up and running and creating
contentful states, content is rapidly divorced from usefulness. The
content created in presence of a certain cue is fixed by whatever HPC is
kept together with said cue by the higher-order HPC that has enabled
selection for ltp*. But this lower-order HPC may be perfectly useless,
recording a causal relation between two properties whose connection
will never be critical, or even particularly useful, for anybody. In those
cases ltp* will have created a useless proto-belief.
3.5 a step towards predication
This is a good point to stop and discuss a couple of general features of
the etiosemantic account of content. We may now, for instance, outline
the general process that we have used in devising the content recipes
there is an f around and shm between fs and gs. In order
to build a recipe to attribute contents that are substitution of a certain
schema F (x) -such as There is an x around- the first thing one needs is
a metaphysical account of what it is to be a case in which F (x). Thus,
for There is an F around S, the underlying metaphysical picture is one in
which the state of affairs consisting of an F being around S is constituted
by some of the instantiations in the Property Cluster of F (which is an
HPC) happening around S (at the time the contentful state is tokened).
And for The causal mechanism SHM ensures that whenever an F is around,
a G tends to be around, the picture is one in which a higher order HPC
keeps together the properties Being an F and Being a G.
Once we have such a rough and ready metaphysical picture of what it
is to be the fact F (x), the task of finding a recipe to attribute the content
F (x) to a selected-for state reduces to this other task: finding the causal
profile of a state such that a complete explanation of the selection for
that state must invoke F (x), in a sufficient number of generations. This
is the barest outline of the process; a much more detailed account may
be gathered from the recipes we have offered for concrete contents, and
much more detail still will be provided in the chapters to come.
So, we may think of the process of providing content recipes as a
process in which one uses a metaphysical picture of the target fact to
ascertain the causal profile of which mental mechanisms may have its
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selection enabled by such fact. Thinking of it this way suggests that facts
whose metaphysical profiles are close may be such that the mechanisms
whose positives have them as content also have causal profiles that are
close. This may provide an easy route for the appearance of contentful
states involving more sophisticated states of affairs. What I have in mind
is that the states which may be attributed with content according with
shm between fs and gs may be a precursor of the more interesting
relation of predication.
For example, it is possible that, in some cases, the causal structure
SHM that the disjunctive recruitment exploits is particularly intimate. It
may be, for example, that condition 2. in shm between fs and gs
holds because the specialised homeostatic mechanism that subserves
kind F is a proper part of the specialised homeostatic mechanism that
subserves kind G, and the G Property Cluster is a subset of the F
Property Cluster. In such a case, in some sense, being a G is a part
of what it is to be an F: G reappearing is part of what it is for F to
reappear. This is the kind of relation that holds between pairs of HPC
such as man and animal. In case this more stringent relation holds
between Fs and Gs, we may attribute a content that involves being in
the determinate-determinable relation.
gs are fs: A subject S has a mental state fg with the content Gs are
Fs if
1. fg is hereditary, and consists of a G-mechanism, and an
F-mechanism disjunctively recruited for the input of the
G-mechanism.
2. The specialised homeostatic mechanism SHMF that partially
constitutes the HPC F is a proper part of the specialised
homeostatic mechanism SHMG that partially constitutes G.
Likewise the G Property Cluster is a subset of the F Property
Cluster
3. The facts about F and G cited in 2. are the ones that have
enabled selection for fg.
This is a good starting point towards predication. If we abuse lan-
guage for the sake of (slightly) gaining psychological plausibility, we
may render the content of the states alluded to ings are fs thus: G is
F (Fly is moving thing, Peach is fruit, etc.)21
3.6 explanations and procedures
There is a source of disatisfaction here, though: while shm between
fs and gs appears to be identifying a natural grouping of mental
states -those that record a grounded relation between the exemplifi-
cations of two kinds-, gs are fs appears to be tracing an artificial
subdivision inside that group, with the only objective of identyfing a
relation among properties (the determinable-determinate relation) that
we human cognisers do find natural. At first sight, that is, shm be-
tween fs and gs points at a theoretically fruitful subclass of mental
states, and gs are fs does not. This metatheoretic fact is evidence
that tracking true necessitation relations among kinds has a more nat-
ural home in more sophisticated cognisers. Simple agents such as the
21 This language abuse is inspired by Millikan (in Millikan (1998)), after Quine’s (in Quine
(1960)) “Hello! More Mama”, in her rendering of the content of something similar to
what I have been calling F-mechanisms.
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ones we have been dealing with have enough with tracking grounded
relations of sufficiently* increased posterior probabilities -although if
the grounded relations in question are of the kind recorded in gs are
fs, they will end up having states with the content Gs are Fs.
This talk of theoretical fruitfulness is extremely vague. There is maybe
a clearer reason why the recognition of causally-grounded relations
appears to belong more naturally with our simple agents: the mecha-
nism of disjunctive recruiting a mental states’ firings whenever such
recruiting is fitness-conducive does not distinguish between causally-
grounded relations and full-blown natural kind parthood relations as
recorded by gs are fs. So, in a sense, an agent relying on this mecha-
nism cannot be blamed for treating equally both kinds of relations. There
is a closely analogous sense in which Democritus cannot be blamed for
mistaking a black speck for a fly. The procedure he follows for recogniz-
ing flies has this sorry feature. I submit, and will try to elaborate on this
in section 3.10, that the difference between explanations (that ground
content) and procedures (that ground holding-accountable practices)
can explain many of our internalist intuitions both in epistemology
and in philosophy of language. Although a fuller discussion will have
to wait until then, we can already sketch what I will be meaning by
Procedure.
Procedures depend on the mechanisms that create contentful states.
Every such state has a producer that has created it with such and such
a causal profile. In ephemeral contentful state I suggested
that, for a mechanism n to be able to confer content on its ephemeral
products, it must create them with a certain causal profile (that is,
maybe, function of the cue that has caused n to create them). This is
what gives meaning to the notion of procedure22:
procedure: If a cue Cm has caused a mechanism n to create an
ephemeral state m that can be attributed with content by using a
recipe derived from ephemeral contentful state -in par-
ticular, n has historically relied on a higher order HPC Qn, as
described in condition b1-, then
1. m’s Procedure is the causal profile with which n has created
it.
2. m’s Procedure’s ecologically-fixed context is the domain d in
which the specialised homeostatic mechanism that partly
individuates Qn-1m is active (see subsection 1.4.5).
The hypothesis about blamelessness is, then,
blamelessness : m’s behaviour is blameless if and only if it accords
with m’s Procedure. Otherwise, it is blameful.
In 3.10 we will see that this notion of blamelessness23 allows us to
capture many of our internalistic intuitions about the behaviour of
contentful states. The idea is that it should do (should from this blame-
22 This notion is related to what Millikan (1984, chapter 9) calls intension.
23 This expression, introduced as a technical term in Parfit (1984), has become a term of
art in ethics, referring to the possibility of acting for the right motives -even if with
the wrong outcome. Although I’ll put it to a different use, I think there are important,
non-accidental analogies between blameless wrongdoing in ethics and in the philosophy
of mind. I hope to develop this idea sometime.
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ful/blameless perspective; there are others) whatever it was created for
doing2425.
I turn now to the discussion of another, very important family of
ephemeral contents: those involving individuals.
3.7 reference to individuals is cognitively cheap
There is a sense in which the conditions for existence of contentful
states which involve reference to individuals are not terribly more
complicated than the conditions for states which involve reference to
natural kinds. In fact, the very same kind of process through which, I
have argued, a mental state is endowed with the content that There is
an F around, may underlie contents such as a is around, where a stands
for an individual. Plant phototropism is a simple case in point.
Phototropic plants, such as the snow buttercup, turn around to face
the Sun. The heliotropic mechanism of buttercups (cf. Sherry and
Galen (1998)) involves differential cell-growth in differently-illuminated
regions of the flower’s peduncle. This, in turn, makes the flower bend
towards the source of light. Let us consider a peduncle, ped, which
can be in a number of states, pedi, each of them a substitution of the
schema: Groups of opposed epidermal cells in the peduncle along vector i’s
having different size. Each of pedi indicate a number of properties: such-
and-such pattern of light density in the surface of the peduncle, the Sun being
in such-and-such position in the sky, etc.
For each such property we may construct an Indication Profile. In
fact, given that we have now many more states than two, this Indication
Profile will have to be a hypermatrix. For simplicity, we may consider a
finite number of different states ped may be in -say, n-, and n different
apparent positions of the Sun in the sky. Then calculate conditional
probabilities for each pair of values -they will maybe be normally
distributed around some value, the one that makes the flower face the
Sun.
Identifying the Fitness (Hyper-)Matrix for each such IP implies doing
empirical research on the beneficial effects of phototropism for the
buttercup. According to Sherry and Galen (1998, p. 984), they include:
increasing the temperature of the flower bowl, being more attractive
for pollinator insects, helping to grow more, and larger, achenes, which
in turn are better at germinating, etc26.
Let us see now whether the situation with snow buttercups warrants
an attribution of content to any of pedi. If we remember the recipe for
content-attribution we proposed in Chapter 1:
24 It should be noticed that this technical notion of blamelessness is totally independent from
responsibility: these very simple mental states cannot help but behave according to their
procedure. Responsibility will only enter the picture once free decisions do, and this is
not a matter I plan to discuss in this work.
25 The notion of Procedure is what is needed to account for the possibility of supernormal
stimuli, briefly discussed in 1.1.2. Although in our examples we are only seeing Proce-
dures which prompt a mechanism to go on or off, we could easily imagine more nuanced
Procedures which tailored the degree of response to some features of a cue. Such happens
with the size of an egg (cue) and degree of preference for incubation (response). All of
this is compatible with the content of the representation being There is an egg here.
26 Of course, snow buttercups can only cash these benefits if, apart from tracking where the
Sun is, they follow it. In very simple systems such as this (what Millikan (1995) has called
pushmi-pullyu systems), the descriptive (e.g. telling where the Sun is) and the directive
(e.g. making the flower bend in that direction) functions cannot be separated, so we are
helping ourselves to an idealisation here in considering only the descriptive part.
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there is an f around : m’s being on has the content There is an F
around if
tfa1 : etiological function warrants, for a number i > 1 of
properties Gi, the attribution to m of the etiological function
of indicating the instantiation of Gi around its possessor S.




, of Indication Profile
and Fitness Matrix for each property Gi are grounded on
the frequent co-instantiation of several properties in S’s envi-
ronment. (cf. subsections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2)




pairs remain the same across
S’s lineage is causally grounded on a specialised homeo-
static mechanism SHM that explains the recurrence of the
properties appealed to in tfa2 in a certain domain d around
m.
tfa4 : F is the natural kind individuated by SHM and the smallest
set of properties P’ such that SHM explains the fact that, in
d, the properties in P’ are frequently coinstantiated.
The properties that clause tfa2 talks about include the ones we have
been describing above: differential illumination of the peduncle, in-
creased flower-bowl temperature, etc. We may furthermore assume that
the Fitness Contribution of phototropism has been instrumental in the
survival of the actual snow buttercups. Now, what is the specialised
homeostatic mechanism that explains the recurrence of these proper-
ties? It is the mechanism that keeps a light source above the heads
of the buttercups: the hydrostatic equilibrium between gravitational
compression and fusion that keeps main-sequence stars such as the
Sun where they are. The HPC defined by the particular instantiations
of the properties above and this homeostatic mechanism is, then, an
individual: the Sun. The content of a particular arrangement of cell
sizes in a snow buttercup’s peduncle has a content along the lines of
The Sun is over there.
3.7.1 Natural Kinds And Individuals Are Not All That Different
The reason that reference to individuals is as cognitively cheap as
reference to natural kinds, under this account, is that, fundamentally,
individuals are taken to be the same kind of stuff as natural kinds: the
same kind of features that identify kinds (i.e., instantiations of proper-
ties in a cluster and the causal link among them) identify individuals
as well. Individuals, in this sense, are a subset of kinds which meet
further restrictions. Thus, e. g., in Wilson et al. (forthcoming):
However individuals and historical entities are specified
precisely, they have in common the idea of being spatiotem-
porally bounded, continuous particulars.
Individuals are different from other kinds in that their spatio-temporal
parts are in contact with one another. Kinds in general, on the contrary,
may have and normally have scattered parts (e. g., the different tiger
instances).
The idea that individuals and kinds are fundamentally the same kind
of entities is by no means new, and has been defended by Millikan
(Millikan (2000, paragraph 2.3) and Millikan (1998)). A number of
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philosophers of biology (starting with the influential Ghiselin (1974)),
on the other hand, have defended that biological species are best seen
as individuals. Thus the cognitive cheapness: the content-conferring
processes we are investigating simply latch on whatever HPC is around.
If it is a kind, a kind; if it is an individual, an individual.
3.7.2 Reference to Individuals is Cognitively Expensive
On the other hand it is a contingent, but real enough, characteristic
of most individuals that they are not longevous enough to sustain
the evolution of contentful states with them figuring in the content
attributed. It is not by chance that the individual doing this job in
the previous section is the Sun. Not that there are no other examples
-maybe some trees are longevous enough, and evolutionary biologists
are probably able to grow in chemostats bacteria that are sensible in
interesting ways to short-lived concrete individuals27. But the point
remains that individual lifespans are, in general, much shorter than the
time needed to sustain the selection for a contentful state.
Contentful states with contents involving individuals will be, in
general, ephemeral. In this section I will provide the template for
content-attributing recipes for these ephemeral states.
3.8 individuals and ephemeral states
What we need for the existence of ephemeral states with a content
involving individuals is a selected-for mechanism (or chain of mech-
anisms) that produces them. As we have seen in 3.2, the newly born
contentful state will (or at least may) be functionless; it is features about
the explanation of its existence -and its contribution to the explanation
of the existence of its producer- that transcend those needed to fix a
function attribution, that fix its content. We may start by providing a
set of sufficient conditions for crediting an ephemeral state with the
content a is around. For that, we can follow the process recommended in
ephemeral contentful state (see 3.3). According to this process,
we first need (according to a128) to obtain a recipe for attributing a
content of the same kind to a selected-for state. As we have just seen in
3.7, the there is an f around recipe is sufficient for this. We need
then (as per a2) to check in which way such selected-for state’s causal
profile depends on the individual’s HPC for it to be fitness-conducive.
Let us say, in general, that the selected-for mechanism n that produces
the ephemeral mechanisms whose being on has the content a is around
acts according to the following routine:
routine: Inputs of type C, such as Cm, cause n to create mechanisms
with input finput (Cm) and output foutput (Cm).
That is, we are supposing that there is a transformation that takes
every cue to a causal profile, and n has stumbled upon a way to make a
mechanism with the latter causal profile whenever it receives the right
cue as input. And the ephemeral mechanisms with the causal profile
in question have been fitness-conducive because (here we need to plug
27 And if Ghiselin’s “radical solution” of considering species as individuals is right, there
are many more examples.
28 This a1, and the a2, b1 and b2 below, are from ephemeral contentful state.
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in the content attribution recipe there is an f around, which, we
have said, will do for a is around as well):
fitness conduciveness: A sufficient* number of mechanisms mi
produced by n according to routine in the presence of cue Ci
have been fitness-conducive times because
fc1 : For a number j > 1 of properties Gj, mi has indicated the
instantiation of Gj around its possessor.




, of Indication Profile and
Fitness Matrix for each property Gj are grounded on the
frequent co-instantiation of several properties in the environ-
ment of mi’s possessor.




pairs remain the same during
mi’s lifetime is causally grounded on a specialised homeo-
static mechanism SHMi that explains the recurrence of the
properties appealed to in fc2 in a certain domain di around
mi.
fc4 : ai is the individual individuated by SHMi and the smallest
set of properties P’i such that SHMi explains the fact that,
in di, the properties in P’i are frequently coinstantiated.
Finally (as per b1 and b2) we need to make sure that there is a higher
order HPC that keeps together the individuals ai appealed to in fit-
ness conduciveness and the cues Ci. The only extra bit we need
for this is part of b2:
higher order hpc : There is a higher order HPC Qn that explains
that instantiations of properties Ci go together with instantiations
of the properties in the Cluster of HPC ai.
That is, n (the selected-for mechanism) relies on HPC Qn in the sense
that the cues it uses to create ephemeral mechanisms mi go usually
together with lower level HPCs (individuals, in this example) that
are situated so as to make mi, with the causal profile it has, fitness-
conducive. This going together29 is enforced by Qn. If these conditions
are in place, the content-attributing recipe for ephemeral states is easy:
a is around - ephemeral: An agent A has a mechanism, mi, whose
positives have the content ai is around, if cue Ci has caused n to
create it and all of routine, fitness conduciveness and
higher order hpc are in place.
This is just an application of the process suggested in ephemeral
contentful state to the case of ephemeral states with contents of
the kind a is around. The rigorous formulation is, to be sure, somewhat
convoluted, but the underlying idea is extremely simple: the selected-for
mechanism relies on an HPC (for this purpose: an HPC is a correlation
and its causal explanation) that correlates cues and lower level HPCs.
If so, the produced, ephemeral mechanism may be attributed with a
content that involves the lower level HPC (an individual, maybe, or a
kind) that goes together with the cue that caused its creation.
Again, it will be much easier to secure a firmer grasp of a is
around - ephemeral and its auxiliary principles by applying them
to a concrete example.
29 Going together is metaphorical, but the main idea should be reasonably clear. A cue goes
together with an HPC if cues of that type are reliably accompanied by the existence of
HPCs of that type.
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3.9 dominance hierarchies among lobsters
American lobsters have a complicated social structure, with males
forming a dominance hierarchy -cf. Karavanich and Atema (1998). If
you put a bunch of lobsters which have never met before in a water tank,
males will start fighting with one another. After fighting, losers will
subsequently avoid contact with winners, while winners will continue
to display aggresive behaviour against losers. According to Karavanich
and Atema (1998), the cue lobsters use to avoid fights with previously
encountered conspecifics is the chemical signature of their urine.
A natural way to describe the scenario in intentional terms is that an
individual lobster (say, lobster #i, or Li) after a fight with some other
individual (say, Ln), acquires a mechanism the firing of which has the
content Ln is around, which it may subsequently use to avoid further
encounters with the winning lobster, or to more efficient harassment of
losers. Let us see how etiosemantics goes about predicting this outcome.
We postulate the existence of a mechanism n which follows this
routine:
Whenever Li loses in a fight with some other lobster,
say Lj, and the urine chemical signature UCSj is around
Li when this happens, n creates a state mij in Li with
the following causal profile: the presence of urine chemical
signature UCSj around Li causes mij to go on, and mij ’s
going on causes Li to initiate a fight-avoidance routine.
On the other hand, whenever Li wins in a fight with
some other lobster, say Lk, and the urine chemical signature
UCSk is around Li when this happens, n creates a state
mik in Li with the following causal profile: the presence
of urine chemical signature UCSk around Li causes mik to
go on, and mik ’s going on causes Li to display aggresive
behaviour towards Lk.
This is, simply, the routine schema we saw above with the following
substitutions of variables:
• Cm is presence of chemical UCSm together with an outcome in fight O
(which can be either win or lose)
• finput (Cm) is presence of the chemical that is part of Cm.
• fouput (Cm) is Initiate avoiding behaviour if O is lose and Display
aggresive behaviour if O is win.
Given how we have set up the case, it is natural to suppose that n is
still around because it has been fitness-conducive30; and such fitness-
conduciveness stems from the fitness-conduciveness of a sufficient
number of its products which is, in turn, explained by the fact that:
Mechanisms such as mim have indicated a number of prop-
erties -it indicates the presence of chemical UCSm very well,
and many other properties not that well. Indicating these
properties is coupled with certain Fitness Matrices; this fact
is explained by the frequent coinstantiation of a number of
properties; most relevantly, a certain chemical signature of
30 Apparently, it is still still unclear what it is about dominance hierarchies among lobsters
that makes them selected-for. I will take for granted that they are selected-for.
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the urine correlates with whatever it is that makes a lobster
likely to win or lose in a confrontation with Li. There is
a specialised homeostatic mechanism SHMm that makes
this properties coocur. SHMm, together with the Cluster
that stems from the properties we have just talked about,
constitute an individual lobster, Lm.
This is fitness conduciveness, applied to the lobster example. The
Property Cluster of an individual lobster Lm includes: instantiations
of whatever signs of lobsterhood you may think of, and of particular
properties of that very lobster, such as being particularly fond of some
type of frozen squid, having clasps of thus-and-so shape and, crucially,
releasing UCSm with the urine and being likely to win (lose) in a
fight with Li. SHMm is the homeostatic mechanism that keeps those
properties recurring together: the mechanism that prevents Lmfrom dis-
integrating -the cohesion of the materials of her carcass, the nutritional
processes that keep her body from diminishing in size, etc. Finally, it
needs to be the case that a non-accidental regularity keeps the Cm
being good enough cues of individual lobsters:
There is a higher level HPC that explains that instanti-
ations of properties of kind C go together with [the fact
that a certain urine chemical signature goes together with a
likely outcome of fight, for a reason that has to do with an
individual lobster].
And this is higher order hpc as applied to the lobster example.
The higher level HPC required indeed exists. It is, basically, lobsterhood
plus facts having to do with the number of possible urine chemical
signatures: if a lobster finds a chemical signature; this is a sufficiently
good sign that this encounter upon UCSm will be caused by the same
thing that caused previous encounters, because the probability of two
lobsters sharing UCSm is vanishingly low, and the probability of UCSm
not coming from a lobster is equally low31. Supposing all of this causal
structure in place we may, finally, provide a content attribution recipe
for individual mechanisms mij:
A lobster Li has a mechanism, mij, whose positives have
the content Li is around, if cue Ci has caused n to create mij
(cf. figure 9).
Even with the benefit of concrete examples, the appeal to a nested
structure of HPCs, closely knitted together with the causal profile of
the selected-for mechanism and the ephemeral mechanisms it creates,
may strike many as unnecessarily complicated. It is, in fact, strictly
necessary if we are to avoid Indeterminacy, Input and Output problems
in our content attributions. First of all, the low order HPCs (each
individual lobster) are needed to avoid having content indeterminacy
among the many properties each ephemeral mechanism indicates (e. g.,
such and such UCS, this individual lobster, lobsters in general, etc.), or
among the many properties that explain the success of the consumers
of the representation (e. g., lobster likely to beat (lose against) me in a
fight, creature likely to harm (be harmed by) me, etc.). This is simply
the ephemeral implementation of the strategy described in chapter 1.
31 Of course, only in the ecologically-fixed context of n’s Procedure. See above 3.6 and
below 3.10.
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Secondly, we need the higher order HPC n relies on to fix the lower
level HPC each new ephemeral mechanism is about32.
I should also point out that I am not conjuring this complicated
structure of overarching HPCs out of the blue to serve my content-
attributing needs. Those HPCs are already sitting there, for the taking.
The content theorist only needs to help himself to them.
Although I have used the lobster case merely as an example in our
way to building more complex contentful states, there are lessons to
draw from it that may be useful for the contemporary debate about
Individual Recognition in ethology. I discuss these implications in
Appendix C.
3.10 contentful states and non-existence
It should be noted that this general strategy for attributing content
to ephemeral states complies with what I called in 1.6 compressed
explanation: the content of these states is a compressed explanation
of their existence in a sufficient number of cases. The difference with
contents attributed using recipes such as there is an f around is
that, in the latter, selected-for states, the cases in which the content of
the representation is not a compressed explanation of its existence are
cases in which the representation is, simply, false. But ephemeral states
may go wrong in a more catastrophic manner.
Consider again the lobster case. There is a mild kind of misbehaviour
on the part of a contentful mental state: If Li loses a fight with a UCSk-
releasing lobster and as a result n forms a mental mechanism mik that
goes on whenever UCSk is in the water, causing Li to flee, we may use
a is around - ephemeral to attribute the content Lk is around to
mik’s going on. If, unfortunately, on occasion the presence of UCSk
is not caused by Lk, but, e. g., by an ethologist testing our lobster for
Individual Recognition, mik’s going on still means Lk is around. Li is
misrepresenting the world. This kind of mild misbehaviour we call
error, or misrepresentation.
But there is another, more worrying kind of misbehaviour. Consider
the following case:
the pitiless biologist : A biologist experimenting with a group
of lobsters releases in the water tank a lobster, Ll, the urine of whom
she has somehow rendered odourless. Ll proceeds to bash lobster Li
repeatedly and thoroughly while the biologist releases in the tank a
chemical substance UCSm -which is of the same type as real lobster
urine chemical signatures, but has been synthesised in the lab. As a
result of this, the token of n in lobster Li produces a state mim that
goes on when UCSm is in the water, and that causes Li to flee when on.
Which content should we attribute to mim’s going on?
In this case, a is around - ephemeral is not met: there is no
individual such that the homeostatic mechanism of Qn (the higher
order HPC on which n relies) makes it correlate with the cue that
has caused n to create mim. A content attribution to mim’s being on
32 And if we have an intermediate layer between n and mij (that is, if the ephemeral
contentful state is not a product of the selected-for mechanism, but a product of a product
thereof) we will need to have three levels of HPCs, and so on and so forth. This means that
if, as is probably the case with human mental states, there are many layers of explanations
between selection-for and contentful states, the environment has to be stable enough (i.e.,
there must be homeostatic mechanisms in place) at many different levels.
Figure 9: Two levels of Homeostatic Mechanisms
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would be, for all we know, unwarranted. Moreover, we have reasons for
refusing to grant content to mim: n continues to exist in contemporary
lobsters because it has stumbled upon causal grounds for the correlation
of cues of type C with instantiations of properties that make states of
the right causal profile fitness-contributing. Our recipes only warrant
content attributions when these causal grounds are active in the creation
of a certain state. It is reasonable to think that, in case they are inactive,
the mental states in question come out contentless3334.
3.10.1 The Internal Perspective
mim’s being on may not have content, but it behaves as if it did. Li is
a one-trick lobster: it smells a chemical signature present in the water
during a fight, and then flees (fights) when it smells it again. How
come that some of the times the lobster is acting on the content of its
mental states and some of the times it is not? The answer is in noting,
again, that a content-attribution is but a summary of a certain kind of
explanation of the existence of a state and its continuing success. If an
explanation of the relevant kind does not exist, it cannot be summarised.
And it is completely up to the external world, not the lobster, to provide
or fail to provide the necessary ingredients for such explanation.
Still, one (among others) of the things that a content attribution does
is providing an explanation of the behaviour of the attributee. And, in
this connection, it is true that mim’s being on influences its possessor’s
behaviour in a way that shares certain important traits with the way in
which contentful states explain behaviour. We have already identified,
in 3.6, the nature of these traits: what mim shares with less catastrophic
counterparts is that its positives follow a Procedure of the same kind
-because they have been created by the same mechanism. Following
the definition presented in procedure, mim’ being on’s Procedure is
something like: Go on whenever UCSm is in the water, and cause Li to flee.
On the other hand, and as opposed to more succesful products of n, its
Procedure does not have an ecologically-fixed context.
I have suggested that abidance by Procedures is the basis of a series
of normative claims: in this case we may say that mim, and the lobster
that possesses it, cannot be blamed for fleeing after smelling UCSm.
Blameless doings, on the other hand, are only fitness-conducive if the
world collaborates. The world needs to provide the properties that make
a mental state’s causal profile fitness conducive. That is to say, it has
to provide for the properties appealed to in clause b2 of ephemeral
contentful state:
b2 : There is a higher order HPC Qn that explains that instantiations of
properties Ci go together with the instantiations of the properties
in the HPC Qn−1i = f (Ci), and these lower level HPCs in turn
explain the fitness conduciveness alluded to in b1.
There is a second normativity dimension, according to which a
mental mechanism does well in going on only if these properties, i.
e. the properties instantiations of which are to make the state fitness-
conducive, are present:
33 For similar points regarding selected-for states cf. 2.1.
34 I should point out that n, on the other hand, has content: it is a standing proto-belief to
the effect that Qn is in place; something like Qn exists.
102 ephemeral contentful states
norm: A mental mechanism mi, produced by a selected-for mecha-
nism n, goes on according to its Norm if and only if the properties
that the HPC Qn−1i = f (Ci) keeps frequently coinstantiated with
the presence of mi’s Input, and explain its fitness-conduciveness,
are present.
That is, for example, a state mij of lobster Li, that causes Li to flee,
behaves according to norm if and only if it goes on in the presence of a
lobster higher than Li in the dominance hierarchy. mim, the mechanism
created as a result of the machinations of the pitiless biology, could
very well conform to this Norm.
We may introduce the pair wrongdoing/rightdoing as labels for this
second normative dimension:
rightdoing: m’s behaviour is right if and only if it accords with m’s
Norm. Otherwise, it is wrong.
A case of blameless wrongdoing occurs when a mental state, fol-
lowing its procedure, starts to exist in a situation that does not accord
to norm. A case of blameful rightdoing happens when a mental state
starts to exist according to norm, but without following its procedure.
Note, again, that blameful behaviour is not a possibility for these very
simple contentful states.
The four combinations of blameful/-less right-/wrongdoing seem
to be enough to describe the behaviour of contentless states in a way
that makes justice to our internalistic intuitions. So, what are content
attributions doing? What are they good for?
Well, Procedures and Norms constrain the behaviour of mental states
from opposite directions: Procedures concentrate on the normative
dimension of displaying well-tested behaviour, while Norms concentrate
on displaying useful behaviour. I have been defending a view on content
according to which contents involve the causal structures that make, in
the long run, causal profiles (well-tested behaviour) fitness-conducive
(useful). Contents, that is, explain that states that follow its Procedure,
reliably accord to Norm:
external/internal : The content of a mental state, m’s being on,
is a sufficient number of times, the explanation of the reliable
connection existing between blameless behaviour and rightdoing
by the mental state in question.
To put it simply, contents explain that behaviours are successful
-where behaviour is described by the Procedure, and what counts
as successful is described by the Norm. Take, for example, content
attributions warranted by a is around -ephemeral: ephemeral
mechanisms have the causal profile they have (i. e., they follow the
Procedure they follow) because their producer, n, has followed rou-
tine. Now, n’s doing so has contributed to its being selected -and, thus,
its keeping producing ephemeral mechanisms- because (fitness con-
duciveness) the mechanisms it produces have been fitness conducive
in their turn (and, if I have defined Norms correctly, this should amount
to their behaving according to Norm a sufficient number of times) by
relying on individuals -which (higher order hpc) are kept together
by a higher order HPC. That is, the complicated state of affairs which
underlie content attributions provides an explanation that following
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Procedures a sufficient number of times supposes behaving according
to Norm.
This reliable connection need not be very good. Only as good as to
make m’s producer selected for (or to prevent it from being selected
against). Contentless states are outside the sufficient number of states
for which external/internal is true. In their case, either there is
no reliable connection between blameless behaviour and rightdoings
or, if there is, it’s explained by bizarre circumstances, not having to
do with the higher order HPC that has enabled the selection for m’s
producer.
A promising idea -although, of course, in need of much further
development- is the following: the notions of Procedure and Norm can
take care of the behaviour-explanatory features of content attributions
in the best way possible that is homogeneous for contentful and content-
less states. But a still better explanation of behaviour has to distinguish
contentful and contentless states: there is an explanation in the former,
but not the latter, of the connection between acting blamelessly and
doing the right thing. A complete explanation of a piece of behaviour
includes a reason why a mental mechanism with the right causal profile
is there to effect the behaviour. This is what intentional explanations of
behaviour do.
I would like to hypothesise that external/internal is true even
for sophisticated cognitive creatures such as us. The story would go as
follows: judgings using empty concepts such as vulcan or ill-starred
may be blameless -in that there is a Procedure associated with their
use- and they may be right -because they conform to some broad
Norm such as the ones above- but they will be contentless: there will
be no connection between blameless doings and rightdoings. At least
no connection of the kind that has explained the past success of the
concept-forming procedure35.
35 I also think, but cannot hope to substantiate here, that the strategy of distinguishing a
Procedure-like principle and a Norm-like principle may help solve other debates about
normativity. For example, take the debate about the norm of assertion. Williamson (1996
and 2000) dismisses the norms: assert only what is true and assert only what you have warrant
to assert. The main objection to the former is that assertion “obviously has some kind of
evidential norm” Williamson (1996, p. 497). The main objection to the latter is provided
by situations in which one is warranted to assert something untrue, and assertion seems
objectionable. Williamson, instead, defends a knowledge norm: assert only what you know.
I think this is one of the cases in which norm pluralism is the right option. The warrant
norm plays the Procedure role; the truth norm plays the Norm role, and an analogue to
external/internal shows the connection of assertion with knowledge:
external/internal - assertion: The fact that the content of an assertion A is
known is, a sufficient number of times, the explanation of the reliable connection
existing between blameless asserting and right asserting.
That is, it is knowledge that explains the connection between warrant and truth. This is
the actual way in which knowledge is linked to assertion.

4C O M P O S I T I O N A L I T Y
Let us call F-involving those contents that are about F. In my discussion
so far I have provided sufficient conditions for the attribution to a
mental state (ephemeral or not) of the following F- and a-involving
contents, where F and G stand for real kinds, and a stands for an
individual:
• There is an F around / a is around.
• The causal mechanism SHM ensures that when there’s an F around
there tends to be a G around.
The goal of this chapter is to canvass the strategy for extending the
approach I have been advocating to more complex F-involving contents.
I will, first (4.1) show why the most basic contents must be proposi-
tional and not subpropositional. After that (4.2) I show how to provide
an interesting set of sufficient conditions for a number of contents
beyond There is an F around S, such as There is an F five minutes from here,
There is an F 500 m away, etc. The recipe proposed here will simply be
an application of what we had already seen in previous chapters -that
is, said content attributions will not depend on content attributions to
subpropositional components.
Section 4.3 provides a first approach to the task of providing concept-
contents (i.e., contents such as F) to mental states: I will focus on
cognitive setups in which some mental mechanisms (which I will
call collaborative) contribute to the constitution of a great number of
mental states. To avoid problems with attributions of content to states
without function, I will concentrate in a philosophical fiction: creatures
whose cognitive endowment emerged as a result of mutation and has
subsequently been selected for -swampchildren.
The first idea to be discussed, in keep with contemporary Causal
Role Semantics approaches to this issue, is identifying the concept
of F, in one of these interconnected networks of mental mechanisms,
with the collaborative mental mechanisms that contribute solely to the
constitution of F-involving contents. I will discuss two problems with
this approach, which will lead to a (hopefully) better one:
First (section 4.3.1) the problem of cognitive significance. We may
have a number of mental mechanisms, such that each of them con-
tributes to the constitution of F-involving contents. Say, as a Hesperus-
mechanism and a Phosphorus-mechanism may do with Venus-involving
contents. The solution to this problem, it will turn out, involves having
a set of mechanisms that create a sufficiently varied pool of F-involving
contents. To simplify the discussion I will assume that this set of mech-
anisms is produced by pred, a mechanism that effects predications
between individual and kind concepts and conc, a mechanism that
creates individual and kind concepts from certain cues.
The need for this set of mechanisms, in turn, leads to a second, more
pressing problem (section 4.4): how to fix as F-involving the content of
thoughts constituted by the tokening of mechanisms whose status as
concepts of F depend, precisely, on the content of the thoughts they
participate in. That is, if we make the fact that a particular product of
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conc is the concept of F depend on the thoughts it helps constitute,
then we cannot make the content of these thoughts depend on the
identity of the concepts that form it. In section 4.4.2 I canvass my own
positive (and, I hope, non-circular) proposal for fixing the content of
concepts, of composition mechanisms and of thoughts. With this I meet
the main goal of the chapter. After that, I review (4.5) Millikan’s own
attempt to resolve the threat of circularity, and I conclude that it is
unsuccessful.
As a coda to the chapter, I discuss how my proposal fares compared
with other popular accounts of concepts (4.6), I show how the grain
of truth in two important insights in the philosophy of mind may
be accounted for in the etiosemantic proposal: that association is a
pervasive and important mental operation (4.7); and that causal roles
may help fix the meaning of concepts (4.8). In particular, it is shown
how many of the most vexing problems with Causal Role Semantics
may be solved.
All in all, I regard my proposal as building upon the Classical repre-
sentationalist (Fodorian) insight according to which concepts are terms
in a language of thought. One way to see the results of the chapter
is as providing an explication of how the atomic components of rep-
resentations (concepts, and basic ways of composing them, such as
predication) acquire their content. This is done while explaining sev-
eral seemingly independent intuitions in the philosophy of mind, and
without incurring in the implausibly radical concept nativism Fodor
defends1.
4.1 propositions first
Most contemporary naturalistic accounts of content are inspired by, and
may be considered the sophisticated descendants of, the kind of views
about meaning put forward by Kripke and Putnam in the seventies.
Those were views about the semantics of names and kind terms, so it
is sociologically all too natural that many theorists working in the field
see their task as trying to come up with the right account of content
for singular and real kind concepts, under the assumption that, once
we have those building blocks in place, we can use a version of the
compositionality principle to account for propositional contents -where
the compositionality principle asserts, roughly, that the meaning of a
thought is fixed by the meaning of its subpropositional components
plus the way in which they are composed. The literature is rife with
examples in which the paradigm of mental representation is the concept
of cat (e. g., Loewer (1999), Fodor (1990)) or fly-detectors (e. g., among a
great many others Agar (1993) or Zawidzki (2003)). This is unfortunate
at least because it makes the following problem daunting:
What we want is that fly-occasioned “fly”s, and bee-bee
occasioned “fly”s, and representations of flies in thought all
mean FLY. At best, teleological solutions promise to allow
us to say this for the first two cases -bee-bee-occasioned
tokens are somehow “abNormal” (...) hence their causation
1 And, I hope, without falling in what Godfrey-Smith calls the
neo-Lockean wild goose chase in search of strangely reified “concepts”
or other fundamental representational units. Godfrey-Smith (2009b, p. 38)
that according to him viciates much contemporary philosophy of mind.
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is not relevant to the content of “fly” (...) But teleological
theories don’t even pretend to deal with the third case; they
offer no reason not to suppose that fly-thoughts mean fly or
thought of a frog given that both flies and thoughts of frogs
normally cause fly-thought tokens. Fodor (1990, p. 81)
The problem Fodor is raising in this quote is easiest to see from the
perspective of an optimal-conditions causal theory of content such as
stampe in 1.1.2. Suppose we want to provide the content of the concept
fly according to one of these theories, and we propose the following
definition:
A representation is the concept fly iff, in optimal conditions,
only flies cause it to token.
Even admitting that we have a specification of optimal conditions that
rules out little black pellets, mosquitoes, etc. as optimal-conditions
causes of the tokening of fly, there is another kind of causes of instan-
tiation of concepts that simply cannot and should not be ruled out as
suboptimal or abnormal: trains of thoughts involving flies may cause
further tokenings of the concept fly, and ought to do so, even if the
thinker is temporarily causally isolated from flies. As Fodor goes on
to point out, even a perfect thinker, one who never misrepresents, or
tokens concepts inappropriately, is such that some of her thoughts are
caused by some other of her thoughts.
So, how should we reformulate our optimal-conditions causal theory
to filter out not just cases of misrepresentations (black pellets and
mosquitoes) but also cases of the concept being caused to token by the
tokening of other concepts in a train of thought? Obviously, the quick
fix won’t do:
A representation is the concept fly iff, in optimal conditions,
only flies, or appropriately related thoughts, cause it to
token.
Leaving aside the extreme vagueness of the condition proposed, thoughts
are appropriately related to other thoughts in virtue of their content.
Therefore, this cannot be the general strategy for a reductive account
of content. This problem can be replicated for any account of content
that tries to tie application of a concept to a set of optimal (or Normal)
conditions.
Luckily for the work I have been doing so far, this train of thought
difficulty does not appear in an analysis of propositional contents such
as There is a fly around: it is not the case that, in optimal conditions,
other thoughts, in the absence of flies, cause proto-beliefs or proto-
judgements with such contents. A perfect thinker would never think
There is a fly around in the absence of a fly around her. Fodor’s problem
is a non-issue if one sticks to propositional contents.
But one cannot hope to stick forever to propositional contents. That is,
one cannot hope to give an account of sophisticated content-crunching
engines such as the human mind without an appeal to proposition-
constitutents. I will not review, and will simply endorse, the well-known
arguments from the systematicity and productivity of thought to this
conclusion -cf. Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), Fodor (2008). Fortunately
for the kind of view I am advocating, the compositionality insights
stemming from such arguments can be accommodated. My aim in this
chapter will be to show how to do this. In the process, I will show
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that compositionality, pace Fodor -see his (2008, p. 30)-, is compatible
with the propositions first attitude I have endorsed: one can very well
defend that the most basic contentful states are non-analisable repre-
sentations with propositional content and defend that, once a level of
subpropositional representations (concepts and the like) is provided
for, productivity and systematicity are present in the (now analysable)
representations with proposition content.
In the next few sections I will need to use a larger pool of selected-for
mental states involving Fs. Before concentrating in thought-constituents,
therefore, I will briefly discuss how to provide for content-attributing
recipes for a variety of F-involving contents beyond There is an F around.
4.2 beyond “. . . is around”.
When discussing the Indeterminacy Problem in chapter 1, I concen-
trated in the problem of indeterminacy about the real kind the content
is about. That is, the problem of finding a reason why a mental state
should be attributed with the content There is an F around instead of
There is a G around. This is the most urgent problem, if only because
it is the problem that has drawn everybody’s attention. But, actually,
there is another source for indeterminacy which is seldom discussed
in the literature: why should the content be There is an F around, rather
than There is an F right in front of me or There is an F in a 5 m radius? I
wish to take up now, if briefly, this other question. I have avoided it so
far to simplify the discussion, but the resources to solve it are pretty
straightforward.
In the Cluster of HPCs, according to the definition I presented in
1.4.5, we have instantiations of properties: concrete entities in time and
space. I have been making implicit use of some of the properties of
these instantions in our descriptions of Indication Profile and Fitness
Matrix. For example, if we remember the story democritus and
the content of m’s being on in 1.3, the Indication Profile of m
there was recording the probability of m’s going on [at a time t, and
place a], conditional on the instantiation of a property F [at t, near
a]. In the Indication Profiles and Fitness Matrices that ground the
most basic content attributions, some properties of the event that is
the tokening of the contentful mental state may be transformed, via a
certain mathematical function, into properties of the instantiation of
the property indicated.
With this in mind, a hypothetical way we (or rather, some minor deity)
could have used in calculating the Fitness Contribution of Democritus’s
m is the following:
• We start out with some property F instantiations of which m
indicates. In fact, as we have just seen, that m indicates a property
or not depends on where and when is such a property instantiated,
in relation to when and where does m go on. So, more strictly,
we start with instantiations of F tagged in space and time2 in a
coordinate system centred in m’s position and time when it goes
2 Here again, for simplicity, I’m only considering space and time as the relevant dimension
in which m’s goings on and instantiations of F are to be related. But there could be others.
For instance, the relevant dimension may be temperature: m’s going on at temperature T
indicates instantiations of F at temperature T + 10, etc.
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on3. That is, we rule that m goes on at (0,0,0,0) and calculate the
position of the instantation of F in that coordinate system.
• We then need to find out the property instantiations that explain,
for each property F such that m indicates it, IPF and FMF -see
1.4.1 and 1.4.2. The fact that hits are fitness-increasing also depend
on the spatio-temporal location of the instantiation of a number of
properties. For example, we said that, for Democritus, P (on|fly)
bringing a fitness gain of wfly11 depends on P (nutrient|fly) being
high.
• Finally, we need to “close the circuit” of property instantiations
and workings of m, so that indications issue in positive fitness
values. We have:
1. First activation in m occurs at (0,0,0,0) in a retina-centred
coordinate system -that is, it occurs at the place and time of
first changes in the retina.
2. The property F (Being a black speck, say) is instantiated at
(x,y,z,t) in this coordinate system.
3. The event in 1 causes an order to the motor-control part of
m to move the tongue to position (x’,y’,z’,t’)
4. The property Being frog nutrient is instantiated at (x”,y”,z”,t”),
very near to (x’,y’,z’,t’). That this tagged instantiation goes
together with the one in 2. depends on the homeostatic
mechanism of the individual fly -the one that explains that
the fly does not disintegrate between its impacting the retina
and its being caught by Democritus’s tongue4.
• Once we have closed this circuit we have, for every tagged prop-
erty F such that m indicates it, a cluster of tagged properties.
The cluster, together with the homeostatic mechanism keeping
them together throughout selection for m, individuates the nat-
ural kind that must figure in the content-attribution. And the
spatio-temporal positions of properties in the circuit individu-
ates the location that must substitute the “. . . is around S”. In
Democritus’s case, actually, we can improve the location in the
content-attribution. So, the content should be something like There
is a fly moving from (x,y,z,t) to (x”,y”,z”,t”). In the sections to come I
will, nevertheless, continue talking of content attributions of There
is an F around, ignoring this refinement for the sake of simplicity.
3 This is not as straightforward as it sounds. m may be scattered in space and, in Democritus
for instance, idealised as it is, it covers from the retina to the motor control in charge of
the tongue. The part of m that is relevant for setting the origin of the coordinate system
is, maybe, the retina; but our knowing this depends on our having certain insights as
regards the causal grounds of the interesting indication-relations: we know that it is
changes in the retina that kick off the rest of causal processes we know under the name
of m’s going on; we also know that the indicated property has a straightforward causal
relation with the pattern of changes in the retina, and that such relation depends on the
retina more or less facing the place where the indicated property is instantiated, in its
proximity.
But, on occasions, the causal relations underpinning the indication-relations may not be
so conspicuous. In such cases, looking for the tagged properties that m indicates involves
looking also, at the same time, for such causal relations.
4 Incidentally, the fact that we need to rely on characteristics of the individual fly to
account for the success of Democritus’s mental mechanism may be suggested as a way to
distinguish contents involving countable general terms from those uncountable general
terms. Contents involving gold, in sufficiently sophisticated cognisers, will need no such
reliance on the characteristics of individual chunks of gold.
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And now, further content attribution recipes, beyond There is an F around
are easy to come by. In cases as simple as Democritus it is to be expected
that (x,y, z, t) ' (x ′′,y ′′, z ′′, t ′′). That is, the place and time where the
fly is first seen and where it is eaten are very approximately one and the
same. But this does not need to be so: for example, m may be detecting
an early sign of flyhood, say, 30 seconds before the animal appears
before Democritus’s tongue. Such sign would cause changes in the
retina that would, in its turn, cause the protracting of the tongue 30
seconds later.
What should the content attribution be then: There is a fly. . . ? It will
depend on whether we consider whatever is happening at (x,y,z,t) as
evidence and whatever is happening at (x”,y”,z”,t”) as the instantiation
of the natural kind, or else (x,y,z,t) as instantiation and (x”,y”,z”,t”) as
a later consequence. How to decide exactly where and when is an HPC
instantiated is a complicated question in the metaphysics of real kinds,
and one that is outside the scope of this work5.
It is unlikely that such a mechanism would be very succesful, given
how erratic the behaviour of flies is. But suppose that instances of the
HPC in question have a predictable enough behaviour, so that part of
the property cluster is formed by tagged properties that, first, have
a high chance of ocurring “together” and, second, have a time lag
between them (this is why the scare quotes in “together”) that allows a
mental mechanism to detect an HPC some time before it is instantiated.
In such cases we may have a mental state, as simple as Democritus’s
m, with the content, e. g., There will be a fly in position (0,0,0,+30 seconds)
in a tongue-centric coordinate-system. Many more different contents may
be attributed to equally unstructured representations in this way, if the
world collaborates.
Equipped with this new lot of basic propositional contents, let me
turn now to the discussion of subpropositional ones.
4.3 collaborative mechanisms
Let us now imagine two creatures, Leucippus and Xenocrates, such that
all of their contentful mental states have been selected for -they have
no ephemeral ones. Rather, their whole cognitive setup has mutated
into existence in some or other of their ancestors. This suggestion is
useful, because it allows us to discuss only mental mechanisms with
function, and thus avoid the complications we discussed in chapter
5 I suspect that it works more or less like this: instantiations of properties in the Cluster
come in “waves”, with a few properties showing up first, with low probability; then more
and more properties together, with higher probability and then, after a climax of highest
density of simultaneous instantiations of properties in the cluster, less and less properties
get instantiated with less and less probability. We say that a member of the HPC -a fly,
say, or a horse- appears when and where the climax of instantiation density happens.
Areas of low probability and low density, before the climax, are evidence; areas of low
probability and density after the climax are consequences -and evidence too.
One consequence of this way of putting things is that the distinction between evidence
for the presence of F and F itself turns out to be vague. I believe Millikan could take
profit of such a vague distinction, to avoid such counterintuitive claims as that, when we
hear someone saying that it is raining, we are thereby hearing rain itself -cf. (2000, p. 86).
What we are hearing, in fact, is evidence for the presence of rain; that is, one of the low
density ends of rain itself.
I do not wish to say that evidence for the presence of a real kind is always part of the real
kind itself. It is only when the same mechanisms that bring about the most paradigmatic
properties in the cluster -in the case of rain: water droplets falling from the sky, mainly-
also bring about those low density - low probability tails.
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36. Creatures who share this feature with Leucippus and Xenocrates
I will dub swampchildren. This is, of course, what Fodor would call
philosophical zoology: there have never been, and there will never be,
an actual swampchild.
Now, Leucippus has four mental mechanisms, a, b, c and d. Their
positives have the following contents: There is a mouse around me now,
There is a dog around me now, There will be a mouse around me in 30 seconds,
There will be a dog around me in 30 seconds, respectively7. I shall assume
that these contents have emerged, independently, as a result of selection
for a, b, c and d. I shall also assume that all four mechanisms are
independent: the four inputs and four outputs are disjoint. There is no
common subsystem going on when any of these mechanisms fires.
It is natural to suppose then that, even if there are dogs involved
in the contents of both b and d, there is no concept dog in Leucip-
pus’s cognitive setup: there is no constituent that is common to both
representations. Likewise for mouse.
An alternative setup is Xenocrates’s. He also has four mechanisms, 1,
2, 3 and 4, and they also give rise to four contentful states with the same
content as Leucippus’. But, instead of each individual mechanism’s
positives having a different content, the contents are had by states
constituted by the joint going on of, respectively, (1 and 3), (2 and 3), (1
and 4), and (2 and 4). These mechanisms are wired such that both the
mouse being around Xenocrates now and it being around in 30” make
1 fire; both the dog being around him now and in 30” make 2 fire; both
the mouse and the dog being around him now make 3 fire; finally, both
the mouse and the dog being around in 30” make 4 fire8. So, when the
mouse is around now, 1 and 3 fire, etc. Besides, the joint activation of
1 and 4 has the same output in Xenocrates than the activation of c in
Leucippus; 2 and 4 has the same effect that the activation of d has in
Leucippus, etc. See Figure 10 for clarification9.
There is no competitive edge to Xenocrates’ or Leucippus’ strategies
against each other. Both do the same things in the same situations.
Our content-attributing recipes -those developed in chapters 1 to 3 and
above- warrant the same attributions to c’s going on that they do to 1
plus 4 going on, etc. But we may still wonder whether states 1, 2, 3 and
4 on their own have content. After all, they have some intuitive claim to
being considered subsentential components of Xenocrates’s thoughts.
A first suggestion is the following:
6 I will reintroduce such complications in due time. As we will see, we will need the ability
to create concepts if we are to credit creatures with the possesion of concepts at all.
7 No ability of entertaining de se thoughts is presupposed here. The me is simply there to
provide an origin for the coordinate-system -see 4.2.
8 This is loose talk. A mouse being here in 30” cannot make a mental mechanism fire now.
More precisely, what makes 1 fire is the instantiation of a certain property P such that it,
together with the input of 4 and the output of these two mechanisms, allow us to fix -in
the manner described in chapter 1 and 4.2- a content for the thought constituted of the
joint going on of 1 and 4 of There will a mouse around here in 30 seconds.
9 When reading the figure bear in mind that, in Xenocrates, the presence of any input
causes his mental mechanisms to fire, but all outputs are needed for the effects to the
right to occur. This is what the “AND” and “OR” on top of the arrows mean.
For simplicity, the column of effects in the figure talks about “behaviour appropriate to
mice now”. This only means behaviour that, together with a specification of the input,
and together with whatever relevant features of the environment help fix a content for
the positives of the mechanism of There is a mouse around here now. All of this I have tried
to make clear in chapters 1 to 3.
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Figure 10: Leucippus vs. Xenocrates
swampchild concept - all: A state s of a swampchild is a con-
cept of F if the constitution of every F-involving contentful state
involves the instantiation of s, and no other state does.
Under this definition, Xenocrates’s 1 being on is a mouse (swampchild)
concept, and his 2 being on is a dog (swampchild) concept. This iden-
tification is not entirely implausible. Some evidence: even in this very
simple scenario we may see Xenocrates’ mechanism 1’s being on do
things that we want tokens of the concept mouse to do. For instance,
mediating learning about mouses:
Xenocrates can, and Leucippus cannot, recruit another mental state
for the input or output of his mechanism 1. Xenocrates may, e. g., recruit
a token of the concept whiskers (if he had one) for the input of 110.
Notice that this does not just mean that judgements of There are whiskers
around me now cause judgements in Xenocrates of There is a mouse around
me now. Having whiskers and mouse connected in this way means that
whiskers-thoughts will cause appropriately related mouse-thoughts.
For example, if some input causes both whiskers to go on and 3 to go
on, Xenocrates will form a thought with the content There are whiskers
around me now, and also There is a mouse around me now -in virtue of
the causal relation between whiskers and mouse. But also, mutatis
mutandis, if some input causes whiskers and 4 to go: Xenocrates will
form the thought There will be a mouse around me in 30”. Contra Fodor
-see above-, Xenocrates, simple as he is, is already such that, even if
thinking about whiskers causes him to think about mouses, his tokens
of mouse do not mean anything like thoughts about whiskers. In order to
have a selected-for concept about thoughts-about-whiskers we would
need, first a story that explains the emergence of selected-for thoughts
about thoughts about whiskers, and Xenocrates’s is not such a story11.
10 This recruitment should be a selected-for mutation. Remember Xenocrates is a
swampchild.
11 This is the simplest architecture that solves Fodor’s train of thought difficulty. But there is
no commitment here to the contention that some thoughts (say, about whiskers) need
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The account of concepts swampchild concept - all although
very simple (in fact, we are about to see, too simple) is already such
that concepts, according to it, are immune to the train of thought ob-
jection presented in 4.1, and this while being a very straightforwardly
teleological account of concepts. It is just not as simple as Fodor had in
mind. Unfortunately, swampchild concept - all as it stands is
false. Let us see why.
4.3.1 Cognitive Significance.
The problem with swampchild concept - all is that there are
mental states which have, apparently, similar claims to being the con-
cept of something or other as, say, Xenocrates’s 1 but such that they do
not comply with the principle. These are the swampchild-analogues of
the cases that prompt the conception of concepts as individuated by
cognitive significance:
Mental states such as Xenocrates’s 1 being on have a causal role,
described in figure 10. Now, in general we wish to account for the
possibility that two concepts of mouse -say mouse1 and mouse2- are
such that they have distinct, even disjoint, causal roles. That is, that
they be such that each of them participates in the constitution of only
some of the F-involving thoughts Xenocrates is capable of having.
But swampchild concept - all cannot accomodate this possi-
bility. If there are mouse-involving contentful states in the constitution
of which mouse1 does not participate (i.e., those in which mouse2
participate), then mouse1 is not a mouse concept. This is, I take it, the
wrong result. And -as it happens- the easy fix to this problem will not
work:
swampchild concept - some : A state s of a swampchild is a con-
cept of F if the constitution of some F-involving contentful state
involves the instantiation of s, and no non-F-involving state does.
It will not work because we wish to allow for the following possibility:
as a matter of fact, all F-involving contents are G-involving contents, but
being an F is not being a G. In such a situation, mental states we wish
to count as concepts of F count, according to swampchild concept
- some, as concepts of G. Suppose, for example, that Xenocrates only
had mental mechanisms 1, 3 and 4 -no 2. Then swampchild con-
cept - some would yield the result that all three mechanisms’s being
on are mouse concepts. The role of 4, for example, is to participate in
the constitution of some F-involving thoughts (the thought constituted
by the joint instantiation of 1 and 4), and does not have as part of its
role the participation in any not F-involving thought. But surely 4 is
not a mouse concept. Only 1, if any, is.
At this point, a possibility is to stick with swampchild concept
- all, and deny that either mouse1or mouse2 are concepts of mouse at
all. What are they concepts of, then? Maybe of an entity individuated
both by mousehood and the concept’s causal role. Say, the ordered
always ellicit other, related thoughts (say, about mice). It is overwhelmingly likely that, in
more sophisticated cognitive systems, the relations among concepts are not implemented
simply in what I have called recruitments, but in more nuanced ways; such that, for
example, a thought about whiskers only ellicits the related thought about mice if some
other parts of the system carry the information that mice may be relevant to the current
plans of the thinker. I have no sympathy for associationism -for more about this, see 4.7.
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pair formed by these two things -a mode of presentation of mousehood.
This, in slight caricature, is in keeping with the Fregean tradition of
individuating concepts by their cognitive significance.
One problem with this move is that it would force us to start from
scratch: we have provided sets of sufficient conditions for F-involving
contents, but the Fs in question have always been some individual or
natural kind; it is less obvious how to provide naturalistically acceptable
sufficient conditions for mode of presentation-involving contents. And
we would need such as set of sufficient conditions if the mode-of-
presentation move is to work.
There is another, more important reason why this move is unsatis-
factory. One insight behind naturalistic accounts of the mind is that
mentality develops as an increasingly sophisticated way of dealing
with the world. Under this picture, it is unsatisfactory to conclude that
the target of contentful states changes from, say, mouses, to modes of
presentation, as we increase the sophistication of our interaction with
mouses themselves. That is, it is prima facie a strange picture one in
which cognitive sophistication carries with it a change of the intentional
object of thoughts, from mousehood to ordered pairs of mousehood
and a certain causal role.
This is not to say that such ordered pairs, or other even more exotic
entities, cannot be the intentional object of any thought. On the contrary,
in the last few paragraphs I have been discussing these ordered pairs
and this (I hope!) will have elicited in the reader thoughts which do have
said pairs as their object. This is the right context in which the existence
of these contents reveals itself: very sophisticated thoughts such as The
ordered pair of mousehood and a causal role is an unlikely intentional object for
Xenocrates’s thoughts. The existence of failures of reidentification caused
by differences in cognitive significance, on the other hand, should be
dealt with in a different way.
There is another, better way to make swampchild concept -
some work: having a set of propositional contentful states that is big
and varied enough so as to make sure that there will be F-involving
contents which are not G-involving for any F and G -or at least that
this will be the situation for a majority of concepts:
swampchild concept - big A state s of a swampchild is the con-
cept of F if
1. The constitution of some F-involving contentful state involves
the instantiation of s, and no non-F-involving state does, and
2. The set of F-involving contentful states that the swampchild
is capable of having, and involve the instantiation of s, is big
and varied enough.
This gets rid of the problem: the version of Xenocrates which lacks
mechanism 2 is not capable of having a big and varied enough set
of contentful states, so none of his states is a concept according to
swampchild concept - big. This is, I think, the most reasonable
way to credit swampchildren with concepts.
A problem with this solution is the appeal to the size of the pool of
concepts being big enough. This is a clearly normative condition and,
thus, unacceptable for our purposes if left unanalysed -the enough is
the offending ingredient. In swampchild concept - big we are
talking of concepts that have been hardwired by evolution; no selected-
for producer has created them, and this means that the big enough cannot
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be unpacked in terms of the conditions for survival and selection of the
producer of concepts. That is, there in no “enough*” for this “enough”,
the way there was, e. g., sufficiently* good indication for Democritus in
chapter 1. This is a peculiarity of swampchildren: their states are not the
product of other, functional states, but rather were originally mutated
from scratch, and thus, a fortiori, there are no selected-for conditions on
the performance of their producer.
Appeal to an etiological, naturalistic unpacking of big enough is possi-
ble, instead, if the set of contentful states is the result of the workings
of a system, or systems, whose function it is to generate such sets of
states, or such that it has as a normal consequence of its functioning
the appearance of a sizeable number of collaborative mechanisms à
la Xenocrates. That is, big enough, and hence the definition of concept,
become naturalistically tractable when there is a system selected for the
production of contentful states. A corollary to this discussion is that it is
unclear that swampchildren may have concepts, even if their contentful
states are implemented by a net of collaborative mechanisms, as in
Xenocrates’ case. Only creatures which have newly emerged contents
clearly have concepts.
Thus, in the sequel, I will study the conditions for existence of a cou-
ple of mechanisms that are able to endow a creature with a sufficiently
varied pool of concepts: A conc mechanism that creates new concepts,
and a pred mechanism that creates thoughts in which the referent of a
kind concept is predicated of the referent of an individual concept. As
we will see in due course, once we have these mechanisms in place, it
is more reasonable to make the etiology of a certain mechanism m -and
not its actual participation in thoughts- what fixes the fact that its being
on is, or is not, the concept of F. In particular, its having been created
by something like conc.
I turn now to the discussion of these thought-producing mechanisms.
4.4 productivity and circularity
In previous chapters, we have seen instances of producers that create
ephemeral mechanisms with contentful states. We have just been ad-
vancing some reasons to think that, without some of these producers, it
does not make sense to credit a subject with the possession of concepts.
The question now is, what sort of producers should be in place in the
cognitive economy of a subject, if we are to have a mechanism s such
that its being on is the concept of F? An attractive suggestion is that it
is enough with a system that has the relational function of creating the
concept of F in the presence of a cue CF, and such that it has created s in
presence of this cue. Let us call such a mechanism conc. We are about
to see that spelling out what conditions a mechanism should meet if it
is to qualify as a token of conc are not easy to come by, because of a
widespread threat of circularity between mechanism-specification and
content-specification.
To start seeing this, consider what is needed to attribute some actual
token of conc with such an etiological function to create concepts.
At least, it must be the case that some of its ancestors have created
concepts in the presence of the relevant cues. How should we adjudicate
whether this performance has taken place, that is, whether conc’s
ancestors have created concepts? Of course, whatever it is that makes
those things concepts cannot be that they were created by conc’s
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ancestors, on pain of circularity. We have the independent suggestion
presented above (now in a formulation suitable for any creature, not
just swampchildren):
concept - big : A mechanism s’s being on is the concept of F if
1. The constitution of some F-involving thoughts involves the
instantiation of s, and no non-F-involving thought does, and
2. The set of F-involving contentful states that the possessor of
s is capable of having, and involve the instantiation of s, is
big and varied enough.
And for the appeal to the set of thoughts being big and varied enough
to be acceptable, as we have seen, we need a mechanism that has the
function of producing thoughts, such that its existence depends on
the number of thoughts it produces. For simplicity, let us consider a
mechanism pred (from predication) that has the function of taking two
mechanisms R and S, such that R’s being on is an individual concept of
a, and S’s being on is a concept of F, and outputting a thought with the
content Fa only if Fa12.
For a mechanism with this function to emerge, it appears, individ-
ual and kind concepts must exist independently. So. at least, it is not
straightforward how pred could help in fixing, in an independent
manner, the conditions necessary for concept - big to hold. The re-
mainder of this long section is dedicated to disentangling this circularity,
and offering a non-circular account of the nature of conc and pred. The
following subsection maps some analogies between this problem and
the problem of combining the Context and Compositionality principles
in philosophy of language. A way to deal with this latter problem will
be put to use with the former too. This solution, nevertheless, implies
the existence of a core of thoughts whose content is determined inde-
pendently of conc and pred. This may be considered an unwelcome
result, so in section4.5 I take some time to discuss an account (Mil-
likan’s) that apparently does not have this consequence. Unfortunately,
I will conclude that Millikan’s way to provide for compositionality and
subpropositional thought components cannot work.
4.4.1 Context and Compositionality
In Xenocrates, as we have seen, states 1+3, 1+4, 2+3 and 2+4 enjoy
a content-endowing explanation of their existence; the theoretical as-
sumption behind the attribution of content to 1, 2, 3 and 4 is that, in
virtue of this very fact, there are also content-endowing explanations of
the existence of these latter mechanisms. The strategy I have sketched
to account for the content of thought-constituents relies on a mental
analogue of a version of the context principle:
context : A mental state is a concept of F in virtue of the fact that all
contents in which it participates13 are F-involving contents.
12 Together, maybe, with some additional constraints. I do not wish to commit myself to
pred being the mechanism that effects predications. It may well be that the mechanism
that creates thoughts such as Mr. Doodles is on the mat is not the same that creates thoughts
such as Three is prime. Also, it is possible that predication in human thought has features
that are essential to it, and absent from pred; for example, the relata in human predication
are assigned with different thematic roles and pred, we will see, does not do this. By the
end of the chapter, anyway, I hope to have substantiated the claim that pred does effect
predication -some, not all, of them; and maybe a simplified, not a human, version.
13 And there is a big a varied enough number of them; see above.
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We have not said anything about what makes a content F-involving,
apart from enumerating some content schemas (There is an F around, etc.)
that count as F-involving. But there are a great many other F-involving
contents, apart from these. What fixes their content? I have suggested
that the answer “being produced by pred” introduces a problem. The
content of the outputs of pred depend on its inputs in the following
way:
compositionality: The content of a mental state is F-involving in
virtue of the fact that a concept of F participates in its constitution.
And, on the face of it, context and compositionality are in-
compatible. If what makes a content F-involving is the fact that a
concept of F participates in its constitution, then what makes something
a content of F cannot be its participation in F-involving contents. I
cannot go into the complicated debate surrounding the compatibility
of top-down and bottom-up determination of content in language and
thought. I will only note that one possible strategy for securing such
compatibility is not a possibility in the case that interests me. As Szabó
points out,
As long as it is not understood as a causal or explanatory
relation determination can be symmetric, so any version
of [the principle of compositionality] is compatible with
the corresponding version of [the context principle]. Szabó
(2008)
But I am interested in what makes something a concept of F, and what
makes some other things F-involving contents. This is precisely the kind
of explanatory dependence that, Szabó suggests, may make the two
principles incompatible.
In the case of actual learning of the meaning of subsentential ex-
pressions there is, though, a simple-minded explanation14 of how such
learning is possible, given the truth of context and compositionality
principles. A three-step process is postulated:
1. The meaning of a conveniently big and varied corpus of sentences
CS is learned, without making use of the structure of the sentences.
That is, the speaker learns to associate each sentence Si with its
meaning Mi, without relying on the meaning of the subsentential
components of Si.
2. The meaning of the subsentential components of sentences in CS
is worked out from the meanings learned in 1, with the help of
the context principle.
3. The meaning of all other possible subsentential components, and
all other possible sentences, is calculated from the information
obtained in 1 and 2, with the use of the principles of context and
compositionality.
Of course, much more needs to be said about these steps and in par-
ticular this last one. The kinds of inferences that allow a speaker to
work out the meaning of a new word from the context of utterance and
the meaning of the rest of the sentence where the word is found are
anything but straightforward. But this is not a problem for the process
14 Suggested to me by Manuel García-Carpintero.
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we are interested in: once the function of pred and conc is fixed, it
is the working of these mechanisms which fixes the meaning of new
concepts and thoughts. So, the analogue to step number 3 in thought is
pretty clear: the meaning of new concepts is to be fixed by conc and
the cue it uses in the particular occasion of the creation of a concept.
Mutatis mutandis for thoughts and pred.
Now, the simplest way to adapt this three-step process to the consti-
tution of F-concepts and F-involving contents is the following Simple
Solution15:
simple solution: 1. The meaning of a conveniently big and var-
ied corpus of mental states CMS is selected for -swampchild
like. Each state in such corpus is constituted by the joint
instantiation of a number of collaborative mechanisms, but
the content of each such a collaborative mechanism plays no
role in fixing the content of the states in CMS16.
2. The meaning of the collaborative mechanisms that constitute
the states in CMS is fixed by concept - big. Concepts
appear at this stage.
3. The meaning of the rest of possible mental states, not in
CMS, is fixed by composing the meanings of collaborative
mechanisms, in novel combinations.
It must be noticed that, according to simple solution, there are
mental states whose meaning depends on the meaning of its con-
stituents -those that appear in step 3. One may worry that this step
is always going to be subject to the train of thought difficulty, and
others that make a propositions first approach sensible -see above, 4.1.
I dedicate the following section 4.4.2 to develop a version of simple
solution that is free from these difficulties. After that, I will take a
close look at Millikan’s alternative account, that promises to account
for productivity without making use (or making, at most, a derivative
use) of subpropositional constituents. I will raise a basic point about
this account: Millikan’s use of mapping functions introduces a covert
intentional element and, therefore, is faulty from the naturalistic point
of view. The conclusion of the section will be, then, that the appeal
to constituents is unavoidable. Hence my positive proposal, which I
present now.
4.4.2 Interlocking Determination
According to simple solution, the way in which we can safely
attribute pred with the ability to take a concept of F and a concept
of a and issuing the thought that Fa, is by having a previous stock of
concepts and thoughts, such that the ancestors of pred took the former
and issued the latter a sufficient number of times, and this explains the
existence of pred. A selective story that complies with this requisite
must be of a very particular kind, subject to a number of constraints:
15 I should make clear that I am not transposing a solution to the compatibility of context and
compositionality principle from a (more than dubious) assumption that the phylogenetic
development of concepts is recapitulated in the ontogenetic generation of individual
conceptual repertoires for actual thinkers. I feel no sympathy for such an assumption.
Rather, I am drawing this insight from the philosophy of language because I cannot see
any other non-circular way in which conc and pred may be characterised.
16 That is: collaborative mechanisms do not contribute their meaning to the meaning of the
mental state. On the other hand, they do have a role in fixing the causal profile of the
mental state, which in turn helps fix its meaning.
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• The individuation of selected-for thoughts provides one such con-
straint. Throughout this work I have been making the assumption
-typical in teleosemantics- that the fact that selected-for thoughts
are copied from one another (i. e., are inherited) helps individuate
them: even leaving aside its content, it’s not merely its causal
dispositions, but its history that makes a mechanism the mecha-
nism it is. Selected-for thoughts, that is, form what Millikan (1984)
calls reproductively-established families. Under this assumption, if
pred is able to output tokens of selected-for thoughts it must be
because these selected-for thoughts have always been produced
by pred and its ancestors. Otherwise we would have the problem
of explaining on what grounds pred’s output on one particular
occasion counts as a token of the type, say, “selected-for thought
that Fa”.
• If there are going to be individual and kind concepts to serve as
inputs for pred, there will have to be collaborative mechanisms
such as the ones discussed in 4.3. And these collaborative net-
works cannot be simply hardwired by natural selection: as we
have seen in the previous bullet point, it is pred and its ancestors
that must be effecting the connection of concept into thoughts.
Finally,
• While helping selected-for thoughts to recur, pred must also be
securing its own role of taking any individual and kind concepts
and issuing a predication thought.
Not many stories (however just-so) are compatible with these con-
straints. One such story, for the emergence of a mechanism pred that
can produce predicative thoughts17 is:
interlocking - pred A mental mechanism pred is capable of con-
joining concepts in predicative thoughts if
1. A mental mechanism (pred’s oldest ancestor) is mutated into
existence. Its causal powers involve, whenever confronted
with a certain cue (e. g., the repeated coinstantiation of two
mental mechanisms) taking two mental mechanisms (so far
contentless; precisely which two mechanisms is a function
of the cue) and transforming them in a suitable way (e.
g., effecting a conjunctive recruiting). The resulting mental
mechanism is also, so far, contentless.
2. For a number of generations pred outputs a pool of mental
mechanisms with significant overlap. That is, pred is exposed
to significantly overlapping cues across generations, in the
presence of a pool of significantly overlapping inputs. This
grounds an identification of some of pred’s outputs as the
same mental mechanisms or states as some of the outputs of
pred’s ancestors.
3. Some of the mechanisms that pred outputs, then, form
reproductively-established families in Millikan’s sense, and
are selected for, say, the indication of a number of properties
in a way which (following the content-attributing recipes I
17 Again: maybe only a subset of predication-thoughts, and maybe only a kind of
predication-thoughts that are distinctly non-human in that they do not assign thematic
roles and the like.
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have presented elsewhere in this work) allow univocal con-
tent attributions to them. Only from this moment on, these
recurring outputs of pred count as selected-for thoughts.
4. After a sufficient number of these thoughts have come into
existence, concept - big allows us to attribute thought-
constituent content to some of the inputs to pred -cf. 4.4.
Only from this moment on, these recurring inputs to pred
count as selected-for concepts. This provides a foothold for
evaluating the relation between pred’s cue and its inputs
and output (which are now contentful) in “human-readable”,
fully intentional terms. This is why we need parallel selection
for pred and the thoughts it produces.
5. pred has helped produce a number of selected-for thoughts.
If it is now to have the ability to produce ephemeral thoughts
of the same kind it must be because the kind of HPC hierar-
chy I reviewed in 3.3 and 3.8 is also present here:
a) Each selected-for thought produced by pred involves
the presence of one or more HPCs.
b) Consider a number of pairs of a cue SFa and the selected-
for thought that pred creates in its presence, Fa. There
must be a higher order HPC linking cues such as SFa
with thoughts such as Fa in a sufficient* number of cases.
c) In such a situation, if pred goes on to associate an in-
dividual concept b with a kind concept H to form an
ephemeral mental state in the presence of cue SHb, the
output mental state may be attributed with the content
Hb -the state of affairs that the higher order HPC keeps
together with the cue.
In this way we are assigning pred a non-negligible task in the produc-
tion of thoughts, while still allowing for independent content determi-
nation of both its outputs and its inputs. After a number of generations
of this interlocking usefulness of pred and the states it creates, pred is
ready to compose new, not selected-for states into meaningful thoughts.
Once a pred mechanism is in place, the formulation of sufficient
conditions for a mechanism that outputs new concepts is relatively
straightforward. I am envisaging a mechanism conc which, in the
presence of a cue Sa, produces a concept of a. Again, there needs to be
an interlocking story for this mechanism to help create concepts that
have an univocal content:
interlocking - conc : A mental mechanism conc is capable of
creating concepts if
1. A mental mechanism (conc’s oldest ancestor) is mutated into
existence. Its causal powers involve: whenever confronted
with cues of a certain type, producing a mental mechanism
whose positives are, so far, contentless.
2. For a number of generations conc outputs a pool of men-
tal mechanisms with significant overlap. This is because
it is exposed to significantly overlapping cues across gen-
erations. Some of these recurring mechanisms, then, form
reproductively-established families in Millikan’s sense.
3. pred takes some of these recurring mechanisms and forms
selected-for associations with other mechanisms -created
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by conc or emerged independently- that can, thereby, be
attributed with content following the usual recipes in chapter
1 and the beginning of this chapter.
4. We can now use the content of the thought created by pred
to fix the content of these products of conc which start being
concepts. From now on, the relation between conc’s cue and
its output may be evaluated in intentional terms. Finally,
5. conc has helped produce a number of selected-for concepts.
If it is now to have the ability to produce ephemeral concepts
of the same kind it must be because the right HPC hierarchy
is present here:
a) Each selected-for concept produced by conc is about an
HPC -i. e., every thought created by pred with a mech-
anism produced by conc involves an HPC, and every
thought produced using a certain mechanism produced
by conc involves (maybe among others) the same HPC.
b) Consider a number of pairs of a cue Sa and the selected-
for concept that conc creates in its presence, a. There
must be a higher order HPC linking cues such as Sa
with HPCs such as a in a sufficient* number of cases.
c) In such a situation, if conc goes on to create an ephemeral
mechanism b in the presence of cue Sb, b may be under-
stood as the concept of b -the HPC that the higher order
HPC alluded to in (b) keeps together with the cue.
Finally, we can use conc to give a characterisation of concepthood:
concept: A mechanism m is a concept of a if
1. Cue Sa has caused conc to create m, and
2. a is the HPC that the higher order HPC alluded to in in-
terlocking - conc 5b connects with Sa.
I should like to note that what endows conc with the ability of
creating concepts -that is, contentful mechanisms- is not simply the
fact that it has the relational proper function to create mechanisms that
satisfy concept - big, such that this function is satisfied in Normal
situations by a particular set of conditions. This kind of Millikanian
individuation conditions will not do for the same reasons why we
found them wanting in chapter 1: the notion of Normal conditions
is tied to the conditions that were operative during selection for the
functional device in question, and there are bizarre (but, as far as we
can tell, nomologically possible) scenarios in which conc acquires that
very relational proper function without there being any HPC, or any
other causally-grounded correlation to facilitate the emergence of said
function. The consequence is that there is no HPC, in turn, to fix the
content of the associations among mechanisms created by pred -again,
for exactly the same reasons that gave rise to indeterminacy in our
early examples of frogs and flies. This is a crucial obstacle to the whole
project of providing a content for the outputs of conc.
The etiosemantic position on this issue is to insist that conc’s content-
endowing capabilities do not depend solely on its having the right kind
of function with a set of Normal conditions -as in teleosemantics- but,
rather, that they depend on there being the right set of normal condi-
tions (in this case, a nested set of HPCs) that enables the emergence of
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the right kind of function for CONC. Functions are very important, but
second to HPCs.
We may note now that many of the states created by pred and
conc may lie outside the domain of the HPCs appealed to in in-
terlocking - pred and interlocking - conc, but now, having
provided for subpropositional constituents and predication, we have the
possibility of modelling the content of these thoughts with the help of,
say, interpreted syntactic trees. We have, that is, all of the advantages of
the traditional picture of compositionality while still retaining a theory
that is naturalistic through and through -and that has the advantages
of the propositions first approach.
Before going on to draw some conclusions from this sketch of a
theory of contents, I discuss Millikan’s alternative, involving what she
calls mapping functions.
4.5 millikan on productivity
We may distinguish two important kinds of productivity which, prima
facie, appear to be very different. One goes by the name of indexicality:
there is a sense in which, whenever I think There is a food here now (I will
sometimes call this the food thought), I am thinking a wholly new content
-at least because it has never been “now” before: that there is food there
and then. Each token of There is food here now is relevantly different to
other tokens of the same thought: each happens at a different time; and
each means a different proposition: There is food at <the place in which the
thought is tokened, the time at which the thought is tokened>. A cogniser who
is able to entertain the food thought already shows a limited but very
real kind of productivity: she is able to think indefinitely many contents,
and contents never entertained before by anyone, just by tokening the
food thought at different times.
But most would take this to be productivity in, at most, a honorific
sense. What they have in mind, rather, is compositionality. A thought
system is productive in this other sense, roughly, if it counts with a
vocabulary of concepts and of modes of composition, such that the
content of a thought is determined by the content of the concepts that
compose it and the way in which they are composed. The productivity
allowed by compositionality is way richer than mere indexical produc-
tivity. For example, someone who possesses n individual concepts (such
as Michael, or Eve) and m kind concepts (such as horse or shoemaker)
and the operation of predication will be able to entertain n times m
different contents. And, one is tempted to say, really different, not just
indexicality-different.
Indexicality is compatible with a propositions first approach -see 4.1:
the productivity afforded by indexicality does not depend on the re-
combinability of a vocabulary, or the iterability of a number of syntactic
structures but on features of the propositional thought such as the time
or place in which it was tokened. On the other hand, compositionality
provides for much richer productivity but, as we have seen, it leaves
open the problem of how to provide a naturalistic account of subpropo-
sitional contents in light of, for example, the train of thought difficulty.
Millikan’s answer to this conundrum is interesting and original: she
sets out to show that, appearances notwithstanding, indexicality and
compositionality are, at bottom, two aspects of the same phenomenon.
According to this picture, if indexicality can be explained in a frame-
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work which takes propositional thoughts to be the basic bearers of
content, compositionality can be as well.
In Millikan’s theory, productivity in intentional systems is but one
manifestation of the articulated character of natural signs in general
-cf. Millikan (2004, p. 48). This character, perhaps in a concealed way,
is already present in the most simple relations of indication. Take the
definition which kicked off our discussion:
indication: A mechanism m’s going on indicates instantiations of a
property F around S iff
i1: P (F|on) > P (F) and
i2: The difference in probabilities in i1 is causally grounded.
Notice that, according to the definition, the relation of indication holds
between events such that some of their features are a function of one another.
Namely, their spatio-temporal location: instantiations of F <near m, now>
are indicated by m’s going on <where m is, shortly after>.
This kind of causally grounded relations between event types may
be described using what Millikan calls mapping functions: mathematical
transformations from features of the sign to features of the indicated
states of affairs. In the case just discussed, m’s going on at (x, t) indicates
an instantiation of F at f (x, t). The relevant mapping function here is
MFM, where MFM (x, t) = (near x, shortly before t). More terminol-
ogy: this mapping function, in turn, individuates what Millikan (2004)
calls a system of signs: the class of possible and actual signs obtained by
varying the relevant parameters. In the case just described, the relation
of indication established between m and F individuates a system of
signs, SYS18, that may be characterised as follows:
∀x, t (m’s being on at 〈x, t〉 ∈ SYS)
For concreteness, suppose that F is the property Being food, and m’s
being on is a natural sign of this property because the presence of a
round, orange thing nearby always causes ms to turn on (and is the
only thing that causes them to turn on), and most round orange things
are peaches (and hence food) in m’s surroundings.
Under these assumptions, the causal grounds appealed to in clause 2
of indication only support some of the mappings from signs in SYS
to states of affairs. That is, while there are many members of SYS (i. e.,
instances of m’s turning on at a certain time and place) that have been
or will be caused by the presence of a round, orange thing that is food,
there are very many other members of SYS for which it will not be the
case that the corresponding state of affairs (the presence of food there
and then) will also occur, or even made more probable by the causal
mechanisms in place. Some clear cases are
• m’s being on at 〈aroundhere, thedistant future〉,
• m’s being on at 〈Mars,now〉
at least if we assume that peaches will not be the predominant orange
round things in the distante future around here, or now somewhere
in Mars, and there are is no other abundant, edible, orange and round
18 Notice that m belongs to SYS only relative to the natural-sign relation it establishes with
F. It may be that m establishes other natural-sign relations with other properties, each of
which will define an alternative system of signs.
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stuff. More interestingly, the causal grounds of the indication relation
will also fail to support the mapping function for many everyday values
of x and t -e. g., those that pick out events of m’s turning on that are not
caused by the presence of peaches.
Natural signs as described by indication are a plausible precursor
of indexicality. Take, again, the food thought: There is food here now. This
thought is indexical because the content it expresses depends on the
time and place at which it is tokened. Now consider m’s being on (for
all we have said, m’s being on may or may not be the same thing as
the food thought). It is a natural sign of the event consisting of the
instantiation of food somewhere sometime, and we have cashed this out
as saying that events of m’s being on belong in a system of signs, SYS,
such that each member of SYS has, according to MFM, an image in a
range of (possible or actual) events of instantiations of food. The role
that the thought-type the food thought plays in the traditional description
of indexicality is played here by the system of signs SYS.
As we are about to see, Millikan’s main idea is to recognise the exis-
tence of increasingly complicated mapping functions for increasingly
abstract systems of signs; one of the very complicated, very abstract
examples will amount to what is traditionally understood as composi-
tionality. But, first, we need to see the role of mapping functions in the
attribution of contents according to Millikan. The idea is that contentful
states (intentional icons in her terminology) are related to the state of
affairs that is their content (roughly, their real value, in her terminology),
thus:
When an indicative intentional icon has a real value, it is
related to that real value as follows:
1. The real value is a Normal condition for performance
for the icon’s direct proper functions.
2. There are operations upon or transformations (in the
mathematical sense) of the icon that correspond one-to-
one to operations upon or transformations of the real
value such that
3. Any transform of the icon resulting from one of these
operations has as a Normal condition for proper perfor-
mance the corresponding transform of the real value.
Millikan (1984, p. 99)
For our current purposes, claim 1 plays the role of the recipes for the
content of different contentful states I have been giving throughout
this work. But we are currently interested in claims 2 and 3: 2 can be
paraphrased, roughly, as saying that, whenever a state has content, the
relation of that state to its content is covered by a mapping function;
while 3 says that the rest of states in the same system of signs have as
content their image according to this mapping function. In this way we
can provide, for example, a content attribution for the state consisting
of m’s being on a year from now: namely, that there will food near that
token of m in a year. This is so because MFM takes the former (merely
possible) tokening of m to the latter (merely possible) instantiation of
food.
In my example in this section I have been considering a mapping
function, MFM, that transforms the spatio-temporal location of the
sign into that of the signified event -cf. Millikan (2004). We may now
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note that mapping functions may take just about any feature of the
sign to any of the signified event. For example, in some domains -say,
a Mediterranean beach- there is a mapping from the distance between
footprints on the sand (sign) to the speed at which some hiker was going
(signified). Or, in some other domain -say, a field near Toulouse- you
may find a mapping between the number of apples fallen on the ground
and the speed of the wind during the past few hours. indication can
be generalised so as to include these other cases:
indication generalised: A sign of type s’s having feature FS in-




An event E with feature f (FS) |
A sign of type s’s having feature FS
)
>
P (An event E with feature f(FS))
and
i2: The difference in probabilities in i1 is causally grounded.
Where, as I have said, the mapping function f may transform what-
ever features of sign and signified -not just spatio-temporal locations.
Any such mapping functions may be fed into steps 2 and 3 in Millikan’s
quote.
Thus, if, e. g. bee dances -Millikan (1984, p. 107)- are such that trans-
formation of some of their features (number of loops, angle of the
axis of the eight, etc.) correspond to transformations of features of the
position of the nectar, actual bee-dances share a system of signs with
bee-dances-after-transformations-of-features, and these latter entities
have as content their image according to the mapping function that
helps individuate the system of signs -see above. For example, if an
actual dance d has as content that nectar is 50 m from the hive in the di-
rection of the sun, the fact that dances are members of a system of signs
determined by the mapping function that takes dances to positions
of nectar has as a consequence that a hypothetical dance d* in which
the waggle part is a hundred thousand times longer than in d has, as
content, that there is nectar 5000 km from the hive in the direction of
the sun. Give or take.
The Naturalistic Worry.
Taking stock, what we have seen so far is a plausible description of what
a natural sign is, encapsulated in indication generalised, and
how such a picture may help explain the limited kind of productivity we
call indexicality: certain mapping functions take features of the sign (and,
by extension, of simple contentful states) to features of the signified
event (and, by extension, of the content of simple contentful states). A
mild version of the naturalistic worry that I will advance against the
application of mapping functions to compositionality also afflicts its
application to this simpler indexical case. I will present the worry now;
and, after discussing Millikan’s approach to compositionality, I will
show how to extend the worry to the more interesting case.
The relation of a natural sign to its signified, according to Millikan’s
picture as summarised above, may be described at three different levels:
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L1 The first level is constituted by the concrete causally-grounded
relations that are established by signifier and signified. That
is, e. g., the very causal relations that tokens of m that have
actually existed established with the presence of food. Rela-
tions such as: a certain peach’s being around a token of m
at a certain time causing m to activate19.
L2 Then comes the level of the causally-grounded indication re-
lation between types of events: every pair of signifier and
signified that is covered by the causal underpinnings of the
concrete causally-grounded relations in L1. For example,
only a class of distances, neither too large nor too small,
indicate that a hiker was walking at a certain speed20, and
this has to do with causal (particularly, physiological) con-
straints enforced by the muscular and skeletal arrangement
of the human body. These constraints fix the class of pairs
of signified and signifier that is covered by the indication
relation.
L3 The causally-grounded indication relations in L2 may be
only probabilistic, and most of them will only be effective in
a small, gappy domain. So, finally, we may wish to abstract
mathematical transformations that fill-in and extend the
domain in which the indication relation holds. These are the
mapping functions -the f (x) in indication generalised.
For example that to each possible distance between footsteps
dbf, corresponds a speed of the hiker s (dbf), or to each
possible waggle dance d a position of nectar n (d).
All three levels are needed for the Millikanian picture summarised
above to work. Level L2 -that of the causally-grounded processes which
cover the concrete pairs of sign-signified- provides signified events
for as yet uninstantiated signs. This is what we need for a productive
system of signs, which was the whole purpose of the exercise. Level
L3 -constituted by the mapping functions themselves-, in its turn, is
needed at least if we want to provide signified events for members of
a system of signs that lie beyond the causally-grounded domain, such
as the aberrant waggle dance D*. Apart from these abnormal cases,
there may be other, more everyday examples in which an appeal to
level L3 is needed. Say, a token of m inside the skull of a creature that
has been abducted from its original habitat and placed inside a cage in
a lab -where the causal explanation of the correlation of orange-and-
roundhood with nutritiousness is entirely different from that in the
wilderness.
If level L3 does real work in content attributions21, it is reasonable
to worry about the naturalistic credentials of the resulting theory of
19 And causing, or maybe constituting the fact, that food be there
20 For clarification, let me show how this example is a substitution of the indication
generalised schema:
• The sign s is a set of footsteps.
• The relevant feature FS is the distance between footsteps in s.
• The signed event E is the hiker’s walk.
• Finally, her speed is the relevant feature of the event, f (FS).
21 At the end of this section I briefly discuss whether Millikan is committed to level L3 or
not.
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content. The problem is that there are no facts in the causal order to
determine that the content of d* is fixed by the mapping function that
yields 5000 km as a result, and not another function that yields any
other value -or, maybe, another that has gaps for values not covered
by the causal underpinnings of the relation between dances and nectar
position. In choosing one of these mapping functions as the right one,
then, we are surreptitiously introducing an intentional element in the
theory.
Millikan has some things to say about the closely related issue of
Kripkestenian worries about our ability to follow rules, but what she
has to say does not solve this naturalistic worry:
In her (1993, chapter 11), Millikan discusses the problem of rule-
following as introduced in Kripke (1982). Kripke issues a sceptical
challenge against theories of meaning that make facts about the dispo-
sitions to use linguistic expressions on the part of speakers constitutive
of the meaning of these expressions. Kripke puts forward two different
arguments -cf. also Boghossian (1989, p. 509). In summary, they are as
follows:
First, the infinite truths argument: there are infinite truths about the
use of some expressions; for example, there are infinite true substi-
tutions of the schema a plus b is c. But -even if we leave aside our
dispositions to make mistakes, cf. Kripke (1982, p. 26f)- our dispositions
are finite, being the dispositions of finite beings in a finite amount of
time. So, it cannot be that these infinite truths are accounted for simply
by relying on our dispositions.
Second, the normativity argument. There are facts about the correct
way in which we should apply our terms. That is, a theory of meaning
should account for the fact that terms ought to be applied in some ways
but not in others. Now, there is no way to read an ought off a disposition.
Dispositions can only tell us how things are, not how they should be.
Although Boghossian (1989, p. 528) defends that causal-informational
theories are, for the purposes of the sceptical argument, a subset of
dispositional theories of meaning, it is not clear that he was considering
teleosemantic theories among the former. In any event it seems that
teleosemantics has some resources to answer both Kripkean worries.
Millikan (1993, p. 217)’s strategy is to argue that purposes to conform
to unexpressed rules are biological purposes. The idea, as the reader has
probably anticipated, is to place biological functions at the base of the
normativity of meaning. The ought of meaning is a biological ought,
which can be subsequently unpacked in naturalistically unobjectionable
terms by an etiological theory of functions such as, say, Millikan’s own
theory of proper functions -cf. Millikan (1984, chapter 2f), Millikan
(2002). The infinite truths of the first objection, on the other hand, flow
naturally from these normative facts: facts, e. g., about what ought the
terms to apply to cover an infinite number of cases.
Millikan’s example involves the mating strategy of male hoverflies.
She identifies a “proximal hoverfly rule”. If the male is to intercept a
female in flight,
the male must make a turn that is 180 degrees away from
the target minus about 1/10 of the vector angular velocity
(measured in degrees per second) of the target’s image
across his retina. Millikan (1993, p. 218)
This, plausibly, is not simply a disposition that male hoverflies have,
but, rather,
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the hoverfly has within him a genetically determined
mechanism of a kind that historically proliferated in part
because it was responsible for producing conformity to the
proximal hoverfly rule, hence for getting male and female
hoverflies together. Millikan (1993, p. 219)
This kind of historical properties of the mechanism warrant our attribu-
tion to it of a biological function -or, in this context, a biological purpose.
If this is correct, Millikan can then give an answer to Kripkensteinian
sceptical complaints:
• Infinite truths: the hoverfly mechanism has the function of, given
the angular velocity of a retinal shadow, issuing a muscular com-
mand that makes its possessor fly in a particular direction. This is
so for an infinite number of angular velocities or, at any rate, for
a number that far surpasses the number of actual uses that actual
hoverflies will make of the mechanism.
• Normativity: the biological function of the mechanism, attribu-
tion of which is warranted by the kind of history that it has,
underwrites the relevant normativity claims made as regards its
functioning. Intrinsically, mechanisms ought to comply with their
function.
It is clear that this teleosemantic response goes some way towards
answering the sceptical challenge, and, this, at least, warrants a closer
examination of the theory -beyond Boghossian’s somewhat unfairly-
lumped category of “causal-informational theories”. What I wish to
discuss now is the scope of the teleosemantic solution. Given that it is
the hoverfly mechanism’s causal history that supports the attribution
of biological purposes of it, it is natural to consider that features of the
history may constrain the scope over which the biological purpose is
operative. In this case, the selection for the hoverfly mechanism has




A female hoverfly being at x,t|
angular velocity of retinal image being ω
)
>
P (A female hoverfly being at x,t)
i2:
P (Intercepting female hov. at x,t|Displaying behaviour B) >
P (Intercepting female hov. at x,t)
where ω = f (x, t) and B = g (x, t). That is, the relevant indication
relations hold under
1. Certain transformations of angular velocities of retinal images
onto positions of female hoverflies, and
2. Certain transformations of behavioural responses onto positions
of female hoverflies.
4.5 millikan on productivity 129
Millikan’s “proximal hoverfly rule” may be rendered thus:
phr: In presence of a retinal image with angular velocity ω, issue
behavioural response B = g (x, t) = g ◦ f−1 (ω)22.
Now, what is causally grounding i1 and i2? Well, the average flight
speed of hoverflies remains approximately constant, because hoverfly
physiognomy remains approximately constant; non-hoverfly darting
things are sufficiently sparse, and it remains this way because, among
other things, the ratio of non-overfly insects vs overflies is also ap-
proximately constant, etc. This kind of facts make it the case that the
inequalities i1 and i2 hold. But, crucially, only insofar as said causal
grounds do ground the indication relations.
Let us suppose that these causal grounds are operative only for val-
ues of ω below 330 degrees per second -I am making this up-; the
problem should now be apparent: there are infinitely many mathemati-
cal functions that overlap with f in the range supported by the causal
grounds, and infinitely many others that overlap with g. And there is
absolutely nothing to determine which one of them should figure in
phr.
It should be noticed that a number of things Millikan says against
some alternative candidates for phr have no bearing against the present
worry: suppose that never in the history of hoverflyhood a female has
produced an image in the retina with an angular velocity between
500 and 510 degrees per second. It is still the case that the following
“proximal quoverfly rule” is wrong Millikan (1993, p. 221):
pqr: In presence of a retinal image with angular velocity ω, issue
behavioural response B = g∗ (x, t) = g∗ ◦ f−1 (ω).
Where
g∗ (x, t) = Don’t move if 500 < f (x, t) < 510
g∗ (x, t) = g (x, t) otherwise
Hoverflies do not have the biological purpose of following pqr: it is
not that rule that explains that males catch females. There is a principled
reason to choose phr over pqr: there is a concrete causal explanation of
the fact that the behaviour of male hoverflies is fitness-conducive. This
explanation involves the causal underpinnings of the relations i1 and
i2, and these causal grounds also cover the range of angular velocities
between 500 and 510 degrees per second, regardless of whether such
values have or have not been actually instantiated.
There is another, more complicated case that Millikan considers: sup-
pose that, because of engineering constraints, hoverflies do have a blind
spot between 500 and 510 degrees per second. So, their dispositions
are best described with pqr. As a matter of fact, whenever a shadow
between that range of velocities crosses a male’s retina, it doesn’t move.
Millikan (1993, p. 222) claims that, in this case, the rule the male hoverfly
has the biological purpose to follow is still phr: the disposition to rest
at ease in the blind spot in no way furthers the hoverfly reproductive
goals23. In the way I have been putting things, the causal grounds tying
22 Where g ◦ f (x) = g (f (x)).
23 This is, I think, the sensible position. At the end of this section I will discuss Millikan’s
apparent change of mind in this respect.
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retinal shadows with future positions of female hoverflies are operative
also in the blind spot; on these grounds we should include those values
in the rule24.
But all of this still gives no reason to choose one among the many
different functions that overlap perfectly inside the zone of causal
grounding and diverge, however wildly, outside of it. That is, Millikan
has given no reason to decide among the different substitutions of the
following proximal hoverfly rule schema:
phr-schema: In presence of a retinal image with angular velocity ω,
issue behavioural response B = gi ◦ f−1i (ω).
where ∀i
(
gi ◦ f−1i (ω) = g ◦ f−1 (ω)
)
inside the causally-grounded do-
main of the function.
Millikan wants phr to come out as the one and only rule male
hoverflies follow, but the kind of considerations she advances -having
to do with what rule explains the fitness-conduciveness of the hoverfly
mechanism- cannot in fact distinguish phr from an infinite number of
competitors -the infinitely many substitutions of phr-schema. Another
way to put this point is the following: mathematical functions such as f
and g have a role to play in the causal explanation of the selection of a
mechanism only insofar as they describe the behaviour of whatever it
is that is causally effective in said selection. But causal mechanisms25
underdetermine which mathematical functions describe them. This
underdetermination leads directly to rule-indetermination26.
Notice that it will not do to retort that the mapping function has a set
of normal conditions for application (that yields the causally-grounded
domain) and that, outside of this set, the right thing to say is that the
application is abnormal. In fact, the foregoing discussion has shown
that there is no fact of the matter as regards which is the right mapping
function outside of the causally-grounded domain27. So, finally, this
provides reasons to remain appropriately circunspect in our appeal to
mapping functions. Mapping functions, I submit, are well and good
if we restrict their application to the causally-grounded domain: we
should build our content theory only upon the relations recorded in
24 There is a certain complication I am putting aside here. As it stands, the case is underde-
scribed: the causal underpinnings of i2 depend, among other things, on the mean velocity
of male hoverflies. If the engineering constraints alluded to in the description of the case
are such that the maintenance of this mean velocity depends on leaving this blind spot in
the response to retinal shadows, then this is a true gap in the causal underpinnings, and,
pace Millikan, there is no principled reason to include these values in the rule. Another
possibility is that engineering constraints do not mess up with the causal grounds for the
indication relations in this or other ways. If so, we can endorse phr. This second option
is the one I’m taking for granted in the main text.
25 At least of the kind that do not have universal application, i. e., those whose workings
cannot be embedded under strict physical laws.
26 This discussion should not be taken to mean that I endorse the conclusion of Kripke’s
sceptic. My point is simply that Millikan’s theory leaves, at least, the indeterminacy
described by phr-schema.
27 Millikan, in personal communication, has suggested that appeals to the needs of the
consumer (the male hoverfly) can do more to fix the content of the biological purpose
of the hoverfly, and thus the particular function that must go in phr-schema, that I am
according here. The male needs a female hoverfly, so that is what the biological purpose
is about.
I am not sure about that. The needs of the consumer can, surely, decide among different
purposes within the range in which the consumer will use such purposes. But, e. g., reacting
to extremely high or extremely low angular velocities of retinal shadows would never
be conducive to fulfilling the needs of the consumer, because such velocities will never
indicate the presence of a female hoverfly.
Appeals to the consumer leave open a fair amount of indeterminacy among mapping
functions.
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indication generalised. So, for example, a sensible teleosemantics
should admit that d* (the bee dance with an aberrantly long waggle
part) is meaningless.
In a recent discussion, Millikan appears to agree with this conclusion
(beemese is the name Millikan gives to the mapping function that takes
bee dances to positions of nectar):
It is unlikely that a dance that, by logical extension of
beemese rules, would tell of nectar much too far to fly to
could be either danced or, more central, recognized by fellow
bees. No ancestor bees have had dispositions to make use
of such dances. Such bee dances, then, are meaningless in
beemese. Millikan (2006, p. 107)
It is informative to see in which way Millikan’s diagnosis of the situation
differs from the one I have been offering here. On the one hand, Millikan
relies on the empirical implausibility of dances such as d*: maybe bees
are unable to dance them. Maybe so, but, in the discussion of Kripke’s
sceptic I have been reviewing, Millikan has strived at separating content
from actual dispositions. It may well be that no bee has ever had the
disposition to use d*, but in the parallel discussion, the fact that a
hoverfly had a blind spot between 500 and 510 degrees -and, thus,
had no dispositions to respond in that range- was -correctly, I think-
dismissed as irrelevant for the purposes of content attributions. If so,
it is difficult to see why a lack of disposition to respond to d* should
matter. Either dispositions are irrelevant or they are not, but Millikan
cannot have it both ways. Besides, what happens if, after all, bees are
able to dance the dance? Suppose that the mechanism that creates
dances has a tendency to create, very rarely, an aberrant dance such as
d*. If I am right, we are still forced to say that d* is meaningless: the
causal grounds that cover the relation of typical dances to positions
of nectar do not cover d*, and, thus, there is no fact of the matter
regarding which mapping function should we apply to it. But now it is
unclear what Millikan would want to say about this case, and on which
grounds.
On the other hand, Millikan talks of the impossibility of such an aber-
rant dance being recognised by other bees. Recognition is an intentional
notion: presumably, that there is recognition depends on whether the
receiving bee is able to form a mental state with the same content as
the dance. We have no idea whether this is possible or not, and we
should not care: there is no need, for a dance to have content, that such
contentful mental states exist. The dance may well be issuing orders
directly to the muscles of the bee without the intervention of the bee’s
cognitive system -though in point of fact dances do not, of course. That
there is recognition is not necessary to fix the content of dances.
Millikan reaches the right conclusion -that aberrant bee-dances are
meaningless- but by, first, making the content of dances depend on
mapping functions and, then, restricting the scope of these mapping
functions to those supported by actual dispositions of the consumers of
the representation. This goes against the grain of her proposal regarding
Kripke’s sceptic and, in fact, makes it essentially a dispositional account
of the kind that were the main target of Kripke’s discussion. The right
way to restrict mapping functions is, I have claimed, by attending to
the causal grounds of these very mapping functions -the natural sign
relations of indication generalised.
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Millikan is happy (even if maybe for the wrong reasons) to accept
that some bee dances are meaningless. But she is not willing to accept
an analogous result in the case of human thought. Undoubtably we
are able to think about events which are causally isolated from us, and
Millikan wishes to honour this tenet. The next paragraph casts a doubt
on the resources of her theory to do so: it is even more unclear that
mapping functions are able to fix the content of thoughts than they are
to fix the content of bee dances.
Compositionality
As I advanced in section 4.5, Millikan’s ultimate goal is to make both
indexicality and compositionality particular cases of the general pro-
ductivity afforded by mapping functions. We are now in a position to
see how may one think of compositionality as depending of mapping
functions of the same kind as the ones that accounted for indexicality.
Remember from above that a simple contentful state such as [m’s
being on here now] -which, I said, means There is food here now- belongs
in a system of signs, SYS, together with all other actual or possible
events of m’s being on. Members of SYS and their signified events
are tied together by a certain mapping function, and I have just been
arguing that we have a grip on this function only within the causally-
grounded domain.
On the face of it, compositionality is an entirely different beast:
productivity is achieved by the more or less free recombination of con-
ceptual items into more or less iterable syntactic structures. There does
not seem to be any clear place for mapping functions from thoughts to
propositions in this story. Millikan makes the interesting proposal that
there actually is a causally-grounded mapping function from beliefs to
states of affairs28, just like from bee dances to positions of nectar.
The system of signs here is, roughly, the class of all possible beliefs. In
simple systems of signs such as SYS above, you could get from one sign
to another by modifying their spatio-temporal location. In the belief
system of signs, the “feature” that must be modified to get from one
sign to another is more elusive: the main transformation is substitution,
an operation that taks, say, the thought Democritus jumps to, on the
one hand, thought like Xenocrates jumps and, on the other hand, to
thoughts like Democritus protracts its tongue. Likewise, the state of affairs
consisting of Democritus’s jumping transforms to the state of affairs
consisting of Democritus’s protracting its tongue, and to the state of
affairs consisting of Xenocrates’s jumping. The set of possible sentences
reachable by transforming a thought s defines the ways in which the
state of affairs s represents should be considered as articulated. A state
of affairs plus a certain way of articulating it individuates what Millikan
calls a world affair29.
Let us call the mapping function which takes the system of signs
which is the class of every belief to their meanings MFMentalese. How
28 World affairs, really. See below.
29 Millikan is after a fine-grained notion of state of affairs, according to which “Theatetus
swims” and “Theatetus exemplifies swimming” are different states of affairs because they
are differently articulated. If transformations define articulations, it may be suggested
that states of affairs are articulated in every way. For example, there is a straightforward
transformation that takes “Theatetus swims” to “Theatetus exemplifies swimming” -
substitution of predicates.
In response to this, Millikan may, perhaps, defend that there are ways to distinguish
relevant from irrelevant transformations. In any event, I do not wish to press this point
any further.
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are we to establish that the belief-system maps onto meanings according
to MFMentalese? Bear in mind that this mapping function must suffice
to endow with meanings beliefs that have never been entertained before
by anyone -the whole point of introducing mapping functions, after all,
was to account for productivity. I will not worry about how to account
for something similar to Evans (1982)’s Generality Principle, according
to which, if a thinker is able to entertain the thought Fido is brown and
the thought Bill Gates is tech savvy, she will be able to entertain Fido
is tech savvy. It is very difficult to see just what in the causal order is
going to make MFMentalese take Fido is tech savvy to the proposition
that Fido is tech savvy, but it is also open to Millikan to defend that
we cannot really think this thought. There does not seem to be any
straightforward way to adjudicate this issue.
It is best to concentrate in an uncontroversial subset ofMFMentalese’s
domain. Consider again the food thought, There is food here now, as enter-
tained by a human thinker, and all other thoughts that derive from the
food thought by substituting here and now with other spatio-temporal
concepts, say, inside the Pinatubo volcano, or three million years into the
future. It is clear that we can think that there is food at these places and
times, and, if Millikan’s account of this ability is correct, this is because
MFMentalese takes, e. g., the thought There was food inside the Pinatubo
volcano during the 1991 eruption to the proposition that there is food then
and there.
Now, there are certain causal connections between thoughts of the
food-thought kind and facts having to do with the location of food:
food’s being somewhere sometime has caused the tokening of certain
thoughts which, in their turn, have caused fitness-improving (say, food-
grabbing) behaviours. These causal facts may help ground the part of
MFMentalese that makes reference to places and times in the domain
that humans occupy -even if the particular place and time has never
been and will never be occupied by a human being- but they cannot
ground thoughts that make reference to location outside this domain,
for exactly the same reasons that I presenteda above, when discussing
the naturalistic worry. It is only that, in the human case, we cannot
simply bite the bullet and say that the thought There was food inside
the Pinatubo volcano during the 1991 eruption is meaningless. That this
thought means what it seems to mean is nonnegotiable.
Millikan has suggested (1984, 2004, 2006) that a mechanism that
tests beliefs for inner consistency may help explain our coming to have
beliefs about world affairs which are causally isolated from us (let us
call them far away beliefs), and which in no way further our biological
goals:
Consistent agreement in judgments is evidence that ...
various methods of making the same judgment are all con-
verging on the same distal affair, bouncing off the same
target, as it were. If the same belief is confirmed by sight,
by touch, by hearing, by testimony, by various inductions
one has made, and is confirmed also by theoretical consid-
erations (inference is a method of identification too), this is
sterling evidence for the univocity of the various methods
one has used to identify each of the various facets of the
world that the belief concerns. Millikan (2006, p. 111)
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So, let us suppose that I am told that water boils at 100ºC outside my
light cone30, and independent theoretical reasoning lets me reach the
same conclusion. Here, according to Millikan, the consistency in these
two judgements works as a confirmation of the relevant hypothesis
about water. Even if it’s true that the workings of a consistency tester
would be enough to fix a mapping function that deals with far away
or useless beliefs31, the problem with off-causal-grounds mapping
functions turns into this other problem: there is no fact of the matter
as to whether a certain mechanism is a consistency tester. To see this,
consider what it takes for a certain mechanism, let us call it consist, to
acquire the function to test a corpus of beliefs for consistency. At the
very least, for consist to acquire such a function, there must be beliefs
such that it is a consist-independent fact of the matter whether they are
consistent or not. Otherwise, if all there is to two beliefs being consistent
is that a token of consist gives a positive output when confronted with
them, the relation of being consistent is entirely vacuous.
Let us assume, then, that there are consistent beliefs prior to the
existence of consist. We may want to hypothesise the following three
step process:
1. Beliefs in a certain corpus cb acquire their meaning (and their sta-
tus as consistent or inconsistent with one another) independently
of consist.
2. consist tests beliefs in cb for consistency, and thereby acquires
the function of being a consistency-tester.
3. consist helps fix the meaning of other beliefs by testing for their
consistency with beliefs in cb and previously tested beliefs.
The problem with such a story is that the description of 2. is tendentious.
It is unwarranted to claim that consist is testing beliefs for consistency,
where consistency is a relation that holds between any beliefs whatso-
ever, far away or not, useful or not. The only matter of fact is about
the following: consist tests beliefs in cb for consistency*, where con-
sistency* is consistency between beliefs about states of affairs in causal
contact with human beings -these are the kind of beliefs the content of
which will have been fixed in step 1. And a consistency* tester clearly
cannot help fix the meaning of beliefs about far away beliefs.
The upshot of this discussion is that mapping functions cannot play
the role Millikan wants them to in the explanation of the compositional-
ity of beliefs -not even with the help of consistency* testers. It is wrong
to think of a mapping function between beliefs and world affairs such
as MFMentalese as a precondition for beliefs to acquire meaning. The
idea that there is the right mapping function to play this role is already
fully invested with the intentionality we are seeking to explain.
Let me summarise: in Millikan’s account of productivity, the main
bearer of mental content is the (propositional) thought. Although she
recognises a sense in which concepts such as dog have meaning, this
30 By the way, whatever happens outside the light cone seems to be the stock example in
discussions of teleosemantics and the reference to far away, causally-isolated facts -cf.
Peacocke (1992). I should like to note that many events outside our light cone are really
near from us: the events going on a metre away from me five Planck times in the future
-I am aware that this is not a rigorous way of talking- are outside my light cone, but it
is clear that teleosemantic accounts may be able to deal with thoughts involving that
spatio-temporal location -which is just around the corner, and almost now. Anyway, let
us assume that we are dealing with water boiling well outside my light cone.
31 See Rupert (1999) for some reasons why it may not be.
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meaning is entirely dependent on the thoughts in which the concept
participates in the following way: such thoughts have their meaning
provided by a mapping function, and it is invariances in the world
affairs to which all dog-involving thoughts are taken by such a function
that fix the meaning of dog. All of these world affairs involve dogs, and
it is in virtue of this fact that dog refers to dogs. Unfortunately, as we
have seen, the appeal to mapping functions is unable to do the job it
was hoped to do.
We need to stick to the classical idea according to which there are
thoughts whose content is determined by their structure and the content
of their subpropositional components. We need, that is, bona fide compo-
sitionality. Thoughts such as Bill Gates is tech savvy are composed by the
concepts bill gates and tech savvy, and the operation of predication;
and the meaning of Bill Gates is tech savvy derives (via a composition-
ality principle) from the meaning of its constituents and the way in
which they are organised. The sensible content-naturalising program, I
submit, involves providing an account of the meanings of concepts and
of mechanisms able of performing syntactic operations among them.
We may then simply model the meaning of thoughts with abstract
structures -say, interpreted syntactic trees. This is entirely compatible
with recognising the existence of other dimensions of meaning, such as
Millikanian real value (the world affair to which thoughts correspond
according to causally-grounded mapping functions, if there is one) and
sense (the causally-grounded mapping function itself). We should aban-
don the hope of accounting for productivity simply by using mapping
functions, if we remain committed to naturalism.
The alternative I recommend, of course, is the kind of interlocking
determination I described above. I will now finish the chapter drawing
some consequences of my view, and comparing it with other popular
accounts.
4.6 other theories of concepts
The interlocking-determination picture helps clarify why the appeal of
several popular theories of concepts, while explaining what they get
wrong32:
4.6.1 The Classical Theory of Concepts
In the so-called Classical Theory of concepts33, a concept such as bache-
lor is learned by sticking together the concepts unmarried and male
which are already part of the conceptual repertoire of the learner, and
which, together, provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the
presence of bachelorhood. Such more basic concepts will also have
their definitions in terms of other, even more basic concepts until,
eventually, the whole conceptual system will bottom out in undefined
primitives (in the Modern Empiricists’s original version of the theory,
such primitives would be perceptions, experiences or some such).
Concepts, according to the Classical Theory, have necessary and
sufficient conditions of application. If to be a bachelor is to be an
unmarried male, the application of bachelor requires the application
32 In the rest of this section I’m drawing from my Master thesis.
33 In this review I’m drawing from Machery (2009), Laurence and Margolis (1999) and the
papers in Margolis and Laurence (1999).
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of the concepts that express the latter properties, and just them. In
this way, the Classical Theory offers a very elegant account of concept
acquisition. But the Classical Theory is wrong, for a number of reasons.
First, apart from maybe bachelor and a few others, not many concepts
have plausible necessary and sufficient conditions of application. This
is mirrored in the fact that not many words can be, clearly and without
reminder, defined. Apart from the empirical difficulty of finding such
definitions, there is also Quine (1953)’s well-known attack on the notion
of analiticity which can equally be considered an attack on the idea
that concepts have definitions at all.
Available empirical data also militate against Classical Theory: be-
longing to the extension of a Classical concept is an all-or-nothing
question. If an entity has all the necessary and sufficient properties
to belong, it is in. Else, it is out. There are no other cases, and there
are no subcases. Therefore, such account of concepts does not explain
typicality effects. The fact that we are quicker in identifying typical
instantiations of a concept, such as nightingales for bird or fox-terriers
for pet goes unexplained as far as the Classical Theory is concerned.
Besides, the attempts to demonstrate experimentally the psychological
reality of definitions have been unsuccessful -cf. Fodor et al. (1999).
But, maybe, the most crucial reasons for the failure of the Classical
Theory are the problems of ignorance and error, as described by Kripke
and Putnam. In order to apply the concept gold we don’t need to
have the concept of, say, atomic number, or any other that provides
necessary and sufficient conditions of application. We can be way more
ignorant than that, and only have vague ideas about gold being a
very expensive, typically yellow metal. This is compatible with our
being proud owners of the concept of gold. The problem of error
is similar: we can be wrong about some of the characteristics of the
entities that our concepts refer to without failing to have the concept.
For instance, we may firmly believe that philosophers are, as such,
irresistibly inclined to pessimism. But, even if as a matter of fact there
are optimistic philosophers, this does not mean that we don’t have
the concept philosopher. These two problems of ignorance and error
are absolutely omnipresent in the field of real kind concepts: precisely,
such concepts are characterised by our ability to refer to this or that
substance, about whose underlying properties we may be ignorant, or
hopelessly wrong.
How does the theory I have been sketching account for the intuition
that concepts such as bachelor are intimately linked to other concepts
such as married or man? It is perfectly possible that a mechanism
such as conc works in the following way: whenever it is presented
with properties of several kinds, it creates a new concept that follows
a Procedure (see chapter 3.6) according to which it is to fire if these
properties are present. For example, conc creates a concept of H and
issues an order to pred (see section 4.4.2) with the content that, when-
ever something is both F and G, it must create a thought with the
content that it is H. conc’s having done like this in the past has been
fitness-contributing: this is, maybe, because it has stumbled upon a
causally-grounded correlation between properties of the same type as
F and G, and properties of the same type as H, such that whenever
something has the former, it is sufficiently* likely that it will have the
latter.
4.6 other theories of concepts 137
In such a setup, a thinker may have the disposition to think that
something is H if she also thinks that it is F and G. But the content of
the concept H is not F and G; it is, rather, that substance that correlates
with F and G thanks to the same causal grounds that have made conc
fitness-contributing overall. Of course, this is only one of a great number
of ways in which a concept-producer such as conc may have made itself
useful. It may use all sorts of other cues for the formation of concepts,
and make them behave according to all sorts of alternative Procedures.
The very general characterisation of concept that we have provided
allows for that. This, in particular, explains that many concepts are not
like bachelor, in that their application is not tied to the application of
any other concepts -put in more familiar terms, in that they lack clear
definitions.
conc may make concepts behave according to more sophisticated
procedures. For example, it may make pred compare every perceived
individual with a prototype for bachelorhood and, if the overlap is
sufficient, raise the possibility of a positive veredict -such that the slight-
est additional hint that the individual in question is, say, unmarried,
precipitates a formation of the thought that he is a bachelor. This is one
of innumerable ways in which the general framework I defend may
explain typicality effects. That this mechanism, or any other, is actually
present in our cognitive systems is irrelevant for the purposes at hand34;
no particular mechanism -no particular set of cues and Procedures- is
tied to the nature of concepts.
As regards the problem of error: there is no clear limit to the quality
of the correlation between the properties that belong in the cue for
application of the concept and the property reference of the concept
itself. The correlation between unmarried man and bachelor is, to be sure,
particularly good, but correlations with the much lower quality of the
one between pessimistic and philosopher may have been instrumental in
making a certain concept-producer such as conc fitness-contributing. If
such a set of Procedures make pred form useful thoughts in a sufficient*
number of occasions, and there are sufficient causal-grounds for this,
conc may have obtained its concept-producer credentials even if its
concepts follow Procedures which are not particularly good.
4.6.2 The Prototype Theory
The Classical Theory of concepts mirrors old-school descriptivism in se-
mantics: with a great deal of simplification, this is the thesis that proper
names and natural kind terms are synonymous with descriptions that
uniquely pick out their referent. When the problem of lack of appropri-
ate definitions was already well known, Searle (1958) tried to solve it by
appeal to the idea of a cluster of definitions. Proper names, according
to Searle, would refer to whatever it is that satisfies a “sufficient but so
far unspecified number” Searle (1958, p. 171) of said descriptions. This
solves several of the problems of old-school descriptivism: at least, it
explains the fact that Manuel Sacristán, e. g., could have failed to be a
philosopher without thereby failing to be Manuel Sacristán; this would
be so because the candidate to be Manuel Sacristán would still satisfy a
sufficient number of other descriptors.
A theory of concepts that can be understood as partially exploiting
Searle’s insight is the Prototype Theory. According to it, concepts de-
34 Although, of course, some such mechanism must be present.
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ployment is mediated by a statistical evaluation of the most prominent
features of the property that the concept expresses. So, for instance,
the concept philosopher endows the features engages in specula-
tive debates or writes philosophical papers with a high weight,
the features pessimistic and teaches philosophy with a middle-to-
low weight and white bearded or absent-minded looks with low
weights. Someone will fall under the extension of the concept philoso-
pher if the weighted average of her features goes above a particular
threshold value. Prototypical instances of the concept (such as Manuel
Sacristán) will have particularly high weighed averages; this is why
it will be easier to identify Manuel Sacristán as a philosopher than,
say, a philosophically-informed professional surfer. One problem with
Prototype Theory is that of missing prototypes: uninstantiated (such
as medieval computer) or heterogeneous kinds (such as machine)
do not typically have statistically relevant properties. Another is the
problem of compositionality: the prototype for wooden spoon (a typ-
ically large spoon used for cooking) does not arise readily from the
prototype for spoon (a small metallic spoon, most probably) and that
for wooden object (if there is one). A famous example by Fodor is pet
fish: a prototype fish is, maybe, something like a cod; a prototype pet
is most probably some kind of dog or cat; but the prototype pet fish is
a goldfish.
The general form of the explanation why this theory is appealing
is already familiar: a number of concepts are such that the Procedure
that is used to deploy them in some contexts involves such statistical
weighing of properties, or something similar. But these Procedures do
not fix the reference; they are an effect of the workings of a concept-
producer such as conc, and what really fixes the reference of a concept
is the entity that corresponds to the cue conc has used to create this
concept, according to the causal grounds that have made conc fitness-
contributing.
Under this picture there is no temptation to think that prototypes
should compose. The Procedure used to deploy the pet fish concept
may have a convoluted relation with the Procedures used to deploy pet
and fish; nothing in the theory makes it the case that such Procedures
should simply compose. There may be, for example, a first pass in
which something is deemed to be a pet fish if it is deemed to be both a
pet and a fish, but there may also be a pet fish - prototype on top of
that to speed up the process if and when it is possible. There is no limit
to the sophistication of the Procedure for this concept; but its reference
will remain unaffected because it depends only on matters having to
do with its producer and the cue the latter used to create the former.
4.6.3 The Theory-Theory
Theory-theorists suggest that to have a concept is to have the folk
equivalent of a scientific theory. To have the concept number is to know
how it meshes with other concepts, what inferences are we entitled to
make by using the concept, etc. A concept is individuated by its role in
one of these folk theories, just like in Kuhnian philosophy of science
a theoretical term is individuated by its role in the theory whence it
belongs. The theory-theory makes an effort to accommodate Kripkean
essentialist insights. When people try to categorise a particular entity
under a concept or another they can have, in their folk theories, what
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has been called an essence placeholder -cf. Laurence and Margolis
(1999). People can accept that something can have all of the habitual
superficial features of gold while failing to be gold, because people’s
gold-theory allows for the possibility of there being the wrong thing,
whatever it may be, occupying the slot of the essence placeholder. But
this proposal won’t do. Reserving a place for an essence placeholder
in a theory is like appending the conjunct “... and has an internal
essence” to a Classical description. Such placeholder and such conjunct
are totally unspecified, mirroring the almost null knowledge that the
lay person has about the essence of her real kind concepts. But, in fact,
golds’s essence is highly specific, having to do with a certain electronic
structure -that of elements of atomic number 79. The gold-theory and
the silver-theory may have, thus, the same essence placeholder (for
a suitably uninformed lay person, or a kid), while their essences are
very different. Some people’s theories of birch and beech, the famous
Putnamian example, may be exactly the same (“it’s a tree”, maybe), and
an essence placeholder won’t tell them apart: both concepts will have it.
This is just Millikan’s warning:
There has been the tendency in the psychological litera-
ture to misinterpret Kripke’s and Putnam’s antidescription-
ist views on the meaning of proper names and natural kind
terms as invoking definite descriptions at one level removed.
(No, Kripke did not claim that the referent of a proper name
N is fixed in the user’s mind by the description “whoever
was originally baptized as N,” nor did Putnam claim that
the extent of a natural kind term is fixed for laymen by the
description “whatever natural kind the experts have in mind
when they use term T”. Millikan (1998)
I will have something more to say about the identification of concepts
with positions in an causal network in section 4.8 below. Let me say here
though that, indeed, how a concept meshes with other concepts helps
fix the content of concepts. This happens in step 5 of interlocking
- conc: after conc has produced several recurring mechanisms which
then pred associates with other mechanisms, something like concept
- big fixes the meaning of the products of conc attending, precisely,
to their causal role in the network that results in selected-for thoughts.
This is the non-negligible contribution of causal roles in the fixation of
concept-meaning. But, once conc has emerged with the right content-
endowing history, virtually any concept can have virtually any role.
birch and beech are a case in point. What fixes their meaning is conc
together with the cue it used to form them in each case -most likely,
in this case, a word encountered when reading a book. This cue goes
together with a kind of tree, according to the causal grounds that have
made conc fitness-contributing, as discussed above.
4.6.4 Frege Puzzles
The very simple cognitive architecture consisting of conc, pred and
the thoughts and concepts they form is already powerful enough to
explain the appearance of Frege puzzles: conc creates concepts in
the presence of certain cues, and these concepts have as reference the
individuals or kinds that a certain higher order HPC connect with
the cues in question. Now, there is no guarantee that every cue will
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correspond to a different entity -that every cue that prompts conc
to create a concept will correspond to a different referent. To be sure,
in a majority* of occasions different cues will correspond to different
referents -if conc has the kind of history sketched in interlocking
- conc- but sometimes they will not.
When they don’t, there will be two different concepts with the same
referent. Besides, each such concept will have a Procedure of application,
which will be a function of the cue that has prompted conc to create
it. The difference in Procedure explains that one concept of the pairs
be used to form some beliefs and the other, some others. This is what
difference in cognitive significance boils down to. So, against the neo-
rationalist contention that, essentially,
Concepts c and d are distinct if it is possible rationally
to judge some content containing c without judging the
corresponding content containing d. (Peacocke 2008, p. 60)
We may offer the following alternative:
concept identity Concepts c and d are distinct if it is necessary to
appeal to two distinct acts of creation by conc to account for their
existence.
That is, concepts are distinct if conc has created each one indepen-
dently. This, in turn, explains that Peacocke’s principle of cognitive
significance provides excellent evidence of the distinctness of concepts.
The point is, simply, that differences in cognitive significance are not
what make two concepts distinct, but a consequence of their being
distinct.
This proposal about the identity of concepts is not strictly referential-
ist either, if Fodor is right about referentialism:
The question at issue is which, if any, of the beliefs, desires,
etc. in which a concept is engaged is constitutive of its
identity. Referentialists say: ‘None of them; all that matters
is the extension’. Fodor (2008, p. 87)
What I am suggesting is that a concept is individuated by an act of
creation by a concept-producer. Facts about its content (which, indeed,
is exhausted by its reference), and about “the galaxy of beliefs, desires,
hopes, despairs, whatever, in which the concepts are engaged” Fodor
(2008) (which are simply facts about the concept Procedure, in the
very complicated case of human cognisers) flow naturally from facts
about the circumstances of its creation. concept identity offers a
nice way of tying together these features of concepts that Fodor takes,
implausibly, to be independent.
4.7 the true relevance of associative mechanisms
It is maybe not totally implausible that pred, the mechanism of predi-
cation in thought, has been directly selected for -by creating states that
have also been selected for. But for many other mechanisms a different
story must be true: they must have been created by selected-for mecha-
nisms, or, in any event, by chains of mechanisms that have a selected-for
mechanism at the end. It is a challenge to give truth conditions for the
last link in one of these chains, given that only the first is selected for.
4.7 the true relevance of associative mechanisms 141
In the case of pred -let us suppose it has not been directly selected for-
what we would need is a story that fixes a certain much-higher-order
HPC that has as a particular case the connection between SFaand Fa.
That is, we need a higher-order mechanism, hom, that, on the basis
of certain environmental cues, creates, on one occasion, a mechanism
that effects predications -that is, pred- and, on another, a mechanism
that does something else. This is apparently difficult to obtain, in
the face of what I take to be a sensible requisite about the HPC that
facilitates selection for hom: it must comply with what we could call
the Homogeneity Constraint.
homogeneity constraint: The inputs of a selected-for mecha-
nism must be homogeneous.
It is not easy to make precise what this homogeneity must amount
to, but examples are easily given: we have been tacitly following this
principle in the selected-for mechanisms we have described in the past
chapters:
• The mechanism n that created individual-involving mental states
in lobsters had, as its input, any combination of a urine chemical
signature and an outcome in fight. That is, all inputs had to be
homogeneous in that they were all members of this kind.
• The mechanism that creates individual dances in a bee has, as its
input, the position of a source of nectar, relative to the hive. All
inputs have to be of this kind.
The Homogeneity Constraint stems from the fact that hom was selected
for. Such selection happens because mechanisms perpetuate themselves
through reproduction; that is, offsprings are relevantly similar to their
ancestors, and this includes their having relevantly similar causal pow-
ers: roughly the same kind of things makes them react. If offspring-
mental-mechanisms reacted to things of a radically different kind from
their ancestor-mental-mechanisms, a doubt whether they are member of
the same reproductively-established family -and, thus, a doubt whether
we were witnessing a process of selection of one kind of mechanism-
would be very much in order.
Now, homogeneity constraint seems to go hand in hand with
the fact that the mechanisms a higher-order mechanism creates have
states with contents which are also homogeneous among them:
• For n, mechanisms whose being on have the content Lobster #i is
around.
• For the bee-dance mechanism, There is nectar <there>.
This is what makes a mechanism hom that has created pred and
other, different cognitive mechanisms unlikely. What may these other
mechanisms be, that are relevantly similar to pred, in the same way
that contents such as Lobster #i is around, for different #i, are similar?
This is, I think, a genuine problem, and one that has passed largely
unnoticed by teleosemanticists.
There is a solution if a homogeneous cue type gives access to a
variety of HPCs -that is, if cues of the same type connect with, on
one occasion, the relation of predication and, in another occasion, very
different metaphysical relations among properties. As I have suggested
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in chapter 3, one such cue may be the frequent cofiring of mental
mechanisms. This homogeneous cue may give access to a large varieties
of homeostatic mechanisms, because it is relying on the following,
extremely general HPC:
bare-bones causal grounds : The HPC such that
1. One of its seeds is formed by:
a) A pattern of frequent cofiring of two mental mechanisms
A and B.
b) The causal groundsCGA,B of this frequent cofiring.
2. Its specialised homeostatic mechanism is the causal grounds
of the fact that (a) and (b) go normally together.
The grounds of the frequent coinstantiation between (a) and (b) that 2
is talking about is, simply, the following: without a causal ground such
as CGA,B, the rate of cofiring of these two states depends on chance,
and chance in general is less efficient than causation in sustaining coincidence.
This seems like a very basic fact about the world, and one available
everywhere and everytime.
A number of higher-order mechanisms may rely on the bare-bones
causal grounds HPC (from now on, also BBCG) and thereby get
selected. Long term potentiation is, probably, one such mechanism (see
3.4), but there are surely others. We may hipothesise that something
similar to BBCG is the most basic HPC relied on in the evolution of the
brain, and the conferral of content to its states. BBCG gives access to
very different causal structures from a set of homogeneous cues: there
may be very little in common to the reasons that may make two mental
mechanisms cofire regularly.
Part of the past appeal of associationism -the contention that thought
is a chain of mental associations- probably stems from a realisation that
frequently co-ocurring mental states, being evidence for the presence
of causal structures in the external world, may have been a most basic
raw material in the emergence of mentality35.
4.8 the true relevance of causal roles for semantics.
The main insight behind Causal Role Semantics36 (CRS) is that
the semantic properties of a mental representation are par-
tially constituted by certain causal or inferential relations be-
tween that and other mental representations. Loewer (1999,
p. 120)
The account of concepts and compositionality in thought sketched in
this chapter may help explain the appeal of CRS: causal roles do indeed
35 If something like this is correct, Ryder’s SINBAD neurosemantics (2004, 2006) may come
out as a special case of etiosemantics. Ryder defends that representation occurs in SINBAD
networks (i. e., pyramidal cells in Sets of INteracting BAckpropagating Dendrites), which
“have a powerful tendency to structure themselves isomorphically with regularities in
their environment” (2004, p. 212). Although I will not discuss the proposal, I will say that
the neural-computational details of Ryder’s proposal are fascinating, and that it looks
quite possible that something like this be true of some of the actual contentful mental
states in our brains.
On the other hand, the issues with compositionality we have been dealing with in this
chapter are left uncommented by the theory as it stands. SINBAD neurosemantics is, so
far, a theory about atomic representations. Besides, it cannot explain the possibility of
representation in systems without pyramidal cells -simpler or alien brains, for instance.
36 Also Conceptual and Inferential Role Semantics. I will not distinguish between the three.
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help fix the content of mental representations -via what I have called
collaborative mechanisms, cf. 4.3. It is needed that pred -a mechanism that
effects predications- creates a big and varied enough pool of F-involving
thoughts for there to be a selected-for concept of F, which will help in
its turn fix the concept-creating role of conc. So, in the early stages of
the development of pred and conc, the mental configurations in which
the state that will later be the concept of F participates play a crucial
role. These mental configurations are nothing but causal roles.
The relation between causal roles and contents, though, is not straight-
forwardly one of constitution. Something is a concept of F, I have said,
if it has been created by conc in presence of the right kind of cue. For
each individual concept, then, there is no restriction on the number of
thoughts in which it is involved. That is, no restriction on which causal
role does it have.
Even so, it is true that causal roles help fix the content of a certain
concept c. But it is the causal role of other products of (ancestors of)
the producer of c -the ones that have endowed conc with the ability
to create concepts, through a story such as interlocking - conc.
As a final argument in favour of my view, I would like to show how
the account of concepts presented here deals with the most common
objections to CRS37. This, together with the fact that it explains why
and how causal roles are relevant for the semantics of concepts, maybe
helps see it as a plausible alternative to CRS proper.
4.8.1 Error
Actual causal roles involve dispositions to err. Very few speakers (more
likely none at all) are such that they have the disposition to always
apply cat correctly. A common reaction from CRS theorists is resorting
to ideal causal roles. But it remains to be seen how such appeals to
ideality may be made consistent with naturalism.
Broadly teleosemantic accounts of content such as my own have as a
main goal the treatment of error. In the case of simple contentful states,
such as the ones discussed in chapter 1, the strategy was not identifying
the content of a state with whatever it happens to indicate, but with the
HPC that enabled the emergence of a state with a function to indicate
-cf. chapter 1 for details. The answer to the Error Problem for CRS is
a complication of this other answer. We may have the disposition to
judge that Fa in certain situations in which, in fact, ¬Fa. But what fixes
the meaning of that thought is not the actual dispositions of the judger,
but the interplay of:
1. The workings of pred (the mechanism that effects predications
in thought), together with SFa (the cue that has prompted it to
effect a predication in this case).
2. The workings of the producer of concepts conc, together with SF
in one case and together with Sa in the other.
Those functions are fixed, in part, by the causal role of their products
in earlier generations: whatever it was that explained that effecting a
state with such-and-such as causal role in reaction to thus-and-so a
cue is the meaning-contributing factor. The relation between this factor
and causal roles is complicated enough to allow plenty of room for
37 In the exposition of the objections I follow Block (1998).
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error, and there is absolutely no guarantee that the cue used for the
production of the thought that Fa necessitates that Fa.
4.8.2 Holding together the two factors in two-factor CRS
Block (1986, 1998) defends a two-factor CRS. According to this version
of the theory, there are two dimensions of the meaning of a thought T:
• One entirely dependent upon T’s internal causal role, which helps
account for T’s cognitive significance (i.e., the fact that a fully
rational thinker may accept, e. g., the thought Hesperus is a planet
and reject Phosphorus is a planet, and
• Another, “long arm” role which explains why and how T has the
truth-conditions it has (and, thus, explains the identity of the two
thoughts above in this respect.)
Fodor and Lepore (1992, chapter 6) point out that it is an open question
how this two components are coordinated: “Why can’t you have a
sentence that has an inferential role appropriate to the thought that
water is wet, but is true iff 4 is a prime?” Fodor and Lepore (1992, p.
171)
Now, the question whether a thought could have two different mean-
ings according to its causal role and its truth conditions is, from the
perspective of my proposal, meaningless. There is no one-one corre-
spondence between meanings and actual causal roles, and no way to
analyse one in terms of the other. I have briefly explained in 4.6.4
how facts about cognitive significance and facts about reference are
explained by facts about the individuation of concepts -which depends
only on the act of creation that resulted in its existence.
4.8.3 Holism.
The causal roles of the concept cat will be different for any two thinkers.
So, if meaning is to be equated with causal roles, no two thinkers will
mean the same thing with their concept of cat. The usual way to
develop this criticism is by then pointing out that the CRS-theorist
needs to distinguish a part of the causal role that is constitutive of
something’s having the meaning that it has, and a superfluous part that
may vary among thinkers. This (again, cf. Fodor and Lepore (1992))
looks like an endorsement of the analytic-synthetic distinction, which
is probably to be rejected. So, it’s either holism or embracing the a/s
distinction, and both alternatives are unwelcome.
An attractive answer to the objection is pointing out that no part of
a causal role is constitutive of meaning. Rather, the causal role of the
concept of F in some subject may vary enormously, but it will still be
the case that the causal roles of other mental terms created by conc will
have been sufficiently varied as to make sure that, say, kind G made
it the case that the changes created by conc in answer to cue SG were
fitness-conducive.
An example may help to clarify this. Suppose that conc works with
cues that are a combination of retinal shadows and a sound -say animal
alarm calls. In the presence of a combination, Sa, of these two things,
conc creates a mental term a that is then used to store information
about an individual. If, e. g., thoughts with the content a is around and
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F is around cofire very frequently, pred creates a thought a is F, etc. The
mental economy formed by conc, pred and the different terms they
create and link has been fitness-conducive and this can be used to fix
the content of future, not selected-for products of these mechanisms
-see 4.4.2. There is no need that any particular subset of the thoughts in
which, say, a concept of a participates be true of a. It is only needed
that the concept of a was created by conc -which has its own selection
history, and thus helps fix the content of its products- in the presence
of Sa, where this cue is related with the individual a by whatever it is
that has related cues to individuals throughout selection for conc. No
analytic core is needed for this. In fact, a subject could harbour only
false thoughts using the concept of a in question. It is still a concept of
a if it was created by conc in the presence of Sa.

Part II
M O D A L I T Y

5M O D A L C O N T E N T S
The neo-rationalist account of modal epistemology (e. g. Bealer (2002),
Chalmers (2002), Yablo (1993)) has been extensively criticised in the last
few years, but few alternative accounts of our access to modal facts
have been proposed in its stead. In this chapter I lay the foundations
for doing precisely that, by sketching an etiosemantic account of modal
contents.
I will defend that a sizeable portion of the space of possibilities may
be reconstructed as quantifications over times and probabilities. I will
assume that contents about the past are easily naturalisable along the
lines described in earlier chapters and will dedicate most of the chapter
to show that contents about probabilities also are. For this, I discuss
a simple example in which, I wish to argue, it is natural to credit a
particular agent with probability-involving contents (5.2 and 5.3). As
in earlier chapters, I then go on to provide a more general recipe for
the attribution of ephemeral probability-involving contents (5.4). I end
a first part of the chapter by putting these results in the light of the
discussion in chapter 4, and sketching how concepts themselves may
encode this modal information (5.5).
A second part of the chapter is dedicated to elaborate paraphrases
of modal idioms in terms of probabilities and times (5.6). This may be
seen as a development of Forbes’s branching conception of possible worlds.
We may, therefore, explain in fully naturalistic terms how the kind of
modal contents that are constituted by probabilities and times may be
thought. This completes the naturalisation of modal contents.
The rest of the chapter is dedicated to spell out some consequences
of the view (5.7), including an attempt at explication of our intuitions
regarding the necessity of origin, and a first stab at the naturalisation
of epistemic possibility (5.8). Finally, in 5.9 I briefly take up a Humean
objection to my approach.
5.1 perceptual concepts, individual and kind
In a recent article, Papineau (2007) has developed an account of percep-
tual concepts, in order to illuminate several features of (the obscurer)
phenomenal concepts. I will not discuss his account of the latter, but
concentrate instead in an interesting feature of his proposal regarding
the former. My aim in this section will be to show that this account of
how the content of perceptual concepts gets fixed cannot be completely
right. The reasons why it is not will lead us towards a first stab at the
naturalistic account of modal contents it is my aim to develop.
According to Papineau, perceptual concepts are the kinds of concepts
we use when we make mental reference to things we have perceived.
We form a perceptual concept upon our first perceptual encounter with
an entity, and it is reactivated when we perceive that entity again; we
also use our perceptual concepts when we imagine the entities they are
about -cf. Papineau (2007, p. 113).
For Papineau, perceptual concepts involve a stored sensory template.
Incoming perceptual input may, or may not, “resonate” (2007, p. 115)
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with the stored template. Such reactivations, it is to be supposed,
amount to (possibly mis-) recognitions of the referent of the concept.
The perceptual concept is used for gathering information about its refer-
ent; when the perceptual concept reactivates, the additional information
is also reactivated.
Perceptual concepts can be used to think about tokens (There goes that
dog again!) or types (Hey, another one of those dogs!). What determines
whether we are dealing with a perceptual kind concept or an individual
kind concept? Papineau’s proposal is that it depends on which kind of
information is to be carried over from one reactivation of the concept to
the next. For instance, if we are disposed to attach pieces of information
such as “has an injured eye” to the referent of our concept whenever
it reactivates, it is the concept of an individual, say, bird; if not, but
we are only willing to attach information such as “has bright-coloured
feathers” or “flaps wings very quickly”, then it is a kind concept. The
sensory templates of perceptual concepts, Papineau suggests, come
with “slots” ready to be filled. Individual-persons concepts come with
a eye-colour slot; dog kind concepts come with a normal-size slot, etc.
Papineau (2007, p. 117)
What happens when we have both a perceptual individual concept
(for some particular bird, say) and a kind concept (for the type of
bird whence the former belongs)? Papineau suggests that we should
regard perceptual concepts as forming structured hierarchies, with the
individual concept adding detail to the kind concept.
5.1.1 Modal Information.
But things must be much more complicated, at least in the following
respect. Consider again the case of our perceptual concept of a bird.
We now see that it has a broken wing. The doctrine I have been just
reviewing has it that, if we have both the concepts of an individual bird
and of the species whence it belongs, we will attach the information
that it is broken winged only to the individual concept -the kind
concept allowing for individuals with healthy or injured wings. So far
so good, but now, what should we do with the kind concept? Should
we leave it as it is? Well, that would be a missed opportunity, because
we have learned something about the species; namely, that its individual
members can have their wings broken. In general, whenever we gather
evidence to the effect that an individual has the property P, we have also
gathered evidence to the effect that the members of its species may have
that same property. This information can be very useful sometimes. If
I have encountered an aggresive dog once, it is surely good to know
from then on that dogs can be aggresive.
The problem comes now, with the part of the doctrine that talks
about structured hierarchies of increasing detail, individuals being
at the bottom and species higher-up. Because, many times, once we
learn that an individual has some property P we can also rule out that
it can have other incompatible properties. Dogs can be black but a
white dog can’t. That is, perceptual concepts -and concepts in general-
cannot be structured hierarchies as Papineau envisages them. When
I see a white dog, I am not seeing a white dog that can be black -
importing information from the kind on to the individual. Some modal
information -which, put in the terms of Papineau’s view, is surely
an important part of the information that gets attached to sensory
5.2 sensitivity to modal information 151
templates- is not of the kind that can be imported from species into
individuals.
5.2 sensitivity to modal information
In etiosemantics, the difference between individual and kind concepts
is not a matter of the information that we are disposed to carry over,
but of what type of entity explains the presence of the concept in
question. If a kind, then it is a kind concept. If an individual, then it is
an individual concept1.
This simple account, it seems, runs into troubles when facing the
issue of building sensitivity to modal properties; at least when such
sensitivity is to be understood in the broadly causal-informational way
I am favouring. It is commonly assumed throughout the literature
that such a sensitivity would be entirely mysterious. So, for instance,
Peacocke suggests that it would need the postulation of “dubiously
intelligible faculties connecting the thinker with some modal realm”
Peacocke (1999, p. 163). Another example of this stance, from the
other end of the philosophical spectrum, is Millikan denying that true
negative sentences have as their meaning nonexistent world affairs,
because “nonexistent world affairs would surely have no powers in
the causal order, hence could not play roles in Normal explanations”
Millikan (1984, p. 221). The most important task of this chapter will
be to show that sensitivity to modal properties is perfectly intelligible,
although, of course, it involves no appeal to the causal powers of the
uninstantiated.
5.2.1 Frogs, Goodflies and Badflies
Let me introduce a complication in the example of Democritus the frog
and its fly-involving mental states. Now, not all of the flies that live near
the Pond where Democritus and his conspecifics hunt are nutritious for
them. In fact, only a 30% of them are -we can call these goodflies. The
rest are harmless, but they provide no advantage to the frogs who eat
them -and we will call these badflies.
As in previous chapters, we can study the situation for the denizens
of the Pond from a cost-benefit perspective: hunting for flies has a
cost in fitness -because of resource expenditure-, and only securing the
capture of goodflies yields a benefit in fitness. The fittest individuals
will be those that, in the long run, reproduce differentially better, and
will pass their strategies onto ulterior generations.
To simplify the discussion we can assign a numerical value to the
costs and benefits in resources in which hunting frogs incur, and assign
probabilities of success to the different possible courses of actions frogs
can take, in the different circumstances. I will consider three different
strategies followed by three different frogs, Empedocles, Epicurus and
Democritus. I will furthermore help myself to the implausible but sim-
plifying assumption that these hunting strategies have simply popped
1 There is a further, syntactical difference among these types of concepts. For example the
input to the predication producer pred (see chapter 4) was supposed to be an individual
concept and a kind concept, and this presupposed a means to distinguishing both
syntactically. We may suppose that further complications in the conceptual setup of an
individual will bring these types of concepts apart as regards their syntatically acceptable
positions in a thought. Following Papineau, I am leaving these complications aside here.
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into existence because of mutation in the frogs, instead of through a
process of selection:
• Democritus has a mechanism n that goes on whenever he sees a
fly -regardless of whether it is a goodfly or not2. n, in its turn,
causes Democritus to protract his tongue. The net result is that,
whenever a fly is near Democritus, he hunts. His success rate
in hunting is 0,8. That is, of every 10 attempts at hunting, he
successfully secures the prey an average of 8. Democritus has
such a high success rate because he doesn’t leave the fly time to
react. As soon as he sees it, he protracts his tongue3.
• Epicurus has a mechanism m that only reacts to goodflies. When a
fly first comes flying by, he does not even notice it, but once he sees
that it is a goodfly (m’s input is a tiny red dot that only goodflies
have in their abdomen4) he hunts -m causing the protraction of
the tongue. The hunting success-rate for Epicurus is 0,6. It is
somewhat lower than Democritus’s because it takes some time
to see that something is a goodfly (the red dot is really tiny, and
not easy to spot) and so, by the time that Epicurus has found out,
the goodfly is normally starting to move away from the frog. Cost
and benefits of hunting are as with Democritus.
• Empedocles has a slightly more complicated strategy. When he
sees a fly a mechanism we could call preparation goes on. prepa-
ration’s being on, in its turn, kicks off a number of changes, e. g.,
increased hearbeat rate, increased attention and the like, that serve
as a preparation for hunting: if a frog hunts when preparation
is on, its probabilities of success are increased.
Besides, Empedocles has a mechanism m that is an exact copy
of Epicurus’s: when he sees the red dot that is the tell-tale sign
of goodflies, m goes on, and this causes Empedocles to hunt.
The difference is his success rate -preparation being on- which
is as good as Democritus’s: 0,8. On the malus side, the cost of
preparation’s going on is -5 resource units (rus, from now on).
I will also assume that, for the three frogs, the cost of hunting (whether
successful or not) is -20 rus; the benefit of catching a goodfly is 500
rus; the benefit of catching a badfly is 0 rus -cf. figure 11. We may now
calculate the Fitness Contribution of their hunting systems. We will
disregard the values outside the diagonal of the Fitness Matrix, given
that our simplifying assumptions (i. e., that they are perfect detectors)
imply that the frogs will never cash them:
2 For the sake of simplicity I will be assuming that Democritus, and the other frogs, make
no mistakes in recognising flies. That is, that the probability of there being a fly given
that the input to Democritus’s m is present is 1.
3 To put this in the context of the discussion in previous chapters, we are assuming here
that Democritus is somehow perfect in his detection of flies. This is, strictly speaking,
impossible: Democritus will always be using a proximal cue which will never have
a perfect, counterfactual-supporting correlation with flies. First, there is the empirical
reason that no proximal cue will, as a matter of fact, be such a perfect tracker. Then, there
is the theoretical reason that -as I have argued in 2.5- the property of Being such-and-such
a natural kind is not a Shoemakerian property, which is what detectors detect.
So, the success rate in the main text does not refer to Democritus’s ability to identify flies
-that is, this rate is none of the probabilities in the IPfly, which we are assuming identical
to the identity matrix. The success rate, instead, is useful in calculating FMfly: how big
a prize is to identify a flie, given Democritus’s subsequent ability in hunting for it.
4 Here again, for the sake of simplicity, I will assume that Epicurus’s IPgoodfly is the
identity matrix.
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Figure 11: Three Strategies
• For Democritus, the fitness value associated with a correct positive




• For Epicurus, the values are wgoodfly11 = −20+ 0, 6 · 500 = 280,
and wgoodfly22 = 0.
• Finally, for Empedocles, wfly11 = −5+ 0, 3 · (−20+ 0, 8 · 500) = 109
and wfly22 = 0.
And the overall Fitness Contributions for each of them:
• FCDemocritus = 100 · P (fly)
•
FCEpicurus = P (fly) (P (goodfly|fly) /P (fly) · 280) =
P (fly) (0, 3 · 280) = 84 · P (fly)
• FCEmpedocles = 109 · P (fly)
Let us see the three frogs in action in a little simulation. The game
goes as follows: in each round (i. e., hunting episode) a fly gets near
each of the frogs. We are assuming that there is no direct competence
between them. That is, that a frog catches the fly is just a matter of
the effectiveness of its strategy. That the fly is good or bad is simply
a matter of chance (with the probability of flies being goodflies being
0,3) but, in each round, all three flies facing each of the frogs will be
of the same kind. When faced with a fly, Empedocles, Democritus and
Epicurus will do as described above, and the amount of resources they
cash or loose will depend partly on their behaviour (preparation’s
going on or not, for example), and partly on the success rate of their
hunting.
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Figure 12: The three frogs after 100 hunting episodes
After 100 hunting episodes, the situation is as shown in figure 12.
In the x-axis we have the number of hunts, and in the y-axis the net
resource-balance for Empedocles (black line), Democritus (blue) and
Epicurus (green). First, we can see that Empedocles’s and Democritus’s
resources grow parallel, although Empedocles’s are increasingly higher.
This is because they have success in exactly the same hunting occasions
-their success rate is the same- but, where Democritus always spends
20 rus -he hunts each and every fly-, Empedocles does better and only
spends the 5 rus of preparation’s going on in the cases in which he
will end up not hunting -because the prey is not a goodfly. As for
Epicurus, he doesn’t even spend the 5 rus of preparation so, if he were
to be as successful in hunting as Empedocles or Democritus, he would
outperform them. But he is not; his lower success-rate in hunting makes
all the difference -the green line makes less “jumps up” that black or
blue. After ten thousand hunts (Figure 13) the differences only grow
bigger.
This is simply a more vivid presentation of the information already
present in the Fitness Contributions: Empedocles’s strategy is the most
profitable in the long run. He would be fittest and would be the one
to reproduce and pass his strategy on; he would be selected for. The
situation with Empedocles is not much different from the situation
with Democritus in democritus and the content of m’s be-
ing on, in 1.3: Empedocles has a couple of mechanisms, m and prepa-
ration, that indicate a number of properties, and this has made him
more successful than conspecifics with a different cognitive setup. This
is the kind of story that earns content attributions for its main charac-
ters. Let us, then, work out the correct attribution of content to these
mental mechanisms’s being on. We will see that there is a state with a
probability-involving content, but that it is neither m nor preparation’s
being on. It is, instead, the state consisting in these two mechanisms’s
being wired the way they are.
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Figure 13: After 10000 hunting episodes
5.3 content attribution to empedocles’s mental states
5.3.1 M and Preparation
What is the content of the positives of m and preparation? We may use
the there is an f around recipe for content attribution introduced
in chapter 1: I argued there that the content of the positives of an
atomic indicator mechanism should involve the HPC that explains the
correlation between the Indication Profiles and Fitness Matrices of that
mechanism. If so, m is easy: its success relies, in the particular way
we reviewed in chapter 1, on the existence of a Homeostatic Property
Cluster that explains the frequent coinstantiation of properties that
are close to its Input (maybe Being a red dot in the abdomen of a fly)
and other properties (such as Being nutritious for frogs) that explain the
fitness-conduciveness of reacting to properties in the input. The HPC
in question, we are assuming, is goodfly. So the content of m’s being on
is There is a goodfly around univocally -or so I argued in the analogous
case of chapter 1.
What about preparation? Its input are properties in the fly Prop-
erty Cluster, but the explanation of the values in the Fitness Matrix is
slightly more complicated than other cases we have seen so far. We
calculated above the overall fitness of a correct positive for Empedocles:
FCEmpedocles = [−5+ 0, 3 · (−20+ 0, 8 · 500)]P (fly) = 109 · P (fly).
This fitness is a joint merit of the workings of m and preparation.
m gets the most benefitial fitness contribution:
FCM = [0, 3 · (−20+ 0, 8 · 500)]P (fly) = 114 · P (fly) .
Apparently, the m in Empedocles does a much better job than the m
in, for example, Epicurus. But this comes down to its better success rate
when hunting, and we know that the rise in success rate is facilitated
by preparation. In creatures such as Epicurus, which lack a token of
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preparation, success rate is significantly lower. preparation makes
Empedocles enter in a state that, if the fly is a goodfly, will help hunt it
more efficiently. This is Empedocles’s competitive edge against Epicu-
rus, who lacks this preparation. Besides, the cost of causing this state
is low enough so that, if the fly is not a goodfly, losses are minimised.
This is Empedocles’s competitive edge against Democritus, who incurs
in the full cost of hunting every time. preparation steers a middle
course between fully responding to flies as Democritus, and ignoring
them as Epicurus. preparation makes Empedocles a more cost-effective
hunter. It is easy to see this if we compare his resource-curve with Dem-
ocritus’s. The only difference between both curves is that Democritus’s
goes down 20 rus everytime a fly approaches him, while Empedocles
manages to spend only 5 rus in the event of an encounter with a badfly.
preparation is exploiting a homeostatic mechanism that makes fly-
cluster properties come together, the very mechanism that explains that
a 30% of the times the cluster includes the nutritional properties of
goodflies5. This homeostatic mechanism is the one that individuates
flyhood. So, preparation’s positives have the content There is a fly
around, just as m’s positives have the content There is a goodfly around.
None of these two contents reflect the fact that P (goodfly|fly) is
crucial to the success of Empedocles’s strategy versus Epicurus’s and
Democritus’s. It appears, though, that such a probability should be
part of a content-endowing explanation. The question is, the content of
which state?
5.3.2 Synergic Associations
The relative “positions” of m and preparation in Empedocles’s cogni-
tive setup bear some resemblance to the relative “positions” of F- and
G-mechanisms in the cases of conjunctive and disjunctive recruiting I
discussed a couple of chapters ago, in 3.1. There, too, the Fitness Contri-
butions of both mechanisms were mutually dependent -one could see
the process by which the F- and G-mechanisms came to be associated
either as the F-mechanism recruiting the G-mechanism for its output,
or as the G-mechanism recruiting the F-mechanism for its input, and
the gain in Fitness Contribution harvested by their association could be
allocated to the account of either of the two mechanisms.
I wish to suggest that the state formed by preparation, m and their
association6 has a probability-involving content. I will call this kind of
cost-effective associations among mechanisms, synergic associations. A
probability-involving content attribution to synergic associations is sen-
sible: for example, it is the probabilistic relation between instantiations
of the property of Being a goodfly and those of the property of Being a
fly that explains the success of the synergic association of m and prepa-
ration. It is in the spirit of my former discussion of conjunctive and
disjunctive recruitments to claim now that the association of the two
mechanisms has the content that there is whatever causally-grounded
relation between Fs and Gs that explains that, if there is an F around,
the probability of there being a G around is in a certain interval:
5 By the way, there need not be any fundamentally random mechanism at bottom of such
probabilities; for all Empedocles and Democritus care, the homeostatic mechanism may
produce good- and badflies in the perfectly deterministic sequence {b,g,b,b,g,b,b,g,b,b}.
6 That is, the causal underpinnings, whatever they are, of the fact that preparation’s being
on improves the Fitness Matrix associated with m, at a low cost.
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probabilistic relation: An agent A has a state, n, with the con-
tent There is a causally-grounded relation between Fs and Gs such that
x > P (G|F) > x ′, if the following explains that n exists
1. A has a mechanism whose positives have the content There is
an F around and another with the content There is a G around.
2. n is a causal association of the F- and the G-mechanisms
alluded to in 1 such that FCF + FCG when the states are
associated is higher than FCF + FCG when they are not.
3. The difference in fitness contributions in 2 is explained by
whatever causal underpinnings the fact that x > P (G|F) > x ′
has.
We may have qualms about attributing a probabilistic-relation con-
tent on such a meager basis. One of the reasons for this is that it is
impossible to read the probability the mental state has as content off
its causal profile: there is no one-one relation between, on the one
hand, the kind of relation between F and G (probabilistic or otherwise)
and, on the other hand, the form of the synergic relation between F-
mechanism and G-mechanism. A consequence of this is that many of
the ways of associating two mental mechanisms we have been studying
-e. g., disjunctive/conjunctive recruitment in Chapter 2 and the kind
of synergic relation that holds between preparation and m- may be
useful in overlapping cases. If, e. g., the proportion of flies that are
goodflies is high enough, simply effecting a disjunctive recruitment of
preparation for m’s input may be enough to make the difference with
other competing agents that have not stumbled upon the recruiting.
Even more: if the synergic relation is not very benefitial -e. g., if the
cost of preparation’s going on is too high, or the increment in the
hunting efficacy of m too low- the disjunctive recruiting may yield a
higher increase in FC than the synergic association.
We encountered the same situation in chapter 3, when discussing
states that represent causal relations: there is no straightforward corre-
lation between the causal profile of the state and whatever it is that it
represents. This correlation appears only when there is a second order
mechanism (ltp* was our example there; see 3.4) that produces states
that represent causal relations.
In the following section, again, we will see that, when there is such a
producer mechanism that outputs states that represent a probabilistic
relation among properties, we find some correlation between form of
the state and type of relation that it represents. This is an important
feature, because it is the causal profile of particular states, and not the
historical properties upon which content supervenes, that other states
see. That is: once we move pass the simplest train of thoughts, we need
some level of isomorphism between the probability a state represents
and the causal profile of this state. This is what we will attain in the
following section.
Before that, though, I wish to discuss an interesting special case in
which the probability in question may be read off the causal dispositions
of the contentful mental state -even if the latter is selected-for.
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies.
A situation such that a disjunctive recruitment is chosen over and
above a synergic association in the face of two probabilistically related
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properties will not happen if we allow all possible mental mechanisms
-under certain restrictions- to appear through mutation and fight to
prevail.
For a concrete example, in the three-frogs scenario we have been
discussing, we have seen that, at zero cost, you only get a 0,6 success
ratio, which goes up to 0,8 if you spend 5 rus. We may assume that
these two values are connected by a function that raises the success ratio
with every raise in the cost of preparation. A reasonable cost function
would approach success-ratio of 1 asymptotically as cost progresses
towards infinite. One such function7 (that, besides, yields 0,6 success-
ratio when cost is 0 and 0,8 success-ratio when cost is 5, to keep the
example continuous with the previous discussion) is, for example,






Thus, the fitness contribution of the different strategies, taking this
cost-function into account would be:
FC (cost) =
[










This formula is such that FC (0) = FCEpic. and FC (5) = FCEmped.8.
FC (cost) has a maximum around cost = 11, 3. The strategy that imple-
ments a preparation with that cost is evolutionarily stable in Maynard
Smith’s sense (see Maynard-Smith (1999)): no different strategy (that
still complies with the cost-constraints stated, that is) can penetrate a
population implementing such an EES -see figure 14.
In the ideal situation in which, given a particular fitness landscape
such as that defined by the three-frogs example, there is enough time
and variation for natural selection to reach the EES, we could, so to
say, read P (goodfly|fly) off the preparation cost in the strategy. This
situation is, maybe, most confortable for the content internalist’s intu-
itions, in that it allows for a reconstruction of the external property in
question (the conditional probability, in this case) in terms of features of
the internal system -the cost/success-ratio pair chosen by the winning
strategy. But it is important to remember that such a situation may be
unrealistically idealised: evolution may not have time to find the EES,
or it may be inaccessible for reasons having to do with the gene pool -cf.
Bell (2008, chapter 3). Even if the final strategy is not in the maximum
of the fitness landscape, it is still the case that one particular conditional
probability -the one that happens to be the causally-supported one in
the context- figures in the explanation of the survival of the subopti-
mal, but good enough, winning strategy. This is why the conditions
for a selected-for mental state to have the content There is a causally-
grounded relation between Fs and Gs such that x > P (G|F) > x ′ are not
very informative.
It would be wrong to take these considerations as pointing to another
constraint for our content attributions:
7 Among many possible alternatives. This is just a whimsical example.
8 To include Democritus in the picture we would need to complicate this formula slightly.
The point I am after can be made making reference to Epicurus’s and Empedocles’s
strategies alone, though, so I will not tax the reader’s attention with further niceties.
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Figure 14: The fitness landscape
informativeness: If some state S in an agent A has a content C, it
must be possible to reconstruct a satisfactory amount of C out of
the role of S in A.
Informativeness is an internalist requirement. An extreme version of
this constraint is,
causal role: A state S in an agent A’s having a content C consists
of S’s having a concrete role R in A.
I trust that the reader will have found, in the discussion in chapter 4,
enough reasons to reject both informativeness and causal role.
Informativeness expresses the feeling that, even if we are not ready
to equate content with position in a conceptual network, there must be
some interesting portion of the content of a mental state that may be
recovered by observing the actual workings of S -regardless of its causal-
historical properties. This is related to, but different from, another
internalist requirement that could be made using the terminology
introduced in chapter 3,
few blameless wrongdoings: The Procedure a producer mech-
anism follows must provide a reliable guide to the content of
its products; the amount of blameless wrongdoings must be ad-
equately low -and this adequately is not merely adequately*, that
is, not merely to be explicated in terms of Fitness Contribution
balances, but follows some independent norm.
We should reject both informativeness and few blameless
wrongdoings. There is no independent norm to help us gauge the
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informativeness or the blameless wrongdoings a selected-for mental
state is allowed to make; this constraint introduces an extraneous, non-
naturalistic normative element. On the other hand, as we are about to
see -and as we have already seen in a number of parallel contexts- if
the synergic association in question is produced by a selected-for mech-
anism which has a function to yield such associations, an independent,
fully naturalistic norm emerges that meets the intuitive informativeness
constraint. I turn to show this now.
5.4 producers of synergic associations
I shall start from a just-so story about a possible mechanism which has
been selected for producing synergic associations; after that, I will give
more general conditions for the attribution of content in this situation.
Consider an agent A such that there is a magnitude mg (e. g., A’s
hearbeat-rate, or degree of attention) with the following characteristics:
First, it has a base value, mgo. Second, it is possible to increase or de-
crease mg, with the corresponding expenditure or saving in resources;
that is, the value of the increment of mg is a monotonically-increasing
function of its cost, mg−mgo = ∆mg = f (cost). Finally, the increase
on fitness values, wij of some mental mechanism m of A’s, whose posi-
tives have the content There is a G around, is a monotonically-increasing
function of ∆mg, thus: ∆wij = gij (∆mg) = gij (f (cost)) = w ′ij (cost).
So, the gain or loss of total Fitness Contribution of m, after devoting
a certain amount of resources, cost, in raising mg is:
∆FCG (cost) = −cost +
P (G)
(











We could envisage a mechanism n that works according to the
following Procedure9:
procedure - synergic : Whenever two mental mechanisms of A,
an F-mechanism and a G-mechanism, are such that
P (G− state is on|F− state is on) = X
if costmax is the value that makes ∆FCG (cost) maximum, then
add the following action to the output of the F-mechanism: Spend
costmax in increasing mg.
n, following procedure - synergic, effects a change in the F-
mechanism that links it with the G-mechanism: now the F-mechanism
affects the performance of the G-mechanism in a way in which it previ-
ously did not, and the result is a higher overall Fitness Contribution.
n would be more nuanced in its behaviour that, for example, ltp* in
3.4, in that it would not simply create all-or-nothing recruitings among
states, but rather taylor the association of states it produces to reflect
the probabilistic relation that its target properties have in ther real
world. Given the very tangible contribution that n makes to the fitness
of its possessor (by improving the Fitness Contribution of the states it
associates) it is possible that it had a non-negligible influence in the
9 n needs to use a proximal cue to know about the conditional probability below. I’m
leaving this complication aside.
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survival of its possessor and that, by that token, became fixated in its
lineage.
The presence of a higher-order producer mechanism such as n helps
alleviate the uninformativeness of conditions such as probabilistic
relation above: in the case of mechanisms that comply with proba-
bilistic relation and are not the products of a previously selected
mechanism, one cannot recover the information about the probabilistic
relation among instantiation of properties around the possessor of
the mechanism out of the workings of that very mechanism -barring
assumptions to the effect that the environment would only allow an
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy to get fixated. That is, pretty much any
position in the fitness landscape in figure 14 could be selected because
of its sensitivity to probabilistic relations among properties, if no other
mutant has been lucky enough to stumble upon a better strategy -one
nearer the maximum, that is.
This is not the case with states created by selected-for producers such
as n, not even for mechanisms that are less accurate in calculating the
most cost-effective investment in magnitude mg. Any such producer
will produce several states, that represent different probabilistic rela-
tions among properties. From such a set of states, and if we have some,
even partial, information about the probabilities they are representing,
we may be able to “reverse engineer” the procedure the producer uses
to create them. This would provide a route from the state and its charac-
teristics back to the probabilities it involves in its content. This, in turn,
will help meet informativeness. More importantly, other states
in agent A may make themselves sensitive to the systematic relation
between causal profiles of mechanisms created by n and conditional
probabilities in the environment.
5.4.1 A more general set of necessary conditions.
Now, in general, what are the conditions for some mental mechanism
n to be such that the associations it effects have a probability-involving
content? The following set of conditions (closely related to the analo-
gous set of conditions in 3.8) do the trick, for a mechanism that takes an
F-mechanism (i. e., a mechanism whose positives have the content There
is an F around) and a G-mechanism and effects a synergic association
with the content There is whatever causally-grounded relation between Fs
and Gs that explains that x > P (G|F) > x ′.
Inputs of type C, such as Cm, cause n to create synergic
associations among mechanisms fa (Cm) and fb (Cm). The
form of the association is also a function of the cue -say,
fassoc (Cm). We’ll call this association SAm (a,b).
This is a substitutions of variables in the routine schema we saw in
3.8. Besides,
A sufficient* number of the synergic associations SAi
produced by n in the presence of cue Ci have been fitness-
conducive because
• Cues such as Ci are a good enough sign of the fact that
the HPCs a and b -which are the ones that the content
of fa (Ci) and fb (Ci) involve- are in a probabilistic
relation such that xi > P (a|b) > x ′i -the interval of
probabilities is also function of the cue.
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• The added Fitness Contributions of the a- and b-mechanisms
after their synergic association in SAi (a,b) has been
higher than before their association, and
• The fact that xi > P (a|b) > x ′i figures in a relevant
explanation of why 1 is the case10.
This is analogous to fitness conduciveness in 3.8. The idea is that
what explains the fitness conduciveness in each succesful product of
n is a mechanism similar to the ones appealed to in probabilistic
relation above. Finally, as always, we need to make sure that the
workings of n are covered by an HPC that keeps together cues and
synergic associations:
There is a higher order HPC Qn that explains that in-
stantiations of properties Ci go together with the fact that
xi > P (a|b) > x
′
i where a and b are the HPCs targetted by
mechanisms fa (Ci) and fb (Ci) respectively.
This is analogous to higher order hpc in 3.8. Once we have a
mechanism n with such a causal profile, embedded in such a causal
net, we can use it to create states with probability involving contents:
An agent A has a state, SAi (a,b), whose positives have
the content There is a causally-grounded relation between as and
bs such that xi > P (a|b) > x ′i if cue Ci has caused n to create
it.
The basic idea is the same as in previous chapters. The mechanism that
is actually selected for, n, has stumbled upon a causal structure that
effects a correlation between a property of type C and the fact that two
natural kinds F and G are such that x > P (G|F) > x ′. This has been
useful because n’s outputs are states that take profit of just that kind of
probabilistic relation among natural kinds -states such as the one that
Empedocles uses to beat Democritus and Epicurus in the fly-hunting
competition.
A perfectly intelligible faculty.
A mechanism that follows, say, procedure - synergic is going to
be pretty sophisticated, to be sure. For starters, it has to be able to
find the maximum of ∆FCG (cost), which in turn involves solving the
equation d∆FCG(cost)dcost = 0, and that would be a pretty impressive feat
for a mutation to achieve in one step. Naturally-evolved mechanisms
that implement something similar to this procedure will derive from
other, less accurate mechanisms -ones that give a coarser approxima-
tion to costmax, for example. In any event, even if it is implausibly
sophisticated, there is one thing it is not: it is not the embodiment
of a “dubiously intelligible faculty”, as in Peacocke’s turn of phrase.
It is perfectly intelligible how and why could an organism go about
following procedure - synergic. And yet, as I will try to show in
the following sections, this is the basic building block for our modal
competence.
10 A “relevant” explanation will be relevantly similar to the explanation of Empedocles’s
success in the three-frogs example.
5.5 concepts and probability-involving contents 163
The relation between F-Mechanism and G-Mechanism.
It should be noticed that the synergic association between the F-mechanism
and the G-mechanism need not be a direct causal relation. It is compat-
ible with procedure - synergic that the effect of the investment in
dmg occurs downstream from the G-mechanism. What n does is making
the F-mechanism cause some changes that have nothing to do with the
workings of the G-mechanism, which it leaves untouched.
In such a case, we should describe the situation as one in which
the F- and G-mechanisms jointly cause a (number of) event(s) with a
positive Fitness Contribution for A. Of course, in other cases proce-
dure - synergic may create a bona fide causal relation between the
two mechanisms, wherein, for example, the G-mechanism changes as a
result of the F-mechanism’s going on. This very simple setup may help
see a particular family of problems under a clearer light. What makes
the F-mechanism and the G-mechanism produce representations that
are somehow linked may not be a direct causal connection. But this
does not mean that mere co-activation of the two mechanism is enough
for their representations to be so-linked. Such a theoretical possibility
may be an interesting avenue to a solution to the binding problem in
psychology -cf. Revonsuo (2009) and references therein.
I should also quickly point out that implementing a probabilistic
causal relation between the F-mechanism and the G-mechanism in
response to a probabilistic relation between Fs and Gs would be a pretty
bad strategy. It is not that the activation of the F-mechanism should
cause the activation of the G-mechanism a 30% of the times, if the
probabilities that govern the causing are independent from those that
govern the relations between flies and goodflies. Such a probabilistic
causal relation would get a correct positive of the G-mechanism in only
a 30%× 30% = 9% of the cases in which it is activated.
It is likely that a real life ltp* works more or less this way: whenever
there is co-firing of F-mechanism and G-mechanism, ltp* makes the
probabilistic causal relation between both a bit higher until, after suf-
ficient co-firing, it reaches the strongest possible causal link between
states. With independent firing, instead, a complementary mechanism
ltp* (standing for Long Term Depression) diminishes the causal link.
Anyway, if we make an ltp*/ltd* pair work on a probabilistic relation
between properties (they make, e. g., the causal link strength move up
and down a sigmoid curve between 0 and 1, with 0 being no causal
relation at all, and 1 causal necessitation), it can be shown that, for
probabilities above 0,5, the pair makes the connection reach 1 in the
long run, and for those below 0,5 it makes it go down to 0. So, for
high correlations you get Democritus, and for low correlations you get
Epicurus. There is a better strategy, as we already know, and one that
can’t be mimicked just with ltp*/ltd*: Empedocles’s.
5.5 concepts and probability-involving contents
We may now come back to Papineau’s perceptual concepts. Let us recall
from chapter 4 the mechanism conc, which is able to produce concepts.
conc takes a cue Sa as input and issues a concept which may be used
in thoughts of the form Fa -that is, thoughts in which a property is
predicated of its referent.
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I have criticised Papineau’s suggestion that the difference between
individual and kind concepts is the kinds of information one is willing
to carry over from one encounter with the concept’s referent to the next.
As an extra reason for doubting that this is the right account, we may
note that there is no limit to the amount of error that a cogniser can
make, as regards the kinds of properties that may be carried over upon
encounter with kinds or individuals. Someone may be (very wrongly)
disposed to judge that birds have broken wings after having seen a bird
with a broken wing, or that math teachers have a sunny disposition,
after an encounter with a particularly nice member of the group. All of
this is compatible with his having the kind concept bird, and the kind
concept math teacher.
The right account, I urged in section 4.4.2, has it that someone has
the kind concept bird if a mechanism such as conc has been caused
by a cue Sbird to produce in her a mental mechanism m, such that
Sbird and birdhood are related by the same higher order HPC that
explains the emergence of conc -see the referred section for details.
This may well be compatible with the concept in question following a
comparatively lousy Procedure of application and, in particular, with
the cogniser’s being disposed to carry over broken-wing information
from bird to bird.
But the problem with Papineau’s account that most interests me
in the context of this chapter is the one having to do with carrying
over modal information from individuals to kinds. As I said above, the
inference taking from
• Fido is ill-tempered
to
• Dogs may be ill-tempered
is perfectly safe -and may help to keep you safe on occasion. There is a
straightforward way in which a mental architecture with contents fixed
in the way I am advocating may implement this kind of inferences. We
can envisage a synergic associator, syn, which works in the following
way:
syn - causal profile : • The cue that causes syn to work is
pred forming a thought that predicates a property F of an
individual a -such as Fido is ill-tempered; see 4.4.2 for details
on pred.
• It then issues an order for a synergic association to be effected
between a concept that is a function both of F and a11 (dog,
in our example) and the concept of F (ill-tempered, in our
example).
11 To decide that it is the concept dog, and not, e. g., the concept brownish moving thing
which must be synergic-associated with ill-tempered is a complicated cognitive task,
about which much must be said -and about which I will say next to nothing. One may
hypothesise with Papineau that kind concepts do carry empty slots -although, as I have
been arguing, these slots provide no criterion of kind-conceptness- and that the synergic
association with the concept ill-tempered is promoted in all kind concepts to which the
individual belongs such that they have the right kind of empty slot. So, maybe, dog and
mammal have, and brownish thing has not, a mood slot and this rules that synergic
associations with ill-tempered are promoted in the former but not the latter. But this is
all wild speculation.
In any event, just how syn solves the problem of promoting useful inferences from
individuals to kinds is an enormously interesting empirical question, but one that I need
not care about at the moment. For the point I’m making it is enough that the problem
can be solved in one way or other. We are a living sign that it can.
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• The strength of the association will depend on the amount of
information available. In some cases, it is possible that syn
simply chooses a baseline degree of association -corresponding
to a baseline degree of probability of, say, dogs being ill-
tempered. In more sophisticated cognitive setups, the as-
sociation effected will depend on the circumstances of the
formation of the thought that Fido is ill-tempered -e. g.,
whether its behaviour was provoked or not.
As always, to make syn capable of endowing content to the synergic
associations it effects among concepts, we need it to have obtained
the function to behave as detailed in syn - causal profile in the
presence of the adequate HPC. In this case, there needs to be causal
grounds for the fact that cues of the type (pred’s creating a thought Fa)
go together in a sufficient number of times with the fact that the tokens
of some of the kinds12 whence a belongs have a certain probability of
being F.
The presence of syn, if its function emerged in the presence of the
right causal grounds, will be enough to make the concept dog carry
the (fully intentional) information that dogs are ill-tempered with some
probability13. Let me point out a couple of the advantages of this way
of accounting for the encoding of probabilities in our concepts, if you
are of a naturalist persuasion:
Again, there is no mysterious appeal to uninstantiated events, or
the content-endowing capabilities of the merely possible. The synergic
associator simply works on causally-grounded correlations it has stum-
bled upon. These causal grounds are operative not only in the actual
correlations syn has encountered, but also in innumerable others. This
is how, upon one sole encounter with a cue, syn may go on to rightly
promote a synergic association among concepts. Put from the point of
view of the agent, upon once coming to believe that Fa, she then goes14
on rightly to connect the concepts of several kinds whence a belongs to
a certain probability of their being F.
Nor does the way in which syn works involve undischarged appeals
to a priori knowledge. syn follows a Procedure, described in syn -
causal profile and this procedure gives sufficiently* reliable access
to information about probabilities. There is no realm of the a priori
involved15. I will try to explain now how the synergic association of
concepts effected by the likes of syn may underlie our very own ability
to modalise.
5.6 in situ possibilities
We have just seen how a mechanism such as syn may help a creature
gather modal information about a kind. A similar procedure may effect
the gathering of modal information about individuals. There is an
apparently sound inference that goes from:
12 See footnote 11.
13 More strictly: information that there is whatever causal grounds that explain that x >
P (ill− tempered|dog) > x ′.
14 We should not think that she does this voluntarily, out of her own will, etc. These kind of
mental acts have much more stringent sets of conditions of existence. All that the agent
is “doing” in the main text is automatically forming a conceptual relation upon coming
to believe that Fa.
15 Or, maybe, the realm of the a priori is the realm of the selected for being sufficiently*
reliable. I don’t find this suggestion totally unattractive.
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• Fido is angry now
to
• Fido may be angry
I do not intend the conclusion to be read as following logically from the
premise. That is, the argument is not supposed to rely on an instance
of the axiom T which allows to infer ♦p from p. This inference is of no
practical (ecological) interest and, as such, is unlikely to be at the base of
our modal competence. Knowledge of the logical law in question, and
particular instances thereof, true as they are under natural assumptions,
provides no competitive edge outside the Philosophy department.
Instead, what seems to be ecologically very useful is knowing that
Fido may be angry again in the future. That is, that Fido is such that
there is a non-negligible, objective probability that he be angry again in
the future. In this way, we may adjust our behaviour (in the nuanced,
synergic way I we have sketched) to a certain probability of certain
future time slices of Fido’s which we may encounter being angry16. We
may easily imagine a mechanism, synind, that works just like syn, but
encondes modal information about individuals:
synind - causal profile: • The cue that causes synind to work
is pred forming a thought that predicates a property F-now
of an individual a (such as Fido is ill-tempered now)
• It then issues an order for a synergic association to be effected
between the concept of a and the concept of F (ill-tempered,
in our example).
• As with syn, the strength of the association will depend on
the amount of information available.
Again, for synind to be able to create contentful states there needs to
be causal grounds for the fact that cues of the type (pred’s creating a
thought Fa now) go together in a sufficient number of times with the
fact that a has a certain probability of being F again in the future. The
content of the synergic association created by synind is, then, There are
causal grounds which explain the fact that there is a certain probability of a
being F in the future.
We are interested merely in the general features that make something
a modal thought about an individual and, to this effect, characterising
a system such as synind which produces just this kind of thoughts is
enough. The particular way in which synind does this is irrelevant for
the purposes at hand. One such way may involve making the possessor
of the concept of a go into a state similar to Empedocles’s prepara-
tion whenever it forms a thought with the content a is around. More
sophisticated cognitive systems will have a very context-dependent
implementation which varies whith every a-involving thought the cog-
niser may entertain. On the other hand, synind is but one example of
a mechanism that produces modal contents about individuals. Other
mechanisms may use other entirely different cues, apart from a judge-
ment of a being F on some particular occasion: testimony, for example.
16 In fact, although I have not stressed it for ease of exposition, the same happens with
kinds: in the inference from Fido is ill-tempered to Dogs may be ill-tempered we do not simply
reach a logical consequence of the premise, one, for instance, that would be true if Fido
is the only member of the species that may be and is ill-tempered. In the kinds-inference
too, the conclusion should be read as pointing to a feature of the causal structure of
doghood that makes ill-temperedness recur with some probability along the species.
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What synind does is creating thoughts about still-open possible
courses of the actual world; it encodes the information that, e. g., Fido
is such that the future is open with respect to its being ill-tempered
again. More sophisticated producers may produce other, more sophis-
ticated contents about still-open possible courses of the actual world.
In summary, it does not seem far-fetched to suppose that there is a
naturalistically-acceptable reduction along these lines of contents in-
volving what we may call the in situ possible:
in situ possibility: It is in situ possible that p at some time t (♦ti.s.p)
iff there are causal grounds for the fact that the probability of p
after t is higher than a threshold T17.
For example, it is in situ possible today that tomorrow will rain iff
the world is such that certain causal processes constitute a probabilistic
propensity to rain that underlies a high enough probability of tomorrow
raining. It will cease to be in situ possible the day after tomorrow, if
tomorrow does not rain. Mental contents involving in situ possibilities
refer to these causal processes18.
I should insist once more that, maybe in despite of appearances, our
ability to entertain thoughts about in situ possibilities is not constitu-
tively linked with whatever might be useful to us -so that thoughts
involving useless in situ possibilities go unexplained by the present ac-
count. Instead, mechanisms such as synind tap into causally-grounded
correlations -say, between a cue and the fact that a certain probabilistic
propensity exists- which may be in place far beyond what we find useful
-e. g., outside our light cone. If one of these modal-thought producers
has been produced by another mechanism, and not directly selected
for, its usefulness may be exactly zero.
5.6.1 Everyday Possibility
In situ possibility is a good candidate for the kind of modal contents
that may have naturally emerged in the first place. They help cope with
what is yet to come, and do so in a cost-effective way. Also, it provides
what appears to be a basic building block for our full-blown modal
competence. I wish now to indulge in an educated guess as regards
how the process to such competence may go19.
17 The threshold is there to ensure that in situ possibility remains an all-or-nothing affair.
Alternative constructions -in which something is in situ possible to a higher or lower
degree- are obviously possible.
18 Assuming that probabilities are meaningless without a partition of the space of possible
states of affairs, one natural question regarding this definition is: the probability of p with
respect to what? Well, if we remember the kind of causal mechanisms we have proposed
as underlying our modal contents, synergic associations mediate a nuanced response
between two different possible kinds of states of affairs. In the three-frogs example, the
two possible kinds of states of affairs were There being a badfly around and There being a
goodfly around. In that situation, the probability of each of these states of affairs is to be
calculated against a partition that includes both states of affairs and, maybe, a Things are
otherwise state of affairs to cover all other cases. synind has been selected for enabling
these kinds of nuanced responses; it is to be expected that examination of the causal
grounds that have facilitated this selection -such as the causal grounds of the relative
frequency of goodflies in our example- will lead us to the right partition against which
we should calculate the probability of p.
19 The following subsections may be seen as elaborations upon Graeme Forbes’s “branching
conception of possible worlds” Forbes (1985, p. 148f), which, in its turn, is an elaboration
of Kripke (1980)’s terse footnote 57, p. 115. See also Pérez-Otero (1997), Mackie (1998),
Mackie (2006).
The picture of the modal realm that emerges from the discussion to follow, nevertheless,
is a (smallish) proper subset of Forbes’s.
168 modal contents
The second step on the way to such competence may be a temporal
quantification over in situ possibilities:
everyday possibility: It is everyday possible at t that p (♦edp) iff,
for a certain contextually relevant time t ′ 6 t, it is true that ♦t ′i.s.p.
Everyday possibilities seem to be involved in most of the modal
contents we entertain outside the Philosophy department. Take, for
example,
The James Caird could have missed South Georgia20.
It is natural to read this statement as saying that there was a contextually-
relevant time (e. g., shortly after the James Caird left Elephant Island) in
which it was in situ possible that it missed South Georgia; i. e., shortly
after this lifeboat abandoned Elephant Island, the probability of its not
reaching its destination (as opposed to simply getting lost in the frozen
sea) was suitably high.
5.6.2 Everyday Counterfactual Conditionals
It appears that judgements involving everyday possibility are what
Van Inwagen (1998, p. 73) claims we can know using our ’ordinary
human powers of “modalization”’. I will discuss epistemology in the
next chapter, but here way can already see that most everyday modal
contents seem to be informatively paraphrasable in terms of everyday
possibilities. Take one of Van Inwagen’s examples of everyday modal
truths we can know:
We’d have had more room if we’d moved the table up
against the wall (ibid.)
The natural extension of the idea of everyday possibilities to counterfac-
tual conditionals such as this one is to suggest that such conditionals
point to the following fact: the antecedent is everyday possible -that
is, there is a certain contextually-relevant time such that, at that time,
there is a high enough probability of the antecedent holding- and, at
that very same contextually relevant time, the indicative conditional
linking antecedent and consequent is true. That is, the trick is letting
the antecedent fix the contextually relevant time and then use that time
to evaluate the conditional. Something along these lines:
everyday counterfactual conditional: p ed q iff for a
certain contextually relevant time t ′ 6 t, ♦t ′i.s.p∧ (p→i q) .
That is, we would have had more room if we had moved the table up
against the wall if and only if it is everyday possible that we had moved
the table up against the wall, and, at that time, if we move the table up
against the wall we have more room. This indicative conditional →i is
not the mere material conditional; roughly, it records a relation between
p and q that is analogous to the relation between F is around and G is
around in the disjunctive recruitments discussed in 3.1: there are causal
grounds for the fact that, if p, then q to a high enough probability.
It may be suggested that we do not need the antecedent to be every-
day possible. After all, the consensus is that counterfactual conditionals
20 If you don’t know what this is all about, you definitely need to read about Shackleton’s
expedition to the South Pole. For example, Lansing (1999).
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with impossible antecedents are vacuously true21. Asking for the an-
tecedent to be possible, on the other hand, helps fix the right time at
which the conditional has to be evaluated. Besides, everyday counter-
factual conditionals -such as Van Inwagen’s example- are always such
that the antecedent is possible. They are popular because they let us
think about what would have happened if one of the open possibilities
in the past had become actual.
It is likely that our everyday abilities to modalise are restricted to
entertaining everyday possibilities and everyday counterfactual condi-
tionals. We may, nevertheless, easily enlarge the class of naturalisable
modal contents with a couple of simple modifications to the definitions
just introduced.
5.6.3 More Metaphysical Possibilities
We may, first relax in situ possibility, allowing that something is
an open future possibility if its probability is nonzero.
open possibility: It is an open possibility that p at some time t (♦top)
iff there are causal grounds for the fact that the probability of p
after t is nonzero.
Now we can backtrack the open future to any point in time -not just
a particular, contextually-relevant relevant one. If it is true at some time
that p is an open future possibility, p is metaphysically possible.
metaphysical possibility: It is metaphysically possible that p (♦p)
if ∃t♦top.
metaphysical possibility covers a very sizeable chunk of the
space of possibilities22: This table might break, I might have been born in
November, Napoleon might have won at Waterloo... And we can naturalise
contents involving such metaphysical possibilities because we can natu-
ralise their ingredients: first, we can naturalise contents involving future
contingents -I have devoted the first half of this chapter to give reasons
to think that this is so-; and, second, we can naturalise contents about
the past -I am simply assuming without any argument beyond the exis-
tence of the general content-naturalisation strategies developed in the
first chapters of this work, which do seem to apply straightforwardly
to past events23. We may also assume p↔ ¬♦¬p24. See figure 15.
The contention is not that metaphysical possibility holds a pri-
ori. It need not. For it to hold a priori, thoughts involving metaphysical
possibilities would need to be formed out of the concept of past times,
and of future contingents. But the producer of metaphysical-possibility
21 For a recent opinion otherwise see Sauchelli (forthcoming).
22 One may even go on to suggest that the space of metaphysical possibilities is the space
of open future possibilities at all times: even cases that are apparently not covered by
metaphysical possibility, in fact are: Bachelors cannot be married would, if so, mean
that there are no times in which the probability of a married bachelor is nonzero.
Nevertheless, it looks as if the truth-maker of this statement has nothing to do with
the branching time, and this may point to the fact that there are further metaphysical
possibilities that the ones covered here; this is why I’m refraining from writing “and only
if” in metaphysical possibility.
23 For the naturalisation of There was a fly here 30 seconds ago see 4.2.
24 A naturalisation of negation is needed in the long run if we are to use this equivalence,
and the naturalisation of negation is notoriously difficult -see the seldom-read last
chapters of Millikan (1984) for a teleosemantic first stab. I hope to pursue this issue in
future work.
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Figure 15: Branching Possible Worlds
thoughts, call it met, may have been selected for independently, or may
have been produced by a selected-for mechanism independently, of
those other concepts.
As regards the strict counterfactual conditional, we can maybe sug-
gest that it holds if at the latest past time at which the antecedent is
open, the indicative conditional linking antecedent and consequent.
The latest time is here playing the role that the class of closest possible
worlds where the antecedent is true plays in Lewis’s account: worlds
that are closest in time to ours are also closest in Lewis’s intuitive metric
of proximity2526.
This, again, makes it neccessary that the antecedent be an open
possibility at some time or other, and thus metaphysically possible. If
25 This is just a subset of the picture of counterfactuals that Lewis has in mind -one in
which we only recognise possible worlds that are trajectories of the actual world which
actualise different options of the open future at different times. See Lewis (1979). Other
contemporary accounts of counterfactuals, as far as I can see, overlap with my account in
this region. See, e. g., Kment (2006), Williamson (2008).
In particular, Williamson talks of
the widespread picture of the semantic evaluation of those conditionals
as “rolling back” history to shortly before the time of the antecedent,
modifying its course by stipulating the truth of the antecedent and then
rolling history forward again according to patterns of development as
close as possible to the normal ones to test the truth of the consequent.
Williamson (2008, p. 150)
The semantics of counterfactual conditionals sketched in this chapter explains why such
a method is reliable.
26 There is empirical data to sustain this! Variation of physical magnitudes over time seems
to follow power laws, sometimes very closely. See Bell (2008, p. 53) and references cited
therein.
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we wish to include the case of impossible antecedents, we may use a
definition by cases:













5.6.4 Modal Contents Naturalised
To sum up, we have now before us a general strategy for the natural-
isation of modal contents: the reference of ♦p is a complicated state
of affairs, a quantification over probabilities and times. None of the
components of this state of affairs are such that contents involving them
are suspicious of being impossible to naturalise. Contents involving the
past are clearly naturalisable along the lines of the etiosemantic theory
I have developed in the first chapters. Contents involving probabilities,
indeed, are more suspicious, but in this case we have seen a proposal in
some detail: the mechanisms we have called synergic associations allow
us to see how contents involving objective probabilities may be natu-
ralised. To be sure, much detail remains to be provided -importantly, a
naturalised account of contents involving quantification and negation
should be developed- but we now have more solid grounds to believe
the task to be possible.
There is a further, lesser problem to be recorded here. We have
seen how contents involving probabilities may be naturalised, and we
have expressed the hope that contents involving the past may also be
naturalised. So, at least the following route to the naturalisation of
modal contents is available: we entertain them by using our concepts
of the past and the probable. The problem with this route is that the
relation between these concepts and the concept of the possible does
not seem to be a priori, as it should be if we really thought about the
latter using our concepts of the former. There are two options here:
we may dig our heels, and defend that, indeed, the relation between
such concepts is a priori. This may be close to what Kripke and Forbes
believe. The other option is to defend that the relation between such
concepts is fully a posteriori, and then we need a story that explains the
existence of concepts that is enabled by the existence of the complicated
states of affairs that, we have said, are modal states of affairs. This story
either exists or it does not, and it may be epistemically impossible for
us to discover it. None of the options, therefore, is entirely out of the
question. It is very difficult to ascertain whether the relation between
our concepts is, or not, apriori, so it is difficult to know whether the
first option is open at all. It may be impossible to discover the facts that
have made an independent concept of the modal realm useful, so it
may be impossible to know whether the second option is an option at
all.
In the following section, to further clarify the view, I will draw a
number of consequences of the branching metaphysics of modality I
have quickly sketched in these last sections.
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5.7 some consequences
5.7.1 The Right Modal Logic
According to the semantics of modal operators sketched above, the
axiom
m: A→ A
is met. If there is no moment in time in which ¬A is an open possi-
bility, it is true in particular that the actual moment is such that ¬A is
not an open possibility -let alone true.
Also,
4: A→ A
holds. If there is no moment in time in which ¬A is an open possibil-
ity, then there is no moment in time in which it is an open possibility
that there is a moment in time in which ¬A is an open possibility. I am
assuming here -and everywhere- that the fact that a possibility becomes
actualised at any time can have no impact on which possibilities were
open at prior times. Otherwise put,
eviternity : The facts about which possibilities are open at any time
time are eviternal facts, with beginning but no end.
This is the most natural view of time, but by no means the only
available, and other options will maybe allow rejection of 4. I cannot
defend my choice here, but will simply record this as an additional
committment of the kind of naturalistic account of modality I am
developing here. Finally, the axiom characteristic of S5:
5: ♦A→ ♦A
Appears to be met as well, once we accept eviternity: if there is a
time at which A is an open possibility then there is no time at which
there is no time at which A is an open possibility.
According to this understanding of modality, then, we have the nice
result that the right modal logic is S5.
5.7.2 Determinism, Counternomic Possibilities
It should be noticed that according to the account of modality just
sketched, the following possibility does not exist, or at least is not
covered by the account: determinism is true -that is, roughly, for every
proposition of the type “at t, p” only it or its negation is an open possi-
bility at any time- but, nevertheless, things could have been otherwise.
That is: metaphysical possibilities are constituted, in the way described
above, by facts about the open future at different times.
It is likely that many scientists of the Enlightment were determinists,
and it is also likely that some of them believed that, even so, things
could have, in some sense, been otherwise. Perhaps the idea was that
the world’s timeline was non-branching but that, alongside, there were
other possible timelines. All of this is out of the question if the kind of
branching account of modality I have presented is correct.
There is another, perhaps more worrying counterintuitive conse-
quence of this picture of modality. Under the plausible assumption that
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natural laws are not fixed at any particular moment in time, they are
also metaphysically necessary. Although not the mainstream position,
we are used to necessitarianism about natural laws (e. g., Shoemaker
(1998)) but the branching conception of modality offers different reasons
than the usual Kripean considerations about the semantics of terms
such as “mass”. It also has a bonus (malus, really) counterintuitive
consequence in the vicinity: suppose there is an initial moment of time,
t0. All intrinsic facts about t0 -not involving later times, that is- are
necessary: the number and distribution of particles, their temperature,
etc. could not have been otherwise. I expect many readers to protest
at this point. They surely know some of these states of affairs to be
contingent? Against this retort I can only say the following: the reader’s
state of conviction might be illusory. And there is a powerful reason
to accept this kind of metaphysics of modality: it allows a substantial
naturalistic explanation of our epistemic access to modal facts. So, I
will ask the reader to bear with me and, at the end of this work, ponder
whether the weight of this (admittedly uncomfortable) result is or not
compensated by the advantages that accrue from accepting the theory.
5.7.3 Necessity of Origin
Finally, I would like to sketch a way in which this branching conception
of modality makes essentialist theses such as the necessity of origin
come out true.
There is a more optimistic way to read the uncomfortable result that
the state of the world at t0 is necessary: this would be a particular
instance of the widely accepted principle that some properties of the
origin of entities are essential of those very entities. Thus, the egg and
sperm that originated the zygote that in turn became me are essential
to me: I could not have originated from other egg and sperm. Also,
the material, and maybe the process of construction, which are used
in building a certain table are commonly regarded as essential to that
very table. In the same vein, maybe it is essential to our world being
what it is that it has the properties at t0 that it does.
I do not think much of this redescription of necessitarianism about t0.
Saying that its intrinsic properties at t0 are essential to our world seems
to convey the idea that whatever world it is that does not have said
properties at t0 is not our world. But no world fails to have the actual
world’s properties at t0. The fact that our world has these properties
essentially is, at best, trivially true. Anyway, this friendly attempt at
redescription points out to a possible strategy to defend essentialist
principles such as those described above.
The simplistic way to implement the strategy (more or less endorsed
by Forbes (1985), and criticised by Pérez-Otero (1997) and Mackie (1998)
on the counts I summarise below) would be as follows: first, assume
that time is forward-branching only, i. e., time only branches into the
future, but not into the past; second, assume that possible worlds that
contain a certain entity a must be identical to the actual world up until
the time in which a comes into existence. That is, every a-containing
possible world shares an initial segment with the actual world that
includes a’s coming into existence. If so, a’s origin is, indeed, necessary.
This defense of the necessity of origin comes at too high a price: it
makes every event happening before a’s time, up to and including its
origin, essential to a. So (to use an example by Pérez-Otero) if Kant
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sneezed n times during his lifetime, there is no possible world in which
he sneezed n+1 times and I exist. This is unacceptable.
One alternative to this is proposing, with Mackie, that the way to
think of de re possibilities is one
in terms of divergence into the future from ’the actual
course of events’, even if we are not very strict or precise
about the extent of match that is involved when we speak
of ‘the actual course of events’. Mackie (2006, p. 103)
The idea, I take it, is having a notion of the actual course of events that
counts, for the purposes of evaluating de re possibilities about me, as
the same courses of events those that only differ in irrelevant respects
such as the number of sneezes that afflicted Kant during his lifetime.
The problem, then, is to provide a principled way for grouping together
irrelevantly-different courses of events.
We should remember from earlier chapters that individuals are hosts
of causal mechanisms keeping together clusters of properties. Individ-
uals, like kinds, are things about which we can learn in some circum-
stances things that remain true in many other circumstances. It is this
feature that has enabled the existence of individual-involving contents
and, eventually, individual concepts.
Keeping this in mind, one natural suggestion regarding the individu-
ation principle for courses of events that underlies evaluation of de re
possibilities regarding an individual a may be one of causal indepen-
dence between the facts that differ among said courses of events and
the causal mechanisms that keep a together, so that:
causal isolation: A course of events is one in which a exists if and
only if
• it overlaps with the actual course of events up to and includ-
ing the time of a’s origin. Or
• the events in which it differs from the actual course of events
do not prevent the causal mechanisms constitutive of a from
existing.
It seems to be the case that the causal influence of Kant’s sneezing
just one extra time would have not been amplified, from the late 18th
century to the late 20th century and from Königsberg to Spain, in a way
sufficient to prevent the sperm and egg which originated me to form
the zygotic proto-me. This is why, according to causal isolation,
a world that differs from our own only in that Kant sneezed one more
time is a world in which I exist27. Of course, if, unexpectedly, Kant’s
sneezing has an impact in my parents’ sperm and egg then Kant’s
sneezing n times is necessary to my existence28.
There is a substantial question here of why count the union of sperm
and egg as the debut of the casual mechanisms constitutive of a. It is
very natural to say that a couple’s plan to have a baby is also a good
candidate to being part of these causal mechanisms. Why isn’t it?
27 What counts as the same egg and sperm in a world which diverged from our own before
they came into existence? Reapply causal isolation for said egg and said sperm.
28 An important class of events that meet causal isolation are those which are not in
a time-like relation. That is, if from the point in spacetime in which Kant sneezed it is
impossible to reach the point in spacetime in which I am conceived at the speed of light,
then Kant’s sneezing has no impact in my existing. But there are surely other, less clear
cases.
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The view that I have been advancing has it (simplifying a lot)
that individual-involving contents (and, eventually, singular concepts)
emerged because they were useful in keeping track of individuals. Indi-
viduals keep their properties across time so that what we learn upon
one encounter with them carries over to other encounters.
Now, even if there are some individual’s properties the recurrence of
which may be explained by a couple’s intention to have a baby -e. g.,
the baby’s family resemblance with their parents-, the truth is that the
kinds of mechanisms that are kicked off by the formation of the zygote
are much better at keeping some individual’s properties together -the
general looks, the sex, a general propensity to be melancholy, say- and
their efficiency does not wane until the death of the individual29. This
is maybe why our concepts of individual human beings are attuned
to the coming into being of the mechanisms that the existence of the
zygote facilitates. That they are so attuned or not is, on the other hand,
a purely empirical question.
All in all, the general explanation of our inclination to count a possible
course of events as one in which a exists is that whatever happens in
this alternative event should not affect what a is. And what a is, in
turn, is fixed by what individuals in general are; that is, by the kind of
structures that have enabled the selection for a producer of individual
concepts.
5.8 epistemic possibility
It is not totally unlikely that the reader has intuitively identified the
kinds of probabilities we have been talking about with creedences. In
the three frogs example, there is a natural way to describe Empedocles
situation which is: for all Empedocles knows, that fly (the fly approaching)
has a 30% change of being a goodfly, and this is the condition that
he is adapting his behaviour to. This is so even if the fly approaching
is a badfly (and let us assume that if something is a badfly then it
is metaphysically impossible for it to be a goodfly.) Thus, the state
formed by the synergic association of Empedocles’s concepts fly and
goodfly30 would be no less and no more than Empedocles’s placing a
30% creedence on each fly being a goodfly.
This way of looking at matters is incorrect. For all we have said, Empe-
docles may only have: a mechanism whose positives have the content
There is a fly around (the Fly-mechanism); a mechanism whose positives
have the content There is a goodfly around (the Goodfly-mechanism);
and the synergic association between them that, I have argued, has the
content There is a causally-grounded relation between flies and goodflies such
that P (Goodfly|Fly) = 0, 3. Empedocles has no state whose content
involves an individual fly; no state with the content That fly is a goodfly
or Fido is a goodfly. He is, then, unable to predicate of any individual fly
that it might, or might not, be a goodfly. The only relation he represents
is one among natural kinds -flyhood and goodflyhood- and this is a
bona fide probabilistic relation, not merely an epistemic one: flies do have
29 Or maybe shortly after; this is maybe why, although there seems to be a clear point in
which the individual starts to exist, the point at which it ceases to exist is less clear.
30 Strictly speaking, Empedocles does not have these concepts. Only unarticulated thoughts
with the content There is a fly around and There is a goodfly around. Talk of concepts is more
natural, and we already know how to account for synergic connections at this level, so
I’m helping myself to the loose talk.
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a 30% chance of being goodflies, even if for each individual fly either it
is a goodfly or it is not.
It is true that the way in which we have rendered the content of the
positives of Empedocles’s Fly-mechanism (There is a fly around) makes
an epistemic reading almost irresistible: a fly approaches and the There
is a fly around state lights up in Empedocles’s brain. Given that he has a
standing belief with the content Flies have a 30% chance of being goodflies,
isn’t he jumping to the conclusion that the fly approaching has a 30%
chance of being a goodfly? Isn’t that what his investing in mg amounts
to?
It has happened in earlier chapters: the natural rendering of the
content of Empedocles’s states is somewhat misleading. Quine-style
alternative renderings such as “Lo! More fly!” do not lead us to this
mistake: Empedocles is detecting “more fly” and, seen as an uncount-
able, every “portion of fly” has the same probabilistic relation with
goodflyhood. Empedocles’s states encode genuine knowledge about
the world -the evolutive history of the states playing the justificatory
role. It is simply not knowledge about individual flies, but about the
relation between flyhood and goodflyhood.
5.8.1 The emergence of epistemic modality.
In chapter 3, I have developed the materials to account for some
individual-involving contentful states, and later, in chapter 4 I have
provided an interesting set of sufficient conditions for the presence of
concepts of individuals. If we endow Empedocles with the ability to
entertain individual-involving thoughts, we may start to see states with
epistemic-modal content.
Suppose now that Empedocles is able to entertain the thought That
fly is around whenever he detects a fly around him. More should be
said, of course, to motivate just how and just why would Empedocles
go about doing this, but I hope that, remembering the discussion in
chapters 3 and 4, we can grant the point for the sake of discussion.
It may be turn out useful to implement a top-down process of con-
verting predications of possibility at the kind level into predications of
posibility at the individual level: whenever the agent finds out that Fs
might be Gs, it effects a synergic association between every individual
concept of an F, and the concept of G.
We may want to say that this more sophisticated version of Empe-
docles is entertaining thoughts along the lines of That fly might be a
goodfly. For instance, we may not want to say that Empedocles is wrong
in thinking this, even if it is metaphysically impossible that a badfly
had been a goodfly, and if “that fly” is a badfly. It should be noted that
That fly might be a goodfly is simply an intuitively appealing content-
attribution for one of Empedocles’s mental states, but not a content
attribution that follows the recipes I have been defending throughout
this work. Those recipes build contents out of the explanations of the
existence of the contentful state and, in this case, the only explanations
available are those subserving contents attributions of probabilistic
relations among the fly and goodfly kinds, and of the presence of an
individual fly. There are no extra causally-grounded correlations in the
external world to be involved in the content of this mental state. And
the causal grounds that are available, as we have seen, only warrant the
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content attributions: “P (goodfly|fly) = x” on the one hand, and That
fly is around on the other.
That is, we may advance the hypothesis that the content we would
express as That fly might be a goodfly with an epistemic might is the same
content as P (goodfly|fly) = x and that fly is around.
If we are in a daring mood, we may take these considerations as
evidence for an analogous paraphrasis of our full-blown epistemic-
modal talk:
epistemic possibility: It is permissible for S to find Fa epistemi-
cally possible if31 S (permissibly) believes that
1. P (F|G) = x for a relevant property G and a sufficiently high
x, and
2. Ga
Where the “sufficiently” and the “relevant” in 1 depend on the
context of evaluation. Thus, for instance, This table might be Swedish,
with an epistemic might, means that the table belongs in a kind (e
.g., smart-looking, clear-wood tables) such that the probability of such
tables being Swedish is high enough in the context of utterance -maybe
a casual conversation among friends, where the issue is not really
critical for anybody-. And This might be the winning lottery-ticket means
that the ticket belongs in a kind (e. g., valid lottery tickets) such that
the probability of such tickets winning is high enough in the context of
evaluation -different values will be operative in a conversation between
two burglars that have broken into the house of a lottery-winner, and
in a TV ad promoting a lottery. I cannot go into a full discussion of
epistemic modals here, and simply advance these considerations as
directions for future work.
5.9 humeanism about probabilities
I want to put an end to this chapter considering the following broadly
Humean objection:
For every member of Empedocles’s family line, the exis-
tence of the synergic association of its m and preparation
mechanisms may be explained by appealing only to the
statistical frequency of goodflies in the fly population in the
past. No mention of objective probabilities is needed. The
appeal to them does no real work. With suitable modifica-
tion of your content-attributing recipes we could get to an
attribution along the lines of In the past, the proportion of flies
that were goodflies was thus and so. This is ontologically more
circunspect, and is therefore to be preferred.
Let me for a moment suppose that this, more circunspect content
attribution is to be preferred. The first thing to say is that we should
really insist in the need to examine the theory that yields it. Maybe
that theory gives all sorts of counterintuitive content-attributions; then
again, maybe it gives better and more elegant results that the theory
I’m advocating for. The point is, we don’t know, and theories should be
evaluated as wholes. It is in general too easy a criticism to point at a
single counterintuitive result, without providing arguments to the effect
31 Not “... and only if”, of course.
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that the result in question could be avoided without loosing overall
plausibility at other corners of the theoretical building.
Having said that, we cannot dispense with objective probabilities,
even if we wished to do so. Of course, in a sense, the existence of
Empedocles’s synergic-association state is explained by the past history
of statistical frequencies between flies and goodflies. Even so, in order
to give a common explanation for the survival of preparation in Empe-
docles’s family line, you need to get to the level at which homeostasis
takes place. What the Humean is not taking in consideration is the need
for having all (or at least most*) of Empedocles’s family members inter-
twined in the same explanation with the probabilistic relation between
fly and goodfly. This you can’t get just by appealing to the statistical
frequencies in the past of each member; that each member happens to
stumble upon the same frequencies would be left unexplained. This
would be a case of sheer luck, giving rise to no contentful state -or so I
argued in chapters 1 and 2.
So, at least this can be said: if the Humean is right, and frequencies
must be left unexplained, then Empedocles doesn’t have contentful
states that refer to probabilities after all -nor do they refer to statistical
frequencies or any cognate thereof.
6M O D A L E P I S T E M O L O G Y
This final chapter is dedicated to advancing my final proposal for the
naturalisation of modal epistemology. In many respects, the account to
follow simply falls out from what I have said in the chapters leading to
this point. The one new idea introduced in this chapter is a proposal
for a solution to the Generality Problem in reliabilism (6.1.1). From this
solution, a particular brand of reliabilism I shall call ecological reliabilism
emerges. I will suggest that modal epistemology may be simply a
special case in ecological reliabilism (6.2).
At this point we may ask, do we really need a reliabilist modal
epistemology, even if such a thing is workable? There has been an
enormous amount of high-quality work in neo-rationalist accounts of
modal epistemology; what is the problem with that? In 6.2.1 I will
elaborate on one problem with conceivabilism, a prominent example
of neo-rationalist modal epistemology: conceivabilists have devoted
their efforts at dispelling or otherwise avoiding several famous coun-
terexamples to the rationalist main insight -in one version at least- that
conceivability entails possibility. The account we are left with, once
the counterexamples are warded off, is to be accepted simply on the
grounds of its lack of counterexamples. I will defend that this is unsat-
isfactory, at least in the sense that any other account which provides
a more substantial explanation of the link between conceivability and
possibility is to be preferred. I will, then, suggest that the package deal
provided by etiosemantics and ecological reliabilism, together with
the branching conception of modality, may provide such a substantial
explanation of our modalising powers. It is, therefore, to be preferred.
6.1 content and epistemology
In accounts of the kind I have been advocating, there is a quite straight-
forward relation between the conditions for a state to have the content
it does and some conditions which have been defended as underlying
epistemic properties such as Being justified, or Constituting knowledge.
Take, again, the simplest content-attributing conditions I discussed in
chapter 1 for a content of the type There is an F around. I defended
that the state consisting of a certain mental mechanism m’s being on
has that content if m was selected for indicating any of a number of
properties, and this selection was enabled by the fact that all or many
of these properties belong in a Homeostatic Property Cluster: a cluster
of properties such that there are causal grounds for the fact that they
co-recur frequently together. As a useful abbreviation, let me introduce
the notion of sufficiently reliable:
sufficiently reliable: A state S is a sufficiently reliable indicator
of the existence of fact F according to threshold value T if and
only if: α (S, F) > T .
Where α (S, F) is the correlation coefficient between S (say, m’s being
on) obtaining and F obtaining1. The relevant probability space (i. e.,
1 More strictly, the correlation between their indicator random variables.
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which possible or actual situations should be taken into account when
calculating the probabilities used to calculate α (S, F)) depends on the
context -cf. Williamson (2000, p. 84).
We can now note that m’s being on is a sufficiently reliable indicator
of the fact that F is around, where the relevant probability space is
fixed by the context in which the homeostatic mechanism that sustains
F-hood is operative -cf. 1.4.5 for details. That is, a certain property (Being
a black speck, say) causes m to go on, and instantiations of this property,
in turn, covary positively with the presence of F-hood, in a certain
spatio-temporal context, which is the one that fixes α (S, F) -say, ponds
where frogs endowed with m have normally lived, and which they
have shared with flies. Here, the threshold value T is, simply, the value
afforded by the causally-grounded correlation between instantiaton of
Being a black speck and the presence of flies. This value has helped m
thrive and get fixated in the frog population. Maybe a lower T would
have been just as good for selection, but this is irrelevant.
Following the terminology introduced in chapter 3, we may say that
m follows the Procedure: Fire now if a black speck is around now2. Also
remember from 3.6 that every Procedure comes with an ecologically-
fixed context. Now, the following paraphrases of epistemic idioms are
not totally implausible:
• m’s going on is justified only if m has followed its Procedure in
its ecologically-fixed context -see 3.6 for more on these notions.
Derivatively, we may say that m’s possessor is justified in judging
that an F is around in this situation.
• m’s going on constitutes knowledge if the HPC that explains m’s
reliability in the ecologically-fixed context is responsible both of
m’s going on and of F being around. Derivatively, we may say that
m’s possessor knows that an F is around in this situation.
Where an HPC being responsible of m’s going on involves the HPC
occupying the same position in the causal network leading to m’s going
on that it has occupied in a sufficient number of occasions of causing m
to go on in the past. On the other hand, an HPC being responsible of F
being around may simply involve partly constituting the fact that F is
around. So, the HPC in question constitutes flyhood, which is why it is,
in this latter sense, responsible of the presence of a fly around. When a
fly causes m to go on in the usual way -that is, by the instantiation of
Being a black speck that belongs in the cluster of the HPC fly causing m to
go on-, this mental state constitutes knowledge that a fly is around. If,
on occasion, a random black speck causes m to go on in the ecologically-
fixed context, m’s being on is justified but does not constitute knowledge.
If, furthermore, a fly is around -but it is, say, an albino fly and has not
interacted with m-, m’s being on is justified, true but does not constitute
knowledge.
For another example, consider the American lobster I discussed
in 3.9. A lobster Li has a mechanism mij whose positives have the
2 We may want to make the assumption that m’s going on corresponds, at the “personal”
level, with m’s possessor’s (proto-)judging that an F is around -I said something in
favour of this assumption in 3.1.2-, but we should be careful: this does not mean that m’s
following the Procedure above corresponds to m’s possessor following the personal-level
Procedure Judge that a fly is around whenever a black speck is around. The fact that Maurice is
caused to judge that a fly is around by a black speck being around does not mean that
he can entertain that Procedure -which, I take it, is need for following it at the personal
level. He may be unable to entertain contents involving black specks, for example.
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content Lobster Lj is around. mij follows the Procedure Go on when
chemical compound UCSj is in the water. This Procedure comes with an
ecologically-fixed context which includes part of the Atlantic coast of
North America -and which does not include tanks of salt water in
ethology departments. According to the paraphrases above, when mij
goes on in the presence of chemical compound UCSj somewhere in the
coast of Maine it does so justifiedly. If, moreover, it was lobster Lj that
released UCSj, it constitutes knowledge.
6.1.1 Ecological Reliabilism
These paraphrases, which I will be presently stating in a somewhat
more formal fashion, may help negotiate several difficulties with other
broadly reliabilist proposals. Take one popular theory about justification
in contemporary epistemology: process reliabilism (first presented in
Goldman (1976/2000), see also Goldman (1986) and Goldman (2008)).
A simplified version of the main thesis of process reliabilism is:
rj: A belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a process that
reliably leads to true beliefs. Conee and Feldman (1998, p. 1)
Many interesting objections have been advanced against process
reliabilism. I will only take up one here, arguably the most influential:
the Generality Problem (Conee and Feldman (1998)).
The objector asks us to notice that reliability is a property of process
types. A process token either fails or succeeds in producing a true belief,
but it is not reliable in any clear sense. Now, any process token belongs
to innumerable process types. Take, for example, the case of Smith
forming the belief that there is a maple tree nearby on the basis of a
perception of the tree in question through a (solid, but transparent)
window. This seems a clear case of justified belief, but it is unclear
which is the process whose reliability supports this intuitive conclusion:
The token event sequence in our example of seeing the
maple tree is an instance of the following types, among
others: visually initiated belief-forming process, process of a
retinal image of such-and-such specific characteristics lead-
ing to a belief that there is a maple tree nearby, process
of relying on a leaf shape to form a tree-classifying judg-
ment, perceptual process of classifying by species a tree
located behind a solid obstruction, etc. The number of types
is unlimited. Conee and Feldman (1998, p. 2)
And some of these process types will be extremely reliable -e. g., relying
on leaf shapes-, and some others very unreliable -e. g., relying on
perceptions from behind a solid obstruction, which more often than
not will be opaque. Without a principled way to choose the relevant
process type, process reliabilism is not an assessable theory. Conee and
Feldman consider proposals as regards which is the way to choose
among competing type-candidates which come from three different
approaches:
• Proposals based in common sense. The relevant process type should
be the one the common sense dictates. This seems to leave out, in
the example above, the type perceptions from behind a solid obstruc-
tion, which common sense quite clearly does not endorse. But,
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Conee and Feldman retort, the are many other candidates in the
example that common sense is confortable with: visual percep-
tion, tree-identifying process, etc. Process indeterminacy follows.
I should add that an undischarged appeal to common sense, even
if it were not to suffer from the mentioned shortcomings, would
also be suspicious for my purposes: we are in the business of
sketching a naturalistic epistemology, and the clearly intentional
workings of common sense are not a respectable basic ingredient
in such an account.
• Proposals based in science. There are several:
– The relevant type for any belief forming process token is the
natural kind to which it belongs. Conee and Feldman (1998,
p. 10)
But there are many natural kinds a process may belong to.
– The relevant type for any process token is the natural psy-
chological kind corresponding to the function that is actually
operative in the formation of the belief. Conee and Feldman
(1998, p. 11)
That is, the process that is psychologically real. But there are many
processes that are psychologically real in the formation of a belief
that p. In the example above, the process that goes from the very
leaf shape Smith perceives to his belief that there is a maple tree;
the process that take any number of perceptions of similar shapes
and issues a belief that there is a maple tree nearby, etc. All of
them are active in the case in question.
– The relevant type for any belief forming process token t is the
natural kind that includes all and only those tokens sharing
with t all the same causally contributory features from the
input experience to the resulting belief. Conee and Feldman
(1998, p. 14)
This is too restrictive; beliefs are only considered of the same type
if they share all causal antecedents, but we obviously type beliefs
more broadly. Another issue one may rise is, how should we type
causal antecedents themselves?
– The relevant type for any belief-forming process token t is
the psychological kind that is part of the best psychologi-
cal explanation of the belief that results from t. Conee and
Feldman (1998, p. 17)
But we should resist the unwarranted assumption that there is
one best psychological explanation of our beliefs.
• Finally, one may suggest that we do not need a systematic solution
to the Generality Problem. For example, one may suggest that
it is contextual factors that fix which process is relevant for the
attribution in question. But it does not seem to be true that, for
most situations in which a belief is formed, there are contextually
salient processes. For example, in the perception of the maple tree
above, it is not true that there is one, and only one, salient process
for the formation of the belief that there is a maple tree nearby.
Conee and Feldmand, therefore, conclude that every proposal fails, and
thus, that process reliabilism fails.
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I would like to argue that, if what I’ve said so far in this dissertation
is approximately right, Conee and Feldman have overlooked a fourth
way of singling out the relevant process type. According to this fourth
way, the methodology to come up with the right process type that
has produced the token belief b with the content that p would rely on
the processes that endow b with the content it has. We may suggest the
following heuristics for finding out the relevant process in the formation
of a belief b:
1. Ascertain which are the causal-historical properties in virtue of
which b counts as having the content that p.
That is, search through the battery of content-attributing recipes I
have been developing throughout the work, and find out which
one applies to the belief in question. Let us suppose, for example,
that a cue S has caused a belief-producing system bel to produce
b. bel is able to produce perceptually-based beliefs, which may
suppose -simplifying a lot; see chapter 4 for a fuller story- that it
belongs in a higher-order reproductively-established family the
selection of which has been made possible by the existence of
HPC connecting cues such as S correlate with states of affairs such
as p. In a realistic setting, the workings of bel will be fantastically
complex, and the cue may involve an open-ended amount of
retinal shadows.
2. The content-determination will involve a history of selection for
the belief in question or, much more likely, a history of selection
for bel, or bel’s producer. The selection in question, if it’s to
give rise to a contentful state in its product (or product’s product,
or. . . ) must have been enabled by an higher order HPC -all of this
is covered in detail in earlier chapters.
Now, if there are n members in the chain of producers (we may
assign number 1 to the selected-for mechanism, number n to the
contentful state we are interested in) there are n-1 Procedures,
one for each link, which the selection for 1 fixes3. Each of these
Procedures must be sufficiently reliable in a way that adds up to
the fitness-contributing properties of the 1st link. All Procedures
have an ecologically-fixed context within which they are fitness-
contributing. This context is defined, for each Procedure i, by the
ith level of the HPC.
3. Finally, the process relevant to the justification of b is the concate-
nation of all the n-1 Procedures, together with their ecologically-
fixed context. In most cases, a sizeable number of Procedures will
be innate, or fixed early in the life of the individual, and only the
last few will matter to the justification of the belief. But, strictly,
all of them are relevant.
The most general account of justification and knowledge would, there-
fore, be as follows4:
justification: A belief b with the content that p is justified if and
only if
3 See the discussion of a concrete example of the etiosemantic treatment of what I’ve called
ephemeral states -contentful yet not selected-for- in 3.9.
4 A couple of examples of justification and knowledge according to this most general
account were already provided at the beginning of this section. Democritus was featured
in one, American lobsters in the other.
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Figure 16: A Concatenation of Procedures and Ecologically-Fixed Contexts.
Each mechanism is produced by the mechanism in the left, the chain
bottoming out in the selected-for mechanism 1. The rightmost box
stands for a state, not a mechanism: the belief B that p.
Each mechanism is caused by a Cue to produce the item in its
right, following a Procedure. The fact that Cues and Procedures
that are fitness-contributing go together is explained by a set of
nested causal grounds (the Nth-order HPC I cite in the main text)
which are represented by the dotted-line boxes. E. g., Cue 1 goes
together with the fact that Procedure 1 is fitness-contributing -which,
in turn, implies the fact that [Cue 2 and the fact that Procedure 2 is
fitness-contributing go together, which in turn...].
1. b’s content attribution that p is the result of a chain of n
producers, of which the 1st is selected-for.
2. The selection for 1 has been enabled by the existence of an
nth order HPC.
3. This selective history, and the nth order HPC, fix a concate-
nation of Procedures for each link in the chain, together
with an ecologically-fixed context for the application of each
Procedure. Finally,
4. b has been produced according to the n Procedures, such
that each was in its ecologically-fixed context (see figure 16).
Derivatively, we may say that b’s possessor is justified in believing
that p in this situation.
We may now provide a general version of sufficient reliability:
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sufficiently reliable - general : The process P that gave rise
to belief B is sufficiently reliable according to threshold value T if
and only if: α (S, F) > T . Where S is the type Beliefs produced by
bel and F is the content of those beliefs.
The process consisting of all the concatenated Procedures that give
rise to b is sufficiently reliable in its ecologically-fixed context, with
a T fixed by the entirely unpredictable nature of the nth order HPC
that b and its chain of producers are tapping into. As I envisage these
structures, it may be that each different <Cue, Procedure> pair at each
different level i gives access to a different HPC at the level i-1. Each of
which may enable a higher or lower reliability. These are the values of
sufficient reliability. They are what they are, regardless of our ability to
discover them. So, if I’m right, Goldman gets it wrong when he writes
that
[j]ustification conferring processes are ones with a high
truth-ratio. (Just how high is vague, like the concept of
justification itself). Goldman (2008)
The degree of reliability of justification-conferring processes is not
vague, or not as vague as Goldman assumes. It is simply very well
concealed.
We may now, provide the general paraphrasis of knowledge talk
according to this ecological variety of reliabilism:
knowledge: A belief b with the content that p constitutes knowledge
if and only if the nth order HPC that explains the sufficient
reliability of the concatenation of Procedures in their ecologically-
fixed context is responsible both of the existence of b and of the
fact that p. Derivatively, we may say that b’s possessor knows that
p in this situation.
The idea, then, is that the principled way to choose the process whose
reliability counts in order to ascertain the status of a belief as justified
stems from the process in virtue of which a mental state is endowed with the
content it has. The very nature of content-conferring processes makes
them (sufficiently) reliable, and this status is what our epistemic talk
tracks: knowledge happens when all goes well, as a result of following
the right Procedure in the right context; justification happens when all
Procedures are followed, in their right context.
It should be noted that what can be known according to this account
far outstrips what has been useful to us or our ancestors. What defines
the ecologically-fixed context for each level is the HPC that keeps
together a certain type of Cue with the fact that a certain type of
Procedure is fitness-conducive -in the simplest cases; see 3.6. The HPC
in question may stretch way beyond the instances that have been, will
be or may be used by humans and their ancestors. For example, there
is an HPC that connects certain colourful shapes with the presence
of orchids. It is the HPC orchid itself, which has instantiations of such
properties as Being thus-and-so a colourful shape in the Cluster. Where and
when is such an HPC instantiated is independent of human cogniser
interested in orchids. Such an HPC may well extend the ecologically-
fixed context of a process that takes in such shapes as Cue and issues a
Procedure that creates a mental state with the content There is an orchid
around to areas that are outside the light cone of every human, past,
186 modal epistemology
present or future. Such will be the case, e. g., if orchids outlive humans
on Earth5.
This is how ecological reliabilism deals with the three criteria that
Conee and Feldman lay out for a satisfactory solution to the generality
problem:
1. It must be principled, not concocted ad-hoc for each belief : my proposal
is that, for every belief token, the relevant process is the process
in virtue of which a mental state is endowed with the content it
has. This is an homogenous, principled condition.
2. It must make defensible epistemic classifications. That is, it must yield in-
tuitive predictions as regards what is or is not justified: this is difficult
to assess in real, human cases because we have very incomplete in-
formation about the processes leading to a contentful state. More
transparent process attributions, such as “perception” or “recog-
nition of tree-type from leaf-shape” fare better in this count but
fail in responding to the other criteria. In favour of the ecological
reliabilist proposal we may say two things: first, it might well turn
out -I, for one, believe that it would- that the justification and
knowledge predictions achieved by a completed ecological relia-
bilist theory overlapped significantly with our intuitions. Second,
we have seen in the simple cases of Democritus and American
lobsters above that they, indeed, seem to correspond with our
intuitions.
3. It must remain true to the spirit of the reliabilist approach. That is, it is
the reliability of the process in question that settles the epistemic status
under scrutiny: Ecological reliabilism is extensionally adequate, in
that the relevant processes will always be sufficiently reliable in
the sense above. It may be suggested that reliability is not in the
essence of epistemic notions according to this account, but rather
that content-endowing Procedures are. Even so, the proposal at
hand explains why justificatory processes are reliable. This is, I
think, enough to vindicate Goldman’s seminal insight.
6.1.2 When Things Go Wrong
To help clarify the theory, let me show how this ecological reliabilism
accounts for epistemic error. False beliefs are easy: the content of beliefs
are fixed in ways which are independent of how the world is in many
respects -the immense majority of beliefs have contents that involve
these respects. They will, frequently, be false, even if they have been
5 By the same token, we are perfectly able to entertain contents with truth-makers that
lie outside our light cone. This is, I believe, the right kind of answer to “useless content”
objections to teleosemantics such as Peacocke (1992, p. 132f). Although, of course, the an-
swer comes from the part of etiosemantics that parts company from strict teleosemantics:
the content of a concept or an expression depends primarily on the HPC that has enabled
its existence; not on, say, the usefulness in principle for a consumer system. Some HPCs
do, while it may be that no usefulness-in-principle does, extend their reach outside the
light cone of every sentient being.
The “useless content” objection is probably more powerful against mainstream teleose-
mantics. For a rejoinder, see Millikan (2006). In this paper Millikan defends that it is
compositionality -in the very broad sense she understands this notion- that is going to
account for representations of facts outside our light cone. I have expressed my doubts
about Millikan’s account of compositionality in chapter 4.
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formed following the right concatenation of Procedures in the right
contexts and are, thus, justified6.
As regards unjustified true beliefs: there may be beliefs formed by a
producer that follows the right Procedure but outside its ecologically-
fixed context7. This fails to meet justification. Illusions are a clear
example: a belief that a red tie is orange, formed after seeing it under
strange illumination is probably formed following the right Procedure,
in the wrong context. Unjustified beliefs may be true, if the cogniser is
lucky enough.
Finally, justified true belief that does not constitute knowledge. Take
a typical Gettier-template: I believe -justifiably, but falsely- that a is the
only F; I also believe -justifiably-, that a is G. I thus go on to form the
belief that the only F is G. As it happens, b is the only F and it is G. My
belief that the only F is G is true and justified, but does not constitute
knowledge.
One way to account for this possibility is as follows. Let us suppose
that the following Procedure for production of beliefs is in place:
From beliefs of the form:
• a is the only F
• a is G
For any a, F and G, if conditions C obtain, form the belief
• The only F is G
The conditions C are there to prevent this process from overflowing
the system with innumerable useless beliefs. Only those relevant to
whatever projects the cogniser has must be formed8.
It may be that some of our belief producers follow this Procedure,
which is obviously truth-conducive. It relies on the fact that if both
premises are true, the conclusion will be, and on the fact that most
beliefs are true. We may also assume that the two premises have been
obtained through generally sound Procedures -involving testimony,
maybe. There is no reason to think that all of these Procedures are
working outside their ecologically-fixed context -or we may assume so
for the purposes of the argument. So the Gettier belief is justified.
But knowledge is not met: the causal grounds that explain the
sufficient reliability of substitution are not responsible of the truth
of the Gettier belief in question. As I have said, this process relies,
among others, on the fact that both premises are normally true -in a
sufficient number of cases-, and this is not met in our example. Thus,
the Gettier belief does not constitute knowledge.
6.2 knowing modal contents
In chapter 5 (together with the rest of chapters, actually) I have sketched
a strategy to naturalise modal contents. This strategy involved, first, a
naturalisation of probability-involving contents and, second, an identi-
fication of an important subset of modal facts with certain quantified
6 On the other hand, there are beliefs such as There are, or have been, HPCs. If my account is
correct, this belief is true in every world in which it is entertained by someone.
7 In my theory, beliefs that are simply put there by a neurosurgeon, or are constituted
by a serendipitous brain tumour, are impossible. They lack the right history and, thus,
cannot have content. Most flavours of Causal Role Semantics, e. g., would yield a different
prediction.
8 Informatively stating C involves solving the frame problem, of course.
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facts about probabilities. Let me stress again that this identification
need not be a priori for human cognisers.
The general knowledge and justification recipes just provided may
be straightforwardly applied to these contents. A judgement j that ♦p
will have the content it has in virtue of the historical properties of the
belief: the function of the concatenation of producers, starting from the
selected-for first link and resulting in j, together with the nth order HPC
that has enabled this function -and, remember: no HPC, no content.
This concatenation of producers comes together with a concatenation
of Procedures, and a ecologically-fixed context of application. Modal
judgements made according to the concatenation of Procedures in the
right contexts are justified. All other judgements are not. If the nth
order HPC is responsible of the existence of j and of the fact that ♦p,
the judgement constitutes knowledge. As simple as that.
It is the package deal consisting of etiosemantic theory of content,
branching conception of modality and ecological reliabilism that I am
proposing as the right naturalistic position in modal epistemology. At
the very least they provide a substantial answer to the “dubiously
intelligible faculty” worry put forward (to provide yet another example)
in this quote:
Not only are we aware of no bodily mechanism attuned to
reality’s modal aspects, it is unclear how such a mechanism
could work even in principle. Yablo (1993, p. 3f)
By no means am I proposing that the mechanisms I have described
throughout this work are to be found in actual human brains. But I do
claim I have given some detail about how a natural mechanism attuned
to the modal aspects of reality could work in principle.
And this bridging of the gap between our judgements and the modal
realm has not come at the expense of “some form of mind-dependence
anti-realism about modality” Jenkins (n.d.)9. On the contrary, the con-
ception of modality I am assuming is fully objective, and all the usual
marks of realism are preserved: widespread error in our modal judge-
ments and unknowable truths, for example, are perfectly possible.
Now that we have a summary of the view on modal epistemology
that I wish to recommend which is clear enough to be assessed, even
if obviously sketchy at many places, I wish to close this chapter by
comparing it to another prominent approach: conceivabilism.
6.2.1 Conceivabilism
Many philosophers have assumed that our access to modal facts is me-
diated by our faculty of conceiving. There has been much philosophical
elucidation of what it is that we mean by conceiving, with the starting
point usually taken to be provided by the, altogether very natural and
initially plausible, appeals to conceivability made popular by Modern
philosophers. To quote from two most prominent examples, Descartes
stated that God
can bring about everything that I clearly and distinctly
recognize as possible. Descartes (1641/1988, Fourth Replies,
2:154)
9 I should note that Jenkins does not defend mind-dependence about the mental.
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That is, everything I (clearly and distinctly) recognize as possible is
possible. Hume also famously contended that
Whatever can be conceiv’d by a clear and distinct idea nec-
essarily implies the possibility of existence. Hume (1740/1978,
43)
According to these two philosophers, we have an ability to conceive, the
exercising of which provides insight on the modal status of propositions
-i. e., whether they are necessary, contingent, possible or impossible.
There is indeed an intuitive appeal to the idea that we have some fac-
ulty that, without recourse to experience, allows us to scrutinise modal
properties. There are, nevertheless, two problems in this connection.
One is to clarify what exactly is this ability to conceive we are talking
about here. The other is to chart the scope of this purported ability:
Which possibilities and necessities can we know through our conceiv-
ings? I will now briefly discuss two alternative proposals regarding the
nature of our conceivings, and the scope of the access to modal facts
that they allow. This will be useful for me to explain what I find lacking
in conceivabilist modal epistemologies, and also to discuss in which
respects the account I am developing respects conceivabilist intuitions
without incurring in the same kind of problems.
Yablo’s Conceivabilism
One of the best worked-out proposals about the nature of conceiving
is provided in Yablo (1993). Yablo understands conceving as being a
special kind of imagining, such that:
p is conceivable for me if I can imagine a world that I take
to verify p. Yablo (1993, p. 29)
That is: if I can imagine a situation of which I truly believe that p
-Yablo (1993, p. 26). Finding something conceivable must be sharply
distinguished from finding it possible-for-all-we-know. For example,
suppose we get to know somehow that every mathematical statement
is, if true, necessarily true and, if false, necessarily so. If we go on to
consider Goldbach’s Conjecture -the as yet unproven conjecture that
every even number greater than 2 may be expressed as the sum of two
primes-, do we deem it conceivable? According to Yablo, we do not. We
simply remain undecided as regards its status from the point of view
of conceivability:
No thought experiment that I, at any rate, can perform
gives me the representational appearance of the conjecture
as possible or as impossible, or the slightest temptation to
believe anything about its modal character. Yablo (1993, p.
10)
There is an appearance otherwise: we are able to imagine a situation
in which newspapers and scientific journals publish the news that a
certain bright mathematician has discovered a proof of the Conjecture.
But this appearance is misleading; for a world to verify this imagining
it is enough that it is a world in which the false news of the existence of
a proof of the Conjecture are published in newspapers and journals.
One may retort, what about imagining a world in which the Goldbach
Conjecture is proved, tout court? A world which verifies that imagining
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needs to be a world in which the Goldbach Conjecture is true. And
one cannot object to the possibility of such an imagining on the basis
that there is no imagery associated to the Goldbach Conjecture being
true. There is no imaginery that distinguishes an imagining of Michael
Jackson climbing a flight of stairs from an imagining of a perfect double
of Michael’s climbing a flight of stairs. But, surely, we can imagine the
latter without imagining the former scenario, or vice versa. Moreover,
Yablo is not defending the mainstream option here: many conceivabilists
believe that we do find both the Goldbach Conjecture and its negation,
conceivable10. So why (or better: how) does Yablo go about denying
that we find the Goldbach Conjecture conceivable?
Yablo seems to defend that conceivings justify modal judgements
because they are reliable in predicting possibilities. That is, whenever
we advance a positive conceivability judgement, more often than not
the content we judge is possible. It is this reliability that underwrites
the justification-conferring property of conceivings. So, we need to
be relying on some kind of information about the proposition such
that, when that information is present, we shy away from issuing a
conceivability verdict.
Now, that we refrain to claim conceivability when confronted with a
situation we recognise to be impossible is clear enough: our recognising
p to be impossible does not seem to be separable from our inability to
imagine a world of which p. So here we have a number of impossibilities
which, as the reliability claim needs, do not go together with a positive
conceivability verdict. So far, so good.
But, if conceivings are to be reliable, Yablo also needs it to be true
that non-recognised impossibilities are such that, more often than not,
we do not deem them conceivable. Otherwise, just from the fact that
we don’t find most recognised impossibilities conceivable, it would not
follow that we don’t find most impossibilities (simpliciter) conceivable:
it may turn out that most impossibilities are of the non-recognised
variety.
According to Yablo, luckily, it is also true that we do not deem
most non-recognised impossibilities conceivable. Take any prominent
examples of non-recognised impossibilities. For example, we do not
recognise the Goldbach Conjecture to be impossible; nor its negation to
be impossible. But we remain undecided as regards their conceivability:
we are not willing to risk a judgement in which we place a creedence
of, maybe, about 50%11 -if we know, as we should, that mathematical
statements are necessary if true and impossible if false. Or, if we believe
that one of two women is the mother of a certain child, we are not
willing to judge that each of them is conceivably his mother -having
10 According to David Chalmers, the Goldbach Conjecture is only prima facie conceivable. I
discuss his views below.
11 Yablo believes there is no thought experiment we can perform to rationally tilt this
creedence in any direction. This may well be so for Yablo, as it is for me, but how about
the following case: Eva has the hobby of trying random even numbers for compliance
with the Conjecture. She stumbles upon a number which her calculations show not to be
the sum of any two primes (she has made a mistake„ but she is a consistently reliable
mathematician, so she is perfectly justified in believing the outcome of her calculations).
Believing she has produced a counterexample, she comes to believe that the Conjecture
is false, whence she infers that it is possibly false.
It is natural to see that situation as one in which Eva is justified in believing the Conjecture
to be possibly false.
Eva, fully rationally, may place a much higher creedence on the possibility of the negation
of the Goldbach Conjecture, which is why she may well be willing to risk a judgement of
conceivability.
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in mind, as we should, that whoever is his mother is necessarily his
mother. It is this, we may say, Yabloan prudence that undergirds the
reliability of our conceivings.
In these examples, our reluctance to claim conceivability of the target
proposition p seems to stem from our appreciation that, for all we know,
we may be in one of the two12 kinds of situations that, according to
Yablo, account for modal error. One in which there is a proposition q
such that
1. q
2. if q then ¬p
3. That I find p conceivable is explained by my unawareness that
1. and/or by my unawareness that 2. Yablo (1993, p. 35, slightly
edited)
So, e. g., we refrain from claiming conceivability that one of two women
(Martha, say) is possibly a certain child’s mother because we cannot
decide whether the other woman, Mary, is in fact his mother, and we
recognise that our inclination to claim conceivability that p (that Martha
is the mother) may stem from our unawareness that q (that Mary is),
where if q then ¬p. To avoid being in this kind of modal error, we
refrain from issuing a conceivability verdict. In this way we salvage the
reliability of our conceivings.
This strategy, on the other hand, seems to be vulnerable to an attack
that dramatically reduces the scope of modal judgements that our
conceivings can justify. Van Inwagen (1998) may be described as an
attempt to show that, for any ambitious modal target proposition p,
we may always identify a non-trivial epistemically-possible defeater,
unawareness of which may, for all we know, underly our inclination
to claim conceivability. Take, for example, our coming to believe that
cows might be purple on the basis of our imagining a world of which
it is true that cows are purple. A creative modal sceptic may force us to
withdraw the verdict of conceivability by suggesting that the fact that
we find p: Cows are purple conceivable stems from the fact that we are
unaware of q: There is no cow DNA that allows for purple coat pigmentation,
such that if q then ¬p. That is, for all we know we may be victims
of the kind of modal error presented above, so our Yabloan prudence
kicks in and makes us withdraw our conceivability verdict.
Moreover, this strategy can be extended to the conceivability of any,
however ordinary, modal proposition. Take p: I have read Aquinas’s
Summa Contra Gentiles in English translation. I am pretty sure I know p
to be possible. But now consider q:
There is something N about my neuronal makeup such that N
is a necessary property of me [maybe it is genetically necessitated
by my being a son of my parents] and N makes it impossible that
I read that book in particular [maybe I just cannot parse some of
the very sentences that constitute the book, although I would have
no problems with most other possible English sentences].
For all I know my apparent ability to conceive of p may be due to my
unawareness of the fact that q, together with the fact that if q then ¬p.
12 The other kind of situation is one in which unawareness is substituted by denial in
condition 3. below.
192 modal epistemology
All in all, Yablo’s approach to conceivability seems have the short-
coming of being all too sensitive to epistemically-possible defeaters to
our judgements of conceivability. Otherwise put, if our conceivings are
reliable only in virtue of our Yabloan prudence, then, even if a conceiver
does not come up with suitable defeaters on her own, a sufficiently
creative, modally-sceptic interlocutor can reduce her to silence.
Yablo has chosen this route, perhaps, because he wants to account
for the reliability of our possibility judgements but does not trust any
subpersonal mechanism with the task. As we have seen in a quote
above, he does not believe that any bodily mechanism may be attuned
to modality; instead, it may be that personal level reasoning processes
that lead to what I’ve called Yabloan prudence are more plausible. But in
fact, as I have just shown, such personal level processes yield too high
a tax of misses -wrong rejections of candidates of possibilities. That is,
their reliability is obtained at a prohibitive cost in productiveness.
It would be great if there was a mechanism which combined more
wisely than us -if we are Yabloan-prudent cognisers- productivity and
reliability. Luckily, there is. The kind of naturalistic modal epistemol-
ogy I have been sketching in these last chapters shares with Yablo’s
conceivabilism the aim of providing a basis for the reliability of our
modal judgements. According to my proposal, though, this reliability
does not stem from Yabloan prudence in the deployment of concepts,
but from the judgement producers -entirely subpersonal mechanisms
such as pred in chapter 4 or syn in chapter 5- having stumbled upon
sufficiently-reliable correlations between the cue that causes a modal
judgement to be formed and the modal fact in question -which is, re-
member, a fact about the probability of a certain ulterior fact at certain
times.
As in the example that has figured prominently in earlier chapters,
one of these producers may have stumbled upon a reliable correlation
between cues such as Fido’s being ill-tempered and the fact that there
is a high enough probability that other dogs be ill-tempered. There
is no difficulty in principle about there being systems that develop a
sensitivity to reliable enough cues of the states of affairs -involving
probabilities and the past- that, if my suggestions in the last chapter are
on the right track, constitute many metaphysical possibilities. The sys-
tem subserving our own modalising capacity have developed precisely
such a sensitivity.
As for the role that Yablo accords to imaginings: as I have suggested,
what makes, or not, a certain modal belief or judgement justified is
that it has been produced according to the correct Procedures in the
correct context (see above for details). I am unsure of the role our
imaginigs play in these procedures. This is, ultimately, an empirical
question: do the Procedure our modalising faculty relies on involve
imaginings at any crucial point, or are they just concomitant to the
main process? In any event, it is plausible that at least some kinds of
judgements get justified by processes involving imagery. One example
Van Inwagen (op. cit.) gives of an everyday modal judgement we can
know is: Had we moved the table to a side, we would have had more room. It
is not implausible that the Procedure by which we get to know such
things involves mental imagery of the room after moving the table; just
as knowing where a city is, if it is in the center of the heel of Italy’s
boot, seems to involve imagery. On the other hand, it is possible that
many other acts of everyday modalising -such as getting to know if I
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might have been born on a different day- do not involve imaginings
essentially.
Another interesting feature of the account I have been presenting is
that there is no assumption that we need be aware of the grounds of
the correlations between cues and modal judgements or beliefs that our
modalising engines use; the workings of these mechanisms themselves
may be entirely subpersonal. Contra Yablo (and, I think, pro common
sense) we need to exercise no personal-level prudence for them to be
reliable.
Chalmers’ Conceivabilism
David Chalmers’s project is more ambitious than Yablo’s. He is after an
entailment thesis between some variety of conceivability and some vari-
ety of possibility13, as opposed to the mere reliable relation advocated
by Yablo. To accomplish this, Chalmers (2002) offers an exhaustive tax-
onomy of varieties of conceivability, another of varieties of possibility,
and a chart of the entailment relations that may be established between
them.
According to Chalmers, there are three main dimensions along which
conceivings may vary. With two possible values in each dimension,
this makes a total of eight conceivability flavours. First, there is the
positive/negative dimension:
• Positive conceivability Chalmers (2002, p. 150) is, to a good approx-
imation, Yablo’s notion of conceivability, as described above. Al-
though positively conceiving involves imagining, this is supposed
to be a special faculty of modal imagination, which transcends im-
agery. So, for example, according to Chalmers one may modally
imagine “pairs of situations that are perceptually indistinguish-
able” and situations that are “unperceivable in principle”.
• On the other hand, one finds a statement negatively conceivable
Chalmers (2002, p. 149) if one cannot rule it out a priori. Nega-
tively conceivable statements are, then, all conceptual coherent
statements and only those. Negative conceivability has also been
called conceptual possibility.
The second distinction is between prima facie and ideal conceivability.
The idea here is to idealise away from the imperfections of real-world
conceivers:
• One finds a statement prima facie conceivable Chalmers (2002, p.
147) if one finds it conceivable after some consideration. For exam-
ple, after a perfunctory examination of a mathematical proof we
may deem it sound, and embrace its conclusion -the conclusion is,
then, prima facie conceivable, even if slightly more careful evalua-
tion would show that the proof is not sound and the conclusion
false. Also, we may imagine a very complicated sentence, full of
subordinate clauses and appeals to ’the former’, ’the latter’, etc.
such that we simply don’t have the memory or attention necessary
to parse it. This sentence is not prima facie conceivable.
13 In fact, his ultimate concern is providing a watertight version of the Kripkean argument
against materialism defended in Kripke (1980) -see Chalmers (1996) and Chalmers (2009).
Although the kind of modal epistemology I have sketched in this work has obvious
implications for the conceivability argument against materialism, a satisfactory discussion
thereof will have to wait.
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• On the other hand, we may introduce the notion of an ideal
conceiver: a cogniser who suffers of no limitations of memory,
attention, time and the like14. She would have no problems in
understanding the very complicated sentence we imagined above,
and she would never ever deem sound an unsound mathemat-
ical proof. A statement is ideally conceivable if, well, the ideal
conceiver finds it conceivable.
The final distinction is between primary and secondary conceivability:
• The notion of primary conceivability is difficult to characterise
rigourously, and Chalmers has provided a very subtle and inter-
esting elucidation in his (2002) and (2004). I suspect it may also
be ultimately incoherent, but a detailed discussion of these issues
would take us too far afield. In any event, for the purposes of this
summary, we may identify primary conceivability with epistemic
possibility for a competent, yet sufficiently clueless cogniser. So, e. g., it
is primarily conceivable that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, because
there could be a competent user of hesperus and phosphorus
who ignores that Hesperus is Phosphorus is true; for all that speaker
knows, Hesperus may not be Phosphorus -i. e., he finds Hesperus
is not Phosphorus primarily conceivable.
To evaluate primary conceivability we consider the world in which
certain conditions obtain as being actual, and evaluate what fol-
lows -counteractually, as Chalmers says. For example, we imagine
that it turns out (notice the indicative mood; not “it had turned
out”, in the subjunctive) that the watery stuff is not H2O, and
conclude then that, if so, Water is not H2O is counteractually true.
This is what underlies our veredict of primary conceivability to
Water is not H2O.
There is a parallel notion of primary possibility. A statement is
primary possible if it is true in any possible world considered as
actual. For example, suppose there is indeed a possible world in
which the watery stuff is not H2O. It that is the actual world, then
water is not H2O: if it turns out (indicative) that the watery stuff
is something else, water is that something. We may thus conclude
that it is primarily possible that water not be H2O.
• Finally, a statement is secondarily conceivable if we judge after
some reflection that it might (subjunctive this time) have been
possible. What kind of reflection is needed depends on the prima
facie/ideal and positive/negative distinctions. Secondary con-
ceivability is also sensible to the epistemic status of the cogniser
regarding several key empirical truths. Thus, water is H2O is sec-
ondarily conceivable if we judge (upon reflection) that it might
have been the case that water had not been H2O. But, if we know
that water is H2O, upon reflection we will not judge that such a
thing might have been the case.
And, again, there is a parallel notion of secondary possibility. A
statement is secondarily possible if it is true in any possible world
considered as counterfactual. There is no possible world in which
14 And which, possibly, has ideal creativity when it comes to finding logical/mathematical
proofs. It may be argued that such a cogniser should be able to solve the Halting Problem
and is, therefore, dubiously coherent. I will not press this point now.
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water is not H2O. So it is secondarily impossible that water not
be H2O.
As I said above, Chalmers intends to use these distinctions to find an
entailment thesis between some flavour of conceivability and some
flavour of possibility. Chalmers’s strategy could be described as an
attempt at troubleshooting the Modern rationalist principle, according
to which
mrp : Something is possible if and only if it is conceivable.
A host of counterexamples -of which Modern philosophers were well
aware- come from our cognitive limitations: our limited memory, at-
tention and insufficient mathematical creativity. The prima facie/ideal
distinction is there to negotiate these problems: even if our limited
nature makes us find conceivable some impossible scenarios, an ideal
conceiver will not be subject to this problem. Also, even if some state-
ments are too complicated or long for us to entertain them, they will
pose no problems to ideal conceivers15. That is, we should substitute
mrp with mrpideal
mrpideal: Something is possible if and only if it is ideally conceiv-
able.
It is arguably this what Modern philosophers had in mind, and this
what the “clear and distinct” proviso was designed to solve.
But not every counterexample to mrp comes from the lack of ideality
of our conceivings. Another important source of problems for the link
between conceivability and possibility is the widely accepted existence
of aposteriori necessities and the (less) widely accepted existence of
apriori contingencies. Take a paradigmatic example of aposteriori ne-
cessity: Whales are mammals. No amount of apriori reasoning, however
ideal, on the part of a competent user of the concepts whale and mam-
mal, is going to bring out the relation between both kinds. One needs
to consult the world in order to know it.
The distinction between primary and secondary conceivability is
there to negotiate this second family of problems for mrp. It is true that
Whales are not mammals is ideally conceivable, but only primarily so. The
amount of empirical information about whalehood and mammalhood
that is needed for possesion of the concept -very little, it is to be
supposed- does not comment on whether whales are mammals; so
there might be ideal conceivers such that, for all she knows, whales are
not mammals. But, Chalmers says, nobody is defending mrp 2ary
2ary:
mrp 2ary 2ary: Something is possible if and only if it is ideally
secondarily conceivable.
Where possible is to be understood as secondarily possible, the more
or less default reading of possible. Instead, what Chalmers is defending
is mrp 1ary 1ary:
15 A prominent objection to Chalmers’s modal epistemology -Roca-Royes (forth.) calls it the
Standard Objection- is that we cannot know what an ideal conceiver would judge about
some scenario or other, not being ideal ourselves -cf. Worley (2003). As Roca-Royes points
out, there are possible rejoinders available: it may be defended, for instance, that we are
locally ideal conceivers -ideal in some restricted domain of, e. g., everyday modal claims.
Even so, it would be nice to have an explanation why are we locally ideal, if we are.
These kinds of explanation are sorely lacking in contemporary discussions in modal
epistemology. I view my account as helping provide precisely such an explanation.
196 modal epistemology
mrp 1ary 1ary: Something is primarily possible if and only if it is
ideally primarily conceivable.
What does this amount to? Take again a case of conceiving that
whales are not mammals. According to Chalmers conceiving of this
is something like conceiving of a possible world in which the whaley
animal around (a big, warm-blooded, aquatic animal that breathes
through a blowhole) is not a mammal. Now, we have no reason to
think that this world is metaphysically impossible -at least, no reason
coming from the fact that whales cannot fail to be mammals. And that
world being metaphysically possible is what Whales are not mammals
being primarily possible consists in -if that is the actual world then, by
counteractual reasoning, whales are not mammals. We have no reasons
to mistrust mrp 1ary 1ary, so we should endorse it.
This quick summary does little justice to Chalmers’s subtle and
sophisticated discussion but, I think, the main thrust of his argument is
captured by it. I have a general worry regarding Chalmers’s approach
to modal epistemology, although I can only make a very incomplete
case here. Fully developing this kind of criticism will be matter for
another work.
The question I would like to ask is: even if Chalmers’s distinctions
are ultimately successful in shielding mrp from counterexamples16, by
providing a counterexample-free alternative to the rationalist principle,
is this enough to justify our allegiance to mrp 1ary 1ary?
In general, the mere absence of counterexamples should not, and
is not, considered enough to justify allegiance to a theory. One main
reason for this is the well known fact that theory is underdetermined
by data. Now, what should count as data in this case is unclear. There
are at least two candidates: actual truths, and well-entrenched modal
beliefs. Regarding the first, it seems that the best confirmation we may
expect of something being possible is its being actual17. Regarding
the second candidate, well-entrenched modal beliefs range from truly
non-negotiable everyday beliefs such as I may have worn a different T-
shirt today to particularly compelling examples of, say, the necessity of
material constitution such as This table could not have been made of ice.
There are many possible theories which make roughly the same
predictions as mrp 1ary 1ary regarding these two sources of data.
The theory I have been developing in this work is, arguably, one of
them. But there are many others: most sensible modal epistemologies
qualify. So, there must be another dimension -besides the mere absence
of counterexamples- along which we may decide which, of any two
equally correct theories, is the best. One obvious candidate is hinted at
in Casullo (forthcoming). He there discusses several putative principles
linking necessity and apriority, and he concludes, about one of them:
[The principle that if p is necessarily true and S’s belief that
p is a necessary proposition is justified then S’s belief that p is a
necessary proposition is justifiable a priori] is an intuitively plau-
sible (...) principle that enjoys no independent support but
faces no decisive counterexamples. Casullo (forthcoming).
16 I have doubts about the soundness, and the usefulness, of both the prima facie/ideal
and the primary/secondary distinctions, and I hope to elaborate on them in future work.
For our current purposes, nevertheless, I will simply grant that they solve what they are
meant to solve.
17 Of course, if the metaphysics of modality are such that the reflexivity axiom is false,
this ceases to be so; but everybody believes that the modal logic correctly governing
metaphysical modality is, at least, T.
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The obvious tie-breaker for modal epistemologies is the possibility of
offering independent support for one of the options. The pack consist-
ing of a branching metaphysics of modality, an etiosemantic theory of
content -specially, the part designed to deal with contents involving
probabilities- and the particular kind of process reliabilism I have called
ecological reliabilism provides a substantial explanation of what it is to
entertain modal contents, and to be justified in believing them. This is,
I think, precisely the kind of independent support Casullo finds lacking
in traditional rationalist epistemologies. This is a substantial argument
against the kind of conceivabilism that Chalmers defends; the reason
why it is seldom made is because we don’t have many proposals re-
garding the independent support of our modal epistemology principles.
Now we have at least a sketch of one such proposal.
Of course, this comes at a price: according to the modal epistemology
I defend, we are justified in believing a lot less modal contents than
according to Chalmers. But this may be simply because we are in
fact justified in believing less contents. Our desire that our modal
epistemology covers more ground than it does should not cloud our
judgement regarding the epistemic credentials of our theories.

7S U M M A RY A N D C O N C L U S I O N S
In this dissertation I have aimed at sketching a naturalistic theory of
mental content, etiosemantics, such that, first, it solves some outstanding
problems with currently available accounts and, second, may be placed
at the foundation of a naturalistic modal epistemology.
The first, and arguably most pressing, problem I have tackled in
my dissertation (in chapter 1) is that of indeterminacy. I have shown,
with the help of a formal apparatus partly borrowed from Godfrey-
Smith (1996), that both producer semantics -and, among them, the
version of teleosemantics with indicators that Dretske defended in
Dretske (1988), cf. 1.2- and consumer semantics -and, most prominently,
Millikan’s biosemantics as defended in a number of books and papers
since Millikan (1984) and until Millikan (2009)- are subject to some
problem or other related to indeterminacy. In particular, Millikan’s
biosemantics can be shown to be vulnerable to the Output problem
-see 2.2.2: the content attributions to very simple mental states that
the theory warrants must involve what I have called high properties
-properties that are closest to what the consumer needs, such as Being
food far from predators, or some such; for high and low properties, and
Input and Output problems, see 1.3.2. The appeal to natural information,
in the sense of Millikan (2004), can lower the properties that contents
must involve, but not down to the point in which the content attribution
follows our intuitions. Of course, our intuitions about the right content
attribution to the states of very simple mechanisms in the brain of
idealised animals are not decisive evidence for or against a theory, but
they are partial evidence in favour of the theory that conforms with
them. And how does etiosemantic go about solving the Indeterminacy
Problem?
The key is taking seriously the very plausible idea that the entity a
certain mental state is about should lie somewhere causally upstream
from the representation -this I have called the compressed explana-
tion principle. Both causal theories of content and teleosemantics abide
by this principle, but the position they accord to the entity represented
in the causal history leading to the representation is not enough to fix a
univocal content. Such a history -in the case of a selected representation,
which is what we are dealing with in chapters 1 and 2- involves the
frequent coinstantiation of a mix of high and low properties such that
there is a causal structure that ensures that the mix keeps recurring. The
proposal is that the entity the representation is about is everywhere in
which the causal structure in question is making the mix of properties
occur. I take some care to describe exactly which is the nature of this
kind of entities, which I call, with a nod to Boyd (1988), Homeostatic
Property Clusters, or HPCs. For a more detailed discussion of HPCs
in my sense see sections 1.4.5, 1.4.6 and 2.5.2. HPCs are, with some
idealisation, the kind of entities we want very simple contentful states
to be about, entities which lie at the origin of both detectable properties
and useful properties and which, therefore, explain how detectors bring
usefulness. Once we look at matters closely it is very plausible that
these entities are what the most primitive contents are about.
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We cannot do many things with selected representations. At any
rate, most of our own representations, which is what we are most
interested in, are not selected but ephemeral: they exist for the first and
last time, during the lifetime of a not particularly longevous individual.
I tackle ephemeral mental states from chapter 3 on. I recover Millikan’s
idea that an ephemeral state has content only if it has been produced
by chain of mechanisms (possibly only one) that bottoms out in a
selected mechanism. Now, Millikan develops this idea by introducing
adapted and derived functions: functions of the ephemeral states or
mechanisms that may help fix their content. I discuss this idea in
3.2, and conclude that the normative dimension of the behaviour of
ephemeral states and mechanisms has not been conclusively established
by Millikan. Her theory of derived functions seems to hesitate between
the mere introduction of terminology -according to this strand, the
derived functions of an ephemeral mechanism would not be anything
over and above the relational function of its selected producer- and
the postulation of additional normativity at the level of ephemeral
mechanisms. In my discussion I suggest that one cannot get additional
normativity out of terminological manipulation and, thus, that the
appeal to the normativity of ephemeral mechanisms has not been
discharged in a naturalistically acceptable way.
Luckily, we do not need a robust notion of the function of ephemeral
states and mechanisms to develop an account of their content. I try to
develop an alternative in 3.3 and 3.8. The main idea is that selected
producers fix the causal profile of their products, and these products
enter in relations with HPCs that mimic, in the short term, the relation
that selected representations establish with the HPCs they are about. To
avoid indeterminacy in the content of ephemeral mechanisms, though,
we need the fact that the producer has been selected to be explained
by what I call a higher order HPC: one that explains the presence, in
the right positions in the history of this mechanism, of the lower order
HPCs the ephemeral representations are about. In a nutshell, if we are
to credit ephemeral mental states with content, the graph that links
these states with its selected producer must be mirrored in the world,
with higher order and lower order HPCs linked in the same way.
This strategy for the attribution of content to ephemeral states is
applicable to very different contents and mental structures; in particular,
in chapter 3 I discuss the idea in connection with two examples. First, I
apply it to the case of contents which record causal connections among
properties -I find this case interesting for two reasons: such contents
may be precursors of thoughts in which a property is predicated of an
individual, and there is a real-life mechanism whose products may be
attributed with just this kinds of contents: long term potentiation (see
3.4). Second, to the case of contents involving individuals -although
individual-involving contents need not necessarily be ephemeral, and
examples to the contrary are provided in 3.7, most are. I also discuss a
real life example, whether what ethologists call individual recognition is
present in American lobsters, that depends, I claim, on the existence of
individual-involving ephemeral states in lobsters. A fuller discussion
of the consequences of this for the debate about individual recognition
in ethology can be found in Appendix C.
In the first three chapters, then, I have explained how to attribute
content to some selected and some ephemeral representations. So far,
though, these representations show an almost complete lack of structure:
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in the kind of mental states with the content There is an F around we have
discussed, there are no components with the content F or around. Now,
we need to account for representations with subpropositional contents
(say, concepts; or mechanisms that effect predications in thought) if we
are to account for the representations of sophisticated content-crunching
engines such as human beings. This is the task I take up in chapter 4.
What I am after in this chapter is a characterisation of a couple
of mechanisms that should be part of a small (maybe the smallest)
cognitive system capable of productivity in thought: A mechanism,
conc, that is able to output new concepts and a mechanism, pred,
that is able to conjoin concepts in a predicative thought. The idea is
that the lessons learned from the implementation of these mechanisms
could be used in characterising other, more complicated mechanisms
in more complicated cognitive systems, although I have not taken up
this further task here.
Characterising conc and pred is complicated, among other things,
because the most simple contentful states have to be propositional:
one of the reasons is that we need to make room for the fact that
concepts, say, fly, may be tokened in the absence of their reference
in circumstances in which doing so is normatively impeccable; e. g.,
while thinking I saw a fly yesterday, or when thinking about halteres and
metathoraxes leads me to think about flies. Instead, it is not possible
to token a proto-belief with the content There is a fly around which is
normatively impeccable if there is no fly around -because it will be false.
See 4.1 for further discussion. Hence the need to start from propositional
contents, and hence the problem of extracting subpropositional contents
out of those. Before advancing my own positive proposal, I review
Millikan’s attempt at accounting for compositionality, and raise some
problems with it. Millikan’s idea is that thoughts form a sign system,
in which certain transformations of thoughts correspond to certain
transformations of states of affairs. I suggest that the existence of
this mapping function cannot be previous to the existence of a fully
compositional language of thought, as it would have to be if it is to
play the role Millikan accords to it in her theory. On the other hand, the
appeal to mapping functions does not seem to be perfectly naturalistic,
in the sense that there are no naturalistic grounds to choose among
different candidate mapping functions which overlap in the domain
causally needed for the selection of a sign system -see 4.5.
My proposal, as I said above, takes seriously the need for a compo-
sitional semantics in thought. The way to make this compatible with
the fact that the most basic representations are propositional is what
I call the interlocking determination of a predication-producing mecha-
nism, pred, a concept-creating mechanism, conc, and an initial pool
of thoughts produced by these mechanisms -see 4.4.2. The fact that
thoughts in the pool have the content they have helps fix the way
in which pred creates thoughts, and the way in which conc creates
concepts. But, pace Millikan, we do not need all the correspondences
to be fixated beforehand, and they might well be a partly haphazard
consequence of the initial pool of thoughts and the causal profile of
pred and conc. And, as Fodor (2008) would want, this is compatible
with a punctuated mind -a mind capable of only thinking one thought.
In 4.4.2, in fact, I show how the theory of concepts that emerges from
the previous discussion deals (satisfactorily, I think) with many of the
objections against other prominent theories of concepts.
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Chapter 4 ends the part of the dissertation dedicated to mental
content. In briefest summary: the content of selected atomic representa-
tions depends on an HPC occupying key positions causally upstream
(chapters 1 and 2); the content of ephemeral atomic representations
depends on a hierarchy of HPCs covering the behaviour of a hierarchy
of producers and products (chapter 3); the content of ephemeral repre-
sentations exhibiting compositionality depends on these two features,
together with the interlocking determination of thought-producing and
concept-producing mechanisms (chapter 4).
In chapter 5 I apply the ideas developed in part I to the case of
modal contents, and finally, in chapter 6 I explain how the etiosemantic
account of content may be used as the foundation for a naturalistic
epistemology and, in particular, how modal contents may be justifiedly
believed or known. Chapter 5 defends a metaphysics of modality (the
branching conception of modality) according to which a sizeable portion
of the modal space (maybe all of it, but I wish to remain uncommitted)
is constituted by states of affairs such as at some time it was an open
possibility that p, where something is an open possibility if there is a
probability greater than zero of it happening -see 5.6. In the chapter I
have taken for granted that etiosemantics is able to naturalise contents
involving past times, and the existential quantifier. Now, while the first
bit is, I dare think, uncontroversial, I have said nothing, or very little,
about how the naturalisation of quantifiers may go. I hope to tackle this
issue in future work, which so far remains a substantial loose end in
the overall picture. Anyway, granting that the naturalisation in question
may be done, there remains another important family of contents about
which I have said nothing up until this chapter, and which are, arguably,
about the distinctively modal ingredient in the branching conception of
modality: contents involving probabilities.
The strategy for the naturalisation of probability-involving contents
in the chapter is showing how the selection of a mechanism could make
essential use of the probabilistic relation among a couple of properties.
The mechanism in question takes profit of this probabilistic relation to
issue a cost-effective response to one of them that still maximises the
prospects of success in dealing with the other -for details, see 5.2 and
the following sections. Mechanisms such as these I have called synergic
associations. It is synergic associations themselves that bear contents
involving probabilities. Selected synergic associations are in the family
of selected proto-beliefs discussed in 3.1; to account for ephemeral
contentful states involving probabilities I have characterised a particular
class of synergic association producers -5.4. This is not to say that all
modal contents have to be mediated by synergic associations. I don’t
think they do. What I think is, first, that these kinds of associations are
among the simplest bearers of contents involving probabilities. And,
second and most important, they provide a solid rejoinder to an often
voiced objection against efforts in the naturalisation of modal semantics
and epistemology, according to which it is simply unintelligible how
mechanisms might be (in Yablo’s turn of phrase) attuned to the modal
aspects of reality. Well, synergic associations is, at least, one way in
which they might. The argument from the impossibility of a mechanism
sensitive to modality may be countered simply by showing a way in
which such mechanism may exist. Such a mechanism is as paradoxical
as a mechanism attuned to future aspects of reality, which are also
causally inert now -but nobody thinks it impossible or unintelligible to
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develop a naturalistic semantics of future events. The trick, as always,
is have the mechanism “learn from experience”: if an event of type A
is consistently followed by an event of type B, a mechanism may start
exploiting this relation to prepare itself for events of kind B: sensitivity
to the future. If events of type B follow probabilistically from events of
type A, a synergic association may exploit this relation to achive a cost-
effective preparation for events of kind B: sensitivity to probabilities.
The last chapter of my dissertation is dedicated to sketching a nat-
uralistic modal epistemology. In fact, the contention is that modal
epistemology is not all that different from the epistemology of what is
actually the case. This falls out from the fact that modal contents are
not all that different from contents involving what is actually the case,
together with the particular brand of process reliabilism -the theory
according to which, roughly, a belief is justified if it was produced
by a reliable process- I defend in this chapter. I take up the famous
complaint that process reliabilism is not an assessable theory until there
is a principled way to choose the right principle for each belief -the
Generality Problem. Etiosemantics has a natural proposal on offer: every
contentful state, however ephemeral, is linked to a selected mechanism
via a chain of mechanisms (possibly only one). Each of these mech-
anisms imparts a Procedure upon its product -see 3.6. This chain of
Procedures, moreover, is defined within what I call an ecologically-fixed
context. Beliefs are justified if they are produced in their ecologically-
fixed context -see 6.1.1. This provides a principled way to choose the
process in question: the chain of Procedures; and a context in which it
is reliable: the ecologically-fixed context.
This sketch of a theory, which I have called ecological reliabilism, is
straightforwardly applicable to modal contents, which are also the
product of a chain of Procedures, in an ecologically-fixed context. This
is going to explain that, most of the times, we are justified in believing
(and know) the everyday modal claims that strike us as true -see 6.2.
That is, an explanation of what Van Inwagen (1998) calls our everyday
powers of modalising is, I dare say, well within the reach of the theory
formed by etiosemantics plus the branching conception of modality
plus ecological reliabilism. This meets, at least to a certain degree of
detail, the main goal of the dissertation. In the final section I also discuss
briefly a prominent neo-rationalist approach to modal epistemology,
conceivabilism, and try to show why my proposal is to be preferred.

Part III
A P P E N D I C E S

AT H E D E R I VAT I O N O F T H E I N D E T E R M I N A C Y
P R O B L E M
the conversion among fitness values
Let us take up again the case discussed in 1.3.1. We have a mental
mechanism m that indicates, among other properties, Being a fly (F) and
Being a black speck (G). We have the values of the Fitness Matrix as seen
from the perspective of the indication of instantiations of F (i. e., FMF)
and we wish to know the values of the Fitness Matrix as seen from the
perspective of the indication of instantiations of G (i. e., FMG).
Let us calculatewG11, assuming that all flies are black specks (P (G|F) =
1). A hit when indicating black specks will have the fitness value of
a hit when indicating flies if the black speck is a fly, and the fitness
value of a false alarm when indicating flies if it is not. That is, wG11 is a
linear combination of wF11 and w
F
21. We simply need to average by the








Now, according to the definition of conditional probability, P (a|b)P (b) =
P (a∧ b). So P (on∧ F∧G) = P (on|F∧G)P (F∧G), which, if P (G|F) =
1, is equal to P (on|F)P (F∧G). While P (on∧G) = P (on|G)P (G).
On the other hand, P (on∧¬F∧G) = P (on|¬F∧G)P (¬F∧G), which


























To calculate wG12 we proceed in an analogous manner.
fitness contributions
m’s Fitness Contribution as seen from the perspective of the indication
of black specks (FCG) is
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FCG = P (G) ·
[





+ P (¬G) ·
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P(off|G) along the way.
FCG = P (G) ·[
P (F|G)P (on|F)wF11 + P (G∧¬F|G)P (on|G∧¬F)w
F
21+





+ P (¬G) ·
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Now we resolve brackets and reorganise.
FCG = P (G)P (F|G)P (on|F)wF11 + P (G)P (F|G)P (off|F)w
F
12 + (A.1)
P (¬G)P (off|¬G)wF22 + P (G)P (G∧¬F|G)P (off|G∧¬F)w
G
22 +
P (¬G)P (on|¬G)wF21 + P (G)P (G∧¬F|G)P (on|G∧¬F)w
F
21
We should now take into account that
P (A)P (C|A) + P (B)P (C|B) = P (A∧B)P (C|A∧B)
and, in particular, given that ¬F↔ ¬G∨ (G∧¬F), we have that
P (G∧¬F)P (on|G∧¬F)+P (¬G)P (on|¬G) = P (¬F)P (on|¬F) (A.2)
and
P (G∧¬F)P (off|G∧¬F)+P (¬G)P (off|¬G) = P (¬F)P (off|¬F) (A.3)
We also know that
P (G)P (F|G) = P (F∧G) = P (F) (A.4)
Substituting the results A.2, A.3 and A.4 in equation A.1, we get:
FCG = P (F)P (on|F)wF11 + P (F)P (off|F)w
F
12 +
















That is, FCG = FCF, as we wanted to show.
BC O N D I T I O N S F O R S U C C E S S F U L R E C R U I T M E N T
Suppose m is a G-mechanism (i.e., a mechanism such that m’s being on
has the content There is a G around) which has some property E as its
input: the instantiation of E around m’s possessor causes m to go on,
and nothing else does. I will characterise when is it useful to recruit
another property F for m’s input.
Before recruiting F, m fires when and only when E is instantiated.




P (E|G) P (¬E|G)
P (E|¬G) P (¬E|¬G)
]
and, thus,
FCG = P (G) · [P (E|G)w11 + P (¬E|G)w12]+P (¬G) · [P (E|¬G)w21 + P (¬E|¬G)w22]
disjunctive recruitment of a property
One way of recruiting the real kind F for the input of the m is making
m fire whenever either E or F are around. We call this disjunctive
recruitment.
In this situation, the indication profile of M will change to:
IP∨ =
[
P (E∨ F|G) P (¬ (E∨ F) |G)
P (E∨ F|¬G) P (¬ (E∨ F) |¬G)
]
The fitness contribution of m will change accordingly:
FC∨ = P (G) · [P (E∨ F|G)w11 + P (¬ (E∨ F) |G)w12] +
P (¬G) · [P (E∨ F|¬G)w21 + P (¬ (E∨ F) |¬G)w22]
It is rewarding to recruit F disjunctively for M’s input if and only if
said recruiting amounts to an increase in fitness contribution. That is,
iff FC∨ − FCG > 0. Take into account that
• P (E∨ F|G) − P (E|G) = P (F∧¬E|G). The probability of either E
or F being instantiated, conditional on G, minus the probability
of E being instantiated conditional on G, is the probability of F
being instantiated in the absence of E, conditional on G.
• P (¬E|G) − P (¬ (E∨ F) |G) = P (F∧¬E|G). The probability of E
not being instantiated, conditional on G, minus the probability
of neither E nor F being instantiated conditional on G, is the
probability of F being instantiated in the absence of E, conditional
on G.
• P (E∨ F|¬G) − P (E|¬G) = P (F∧¬E|¬G)
• P (¬E|¬G) − P (¬ (E∨ F) |¬G) = P (F∧¬E|¬G)
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Figure 17: Conjunctive Property Recruitment
And, so,
FC∨ − FCG = P (G) · P (F∧¬E|G) (w11 −w12) −
P (¬G) · P (F∧¬E|¬G) (w22 −w21) > 0
We may call P (F∧¬E|G) F’s positive excess over E. This positive excess
records the probability of m now firing in the presence of G in cases
in which it would have not fired with E as its only input property. The
positive excess yields a higher probability of cashing in the benefit of
hits (w11) and a decreased probability of incurring in the cost of misses
(w12). Contrariwise, P (F∧¬E|¬G) is F’s negative excess over E. m, with
its new input, will overfire with a probability recorded by the negative
excess. This implies a lower rate of correct rejections (w22) and a higher
rate of false alarms (w21).
conjunctive recruitment of a property
Another way to recruit F is to make m fire when and only when F and
E are instantiated together.
That is, moving to the following indication profile:
IP∧ =
[
P (E∧ F|G) P (¬ (E∧ F) |G)
P (E∧ F|¬G) P (¬ (E∧ F) |¬G)
]
By a reasoning parallel to the previous case, such a conjunctive recruit-
ing is rewarding iff
FC∧ − FC = P (¬G) · P (E∧¬F|¬G) (w22 −w21) −
P (G) · P (E∧¬F|G) (w11 −w12) > 0
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Where P (E∧¬F|¬G) may be called F’s positive defect over E and
P (E∧¬F|G) its negative defect.
Disjunctive recruiting will be preferred in situations in which false
alarms are not very costly and hits are very rewarding (the import of
“very” and “not very” here is made precise by FC∨ − FC). An example
may be a situation in which nutritional resources are scarce: it may pay
to overfire more if it means missing less prey. Conjunctive recruiting
will be preferred in situations in which false positives are very costly.
Other, more complicated patterns of integration of sensitivities to E
and F may be preferred in the presence of more symmetrical fitness
matrixes.
recruiting f when all gs are fs
Consider the case in which the property F which is to be recruited for
the input of the G-mechanism is (in situ) necessary for G to be instanti-
ated around the possessor of the mental state. That is, P (F|G) ≈ 1. In
this situation, P (F∧¬E|G) ≈ 1−P (E|G) and P (E∧¬F|G) ≈ 0. Nothing
can be said in general about the positive defect and negative excess of
F over E. The conditions for disjunctive or conjunctive recruiting to be
rewarding are:
FC∨ − FC = P (G) · (1− P (E|G)) · (w11 −w12) −
P (¬G) · P (F∧¬E|¬G) (w22 −w21) > 0
FC∧ − FC = P (¬G) · P (E∧¬F|¬G) (w22 −w21) > 0
Conjunctive recruiting will always be rewarding, on condition that
P (E∧¬F|¬G) > 0, which amounts, in this case, to saying that F must
not be always and everywhere instantiated, and E is not sufficient for
G. This is just to be expected from the fact that F is necessary for G.
The condition for disjunctive recruiting to be rewarding, on the other
hand, is more difficult to meet, although it may surely obtain in some
cases.
recruiting f when all fs are gs
Take now the case that P (G|F) ≈ 1, then
FC∨ − FC = P (G) · P (F∧¬E|G) (w11 −w12) > 0
FC∧ − FC = P (¬G) · (1− P (¬F∧¬E|¬G)) (w22 −w21) −
P (G) · P (E∧¬F|G) (w11 −w12) > 0
Here it is disjunctive recruiting that will always be rewarding, pro-
vided that E is not necessary for G, and F is somewhere and sometime
instantiated. Conjunctive recruiting has a more complicated condition.
the content of m after recruitment
As we have already seen in previous chapters, the content of a state has
to do with the causal underpinnings of the conditional probabilities
that are instrumental in the explanation of the actual existence of the
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state. Will the content of a G-mechanism change after recruiting of
some property F for its input?
It is to be expected that, in most cases, if a property F increases the
Fitness Contribution of some state, it is because instantiations of F are
(were all along) part of the Cluster of the HPC that constitutes property
G. In those cases, m does not change content after recruitment -I’m not
saying, but should always be taken to imply: only if the recruitment is
subsequently selected for.
It is not impossible, though, that F taps into another source of fitness
-i. e., indicating F makes m fitness-conducive, but for reasons which are
independent from G. We could imagine that F makes m track more, and
different prey. In this case, the final content of m may be a disjunction
of G and some other property that grounds the improvement in fitness
contribution supplied by F.
disjunctively recruiting an f-mechanism
Suppose we have an F-mechanism and a G-mechanism in a case in
which P (F|G) = 1. Let us calculate the Fitness Contribution of both
states before, and after, disjunctively recruiting the F-mechanism’s
firings for the input of the G-mechanism:
before.
• The input to the F-mechanism is some property E. Therefore, its
Indication Profile is IPF =
[
P (E|F) P (¬E|F)
P (E|¬F) P (¬E|¬F)
]
• The input to the G-mechanism is some property H. Therefore,
IPG =
[
P (H|G) P (¬H|G)
P (H|¬G) P (¬H|¬G)
]


















• Fitness Contributions are, then:
FCF = P (F) ·
[











FCG = P (G) ·
[











• The total Fitness Contribution of both mechanisms to the agent is
just FCF+G = FCF + FCG
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after. After recruitment, the contribution of the F-mechanism re-
mains the same, but the G-mechanism changes:
• IPG∗ =
[
P (H∨ E|G) P (¬ (H∨ E) |G)
P (H∨ E|¬G) P (¬ (H∨ E) |¬G)
]
•













Recruitment of the F-mechanism will be rewarding iff FC∗G > FCG. In
that case we say that P (G|F) is sufficiently* higher than P (G)for the agent.
Thus







. The third addend is the net contribu-
tion of the recruitment, and is positive for normal fitness matrices







Another way to look at the recruitment is as follows: the G-mechanism
remains unchanged, and the fitness matrix of the F-mechanism changes
to cash in the extra benefit obtained by the G-mechanism. The final
result of FCF+G is, of course, the same.

CI N D I V I D U A L R E C O G N I T I O N W I T H O U T
S P E C I F I C I T Y
There is an ongoing debate in ethology concerning the true nature of
Individual Recognition [IR, from now on]: in what circumstances is
some animal recognising a concrete individual as such individual, as
opposed to, say, as a family member (this would be kin recognition) or
as a member of some kind or other?
It has been suggested (e. g., in Tibbetts and Dale (2008) and Tibbetts
et al. (2008)) that, if we are to credit a receiver with the ability of recog-
nising individual signallers, all three of the following features must be
individual-specific: the cue produced by the signaller [cue]; the template
the receiver uses to match the cue [template]; the behavioural response
to the cue [response]. On the other hand, others (e. g. Steiger and Müller
(2008)) defend that only cue and template should be individual specific.
I intend to show that, appearances notwithstanding, neither cue nor
response must be individual-specific for IR to exist. On the one hand,
true specificity in any of these two features is extremely costly, if not a
downright myth, impossible to come by. On the other hand, less than
perfectly specific cues may show sufficient correlation with concrete
individuals to be useful for the purposes the receiver puts them to.
Instead of specificity, a reasonable notion of IR must make appeal to
the role a concrete individual plays in the explanation of the existence
of a certain representation in the receiver’s cognitive economy -along
the lines discussed in chapter 3.
Cue Specificity.
Most discussions of IR in the literature in evolutionary biology (e. g.,
Müller et al. (2003), Tibbetts and Dale (2008), Steiger and Müller (2008),
Tibbetts et al. (2008), an exception is Sherman et al. (1997)) assume that,
if we are to credit some agent with recognition of individuals, the cues
the former use must be individual specific. The first thing to point out is
that it is hard to see what precisely individual-specificity must amount
to. Honest-to-God individual specificity will not do:
true specificity: Some cue, C, is specific to some individual, I, iff
P (I|C) = 1.
and
ir - specificity: A receiver is able to perform IR only if it uses
individual-specific cues in the sense of true specificity.
Individual-specific cues in this sense do not exist, or at least are
extremely hard to come by1. A common experimental setup for testing
1 There is a sense in which every cue is individual-specific, and more than that: the fine
physical structure of cues is sufficient, most probably, to distinguish every cue -even
leaving aside its causal-historical properties- from every other cue and, for example, the
call of baby seals and recordings of the very same token calls must undoubtedly differ in
subtle ways -their frequency spectrum, say. Biologists participating in the IR debate take
for granted a common-sense grouping of cues according to which the call of baby seals
and a recording of those calls count, naturally enough, as the same cue. I will go along
with them in assuming the existence of such a common-sense grouping. In the main text
I’m saying that there are no individual-specific cues in this sense.
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IR (as described in Tibbetts and Dale (2008, p. 529)) relies precisely on
ir - specificity being false: presenting the receiver with a putative
cue and observing its response would be impossible if the presence
of the cue made necessary the presence of the cued individual. But,
of course, a researcher may, e. g., record the call of a baby seal and
play it back to an adult individual to observe its responses; this already
shows that the probability of the presence of the cue conditional on the
absence of the individual is, in many situations in which we attribute
IR to a receiver, not zero -and, therefore, shows that P (I|C) < 1 in cases
of IR.
Counterexamples to ir - specificity are possible also without the
intervention of a researcher. Human facial traits are not truly individual-
specific according to the definition above: it is just extremely unlikely,
but by no means nomologically impossible, that two different persons
look indistinguishably alike to us. Some very young homozigotic twin
siblings are actual examples of this situation. But, even if we may
sometimes mistake one twin sibling for the other, it is indisputable that
human facial traits are a good-enough cue for purposes of IR.
Response Specificity.
On the other hand, Tibbetts et al. (2008), identify response-specificity
with cases in which a receiver “treats [an] individual differently from
others” (op. cit.) This may be read as meaning either of two things, none
of which are very promising:
all: There is response-specificity to an individual I only if the response
to I is different from the response to all other individuals.
some: There is response-specificity to an individual I only if the re-
sponse to I is different from the response to some other individuals.
There are several relatively uncontroversial instances of IR that appear
to provide counterexamples to the response-specificity requirement, if
understood as in all. So, e. g., the discussion in Karavanich and Atema
(1998) of dominance in American lobsters hypothesises that lobsters
are capable of IR, even if they only show two different responses in
their encounters with other lobsters: flee or fight. These two responses
are highly non-specific: avoidance is the right behaviour to display
against any individual placed higher-up in the dominance hierarchy;
fighting is the right behaviour to display against any individual in a
lower position. It is by no means true that a lobster Lj’s response to
lobster Li is different from its response to all other lobsters.
The reading in some does account for cases such as this: Lj’s re-
sponse to Li is different from its response to some other lobsters: those
that occupy a lower position than Lj in the hierarchy, if Li is higher than
Lj; or those that occupy a higher position, if Li is lower. But, then, it is
unlikely that anybody disagree that IR involves response-specificity in
this sense. After all, denying this would be equivalent to defending that
IR may be present even if the response is the same for all individuals.
This is a position nobody holds. In summary, in the one hand all
gives a substantive understanding of response-specificity; but there
are cases of IR without response-specificity in this sense. On the other
hand, some accounts for these cases, but it is not a substantive notion
of response-specificity -or, at least, nobody wishes to deny that there is
response-specificity in this weaker sense.
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A Better Analysis of IR.
Likely, high cue- and response-specificity are well correlated with the
presence of IR but, as I have just shown, specificity is not necessary for
IR in either case. Luckily, there is a better way to provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for the presence of IR:
ir - content: A receiver is able to perform IR if and only if it is
capable of having mental states with contents of the kind F (a),
where a is an individual.
This is, quite simply, the common-sense way to analise IR. The reason
ethologists shy away from something like ir - content is, probably,
because they do not believe the notion of content to be sharp enough to
play a role in our scientific theories about animal behaviour. The good
news is that, while we certainly do not have, and maybe there are not,
sets of necessary and sufficient conditions for a mental state to have a
content of the kind F (a), I have provided -in chapter 3- an interesting
set of sufficient conditions for the (pretty central) case of ephemeral
states and the content a is around:
a is around - ephemeral: An agent A has a mechanism, mi, whose
positives have the content ai is around, if cue Ci has caused n to
create it and all of routine, fitness conduciveness and
higher order hpc are in place -see 3.8 for details.
a is around - ephemeral makes the question whether ephemeral
states have the content A is around sufficiently well-formulated for it to
figure in a description of the state of affairs that constitutes IR. How
does this proposal relate to the traditional idea of having IR depend
on cue- or response-specificity? It can be shown that, in general, the
specificity of cues to individuals must be high enough to make the
practice of IR self-sustaining. That is, it must be high enough to make n
fitness-conducive in the long run: one of the conditions for attributing
content to n’s products is that, in a sufficient number of such products
mi,
fc1: For a number j > 1 of properties Gj, mi has indicated the instan-
tiation of Gj around its possessor.
Between these properties Gj that mi indicates we have those that
constitute, together with a specialised homeostatic mechanism, the
individual mi is about. So, suppose that we introduce a measure of state-
specificity, which simply records the probability of a state (mi’s being on)
existing conditional on a certain individual a being around: P (on|a). In
that case for IR to be possible, the state-specificity of a sufficient number
of states must be sufficiently good. The ’sufficiently’ and ’sufficient’
here means: enough to explain that n’s Fitness Contribution has been
as high as to cause its fixation in the population of its possessors.
This strategy allows the existence of values of state-specificity well
below 1; this will happen, for example, whenever the fitness-value
of hits largely compensates for the fitness-value of misses. We may
envisage states that have a content involving a concrete individual but
such that the possessor of the state is perfectly unable to distinguish
this individual from some other. Take, for example the lobster example
examined in 3.9. It is conceivable that a certain lobster Li develops a
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state Mij upon losing a fight with lobster Lj. But it may still be that the
urine chemical signature UCSj is shared by Lj with lobster Lk. In this
situation, Li will fail to distinguish Lj from Lk and nevertheless it is
still the case that Mij has as a content Lj, because it is Lj that has in
its cluster the instantiation of the property Being a token of UCSj that
accounts for the existence of Mij.
ir - content also explains why response-specificity is not neces-
sary for IR: it is enough if the individual the mental state is about
is situated in the right place of the causal structure that explains the
existence of the contentful state; this is more often than not compatible
with very imperfect response-specificity.
Tibbetts et al. (2008) offers an example in which there is no individual-
specific response and no IR either: the discussion of meerkat alarm-calls
in Schibler and Manser (2007). Meerkat alarm calls -the characteristic
sound meerkats make when they perceive a predator, to warn other
conspecifics- appear to be an individual-specific cue, at least in the
informal, “for all intents and purposes” sense: the sound each meerkat
makes is noticeably different from that of all other meerkats.
Meerkats responses, though, are not specific: meerkats flee no matter
who, reliable or unreliable witness, issues the call. Tibbetts et al. propose
this as evidence that without response-specificity there is no IR. ir
- content provides a better explanation of the lack of IR in this case:
is not that there is no response-specificity but, rather, that individual
meerkats do not play the relevant role in the fitness-conduciveness of
the mental mechanism that uses alarm calls as cues. This is a case in
which the response of meerkats does not even accord to some: the
response is always the same, no matter what. There is no need to appeal
to the connection of individual-meerkat calls with the actual probability
of danger; the connection of meerkat calls in general with such danger
is doing all the work.
If they had played it, alarm calls would involve IR, even in the absence
of response-specificity.
Experimental Setups.
A last point Tibbetts et al. make in Tibbetts et al. (2008) (and, to judge
by the title of their letter, one that they see as particularly important)
is that a proposal that leaves response-specificity out is difficult to test.
Without response specificity we may not be able to ascertain whether
a particular cue is individual-specific for the agent to whom we are
ascribing IR. This may be an important practical problem, although
there are ways to overcome it. The lobster case suggests one such a
way: if there are only two possible responses, a way to test sensitivity
to individually-specified cues is to assess the grouping of cues that
prompt each one of the two responses. If the grouping is arbitrary from
the perspective of the cue itself -that is, there are no features of the cue
that ground the grouping-, this is evidence that it is the individually-
grounded correlation between cue and appropriate response that drives
the grouping. In the case of the meerkat, on the contrary, there is such
a non-arbitrary grouping of the cues: all of them result in fleeing. This
is evidence that meerkats are not doing IR.
In any event, practical problems such as this should have no bearing
on the issue of what constitutes individual recognition. Researchers
must simply think harder about experimental setups.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
Agar, N.: 1993, What Do Frogs Really Believe?, Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 71(1), 1–12. (Cited on pages 19, 40, and 106.)
Allaby, M. (ed.): 2009, A Dictionary of Zoology, Oxford Reference Online
- Oxford University Press.
URL: http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t8.e8577
(Cited on page 10.)
Ayala, F.: 1970, Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology, Phi-
losophy of Science 37(1), 1–15. (Cited on page 14.)
Bealer, G.: 2002, Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance,
in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds), Conceivability and Possibility,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 71–125. (Cited on page 149.)
Bell, G.: 2008, Selection. The Mechanism of Evolution, Oxford University
Press. (Cited on pages 158 and 170.)
Block, N.: 1986, Advertisement for a semantics for psychology, Midwest
Studies in Philosophy 10, 615–678. (Cited on page 144.)
Block, N.: 1998, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, chapter
Conceptual Role Semantics. (Cited on pages 143 and 144.)
Boghossian, P.: 1989, The Rule-Following Considerations, Mind
98(392), 507–549. (Cited on page 127.)
Boyd, R.: 1988, Moral Realism, Cornell University Press, chapter How to
be a Moral Realist, pp. 181–228. (Cited on pages 29, 65, and 199.)
Boyd, R.: 1991, Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm
for Natural Kinds, Philosophical Studies 61(1-2), 127–148. (Cited on
page 30.)
Brigandt, I.: 2009, Natural Kinds in Evolution and Systematics: Meta-
physical and Epistemological Considerations, Acta Biotheoretica 57, 77–
97. (Cited on page 30.)
Buller, D.: 1998, Etiological Theories of Function: A Geographical Survey,
Biology and Philosophy 13, 505–527. (Cited on page 15.)
Casullo, A.: forthcoming, Knowledge and modality, Synthese . (Cited
on page 196.)
Chalmers, D.: 1996, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory,
Oxford University Press. (Cited on page 193.)
Chalmers, D.: 2002, Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?, in T. Gendler
and J. Hawthorne (eds), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, pp. 145–200. (Cited on pages 149, 193, and 194.)
Chalmers, D.: 2009, The two-dimensional argument against materialism,
in B. McLaughlin and A. Beckermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of
Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. (Cited on page 193.)
219
220 bibliography
Chalmers, D. J.: 2004, Epistemic two-dimensional semantics, Philosophi-
cal Studies 118(1-2), 153–226. (Cited on page 194.)
Conee, E. and Feldman, R.: 1998, The generality problem for reliabilism,
Philosophical Studies 89(1), 1–29. (Cited on pages 181 and 182.)
Cooke, S. and Bliss, T.: 2006, Plasticity in the Human Central Nervous
System, Brain 129, 1659–1673. (Cited on page 88.)
Cummins, R.: 1975, Functional analysis, Journal of Philosophy 72, 741–765.
(Cited on page 14.)
Cummins, R.: 1991, Meaning and Mental Representation, The MIT Press.
(Cited on page 36.)
Descartes, R.: 1641/1988, Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings, Cam-
bridge University Press. (Cited on page 188.)
Dretske, F.: 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, The MIT Press.
(Cited on page 8.)
Dretske, F.: 1988, Explaining Behavior. Reasons in a World of Causes, The
MIT Press. (Cited on pages 5, 11, 24, 54, and 199.)
Enç, B.: 2002, Indeterminacy of function attributions, in A. Ariew,
R. Cummins and M. Perlman (eds), Functions: New Essays in the Philos-
ophy of Psychology and Biology, Oxford University Press, pp. 291–313.
(Cited on page 24.)
Evans, G.: 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford Clarendon Press. (Cited
on page 133.)
Fodor, J.: 1986, Why Paramecia Don’t Have Mental Representations, in
U. French, P. (ed.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 10, University
of Minnesota Press, pp. 3–23. En el contexto de la objeción del
Liberalismo contra la teleosemántica. (Cited on page 73.)
Fodor, J.: 1990, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, The MIT Press.
(Cited on pages 4, 19, 22, 106, and 107.)
Fodor, J.: 2008, LOT 2, Oxford Clarendon Press. (Cited on pages 107,
108, 140, and 201.)
Fodor, J. A. and Pylyshyn, Z. W.: 1988, Connectionism and cognitive
architecture, Cognition 28, 3–71. (Cited on page 107.)
Fodor, J., Garrett, M., Walker, E. and Parkes, C.: 1999, Concepts: Core
Readings, The MIT Press, chapter Against Definitions. (Cited on
page 136.)
Fodor, J. and Lepore, E.: 1992, Holism: A Shopper’s Guide, Blackwell.
(Cited on page 144.)
Fodor, J. and Piattelli-Palmarini, M.: 2010, What Darwin Got Wrong,
Profile Books. (Cited on page 15.)
Forbes, G.: 1985, The Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
(Cited on pages 167 and 173.)
Ghiselin, M.: 1974, A Radical Solucion to the Species Problem, Systematic
Zoology 23, 536–544. (Cited on page 95.)
bibliography 221
Gillies, D.: 2000, Varieties of propensity, British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science 51(4). (Cited on pages 12 and 13.)
Godfrey-Smith, P.: 1994, A modern history theory of functions, Noûs
28(3), 344–362. (Cited on page 17.)
Godfrey-Smith, P.: 1996, Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature,
Cambridge University Press. (Cited on pages 15, 54, and 199.)
Godfrey-Smith, P.: 2004a, Mental representation, naturalism, and
teleosemantics, in D. Papineau and G. MacDonald (eds), Teleose-
mantics: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. (Cited on
page 33.)
Godfrey-Smith, P.: 2004b, On folk psychology and mental representa-
tion, in H. Clapin, P. Staines and P. Slezak (eds), Representation in
Mind, Perspectives in Cognitive Science, Elsevier, pp. 147–162. (Cited
on page 33.)
Godfrey-Smith, P.: 2009a, Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection,
Oxford University Press. (Cited on page 15.)
Godfrey-Smith, P.: 2009b, Representationalism reconsidered, in D. Mur-
phy and M. Bishop (eds), Stich and His Critics, Philosophers and Their
Critics, Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 30–45. (Cited on page 106.)
Goldman, A.: 2008, Reliabilism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
(Cited on pages 181 and 185.)
Goldman, A. I.: 1976/2000, Epistemology. An Anthology, Blackwell, chap-
ter What is Justified Belief?, pp. 340–353. (Cited on page 181.)
Goldman, A. I.: 1986, Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard University
Press. (Cited on page 181.)
Grice, P.: 1957, Meaning, Philosophical Review 66, 377–88. (Cited on
page 7.)
Griffiths, P. E.: 1993, Functional analysis and proper functions, British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44(3), 409–422. (Cited on page 17.)
Hume, D.: 1740/1978, A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford Clarendon
Press. (Cited on page 189.)
Jenkins, C.: n.d., Concepts, experience and modal knowledge. (Cited
on page 188.)
Karavanich, K. and Atema, J.: 1998, Individual Recognition and Memory
in Lobster Dominance, Animal Behavior 56(6), 1553–1560. (Cited on
pages 97 and 216.)
Kingsbury, J.: 2006, A Proper Understanding of Millikan, Acta Analytica
21(3), 23–40. (Cited on pages 14 and 80.)
Kment, B.: 2006, Counterfactuals and explanation, Mind 115, 261–309.
(Cited on page 170.)
Koch, C.: 1999, Biophysics of Computation, Oxford University Press. (Cited
on page 88.)
Kripke, S.: 1980, Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press. (Cited
on pages 5, 167, and 193.)
222 bibliography
Kripke, S.: 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Harvard
University Press. (Cited on page 127.)
Lansing, A.: 1999, Endurance. Shackleton’s Incredible Voyage, Basic Books.
(Cited on page 168.)
Laurence, S. and Margolis, E.: 1999, Concepts. Core Readings, The MIT
Press, chapter Concepts and Cognitive Science. (Cited on pages 135
and 139.)
Lettvin, J. e. a.: 1959, What the Frog’s Eye Tells the Frog’s Brain, Pro-
ceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers 49, 1940–1951. (Cited on
page 23.)
Lewis, D.: 1979, Counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow, Noûs
13(4), 455–476. (Cited on page 170.)
Loewer, B.: 1999, A guide to naturalizing semantics, in C. Hale,
B.; Wright (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Black-
well: Oxford, pp. 108–126. (Cited on pages 4, 106, and 142.)
Macdonald, G. and Papineau, D.: 2006, Teleosemantics, Oxford University
Press, chapter Prospects and Problems for Teleosemantics, pp. 1–22.
(Cited on page 45.)
Machery, E.: 2009, Doing Without Concepts, Oxford University Press.
(Cited on page 135.)
Mackie, P.: 1998, Identity, time, and necessity, Proceedings of the Aris-
totelian Society 98(1), 59–78. (Cited on pages 167 and 173.)
Mackie, P.: 2006, How Things Might Have Been, Oxford University Press.
(Cited on pages 167 and 174.)
Margolis, E. and Laurence, S. (eds): 1999, Concepts: Core Readings, The
MIT Press. (Cited on page 135.)
Maynard-Smith, J.: 1999, Evolutionary Genetics (2nd. Edition), Oxford
University Press. (Cited on page 158.)
Mendola, J.: 2006, Papineau on etiological teleosemantics for beliefs,
Ratio 19(3), 305–320. (Cited on page 61.)
Millikan, R.: 1984, Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories, The
MIT Press. (Cited on pages 11, 15, 30, 47, 64, 77, 78, 79, 81, 84, 85, 92,
119, 124, 125, 127, 133, 151, 169, and 199.)
Millikan, R.: 1989a, Biosemantics, The Journal of Philosophy 86, 281–297.
(Cited on page 48.)
Millikan, R.: 1989b, In Defense of Proper Functions, Philosophy of Science
56(2), 288–302. (Cited on page 48.)
Millikan, R.: 1991, Meaning in Mind. Fodor and his Critics, Blackwell,
chapter Speaking Up for Darwin, pp. 151–164. (Cited on page 46.)
Millikan, R.: 1993, White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice,
The MIT Press. Bradford Books. (Cited on pages 14, 45, 49, 127, 128,
and 129.)
bibliography 223
Millikan, R.: 1995, Pushmi-Pullyu Representations, Philosophical Perspec-
tives 9, AI, Connectionism, and Philosophical Psychology, 185–200.
(Cited on page 93.)
Millikan, R.: 1998, A Common Structure for Concepts of Individuals,
Stuffs, and Basic Kinds: More Mama, More Milk and More Mouse,
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22(1), 55–65. (Cited on pages 91, 94,
and 139.)
Millikan, R.: 2000, On Clear and Confused Ideas, Cambridge University
Press. (Cited on pages 10, 30, 65, 94, and 110.)
Millikan, R.: 2002, Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychol-
ogy and Biology, Oxford University Press, chapter Biofunctions: Two
Paradigms, pp. 113–143. (Cited on pages 15, 47, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84,
and 127.)
Millikan, R.: 2004, Varieties of Meaning, London: MIT Press. (Cited on
pages viii, 13, 46, 50, 51, 123, 124, 133, and 199.)
Millikan, R.: 2006, Useless content, in G. Macdonald and D. Papineau
(eds), Teleosemantics, Oxford University Press. (Cited on pages 131,
133, and 186.)
Millikan, R.: 2007, An Input Condition for Teleosemantics? A reply to
Shea (and Godfrey-Smith), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
75(2). (Cited on pages 12, 50, 55, and 57.)
Millikan, R.: 2009, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, chapter Biosemantics, pp. 394–406. (Cited on pages 46,
49, 69, and 199.)
Millikan, R. G.: 1990, Truth, rules, hoverflies, and the Kripke-
Wittgenstein paradox, Philosophical Review 99(3), 323–53. (Cited on
page 49.)
Millikan, R. G.: 1997, Troubles with Wagner’s reading of Millikan,
Philosophical Studies 86(1), 93–96. (Cited on page 80.)
Mossio, M., Saborido, C. and Moreno, A.: forthcoming, An organiza-
tional account of biological functions, British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science . (Cited on page 14.)
Müller, J., Eggert, A.-K. and Elsner, T.: 2003, Nestmate Recognition in
Burying Beetles: the "Breeder’s Badge" As a Cue Used by Females
to Distinguish Their Mates from Male Intruders, Behavioral Ecology
14(2), 212–220. (Cited on page 215.)
Neander, K.: 1991, Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Ana-
lyst’s Defence, Philosophy of Science 58, 168–184. (Cited on pages 14
and 44.)
Neander, K.: 1995, Misrepresenting & Malfunctioning, Philosophical
Studies 79, 109–141. (Cited on pages 15, 19, 22, 49, and 67.)
Papineau, D.: 1987, Reality and Representation, Basil Blackwell. (Cited on
pages 58 and 77.)
Papineau, D.: 1993, Philosophical Naturalism, Basil Blackwell. (Cited on
pages 58, 60, and 61.)
224 bibliography
Papineau, D.: 1998, Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 76(1), 1–14. (Cited on pages 58, 59, and 60.)
Papineau, D.: 2001, The Status of Teleosemantics, or How to Stop Worry-
ing About Swampman, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79(2), 279–89.
(Cited on page 62.)
Papineau, D.: 2006, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Ox-
ford: OUP, chapter Naturalist Theories of Meaning, pp. 175–188.
(Cited on pages 4 and 77.)
Papineau, D.: 2007, Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge.
New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press,
chapter Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts, pp. 111–144. (Cited
on pages 149 and 150.)
Parfit, D.: 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Cited on page 92.)
Peacocke, C.: 1992, A Study of Concepts, The MIT Press. (Cited on
pages 134 and 186.)
Peacocke, C.: 1999, Being Known, Oxford University Press. (Cited on
page 151.)
Peacocke, C.: 2008, Truly Understood, Oxford University Press. (Cited
on page 140.)
Pérez-Otero, M.: 1997, La concepción ramificacionista de la modalidad,
Contextos XV, 135–152. (Cited on pages 167 and 173.)
Pietroski, P.: 1992, Intentionality and Teleological Error, Pacific Philosoph-
ical Quarterly 73, 267–282. (Cited on page 68.)
Preston, B.: 1998, Why Is a Wing Like a Spoon? A Pluralist Theory of
Function, The Journal of Philosophy 95(5), 215–254. (Cited on page 85.)
Price, C.: 1998, Determinate Functions, Noûs 32(1), 54–75. (Cited on
pages 15, 22, 24, 42, 43, and 44.)
Putnam, H.: 1975, The meaning of ’meaning’, Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science 7, 131–193. (Cited on page 5.)
Quine, W. V. O.: 1953, Two dogmas of empiricism, From a Logical Point
of View, Harvard University Press. (Cited on page 136.)
Quine, W. V. O.: 1960, Word & Object, The MIT Press. (Cited on page 91.)
Revonsuo, A.: 2009, The binding problem, The Oxford Companion to Con-
sciousness, Oxford University Press, pp. 101–105. (Cited on page 163.)
Richards, R.: 2008, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology, Oxford
University Press, chapter Species and Taxonomy, pp. 161–188. (Cited
on page 30.)
Roca-Royes, S.: forth., Conceivability and de re modal knowledge, Noûs
. (Cited on page 195.)
Rowlands, M.: 1997, Teleological Semantics, Mind 106(422), 279–303.
(Cited on pages 19 and 22.)
bibliography 225
Rupert, R.: 1999, Mental Representations and Millikan’s Theory of
Intentional Content: Does Biology Chase Causality?, The Southern
Journal of Philosophy 37(3), 113–140. (Cited on page 134.)
Rupert, R. D.: 2008, Causal theories of mental content, Philosophy Com-
pass 3, 353–380. (Cited on pages viii, 4, and 9.)
Ryder, D.: 2004, Sinbad neurosemantics: A theory of mental represen-
tation, Mind & Language 19(2), 211–240. (Cited on pages viii, 24, 30,
and 142.)
Ryder, D.: 2006, On thinking of kinds, in G. Macdonald and D. Papineau
(eds), Teleosemantics, Oxford University Press, pp. 1–22. (Cited on
page 142.)
Sauchelli: forthcoming, Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual
conditionals: Lewis versus williamson on modal knowledge, Synthese
. (Cited on page 169.)
Schibler, F. and Manser, M.: 2007, The Irrelevance of Individual Discrim-
ination in Meerkat Alarm Calls, Animal Behaviour 74(5), 1259–1268.
(Cited on page 218.)
Schiffer, S.: 1996, Contextualist solutions to scepticism, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 96, 317–333. (Cited on page 53.)
Schroeder, T.: 2004, New norms for teleosemantics, in H. Clapin (ed.),
Representation in Mind, Elsevier. (Cited on page 14.)
Searle, J.: 1958, Proper names, Mind 67, 166–173. (Cited on page 137.)
Shea, N.: 2004, On Millikan, Wadsworth. (Cited on page 80.)
Shea, N.: 2007, Consumers Need Information: Supplementing Teleose-
mantics with an Input Condition, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 75(2), 404–435. (Cited on pages viii, 12, 39, 50, 54, 56, and 57.)
Sherman, P., Reeve, H. and Pfennig, D.: 1997, Behavioural Ecology, 4th Edi-
tion, Oxford: Blackwell Science, chapter Recognition Systems, pp. 69–
96. (Cited on page 215.)
Sherry, R. A. and Galen, C.: 1998, The mechanism of floral heliotropism
in the snow buttercup, Plant, Cell and Environment 21, 983–993. (Cited
on page 93.)
Shoemaker, S.: 1998, Causal and Metaphysical Necessity, Pacific Philo-
sophical Quarterly 79, 59–77. (Cited on pages 66 and 173.)
Stampe, D.: 1977, Towards a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation,
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2, 42–63. (Cited on pages 6, 7, 13, and 24.)
Steiger, S. and Müller, J.: 2008, ’True’ and ’Untrue’ Individual Recogni-
tion: Suggestion of a Less Restrictive Definition, Trends in Ecology and
Evolution 23(7), 355. (Cited on page 215.)
Sterelny, K.: 1990, The Representational Theory of Mind: An Introduction,
Oxford University Press. (Cited on pages 9 and 67.)
Stuart-Fox, D. and Moussalli, A.: 2008, Selection for social signalling
drives the evolution of chameleon colour change, PLoS Biology
6(1), e25. (Cited on page 78.)
226 bibliography
Szabó, Z.: 2008, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008
edition), chapter Compositionality.
URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/compositionality/
(Cited on page 117.)
Tibbetts, E. and Dale, J.: 2008, Individual Recognition: It is Good to be
Different, Trends in Ecology and Evolution 22(10), 529–537. (Cited on
pages 215 and 216.)
Tibbetts, E., Sheehan, M. and Dale, J.: 2008, A Testable Definition of
Individual Recognition, Trends in Ecology and Evolution 23(7), 356.
(Cited on pages 215, 216, and 218.)
Tye, M.: 2000, Consciousness, Color and Content, The MIT Press. Bradford
Books. (Cited on page 68.)
Van Inwagen, P.: 1998, Modal Epistemology, Philosophical Studies 92, 67–
84. (Cited on pages 168, 191, and 203.)
Weiner, M. and Belnap, N.: 2006, How causal probabilities may fit into
our objectively indeterministic world, Synthese 149, 1–36. (Cited on
page 13.)
Williamson, T.: 1996, Knowing and asserting, Philosophical Review
105(4), 489–523. (Cited on page 103.)
Williamson, T.: 2000, Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford University Press.
(Cited on pages 103 and 180.)
Williamson, T.: 2008, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Wiley-Blackwell.
(Cited on page 170.)
Wilson, R., Barker, M. and Brigandt, I.: forthcoming, When Traditional
Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds, Philosophical Topics 35(1-
2). (Cited on pages 30 and 94.)
Wittgenstein, L.: 1953/1973, Philosophical Investigations, Prentice Hall.
(Cited on page 5.)
Worley, S.: 2003, Conceivability, Possibility, and Physicalism, Analysis
63, 15–23. (Cited on page 195.)
Wright, L.: 1973/1994, Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology, The
MIT Press. Bradford Books, chapter Functions, pp. 27–48. (Cited on
page 14.)
Yablo, S.: 1993, Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 53(1), 1–42. (Cited on pages 149, 188, 189,
and 191.)
Zawidzki, T.: 2003, Mythological Content: A Problem for Millikan’s
Teleosemantics, Philosophical Psychology . (Cited on page 106.)





































Interlocking - conc, 120





















Selection from Fitness Contribu-
tion, 15













syn - Causal Profile, 164
synind - Causal Profile, 166





This thesis was typeset in LYX, available from www.lyx.org. The ty-
pographic style is available for LATEX via CTAN as “classicthesis”. A
classicthesis port for LYX is available from www.soundsorange.net.
Some figures were created using the Biggles module for Python
(biggles.sourceforge.net), others using SciLab (www.scilab.org) and the
rest using OpenOffice (www.openoffice.org).
Final Version as of 4th May 2010 at 16:21.
